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FOREWORD
 
This report summarizes a portion of the results of a research
 
project conducted by the Nuclear Waste Mlanagement Project of the Jet Propulsion
 
Laboratory for the California Energy Resources Conservation and Development
 
Commission. The purpose of this report was to examine the technical status
 
of the United States' principal programs for the management and disposal
 
of high-level radioactive waste. Two waste forms were included in the analysis:
 
* Solidified High-level Waste
 
* Spent Fuel Rods
 
This study was performed by a group drawn from the Jet Propulsion
 
Laboratory, the campus of the California Institute of Technology, and the
 
Scripps Institution of Oceanography. The duration of the study was
 
approximately seven months, and involved three man-years of effort.
 
The work was funded under California ERCDC Standard Agreement
 
No. 154-002. The Project Coordinator was Dr. James A. Walker, Deputy
 
Executive Director, California Energy Resources Conservation and Development
 
Commission.
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ABSTRACT 
Analyses were made of the technical status of the "old U.S.
 
mainline program" for high-level radioactive nuclear waste management, and
 
the newly-developing program for disposal of unreprocessed spent fuel. The
 
method of long-term containment for both of these waste forms is considered
 
to be deep geologic isolation in bedded salt. This analysis was designed
 
to assist the members and staff of the California Energy Resources Conservation
 
and Development Commission in carrying out the mandate of California Assembly
 
Bill AB 2822. Each major component of'both waste management systems is analyzed
 
in terms of its Scientific Feasibility, Technical Achievability and Engineering
 
Achievability. The resulting matrix leads to a systematic identification
 
of major unresolved technical or scientific questions and/or "gaps" in these
 
programs.
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SECTION 1 
SUMMARY
 
This report analyzes the technical status of the "old U.S.
 
mainline program" for high-level radioactive nuclear waste management,
 
plus the newly-developing program for disposal of unreprocessed spent
 
fuel. The method of long-term containment for both of these waste
 
forms is considered to be deep geologic isolation in bedded salt. This
 
analysis is designed to assist the members and staff of the California
 
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission in carrying out
 
the mandate of AB 2822. Each major component of both waste management
 
systems is analyzed in terms of its Scientific Feasibility, Technical
 
Achievability and Engineering Achievability. The resulting matrix leads
 
to a systematic identification of major unresolved technical or scientific
 
questions and/or "gaps" in these programs, in the context of paragraphs
 
(a)and (c)of Section 25524.2 (AB 2822) of the California Public Resources
 
Code (see Section 2).
 
To summarize the findings of this analysis, the following
 
conclusions and observations ippear to be the most important.
 
"OLD MAINLINE HLW" PROGRAM
 
Interim storage and containment of liquid waste has reached
 
the stage of Engineering Achievability. Since a "hot" pilot plant is
 
planned for 1978, spray calcination and in-can melting prior to vitri­
fication is approaching Engineering Achievability. A level of waste
 
oxides of 23 wt.% has been selected based on considerations of processing
 
factors, leachability, and economic factors. However, the ability
 
of the borosilicate glass to retain the waste's radionuclides is influenced
 
by the response of the glass to the radioactive, thermal, mechanical,
 
and chemical properties of the waste. The individual effects of each
 
waste property have been investigated and detrimental impacts on the
 
glass have been observed. Continued investigations are required in
 
order to fully understand the combined effects that the waste's properties
 
could produce on the glass. The actual amount of devitrification from
 
the combined effects must be determined as well as the magnitude of
 
the other factors which influence the potential leaching rate of the
 
radionuclides from the glass. Further studies are planned to investigate
 
the reference glass as well as non-reference glass forms in greater
 
detail. Hence, the technical achievability of vitrification with commercial
 
high-level waste is in the process of being demonstrated. A "hot"
 
pilot plant incorporating spray calcination, in-can melting and vitrification
 
is planned for 1978. Hence, some components of the vitrification system
 
are approaching engineering achievability.
 
I-I
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DISPOSITION OF UNREPROCESSED SPENT FUEL
 
For unprocessed spent fuel management, the major components
 
analyzed are (1) Interim storage in existing spent fuel pools at reactor
 
sites, including re-racking to significantly increase storage capacity;
 
(2) Interim storage in independent on-site or off-site spent fuel pools;
 
(3) Interini (20-30 years) dry storage of spent fuel in an engineered
 
surface or shallow sub-surface retrievable facility (SURFF).
 
By using more accurate criticality codes and fixed "poisons." 
in the racks, new high-density spent fuel storage racks have been 
designed and constructed. As a result, re-racking is flow feasible 
to increase the storage capacity of an existing reactor pool from 1 1/3 
or 1 2/3 reactor cores up to 4 cores. Allowing for a full-core reserve, 
this expansion would permit up to 9 years of storage capacity for the. 
storage of spent fuel for a single reactor.. As of July 1, 1977, 16 
nuclear reactors had obtained NRC approval for re-racking. If NRQ. .
 
approves all 18 pending requests for re-racking, and if intra-utility
 
and inter-utility transfers are permitted were necessary, a net additional
 
storage capacity of 8,200 MTU would be available for future discharge.
 
This is the equivalent of 6 years cumulative discharge for all 63 existing
 
reactors operating at a 70% load factor.
 
If the decision to reprocess spent fuel is deferred indefinitely,
 
the utilities will be faced with some difficult choices in the next few
 
years: (I) Provide additional independent on-site spent fuel pool storage;
 
(2) Join in a private consortium to construct independent off-site spent
 
fuel pool storage, or contract with potential builders and operators
 
of such facilities (such as Exxon, for example); (3). Declare the spent
 
fuel as "waste" and call upon the Federal government to provide storage.
 
These decisions will be influenced strongly by economic factors such as
 
storage costs and the estimated value of the spent fuel, should processing
 
be approved at some future date. It is conceivable that the Federal
 
government will have to assume responsibility for construction and
 
operation of interim off-site spent fuel storage facilities as insurance
 
against the possibility of unforeseen delays in the 1985 operational
 
schedule for the Federal repository in bedded salt. This decision
 
by the Federal government may also be influenced strongly by the need
 
to provide storage capability for foreign reactors operating on enriched
 
uranium fuel provided by the United States.
 
In addition to these economic and international political
 
factors, there are several important technical factors to be considered
 
in designing a spent- fuel storage facility so as to minimize radiation
 
hazards to the public: (1) release of direct radiation from the irradiated
 
fuel; (2) liquid release to the environs from either an excessive storage basii
 
leak or a low-activity storage vault leak; (3) airborne release from a
 
fuel cladding rupture or from a cooler leak. Solutions'to all of these
 
technical problem areas have reached the stage of Engineering Achievability.
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GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL OF ENCAPSULATED HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
 
AND UNREPROCESSED SPENT FUEL IN BEDDED SALT
 
The experiments conducted in Project Salt Vault demonstrated
 
that the technical and engineering problems associated with (1) The
 
safe handling of radioactive materials in an underground environment;
 
(2) The behavior of the bedded salt in response to the radioactivity
 
and decay heat emitted by the encapsulated waste (or spent fuel); (3)
 
The structural design of the underground repository, are all solvable
 
with currently available technology.
 
The first major issue is the duration of pre-storage or
 
"aging" before emplacement in the repository. However, our findings
 
show that if the pre-storage time is 10 years, the maximum temperature
 
rise at the canister wall is well below the level at which any significant
 
difficulties are expected because of brine migration or because of
 
salt decrepitation.
 
A second major issue is the "decay heat" rate per metric
 
ton of uranium. This "decay heat" rate for spent fuel is much larger
 
than for high-level waste in the periods 103-105 years after discharge
 
from the reactor. In order to match the integrated heat load for HLW
 
over the time interval 10-1o4 years, the areal power density for the
 
spent fuel in the disposal layer in kw/acre must be about 1/5 that
 
for HLW (20 kw/acre vs 100 kw/acre). The number of canisters required
 
for spent fuel is therefore about 75 per GW(e)-year compared to 15 for
 
HLW.
 
At the present time long-term repository integrity is an
 
unresolved issue, and is judged to be in the scientific feasibility
 
stage. The weakest links are in the site evaluation and selection
 
processes as follows:
 
(1) 	 Specification of hydrogeological criteria necessary to
 
ensure site stability, including seismic criteria
 
(2) 	 Understanding, measurement, and modeling of the current
 
ground water regime in any given area of interest
 
(3) 	 Extrapolation of that ground water regime up to one
 
million years into the future
 
(4) 	 Understanding of geospheric transport mechanisms, and
 
especially the sorption factors for the long-lived
 
radionuclides in the actual geophysical environment.
 
Experience to date with the sites at Lyons, Kansas; Asse,
 
West Germany; and Carlsbad, New Mexico, show that a number of "scenarios"
 
can be constructed in which a connection between the repository and
 
the biosphere is established. The most important geospheric transport
 
mechanism is the intrusion of flowing ground water. The results of
 
a simplified one-dimensional calculation show that: (1) Without sorption,
 
even an excellent confining geologic formation only introduces a delay
 
in the transport of the radionuclide to the environment; it does not
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retain it; (2) With a high degree of sorption even a relatively poor
 
geologic'formation retains 239Pu (for example) for a sufficiently long

time so that radioactive decay prevents it from reaching the environment.
 
These results emphasize the necessity for a comprehensive program of
 
laboratory and field studies on the interactions of radionuclides with
 
both individual minerals and rocks.
 
The (OWI) has the responsibility for commissioning and
 
evaluating a set of studies and experiments designed to answer.some.of
 
these questions. Their studies to date include: (1) Identification
 
of salt formations of interest; (2) Reconnaissance studies; (3) Area
 
studies. This work has not yet progressed to the next levels of detailed
 
confirmation studies and in-situ tests. In addition, ERDA and NRC have
 
not developed design criteria, site suitability criteria, and site
 
selection criteria. Thus extrapolation of existing l-to--ation to predict! 
Engineering Achievabililty is very difficult. 
At the present time the Scientific Feasibility of deep

geologic disposal of encapsulated high-level nuclear waste and unreprocessed
 
spent fuel in bedded salt has not yet been proven. There is no scientific
 
reason, however, to anticipate that existing, planned and recommended
 
work will not result in a scientific data base that will permit site
 
selection and design, although the proposed time schedule may be too
 
optimistic. During the 10-20 year period of testing, monitoring, data
 
analysis, and projections, the geologic repository will necessarily
 
be operated in a retrievable mode. This procedure has two important
 
favorable by-products: (1) By storing spent fuel in the repository,
 
the pressure for continual expansion of on-site or independent off­
site spent fuel pool capacity is considerably reduced, if not eliminated,
 
and the need for SURFF may also be eliminated; (2) If a decision to
 
proceed with reprocessing should be made during this period, spent

fuel could be retrieved and transported to an off-site or to an adjacent

fuel reprocessing plant. The solidified high-level waste discharged 
from the FRP could be encapsulated in canisters designed to fit into 
the storage vaults and emplacements previously occupied by the spent
fuel canisters. The discussion of major design parameters for the 
repository in fection 6.4.31shows that such a plan is well within the 
capabilities of current technology. 
1-4
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SECTION 2
 
INTRODUCTION
 
The purpose of this report is to analyze the technical status
 
of both high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel management systems for
 
commercial nuclear reactors. This analysis is designed to assist the members
 
and staff of the California Energy Resources Conservation and Development
 
Commission in carrying out the tasks mandated by AB #2822, as passed'by the
 
California State Legislature and signed into law by the Governor in 1976.
 
The complete assembly bill is presented in Appendix D. By this act Section
 
25524.2 is added to the Public Resources Code (relating to energy conser­
vation); the portions of Section 25524.2 especially relevant to this report
 
are as follows:
 
"No 	nuclear fission thermal power plant, including any to
 
which the provisions of this chapter* do not otherwise apply,
 
but 	excepting those exempted herein, shall be permitted land
 
use 	in the state, or where applicable, be certified by the
 
commission** until both conditions (a) and (b)*** have been met."
 
"(a) The Commission finds that there has been developed
 
and that the United States through its authorized agency
 
has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or
 
means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste."
 
Later on in this Section 25524.2 of the California Public
 
Resources Code, paragraph (c)states that "'technology or means for the
 
disposal of high-level nuclear waste' means a method for the permanent and
 
terminal disposition of high-level nuclear waste. It shall not necessarily
 
require that facilities for the application of such technology and/or means
 
be available at the time the commission makes its findings. Such disposition
 
shall not necessarily preclude the possibility of an approved process for
 
retrieval of such waste."
 
Prior to the Presidential decision of April 7, 1977 to defer
 
reprocessing indefinitely, the National Waste Management plan dealt almost
 
exclusively with the high-level nuclear wastes discharged from fuel repro­
cessing plants (including cladding hulls and transuranic (TRU) wastes). The
 
major components of this plan which we refer to as the "old mainline HLW
 
program" are: (1) liquid waste storage and containment; (2)solidification
 
of waste by means of spray calcination and in-can melting; (3)immobilization
 
of calcined waste in borosilicate glass (vitrification); (4)encapsulation
 
* Chapter 196
 
** ERCDC
 
* 	 Condition (b)requires that the commission report its findings
 
and the reasons therefore pursuant to condition (a)to the State
 
Legislature. It also defines the roles of the Legislature and the
 
Commission after these findings have been submitted.
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of waste-glass composite; (5) deep geologic emplacement of canisters in
 
bedded salt for permanent containment and isolation from the biosphere.
 
In response to President Carter's decision, ERDA is in the
 
process of developing a new program for the storage, packaging and terminal
 
disposal of spent fuel. These two programs are indicated in Figure 2-1.
 
Early on it was decided to limit the present analysis to the "old mainline
 
HLW program", plus the newly-developing program for disposal of spent fuel.
 
Other options are under development (for example, metal matrix rather than
 
borosilicate glass encapsulation of solidified high-level waste; geological
 
emplacement in granite rather than in deep salt beds), but they are not
 
nearly as far along as the components of the "mainline" program. Besides,
 
the National Energy Planl (especially Pp.72-73), and recent statements by
 
ERDA representatives2 make it quite clear that heavy emphasis will be placed
 
on the newly developing program for spent fuel in an attempt to meet the
 
target date of 1985 for a Federal repository in bedded salt, operating
 
(at first) in a retrievable mode.
 
A brief and simple account of the origin, nature and disposal
 
options for high level waste contained in Arp6ndix A is designed
 
to give the non-specialist reader an introduction to the present state
 
of high level nuclear waste management.
 
In order to respond to the directives of paragraphs (a) and (c)
 
of Section 25524.2 (AB 2822) one must first define what is meant by "demon­
strated technology or means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste."
 
HIGH-LEVEL 
WASTE DISPOSAL 
PROGRAMS 
HIGH LEVEL 
REPROCESSINGSPENT FUEL WASTE DISPOSAL 
WASTE' PROGRAMDISPOSAL 
PROGRAM 
-"OLD MAINLINE 
PROGRAM" 
* IF SPENT FUEL ISDECLARED TO BEWASTE. 
Figure 2-1. Major U.S. High Level Waste Disposal Program
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Many definitions of these terms are possible. Section 3 of this report
 
discusses the terminology and methodology used in the present analysis.
 
Each major component of both waste management systems is analyzed in terms
 
of its Scientific Feasibility, Technical Achievability and Engineering
 
Achievability. The resulting matrix analysis leads to a systematic ideniti­
fication of major unresolved technical or scientific questions and/or "gaps"
 
in the programs, taking into account the important qualifications contained
 
in paragraph (c) of Section 25524.2*.
 
Before applying the methodology developed in Section 3 to the
 
systems for HLW and spent fuel management, it is useful to examine the
 
dimensions of the nuclear waste problem. Section 4 specifies the origin and
 
nature of both HLW from a reprocessing plant and spent fuel, and contains
 
projections of the annual and cumulative discharge from light-water nuclear
 
reactors during the period 1976-2000. Two projections are given: (1) the
 
1976 ERDA projection; (2) a new "low" ORNL projection based on the slower­
than-planned build-up of LWR's and the Presidential decision to postpone
 
spent fuel reporcessing in the U.S. indefinitely. This projection shows
 
a nuclear generating capacity of 300 GW(e) by the year 2000.
 
Section 5 examines the technological status of the major com­
ponents of the "old mainline" HLW program. Section 6 performs a similar
 
explanation of the newly developing program for storage and disposal
 
of unreprocessed spent fuel. For unreprocessed spent fuel management
 
the major components analyzed are (1) interim storage in existing spent
 
fuel pools at reactor sites, including re-racking to significantly
 
increase storage capacity; (2) interim storage in independent on-site
 
or off-site spent fuel pools; (3) interim (10-20 years) dry storage
 
.of spent fuel in an engineered surface or shallow sub-surface retrievable
 
facility (SURFF); (4) packaging of spent fuel bundles or assemblies
 
in suitable containers and emplacement of these canisters in a Federal
 
repository in bedded salt for retrievable disposition for a period
 
of time, followed by terminal disposition. Sections 5 and 6 apply
 
the methodology of Section 3 to each major subcomponent and component
 
of the mainline programs for HLW and spent fuel, respectively. In
 
each case the analysis includes a description of the process, its technical
 
and institutional development history, its program status and plans,
 
and a critical discussion of the major unresolved questions concerning
 
Scientific Feasibility, Technical Achievability, and Engineering Achievability.
 
In Section 7 the generic or system problems are investigated,
 
including transportation and logistics, interim storage capacity, ownership
 
*The question of "approval" by "the U.S. through its authorized agency" is
 
difficult and complex. The authors are well aware of the strong interaction
 
between criteria and regulations imposed by environmental, economic and
 
social pressures, and the technology needed to meet these requirements.
 
Since this "feedback loop" is examined in Reference 2-3, the present
 
report is purposely limited to the analysis of technologies reportedly
 
capable of meeting almost any "reasonable" criteria and regulations.
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of HLW or spent fuel, allocation of charges for interim storage, influence
 
of licensing procedures, and time schedules for the mainline program.
 
Section 8 contains the conclusions reached by the authors
 
regarding the status of technology "for the permanent and terminal
 
disposition of high-level nuclear waste" (and/or spent fuel), in the
 
context of paragraphs (a)and (a)of Section 25524.2 (AB 2822). Unresolved
 
technical component and overall systems questions are identified, several
 
suggestions are offered as to the methods.that could be used to resolve
 
these questions, and some observations are made about the time schedule
 
of the present programs.
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SECTION 3
 
METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING TECHNOLOGY STATUS
 
The purpose of this Section is to define the terminology,
 
information sources, and the methodology used to analyze the present
 
status of technology for commercial high level waste management. The
 
radioactive waste management system with which we are concerned comprises
 
the whole set of considerations, plans and implementation methods necessary
 
to accomplish a perceived need of society, i.e., the safe, permanent
 
disposal of high-level radioactive waste and/or spent fuel. The "system"
 
is the aggregate of the scientific, technical and engineering capability,
 
working with established governmental regulatory agencies, to assure
 
continuity of management operations with "acceptable" present and future
 
impacts on society. Some insight into the factors affecting the complete
 
system can be obtained by examining the major system components individually.
 
Of course, the understanding of these components must be integrated in
 
order to understand their interaction with the overall system.
 
TERMINOLOGY
 
A very important subset of the overall HLW management system
 
is the technology necessary to construct the necessary facilities for the
 
safe manipulation and ultimate disposal of these extremely toxic
 
materials. In the present analysis, we are concerned with developing an
 
objective approach to characterize the developmental status of HLW
 
disposal technology. In order to do this, it is first necessary to point
 
out the variety of meanings given to the word "technology", and then to
 
adopt an operational definition for this report. Berenano (Reference 3-1)
 
outlines a spectrum of meanings of "technology".
 
* 	 In popular conversation "technology frequently pertains 
to machines and their use." 
* 	 "The application of knowledge to practical purposes." 
(Reference 3-2) 
* 	 "The organization of knowledge for practical purposes."
 
(Reference 3-3)
 
* 	 "a system of interrelated innovation, some technical
 
and some social, which comprise some coherent nexus
 
pertaining to the systematic manipulation of the
 
environment." (Reference 3-4)
 
a 	 "the totality of the means employed by a people to
 
provide itself with the objects of material culture."
 
(Reference 3-2)
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* 	 "systems of rationalized control over large groups of 
men, events, and machines by small groups of technically 
skilled men operating through organizational hierarchy" 
(Reference 3-5). 
Hence, there is a very wide range of possible definitions for
 
"technology." This range complicates the interpretation of the term
 
"technology" as used in AB 2822. Some clarifying language is provided
 
by the California Legislature (Reference 3-6).
 
"As used in this section, 'technology or means for
 
the disposal of high-level nuclear waste' means a
 
method for the permanent and terminal disposition
 
of high-level nuclear waste. It shall not necessarily
 
require that facilities for the application of such
 
technology and/or means be available at the time
 
the commission makes its findings. Such disposition
 
shall 	not necessarily preclude the possibility of
 
an approved process for retrieval of such waste."
 
In general, technology incorporates accepted or demonstrated
 
engineering knowledge and experience. This engineering knowledge, in turn,
 
is based on a scientific background which is broadly accepted by the scien­
tific community. In this report the term "technology" is used to mean tools,
 
machines, and basic and applied knowledge necessary for safe, permanent
 
disposal of high level waste. However, since technology is intended for use-,
 
its status can be impacted by a change in the manner that society judges it,
 
for example by changing a regulation. In this report the detailed regulatory
 
requirements are treated as a set of external constraints on the high level
 
nuclear waste management technology. The major reason for not formally
 
including a complete set of regulatory requirements in the evaluation of the
 
status of the high level waste management technology is that much of the
 
applicable EPA & NRC criteria and standards are still being developed. If
 
all of these standards and criteria were available during our analysis, they
 
would have been explicitly included in the evaluation of the overall system.
 
A complete technological system frequently incorporates the use
 
of many component technologies. For example, an airplane is composed of
 
airframe, propulsion system, avionics, etc. Each of these components may
 
be the result of specific technologies. The technological components of
 
a system are the individual sub-features or steps of a technology which are
 
usually chosen to be, as nearly as possible, self-contained-steps or unit
 
operations. In the airplane example, once the overall system requirements
 
have been formulated, and the individual performance and interface require­
ments for the system components, i.e. airframe, propulsion system etc., have
 
been specified, the individual components can be developed in relative inde­
pendence of one another. Hence it is desirable that such components have a
 
minimum interaction with the satisfactory operation of other components. If
 
a major change occurs in the attainable performance of one of the system
 
components, e.g., the propulsion system, then the performance and interface
 
requirements of the other system components must be reexamined. In many
 
cases modifications must be made to the system component requirements in
 
order to optimally adjust the overall system to the change in the performance
 
of the propulsion system. It should be noted that if the impact of the
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change in the attainable performance of a system component is too large, it
 
may not be possible to continue the project viably within the given cost,
 
schedule & performance constraints. However, in many cases it is possible
 
to switch from one form of component technology to another. In the case of
 
HLW management, for example, if the encapsulation of calcined HLW in boro­
silicate glass should prove to be unsatisfactory, a new technology component
 
such as a "metal matrix" would have to be developed, with in principle mini­
mum impact on the packaging, transportation and disposal of the waste.
 
STAGES OF TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
 
The sequence of the development of a technology often begins
 
with an intuitive design concept following an analogy in what is thought
 
to be an allied field. Although it is useful to consider that technology
 
progresses sequentially through a number of stages of maturation, it should
 
be kept in mind that in actual programs, the stages may overlap. The amount
 
of overlap between the various developmental stages often depends on the
 
amount of programmatic risk that the program management chooses to take.
 
Frequently, the evaluation of programmatic risk is done on a "seat of the
 
pants basis" rather than through use of a more quantative "decision analy­
sis" methodology. The basis for judgment of the "success" of the program
 
management is quite often its "batting average." The level of acceptable
 
batting average depends on the norms for a given managerial environment.
 
In the case of permanent disposal of high level nuclear waste it is certainly
 
desirable to reduce the health and safety component of risk to an extremely
 
low level. Hence, the risks associated with large amounts of overlap among
 
the technological stages of the components of the HLW disposal program should
 
be ones involving only timing and economics, and not health and safety.
 
In the method of technology status evaluation here presented,
 
the following principal stages are used to express the status of the
 
technology for each of the major components of a technology.
 
* Scientific Feasibility Stage
 
* Technical Achievability Stage
 
* Engineering Achievability Stage
 
Some features which identify these three main stages of
 
technology development are given in Table 3-1.
 
In the first stage of orderly reconstruction of a technology, it
 
is recognized that there must be a discovery or a recognition of a poten­
tially useful phenomenon or interacting set of phenomena. This is often
 
based on the recognition of opportunity or need, usually supported by theory.
 
In the next stage of development of Scientific Feasibility the discovery is
 
shown to be compatible with recognized physical laws, and an adequate data
 
base either exists or can be constructed. Such a data base, made by exper­
imentation and objectively evaluated, going into depth and detail beyond that
 
which is needed to verify the theory, is absolutely essential in order to be
 
able to develop a sound design concept. The development of a scientifically
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feasible design concept, albeit not bounded by economics or elegance, is
 
shown in Table 3-1 as the fourth feature of the Scientific Feasibility stage
 
of technology development.
 
Following the assurance that a design concept is scientifically
 
feasible, the next step is to determine if it is technically achievable.
 
Referring again to Table 3-1, we have used the following five features to
 
characterize this stage: embodiment of design concept; search for compatible
 
materials for operation; reference design on laboratory scale for proof of
 
concept; development of prototype; design and execution of simulation tests.
 
The proposed design concept needs to be particularized so that
 
the basic interaction of its phenomenological components can be demonstrated.
 
This idea is expressed as "Embodiment of Design Concept" wherein there can be
 
a demonstration of a specific design suggested in the Scientific Feasibility
 
stage. The specific design at this point is still a demonstration of a
 
phenomenon rather than an application. The next steps in Technical Achiev­
ability are to insure the existence of compatible materials for operation,
 
and the preparation of a reference design on a laboratory scale as a proof
 
of concept. Both of these steps are not usually bounded stringently by
 
economics or considerations such as durability. When these steps have been
 
taken, it is appropriate to develop a prototype, or a number of isolated
 
subprototypes of individual aspects of the design concept. Next, using the
 
prototype, it is necessary to devise and carry out simulation tests. These
 
are often based on such theory as existed in Scientific Feasibility work.
 
These simulation tests sometimes lead to extension of theory, whereupon the
 
whole procedure to this point may be iterated for improvement. Indeed, at
 
any point in either the Technical Achievability stage or the Engineering
 
Achievability stage there may be occasion to cause a feedback and iteration
 
into the Scientific Feasibility stage for further work.
 
When simulation and tests of prototypes or sub-prototypes have
 
been carried out, it is appropriate to investigate Engineering Achievability.
 
However, it should be recalled that in many programs, some aspects of
 
Engineering Achievability may be carried out in parallel with the work on
 
Technical Achievability. In a particular developmental program the degree
 
of overlap between these stages is determined by features such as the
 
"program sense of urgency," resources, and acceptable risks. The entries
 
shown in Table 3-1 under "Engineering Achievability" begin with "Laboratory
 
Demonstration of Integrated System Operation." Such laboratory demonstrations
 
may be performed on a small or breadboard scale, but should include all
 
elements of the system if this is feasible. A key point in progressing 
through the steps of Engineering Achievability is maintainability.
 
Maintainability means that each element of the system, and the system itself,
 
operates in accordance with design specifications, with no more than a cer­
tain maximum acceptable amount of "down-time", and with attendant costs for
 
repairs and replacements. The requirements for maintainability become more
 
stringent through the remaining steps of the Engineering Achievability stage.
 
These steps comprise Pilot Plant, Industrial Scale or Field Trial, and
 
Operating Plant operations. Economic requirements become increasingly
 
stringent as either the system or the sub-system progresses through these
 
last three stages.
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Table 3-1. Features of Stages of Technology Development
 
1. Scientific Feasibility
 
Scientific suggestion or discovery, usually supported by
 
theory
 
Compatibility with recognized physical laws
 
Existence or construction of adequate data base
 
Proposal of 	design concept
 
2. Technical Achievability
 
Embodiment 	of design concept
 
Search for 	compatible materials for operation
 
Reference design on laboratory scale for proof of concept
 
Development 	of prototype
 
Design and 	execution of simulation tests
 
3. 	 Engineering Achievability 
Laboratory demonstration of integrated system operation 
Maintainability 
Pilot plant 
Industrial scale or field trial 
Operating plant 
The operating plant demonstration is deemed satisfactory
 
when it fulfills the system goals more economically than could be done
 
by alternative technologies. This economics analysis includes consider­
ation both of capital costs and of operational and maintenance costs.
 
In today's environment increasing emphasis is being given to the concept
 
of energy effectivenesses. By "energy effective" one means, for example,
 
that the energy expended in the entire nuclear waste management system
 
should be only a small fraction of the net energy output of the reactor
 
system over its lifetime.
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The course of development of the Engineering Achievability of a
 
technology is often affected by an iterative improvement process similar to
 
that described in Technical Achievability. Problems arising ir the steps of
 
engineering achievement may lead to a revision of the technologies develop­
mental status to the Technical Achievability stage or in some extreme cases
 
to the scientific feasibility stage. This type of unsuspected major problem
 
has impacted several major developmental programs such as the F-111 & Apollo,
 
even though very extensive analysis had been performed.
 
3.3 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
 
A method for analyzing Technology Status requires that the
 
purpose of the system in which the technology applies be clearly
 
delineated. Such purposes are stated, first in general terms, such as
 
"contain and isolate nuclear waste from the biosphere," "ensure public
 
health and safety," "preserve the environment." The intent of these
 
statements is that the system should meet societal needs while imparting
 
only an acceptably small adverse impact on other co-existing systems. At
 
the second stage these purposes are translated into technical requirements
 
of the system, and are given in more specific terms. In the case of
 
nuclear waste management, they may be grouped into requirements related
 
specifically to the individual system options under consideration. In
 
this report, two systems are examined--management of high level radioactive
 
waste 	from reprocessed spent fuel rods, and management of unreprocessed
 
spent 	fuel rods. These two systems have some markedly different features,
 
examples of which are listed below:
 
(1) 	 The requirements for handling, transportation and the
 
mechanics of emplacement of high-level waste call
 
for solidification, immobilization, and encapsulation,
 
while intact unreprocessed fuel rods require only suit­
able packaging for either interim or permanent disposal.
 
(2) 	 The requirements for developing procedures for handling
 
and surveillance of the waste will probably be specific
 
to the system chosen.
 
(3) 	The requirements for organizational responsibility and
 
accountability are quite different for HLW systems
 
and for spent fuel systems, because of the problem
 
of accounting for plutonium in reprocessed waste.
 
3.4 INFORMATION SOURCES
 
A key consideration in assessing technology status was the
 
need to obtain the latest possible information. Technical journals
 
and reports although indispensable, are inadequate in themselves because
 
of unavoidable time-lags. To be aware of the current status and capabilities
 
of technology development in a given area, personal visitations constitute
 
an essential part of information gathering, but only if they are supported
 
by a historical knowledge based on the above-mentioned technical journals
 
and reports. There is also value in following notl-technical journals
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and publications to be aware of developments external to technology
 
that may affect its future status. A list of conferences, workshops, and
 
hearings that were either visited or attended by members of the nuclear
 
waste management team follows:
 
(1) International Symposium on the Management of Waste 
from the LWR Fuel Cycle Conference at Denver (TAD) 
(2) Nuclear Waste Management Systems Overview Workshop 
(SIO) 
(3) Public Policy Issues in Nuclear Waste Management, 
Conference at Chicago (CHIC) 
(4) The Tucson Symposium on Waste Management (U of A) 
(5) Workshop on Issues Pertinent to the Development 
of Environmental Protection Criteria for Waste Management 
(EPA W) 
(6) Sandia Laboratories (WIPP) 
(7) Sandia Laboratories (Seabed) 
(8) Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL) 
(9) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
(10) Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) 
(11) American Physical Society (APS) 
(12) Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
(13) Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) 
(14) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
(15) National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
(16) Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
(17) Oak Ridge National Laboratories (ORNL) 
(18) California Energy Resources Conservation and Development 
Commission (CERCDC) 
(19) Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
(20) Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
(21) Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
(22) General Accounting Office (GAO) 
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(23) David Rose (MIT)
 
(24) Harvey Brooks (Harvard)
 
(25) Theodore Taylor (Princeton)
 
(26) Terry Lash, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
 
(27) Hannes Alfven (UCSD)
 
(28) Lawrence Livermore Laboratories (LLL)
 
(29) General Elactric, San Jose (GE)
 
(30) Boeing, Seattle
 
(31) RAND
 
(32) Utilities Waste Management Group
 
To ensure that the entire nuclear waste management team had
 
a broad exposure to both the technological and regulatory issues, a
 
number of people were sent to the key sources of information described
 
above. A summary of the personnel who visited these sources is shown
 
in the matrix in Figure 3-1. The La Jolla Nuclear Waste Management
 
Workshop, Jan. 77, was organized by the JPL/CIT/SIO nuclear waste management
 
team. It enabled the study team to glean from many experts their views
 
of what the major issues are, and what decisions are needed. In addition,
 
the hearings held by the California Energy Research, Conservation, and
 
Development Commission on high-level waste management and reprocessing
 
served as a valuable source of information for this report. These
 
activities, in addition to the general experience of the study participants,
 
provided the study with a broad view of present policies and the range of
 
possible policies to be implemented. This knowledge, in addition to the
 
understanding of Federal programs supplied by our study for the Office
 
of Science and Technology Policy (Ref. 2) was used in this analysis.
 
GENERAL ANALYTIC APPROACH
 
The features of the general analytical approach used in this
 
study are shown in Figure 3-2. These include:
 
* systems component descriptions 
* individual component analysis, and a 
a systems analysis
 
The first group, "System Component Description," requires that the overall
 
system purpose and goal be set forth in terms of functional requirements,
 
including economic parameters, and that the operation of the system be
 
closed and specific. Then the system is separated into components which
 
are as far as possible independent of other components, and the individual
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functional requirements of each component are described. The purpose,
 
after the individual component analysis is completed, is to construct
 
a matrix of stages of technology development vs. system component.
 
In the second group, "Individual Component Analysis," each com­
ponent has its history and plans laid out, and an examination of existing
 
and proposed criteria is made for each component. From a review of the
 
history and compatibility with the criteria, one can determine the status
 
of technological development at which unanswered issues exist. The analyst
 
can identify pertinent actions needed to resolve the open issues at this
 
point. Simultaneously, the analysis may show further unanticipated open

issues, which can be iterated and again carried through the categorization
 
as shown in Figure 3-2. Following this step, the individual component
 
technology stage characterizations are combined into the matrix, as 
shown in Figure 3-4.
 
This matrix is used in the "System Analysis" section of
 
Figure 3-2 where the issues related to the technology of each component
 
are identified in each matrix cell. It is at this point that a conclusion
 
can be reached which can declare the technology to be operable or which
 
is the basis for developing a program for action to advance the technology.
 
In this report, the following stages are used to assess
 
the status of the technology for each of the components of waste disposal
 
systems: Scientific Feasibility, Technical Achievability, and Engineering
 
Achievability. Each of the stages are subdivided further as indicated
 
in Table 3-1 so that a tabulation of sequential and increasingly developed
 
technology can be made. The technological status for each component
 
of a particular waste disposal system can be specified by identifying
 
the state of technological advancement within this framework.
 
The finai decision of the California Energy Commission concerning

the existence of a demonstrated technology for high level waste management
 
depends on a consensus among the Commissioners concerning which of the stages
 
must have been completed before technology may be said to exist for
 
each of the major components. "It is evident that sincere and experienced
 
individuals could insist, with suitably chosen historical precedents,
 
that the completion of the work for the first, or second, or third
 
of these stages could constitute a demonstration of existence of technology,
 
depending upon the background, experience and interests of the individual.
 
For example, some engineers believe that the technology for disposal
 
of high-level nuclear waste in bedded salt deposits now exists, because
 
more than 25 years of analysis, and a certain amount of field testing

experience have not uncovered any problem that cannot be solved with
 
existing technology, including the associated testing and monitoring
 
techniques. Certain equally experienced groups from other fields of
 
work conclude that safety factors and risk assessments will not be
 
satisfactorily understood until many years of operating experience
 
with actual waste packages have been achieved. In assessing a systems

developmental status it is worthwhile to delineate a system's operational
 
goals, and then to determine .how far along in the first, second, or
 
third stages the development must have progressed, for the
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Figure 3-4. Blank Matrix Summary of the Technical Status of Components
 
in the U.S. Mainline High-Level Waste Disposal System
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technology to enable the system's operational goals to be achieved. 
The result of such an analysis will be a statement, specifying for 
each component of a system, the developmental status at the time of 
evaluation. This type of analysis also shows which components of the 
system need further work, or need to have substitute components provided
 
before the system can be made operative.
 
3.5.1 Public Policy Constraints
 
A very important subset of the complete HLW management
 
system is the technological subsystem. Obviously, particular technical
 
methods may exist which are not acceptable because of their potentially
 
deleterious effects on either workers or the general public. Thus,
 
the Scientifically Feasible, Technically Achievable, and Engineering
 
Achievable methods are bounded by public policies and by demands of
 
equity with other systems in the public use. Generally, criteria are
 
set based on environmental considerations such as the need to maintain
 
health or welfare, or on economic considerations such as resource depletion.
 
Figure 3-3 shows the interrelationship between the stages of Technology
 
Development and the constraints on Technology Application which are
 
generally regarded as "Public Policy and Acceptability."
 
Such dynamic social constraints set requirements which have
 
impacts on the stage of Technology Development, and must be taken into
 
account again each time an iteration takes place as a result of the devel­
opment of new information. For example, the Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS)
 
reprocessing plant at West Valley, N.Y. did meet regulatory requirements
 
for a period of several years. However,'a changing regulatory environment,
 
including both more stringent seismic requirements and for waste solidifica­
tion requirements, made the NFS plant uneconomical to operate; and it is
 
now closed down.
 
3.5.2 Identification and Analysis of Issues
 
For an individual component of a Technology, there may
 
be limitations on its operation due to consequences which arise from
 
its use. Hence the examination of the individual components may reveal
 
features that have unacceptable impacts. The question of acceptance
 
and justification of each potential impact must be considered for each
 
stage of technology development. Issues may arise from conflicts among
 
the interests and values of individuals, groups or institutions. In
 
addition, issues may be technological gaps or unresolved technological
 
problems. These gaps or problems may be characterized according to
 
the categories of Scientific Feasibility, Technical Aehievability,
 
or Engineering Achievability. An arrangement for displaying the status
 
of major unresolved issues is outlined in matrix form in Figure 3-4.
 
In using this matrix, key issues would be displayed in the appropriate
 
matrix elements. In order to understand the details of a given identified
 
issue, the reader would have to examine the appropriate section of
 
this report.
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The analysis of the issues consists of considering the
 
possible results of using a proposed method to resolve each identified
 
technological problem. Such results may have an impact on later steps
 
or stages of the technology being developed. For example, a lower
 
fraction of radioactive isotopes encapsulated in the glass during HLW
 
solidification will increase the number of canisters required for waste
 
disposal and decrease the radioactivity and decay heat.per canister.
 
These consequences must be carefully analyzed in order to close the
 
"loop."
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SECTION 4
 
OVERVIEW OF HIGH LEVEL WASTE AND SPENT FUEL SYSTEMS
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SPENT FUEL
 
Nuclear power reactors are fueled by uranium dioxide (U02)
 
which has been enriched to approximately 3% U-235 (97% U-238). The
 
nuclear fuel is fabricated into pellets (about 1 cm in diameter and
 
1 inch long) which are then sealed in stainless steel or zircalloy
 
tubes. In the case of boiling water reactor (BWR), the tubes or rods
 
are 4 m long. For pressurized water reactors (PWR) the fuel rods
 
are 3.85 m long and 1 cm in diameter (Reference 4-1, page 2.32). The rods
 
are firmly bound together in square arrays or bundles. The number of rods
 
per array varies depending on the reactor type and vendor; 7 x 7 or 8 x 8
 
for BWRs and 15 x 15 or 17 x 17 for PWRs (Reference 4-2, page 257). These
 
bundles, when placed in the core of the reactor and surrounded by a flow
 
channel, are defined as assemblies.
 
Often in the literature concerning the generation of electricity
 
by nuclear power, a reference reactor is described. A PWR reactor used for
 
reference is assumed to produce 1000 megawatt electrical (MWe). The fuel
 
rods in this reactor are capable of a maximum burn-up of 33,000 MWd/MTU after
 
1100 days of continuous operation. The reference reactor is considered to
 
have a capacity factor of 80% (Reference 4-3, page 2). It should be noted
 
that a reference reactor is a convention used in generic analysis and does
 
not correspond to actual experience. For instance, the average capacity
 
factor exhibited so far by all reactors lies between 60% and 70% (Refer­
ence 4-15, page 54 and Reference 4-16, page 55; see also the postscript to
 
the debate between Hans Bethe and Barry Commoner on Nuclear Energy in the
 
Cornell Review, Spring 1977, page 45).
 
In the reactor core, fission products are produced when the
 
fissile material splits in the fission chain reaction. Most fission
 
products are radioactive. Those products with short half-lives decay
 
rapidly in the fuel and reach an equilibrium point at which production of
 
new atoms essentially equals the loss by decay and burnout. (An example
 
is 1-131 which reaches equilibrium in approximately 40 days.) Longer lived
 
fission products (i.e., strontium-90) continue to absorb neutrons to a
 
point where it interferes with the chain reaction. As a result the fuel
 
assemblies are generally removed from the core after 1100 days even though
 
there remains a significant amount of fissile (fissionable) material in
 
the fuel rods (equivalent to about 50% of the original quantity, 243 kg
 
U-235 and 254 kg Pu) (Reference 4-4, page 9). Each year, about 1/3
 
of the fuel in the core of a light water reactor (BWR or PWR) is removed,
 
and the remaining partially spent fuel is redistributed in the core.
 
This represents about 30 MTU (70 PWR assemblies, 156 BWR assemblies)
 
discharged annually from a 1000 MWe plant (Reference 4-5).
 
At the time of discharge the irradiated fuel produces almost
 
180 megacuries of radiation and 1.5 megawatts of thermal power per metric
 
ton of fuel (Reference 4-4, page 18, 19, 20). As shown in Figures 4-1
 
and 4-1A the heat and radiation levels of the irradiated fuel decay
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Figure 4-1. 	 Thermal Power Released by the Radioactivity of
 
High-Level Waste from Reprocessing One Metric
 
Ton of Irradiated LWR Fuel Reference 4-3
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quickly with time after shutdown of the reactor. For example, 150
 
days after a discharge the isotopes in the fuel rods containing one
 
metric ton of fuel have decayed to 4 megacuries and have a reduced
 
thermal energy of 20 kilowatts (Reference 4-4, page 18, 19, 20).
 
4.2 ORIGIN AND NATURE OF HIGH LEVEL LIQUID WASTE
 
High-level liquid waste is currently defined in 10 CFR
 
50-Appendix F as "those aqueous wastes resulting from the operation
 
of the first cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, and the
 
concentrated waste from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent,
 
in a facility for reprocessing reactor fuels" (Reference 4-6). The
 
effluent of the solvent re-generation process and the concentrates
 
from the acid recovery system are, in some cases, included in the high­
level waste.
 
The liquid high-level nuclear waste from a reprocessing plant
 
is expected to consist of almost all the fission products (radioactive
 
and nonradioactive) in the spent fuel, a majority of the transuranium
 
actinides formed in the reactor, less than one per cent of the uranium
 
and plutonium, and a large volume of nonradioactive chemicals added
 
during reprocessing. The fission product content of the waste depends
 
essentially on the specific power and burn-up of the fuel assemblies.
 
In the case of the reference PWR with a specific power of 30 MWth/MTU
 
and a burn-up of 33,000 MW-days/MTU, the waste contains approximately
 
29 kilograms of (non-volatile) fission products per metric ton of fuel
 
(Table 4-1) (Reference 4-7, page 7). This is equivalent to 99.9% of
 
all the nonvolatile fission products in the fuel (Reference 4-7, page 7).
 
Although attempts are made to recover all the uranium and plutonium,
 
there is an expected loss of 0.5% to the high-level waste stream, 0.1%
 
to the aqueous raffinate, 0.01% to the solvent stripping operation
 
(appearing in the solvent regeneration stream), and less than 0.1%
 
going to the cladding waste (Reference 4-4, page 39). Of the remaining
 
transuranic elements, between 90 and 100% are discharged into the high­
level waste stream (Reference 4-8, page 30). As revealed in Table 4-1,
 
the quantity of plant corrosion products (nickel, chromium, and iron)
 
and the reprocessing chemicals (hydrogen, nitrate, and phosphate) make
 
up respectively 1.4% and 65% of the weight of the high-level waste.
 
4.3 RADIATION AND HEAT PROPERTIES
 
The decay energy of the waste nuclides is such that special
 
considerations must be made for their safe handling, storage, and
 
disposal. Figure 4-I1 shows the thermal power of the waste resulting from
 
the reprocessing of one metric ton of fuel. Strontium-go, cesium-137 and
 
their daughters are largely responsible for the high heat levels in the
 
first 400 years after reprocessing, decreasing by three orders of mag­
nitude in this period. (Reference 4-3, page 8). The americium and
 
plutonium isotopes dominate for the next 800,000 years with their decay
 
daughters prevailing thereafter (Reference 4-3, page 8). The substantial
 
amount of heat per metric ton of fuel will dictate the type of measures
 
that can be employed in the "early" years of storage and disposal.
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Table 4-1. Materials in High-Level Liquid Waste (a)
 
GRAMS/MTU from Light-Water Reactor(bO)
 
Reprocessing Fuel Product Transuranic Other Total Fission
 
Chemicals Losses(de) Elements(e) Actinides (a) Products (f )
 
Hydrogen 400 Uranium 4,800 Neptunium 480 0.001 28,800
 
Chromium 200
 
Iron 1,100 Plutonium 40 Americum 140
 
Nitrate 65,800
 
Nickel 100 Curium 40
 
Phosphate 900
 
Sub-total 68,500 4,840 660
 
TOTAL 103,000
 
a. 	 Most constituents are present in soluble, ionic form.
 
b. 	 Water content is not shown: all quantities are rounded.
 
c. 	 U-235 enriched FWR, using 378 liters of aqueous waste per metric ton,
 
33000 MWd/MTU exposure.
 
d. 	 0.5% product loss to waste.
 
e. 	 At time of reprocessing.
 
f. 	 Volatile fission products (tritium, noble gases, iodine and bromine) excluded.
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Although the waste heat is of concern, it is the extremely high
 
levels of radiation and the toxic nature of the nuclides in the waste that
 
necessitate the long period of isolation from man and the biosphere. When
 
the waste is discharged, the fission products are the major source of
 
radiation, producing more than 99% of the activity (Reference 4-4,
 
page 53). Almost 90% of the fission product atoms.do not have major
 
impact on long term -waste disposal considerations because they have half­
lives that are either shorter than 4 years and therefore disappear
 
relatively soon, or longer than 4 x 1010 years and therefore have
 
very low levels of radioactivity. (Reference 4-3, page 7). Excluding
 
the very small quantities of isotopes; samarium-151, holium-166, and
 
selenium-79; there are no fission products with half-lives between
 
30 and 105 years (Reference 4-3). Because the main fission products
 
have half-lives under 30 years, the total fission product activity
 
decays rapidly with time. Strontium-90 and cesium-137 play a significant
 
role in the "early" years, producing a substantial amount of activity
 
and creating about three-quarters of the calculated total hazard.
 
After 700 years, two actinides, plutonium and americium, become the
 
major sources of radioactivity and hazard in the waste. This, situation
 
continues for about the next 20,000 years, at which time radium-226
 
has accumulated to the point of becoming the dominant nuclide in the
 
waste, as far as toxicity is concerned. The radioactive toxicity of
 
226 Ra in water (ingestion) is 170 times larger than the 239Pu
 
toxicity in terms of the number of cubic meters of water per curie
 
required to dilute the substance to the maximum permissible concentration
 
(MPC). In air (inhalation) the situation is reversed, the radioactive
 
toxicity of 239Pu is 50 times larger than the toxicity of 226Ra.
 
PROJECTIONS OF SPENT FUEL FROM UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL
 
LIGHT-WATER REACTORS
 
Before examining the status of the technology for the handling,
 
storage and disposal of the spent fuel discharge at the reactor, it
 
is useful to look at the size of the problem. Some aspects of the
 
back end of the fuel cycle can be described by the following parameters:
 
With reprocessing:
 
* 	 Spent fuel discharge - in terms of tonnes per year and
 
cumulative tonnes
 
* 	 Cumulative shipments and shipments/year to and from FRPs 
Reprocessed and solidified HLW - in terms of
 
tonnes per year and cumulative tonnes.
 
Without reprocessing:
 
* 	 Spent fuel discharged - in terms of tonnes per year and 
cumulative tonnes
 
* 	 Annual shipments of spent fuel 
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4.4.1 Nuclear Energy Capacity and Spent Fuel Discharged
 
All of the parameters are dependent upon the projected growth
 
of nuclear energy. Figure 4-2 and Table 4-2 show the recent changes
 
in projection of nuclear capacity for the year 2000. The 1977 ERDA
 
projection exhibits an annual growth rate of 9.5 percent. For this
 
analysis, the growth of nuclear capacity is kept the same regardless
 
of the decision about reprocessing.
 
Figure 4-3 shows the cumulative discharge of spent fuel
 
assemblies through the year 2000. Two projections are shown. The lower
 
curve represents the results of ERDA's planning projection based on ERDA
 
long range goals. The upper curve is based on a recent survey completed
 
for ERDA of both existing plants and those under construction. Over
 
the near term, i.e., to 1986, the latter is considered to be the more
 
accurate projection because it is based on actual industry data.
 
Figure 4-4 uses the number of PWR and BWR bundles discharged
 
to plot the cumulative metric tons of uranium discharged. This information
 
is extended to the year 2000 in Table 4-3. Using the industry projection,
 
there will be 26,000 MTU in 1986. The ERDA projection for the year
 
2000 shows that 86,000 MTU will have been discharged.
 
4.4.2 Transportation 
Trucking presently accounts for almost all shipments of spent 
fuel. The shipping cask carried by each truck can carry 1 PWR spent 
fuel assembly or 2 BWR spent fuel assemblies. The shipping cask carried
 
by rail can carry 7 PWR assemblies or 18 BWR assemblies. (Ref. 4-3A,
 
page 22.15)
 
Figure 4-5 and Table 4-4 show the annual number of shipments.
 
The simplifying assumptions used here are that reracked and expanded reactor
 
storage capacity is sufficient until 1985. In 1985 facilities are avail­
able for shipment of the annually discharged fuel. The upper curve
 
represents the number of shipments if only trucks are used. The lower
 
curve represents the number of shipments if only railroads are used.
 
The middle curve is the projection by ORNL based on a time dependent a
 
mixture of truck and rail shipments from the operating reactors. Each
 
time the spent fuel is shipped to an additional facility a comparable
 
number of shipments must be made.
 
Assuming a round trip distance of 3000 miles the total truck
 
mileage, if all casks are shipped by truck, is 56 x 106 miles for the
 
year 2000. This is 0.35% of the 1971 total truck mileage (Reference 4-13,
 
page 5-2). Similarly, if all shipments are by rail during the year 2000,
 
the 7.3 x 106 miles is only 0.01% of the 1967 rail mileage (Reference 4-13,
 
page 5-2). The impact of these relatively small number of shipments
 
on the transportation system could be significant if "special trains"
 
are required for rail shipment and if local regulations preclude trucks
 
from carryinf these casks through specified areas.
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Table 4-2. Comparison of Past Forecasts Energy-Electrical
 
Capacity-Nuclear Capacity Year 2000
 
Total U.S.
 
Total Total Annual U.S. Electrical Nuclear
 
Forecast Energy Consumption Capacity Capacity
 
Made (Quads) (GWe) GWe)
 
1972 150 	 2000 1200
 
1974 174 	 2030 1090
 
1975 174 	 1750 800
 
1976 144 	 1400 510
 
1977 120 	 1200 380
 
4.5 	 GENERATION OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
 
If the reprocessing option is undertaken, an estimate of the
 
resulting cumulative quantities of solidified high-level waste that
 
will be produced is shown in Figure 4-6. Table 4-6 shows the annual
 
and cumulative quantity of generated waste. This curve assumes that
 
in year marked 0, the first reprocessing plant begins operation at a
 
low capacity factor, that new plants of comparable size (1500 MTU/year)
 
are added every four years, and that each new plant begins operation
 
at a low capacity factor.
 
4.6 	 SYSTEMS FOR STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF SPENT FUEL AND SOLIDIFIED
 
HIGH LEVEL WASTE
 
The "old mainline program" for high-level waste disposal
 
as examined in this report consists of the most highly developed and
 
potentially available components for the liquid storage, treatment
 
and packaging, and geological disposal of the high-level waste resulting
 
from the operation of a reprocessing plant for spent fuel from commercial
 
nuclear electrical power generation plants. Although other methods
 
of handling the high-level waste are being developed, they are not
 
nearly as close to Engineering Achievability as those components of
 
the mainline, or reference, system for high-level waste disposal examined
 
in this paper. The components discussed in the following sections are:
 
(1) 	 Liquid Containment--storage of concentrated commercial
 
high-level liquid waste in stainless steel tanks.
 
(2) 	 Treatment and Packaging--solidification of the liquid
 
waste by spray calcination, immobilization of the
 
solidified waste in borosilicate glass utilizing an
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Table 4-3. 
1970 54
 
1976 1814 

1977 2635 

1978 3614 

1979 4690 

1980 5864 

1981 7126 

1982 8541 

1983 10190 

1984 12080 

1985 14257 

1986 16791 

1971 142
 
1972 287
 
1973 489
 
1974 769
 
1975' 1197
 
1987 19673
 
1988 22847
 
-1989 
 26292
 
1990 30015
 
1991 34033
 
1992 38365
 
1993 43024
 
1994 48020
 
1995 53743
 
1996 59111
 
1997 65042
 
1998 71762
 
1999 78662
 
2000 85937
 
Cumulative MTU Discharged
 
Year 	 Low Case 
 ERDA 77-25
 
2586
 
3620
 
4977
 
6502
 
8365
 
10261
 
12734
 
15610
 
18850
 
22831
 
27147
 
Assumptions: 	 In Column 2 a ratio of 0.176 MTU/Assembly for a BWR
 
and 0.412 MTU/Assembly for a PWR were used. These
 
were the calculated averages from ERDA-25. Both ratios
 
are slightly lower than those given by Blomeke (Reference
 
4-3).
 
In Column 3 the 244 MTU previously reprocessed is included.
 
Source: References 4-9 page 15, and 4-11
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Table 4-4. Annual Shipments of Spent Fuel
 
Year Shipments 
ORNL 
All Truck All Rail MIX 
BWR PWR Total BWR PWR Total Total 
1985 2,345 3,281 5,626 260 469 730 2,107 
1986 2i695 3,853 6,548 299 550 849 2,403 
1987 3,113 4,337 7,450 346 620 966 2,670 
1988 3,426 4,780 8,206 380 683 1,063 2,940 
1989 3,709 5,109 8,904 412 742 1,154 3,115 
1990 4,014 5,610 9,624 446 801 1,247 3,289 
1991 4,334 6,053 10,387 482 865 1,347 3,550 
1992 4,677 6,521 11,198 520 932 1,452 3,733 
1993 5,038 7,008 12,o46 560 1,001 1,561 4,015 
1994 5,411 7,506 12,917 601 1,072 1,673 4,199 
1995 5,807 8,033 13,840 645 1,148 1,793 4,499 
1996 6,240 8,602 14,842 693 1,229 1,991 4,770 
1997 6,679 9,181 15,860 742 1,312 2,054 5,022 
1998 7,107 9,756 16,863 790 1,394 2,184 5,211 
1999 7,530 10,321 17,852 837 1,474 2,311 5,509 
2000 7,948 10,872 18,820 883 1,553 2,436 5i652 
Total Shipments 190,982 24,812 62,614 
Source: Reference 4-11 
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Table 4-5. Generation of Solidified High-Level Waste (MT)
 
Year 	 Number 

of FRP*
 
0 	 1 

1 	 1 

2 	 1 

3 	 1 

4 	 2 

5 	 2 

6 	 2 

7 	 2 

8 	 3 

9 	 3 

10 3 

11 3 

12 4 

13 4 

14 4 

15 4 

16 5 

17 5 

18 5 

19 5 

20 6 

Annual 

500 

1500 

1500 

1500 

2000 

3000 

3000 

3000 

3500 

4500 

4500 

4500 

5000 

6000 

6000 

6000 

6500 

7000 

7000 

7000 

7500 

Cumulative
 
500
 
2000
 
3500
 
5000
 
7000
 
10000
 
13000
 
16000
 
19500
 
24000
 
28500
 
33000
 
38000
 
44000
 
50000
 
56000
 
62500
 
69500
 
76500
 
83500
 
91000
 
*Fuel Reprocessing Plants
 
4-15
 
77-69
 
I00,000 
90,000 / 
80,000 
70,000 
60,000 
50,000 / 
40,000 
30,000 
20,000 -
10,000 / 
0 
0 2 4 6 a 10 
TIME 
12 14 16 18 20 
Figure 4-6. 	 Cumulative.Liquid High-Level Waste from Commercial Nuclear
 
Power Reactors Versus Time after Opening First Commercial
 
Reprocessing Plant
 
4-16
 
77-69 
in-can melter, and encapsulation of the vitrified waste
 
in the storage/disposal canister.
 
(3) 	 Deep Geological Disposal--emplacement of the encapsulated
 
vitrified waste in a deep bedded salt formation.
 
In April 1977, President Carter announced an indefinite post­
ponement of reprocessing operations in the United States. The consequence
 
of this action was to shift attention to extended storage of spent fuel
 
from commercial nuclear power plants. Having developed under the
 
assumption that reprocessing services would be available by the early
 
1980s, nuclear power plants have been designed with only limited storage
 
capacity for spent fuel (1 1/3 to 1 2/3 core capacity) (Reference 4-14,
 
page 5). The first action by the nuclear plant-operators is, and has
 
been, the expansion of existing reactor pools. Two central or off­
site spent fuel pool facilities are in the licensing stage. A spent
 
unreprocessed fuel facility for dry storage (SURFF) to be operated
 
by the Federal Government is in the initial design phase. Also in
 
the design phase is the method by which spent fuel could eventually
 
be permanently disposed of in a deep geological formation. Specifically,
 
these components for spent fuel storage/disposal are defined for the
 
purposes of this paper as the "mainline program" for spent fuel and
 
are examined as follows (Figure 4-7)­
(1) 	 Reactor Pool Storage--the utilization of all available
 
reactor pool space through reracking while retaining
 
the space for the discharge of the full reactor core.
 
(2) 	 Independent Pool Storage--independent, either on-site or
 
away-from-reactor (AFR), spent fuel storage facilities
 
with the capacity and ability to store PWR and BWR
 
assemblies (as originally discharged from the reactor)
 
from numerous reactors for an extended period of time.
 
(3) 	 Spent Unreprocessed Fuel Facility (SURFF)--an independent
 
engineered surface facility for the dry storage of spent
 
fuel assemblies or bundles that have been packaged in metal
 
containers.
 
(4) 	 Deep Geological Disposal--the emplacement of packaged
 
spent fuel assemblies in a deep bedded salt formation.
 
Options other than those considered in these two programs for
 
HLW and spent fuel are being pursued by ERDA, but at a much lower level of
 
emphasis. For commercial HLW, for example, elimination of liquid contain­
ment and immediate solidification is being considered. Fluidized-bed
 
calcination is under development as a possible alternative to spray
 
calcination. Encapsulation of solidified waste in phosphate glass or in
 
a metal matrix is being studied as an alternative to borosilicate glass.
 
Work on options other than deep geologic disposal in bedded salt formations,
 
such as disposal in granite, sea-bed disposal, transmutation, and disposal
 
in space, is continuing in the study and design phases. But it is clear
 
from recent statements by ERDA and the National Energy Plan that the major
 
thrust of the NWM program is along the two lines discussed in this report.
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Clearly not all of the spent fuel will pass through all
 
of the stages shown on the lower path of Figure 4-7. For example,
 
a considerable fraction of the total spent fuel may be shipped directly

from spent fuel pools at reactor sites to a packaging facility located
 
at the site of a Federal geological repository. However, because of
 
the present fluid state of the national program all the components
 
described previously (1)-(4) must be analyzed.
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SECTION 5
 
ASSESSMENT OF STATUS OF "OLD MAINLINE" PROGRAM
 
FOR DISPOSAL OF SOLIDIFIED HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
 
In this section we assess the status of current technology
 
development of thevarious components of the mainline system for the
 
disposal of waste from commercial reprocessing plants.
 
(1) 	 Liquid Containment (storage of concentrated high-levei
 
liquid waste in stainless steel tanks)
 
(2) 	 Treatment and Packaging (solidification of the waste by
 
spray calcination, immobilization of the solidified
 
waste in borosilicate glass utilizing an in-can melter,
 
and encapsulation of the waste)
 
(3) 	 Deep Geologic Isolation (bedded salt emplacement)
 
5.1 LIQUID CONTAINMENT OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
 
5.1.1 Process Description.
 
High-level liquid radioactive waste streams originate in the
 
reprocessing procedure when the spent fuel rods are chopped into small man­
ageable pieces, and the contained U02 fuel along with its combined fission
 
products and fission by-products is dissolved in nitric acid. The
 
solution is chemically treated to separate the bulk of the uranium and
 
plutonium from all other materials. The acid solution, stripped of
 
uranium and plutonium is generally called "High-level Liquid Waste," the
 
nomenclature coming from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix F.
 
For some commercial and military wastes (Nuclear Fuel Services,
 
Inc., Idaho Falls and Savannah River) the containment is accomplished by
 
storing the radioactive liquid for an extended period of time in protected
 
tanks to allow the radioactivity and the heat-generating ability to decrease.
 
Current advanced design, as given in a description of the AGNS
 
process (Reference 5-i) generates about 4000 liters of high-level liquid
 
waste per metric ton of uranium processed. For fuel that is reprocessed
 
at 150 days after removal from a reactor, the waste has about 4 million
 
curies of radioactivity, and about 20 kW of heat per metric ton of fuel
 
processed. The solution is concentrated before reaching the holding tank
 
by a factor of about 6, so that the initial storage receives 600 liters
 
of liquid waste from one metric ton of fuel.
 
Typically, the non-aqueous content of the high-level waste
 
generated from the treatment of a single metric ton of light water reactor
 
spent fuel is 103 kg. The principal chemical constituents are 34 kg of
 
fission products and actinides, 70 kg of treatment chemicals, 4.8 kg U and
 
0.05 kg Pu (Reference 5-2). This concentrated liquid initially generates
 
35 watts per liter, and this heat must be removed at a rate which keeps
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the temperature of the container below the design level. For very small
 
tanks, the surface-to-volume ratio is large and convective air cooling
 
will suffice. For larger volume tanks, it becomes necessary to include
 
submerged cooling coils through which cooling water flows. Normal
 
safety features include spare cooling coils on a standby system, spare
 
tanks for complete transfer of content, and operation at atmospheric
 
pressure by means of venting through absolute filters and condensers.
 
The liquid HLW could be further concentrated, either
 
immediately or during the interim storage period after additional decay
 
of the heat producing nuclides. Economies in the number of tanks needed
 
would be expected. However, chemical limitations on the degree of concen­
tration exist because of the increased temperature of the concentrated
 
solutions and because of the possibility of segregation of solids in
 
the holding tank. Such segregated solids would settle to the bottom
 
of the tank and would constitute a bottom layer of sediment which would
 
not be an efficient heat transfer configuration for transfer of the heat
 
generated in the sediment layer itself to the body of liquid in the tank.
 
If the bottom sediment layer contained a considerable part of the heat­
producing radionuclides, there could be local superheating of the liquid
 
at the surface under a pressure head of the liquid height in the tank,
 
resulting in violent bumping due to expansion of superheated vapor.
 
5.1.2 History of Storage of Liquid Waste
 
Tank storage of large quantities of chemicals has been
 
developed, both in the United States and abroad, to a state where handling
 
is now accomplished for a wide range of corrosive and difficult chemicals.
 
Examples include corrosives and acids, flammables, and cryogens.
 
Storage of high-level radioactive waste solutions in tanks
 
>1000 m3 differs from that for the usual corrosive and difficult materials
 
because of the continuously self-generated heat. This self-generated
 
heat may change the corrosion pathways due to the continuously changing
 
chemical nature of the stored liquid. Furthermore, because of the high
 
degree of containment required, it has been necessary to incorporate
 
sensitive methods for remote leak detection and to facilitate self repair
 
methods in the tanks. When the dissolved solids content of the liquid
 
is high, as in concentrated or in neutralized solutions, it is possible
 
by maintaining the air surrounding the containing tank at a very low
 
relative humidity, that liquid seeping through cracks or pinholes in
 
the tank will lose its water through evaporation and the dissolved
 
material in the seepage will precipitate out and plug the crack. This
 
serves as a self-repair method for the tank which contains high solute
 
concentration liquids. Additionally, secondary containment consisting
 
of catch tanks and drip trays, and spare tank capacity to receive the
 
contents of an unsatisfactory holding tank are used as safety measures.
 
There is extensive U.S. and foreign experience in tank storage
 
of high-level liquid wastes resulting from military reprocessing plants.
 
Some of this experience has been acrued over more than 25 years.
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Table 5-1 sets forth the tank storage capacity, as far as is known,
 
for all foreign countries and for the United States. The total U.S.
 
experience is some 100-fold greater insofar as volume is concerned than
 
all the rest of the tankages combined, excluding the [possibly large]
 
amount in Russia, China, and India. In this analysis, the design and'
 
operating experience in the U.S. is assumed sufficient to evaluate
 
the technological status of containment of liquid-acid high-level waste.
 
Table 5-1. 	 High Level Nuclear Waste Storage Capacity in
 
Cubic Meters, 1971.
 
Location 	 Capability (Cubic Meters)
 
W. Germany
 
Karlsruhe 100
 
Julich 6
 
Great Britain
 
Dounreay 4OO
 
Windscale 710
 
France
 
Marcoule and La Hague 960
 
Belgium
 
Mol 504
 
Japan 360 (Planned)
 
Russia Not Available
 
China Not Available
 
India Not Available
 
United States
 
Hanford 247000
 
Savannah River 67000
 
INEL (ICPP) 8300
 
West Valley 5600 (Capacity)
 
(327,900 Total)
 
(Adapted from References 5-3 and 5-4)
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Experience in the United States has been to a large extent
 
based on the handling of High-Level Waste from fuel used in military
 
reactors. Military reactor use differs from commercial reactor use
 
in that the fuel is burned to a much smaller degree than commercial
 
reactor fuel, before being reprocessed. This ratio may be 1/3 to 1/10
 
or even lower, and the content of fission products, and hence heat
 
generation, in military High-Level Waste is correspondingly less.
 
The earliest production of quantities of high-level waste took
 
place at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1944. The burnup, and hence'the
 
fission product content was quite low, and the storage was planned for
 
asphalt-lined concrete tanks, two of which were put into use. In the
 
interest of greater safety, a series of larger tanks was built; 6 tanks
 
of 150 m3 capacity, consisting of mild-steel lined concrete tanks, located
 
underground. In order to avoid corrosion of the steel, the nitric acid
 
waste was neutralized with sodium hydroxide, and the resulting material
 
stored in the tanks. It was felt that additional safety accrued to the
 
system because the precipitate formed upon neutralization carried down
 
most of the radioactive fission products as an insoluble sludge. In case
 
of a breach of the tank containment, the insoluble sludge would not sink
 
into the soil but would remain as a solid for transfer to other containment.
 
The actual transfer of radioactive sludge from a breached tank is beset
 
with many difficulties, e.g. difficulty in (remotely) removing caked sludge
 
from around reinforcing ribs in the tanks. However, because the sludge in
 
which the fission products are contained is relatively immobile, in principle
 
the removal can be accomplished without significant time urgency. The
 
supernatent liquid in the tank contained mainly the Cs-137, which does
 
not form a precipitate under these conditions," and would present less of
 
a problem in the soil than would the full range of fission products.
 
A larger operation was initiated at the ERDA site at Hanford,
 
Washington beginning in 1945 where concrete tanks with mild steel lining 3
 
were used for containment of neutralized waste, the tanks being of 2000 m

and 3000 m3 capacity. At a later date, similar tanks were used for low
 
heat generation wastes; less than 0.01 watts/liter. A similar design
 
with the addition of gas-jet agitators in the sludge was used for the
 
larger tanks where the waste ranged up to 8 watts/liter.
 
During the years 1956-1973 an estimated 420,000 gallons of
 
liquid high level waste containing about half a million curies leaked from
 
the Hanford tanks. These tanks contained a total of 50 mil-lion gallons
 
of high level waste. A further modification of design was made so that all
 
tanks built since 1968 have been of double wall construction. Particular
 
attention has been given to the weldment. The metal walls have been
 
heat-treated after fabrication to relieve residual stresses. The three
 
types of tanks are shown in Figures 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3.
 
The history at Savannah River covers a smaller tankage volume
 
(see Table 5-1). The tanks, however, were generally similar to those at
 
Hanford. The final conclusion of the study of the leaks at Hanford was that
 
the cause of tank leakage in radioactive waste storage service was stress
 
corrosion at welds where metal composition had changed due to the welding.
 
The leaks in the tanks at Savannah River were contained because of the cup­
and-saucer configuration of the tank sitting on a secondary containment pan.
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The experience of both Hanford and Savannah River was remarkably
 
similar; 12% of the tanks at Hanford leaked, and 14% of the tanks at
 
Savannah River leaked. The Savannah River tanks because of the second­
ary containment 'did not result in discharge of waste into the ground.
 
Both of these tank-farms handled low-burnup military waste in the form
 
of neutralized sludge and supernatent liquid, which were thought to
 
be compatible with mild'steel tanks.
 
In 1966, the Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. plant in West Valley,
 
New York iniated commercial reprocessing activities using high level waste
 
storage tanks of 2850.m3 capacity based on Savannah River design features,
 
namely, in situ stress relief of the welded tanks, theuse of a separate
 
catchpan under the complete holding tank, and concrete lined excavation area
 
for tertiary containment. The reprocessing streams have been treated as at
 
Hanford and at Savannah River with alkali in order to neutralize the wastes
 
and permit the use of carbon steel tanks.
 
To summarize, the operations at Oak Ridge, Savannah River,
 
Hanford, and West Valley with storage of liquid waste used neutralized
 
waste. The containment of neutralized liquid high-level waste is useful
 
from an operational and management perspective, but it does not provide
 
a direct demonstration for the use of acidic high-level waste storage.
 
Non-neutralized high level storage waste experience has been
 
gained as Idaho National Engineering Laboratories (INEL). The reprocessed
 
fuel at INEL has been left acidic and has been stored in stainless steel
 
tanks. In addition, some of the fuel reprocessed at INEL has a burnup that
 
approaches the burnup of commercial reactors. The experience dates from
 
1952 when stainless steel tanks were put into service. The acid high-level
 
waste at INEL is held in a number of stainless steel tanks of 1100 m3 capac­ 3
 
ity together with some smaller tanks of 110 m3 capacity. Altogether, 8300 m

acid high-level waste are in storage at any one time since an active program
 
is carried out to reduce aged waste to calcine and thus free more volume for
 
fresh waste. A careful management program, covering temperature profile
 
monitoring, corrosion test coupons in-tank to estimate wall corrosion, and
 
the homogeneity of the acidwaste content has resulted in a history of no
 
leaks. (Reference 5-5A, page E-7).
 
5.1.3 	 Liquid-acid High-level Waste Containment Program
 
Status and Plans.
 
The chemistry of HLW solutions during an extended holding
 
period is compatible with storage in selected stainless steels as mentioned
 
above in the discussion of INEL experience. Interest continues on potential
 
effects of excess zirconium content which may result from corroded zircalloy
 
The reason is that zirconia precipitate
in long-cooling-time fuel bundles. 

may act as a scavenger and hinder plutonium separation from reprocessing
 
streams. A 	continuing program to determine acid concentration limits and
 
temperature 	limits in preparation for possible future needs is in progress
 
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Reference 5-6).
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5.1.4 Issue Related to Technology Status of Liquid Containment
 
An early review of the literature related to liquid high-level
 
waste containment dentified three issues of concern. These were (I) sta­
bility of the liquid during containment, (2) the compatibility of the acid
 
liquid waste and the steel tanks, and (3) the availability of adequate con­
trol technology to take care of the off-gases coming from the tank. Based
 
on the current literature concerning acid waste storage, and presentations
 
at CERCDC headings concerning waste disposal means, we consider that the above
 
three issues have been shown, by the INEL experience, to be resolved for
 
military waste. The same methods are applicable to commercial waste if the
 
heat loadings, with which experience has been accumulated, are not exceeded.
 
Furthermore, there appears to be no significant change in the composition
 
of the liquid waste over time that would affect future interim holding oper­
ations. The history of storage at INEL and measurements from test-coupons
 
in the tank indicates that liquid acid-waste and the existing stainless,­
steel storage tank are compatible. In addition, the filter and monitoring
 
control systems have been adequate to control the off-gases.
 
5.2 TREATMENT AND PACKAGING
 
The mainline system for the solidification of the high-level
 
liquid waste (HLLW) consists of three operations: solidification of the
 
liquid in a spray calciner, immobilization of the calcined waste in
 
borosilicate glass using an in-can melter vitrification process, and finally,
 
the encapsulation of the vitrified waste in the storage/disposal canister.
 
The solidification of the HLLW by calcination in a spray calciner
 
is intended to satisfy Federal regulations which require the liquid to be
 
converted to a dry solid which is "chemically, radiolytically, and thermally
 
stable" (Reference 5-7). Due to the potential dispersability of the calcined
 
waste, additional containment is obtained through incorporation of the
 
calcined waste product within a suitable material. For the mainline system
 
the waste is incorporated into a borosilicate glass in an in-can melter.
 
The borosilicate waste/glass solid is encapsulated in the formation
 
canister and after going through leak checks and decontamination procedures
 
is eventually planned to be sent to a Federal repository. A schematic
 
diagram of the three phase process is presented in Figure 5-4.
 
Except in the initial development stage, spray calcination and
 
in-pot melting have been investigated together. Even though calcination,
 
vitrification, and packaging of the high level waste will be operated as
 
an integral process, the issues on the status of operation and development
 
are generally concerned with specific steps of the process.
 
5.2.1 Solidification of Waste by Spray Calcination
 
5.2.1.1 Process Description. As shown schematically in Figure 5-5, HLLW
 
is pumped into an internal mixing pneumatic atomizing nozzle located at the
 
top of the spray chamber. The atomized droplets are flash-dried and calcined
 
as they fall through the chamber (7000C wall temperature). The short period
 
of time required for calcination results in essentially no holdup time in the
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chamber for the calcined product. The powder products (fines) that travel
 
with the offgas are separated from the off-gas by stainless steel filters
 
which are periodically cleaned by reverse direction pulses of air. The
 
pressure drop across the filters determines the time between pulses which may
 
vary from 5 to 30 minutes. The fines are then discharged with the main
 
calcine product. Atomizing air, steam and oxides of nitrogen exit through
 
the filters. With less than 0.1% of the nonvolatile radionuclides passing
 
through the filters, there is no significant load on the effluent treatment
 
subsystem and no major amount of liquid to be recycled to the calciner from
 
the treatment subsystem (Reference 5-8, page 25).
 
5.2.1.2 Development History. Spray calcination has been in develop­
ment at the Battelle Northwest Laboratories (BNWL) for over 16 years.
 
The Waste Solidification Engineering Prototypes (WSEP) program, which
 
existed between November 1966 and October 1970 ran both radioactive and
 
non-radioactive tests with various calcination processes, including the
 
spray calcination technique (Reference 5-10). Thirteen fully radioactive
 
engineering-scale operational runs were undertaken on the spray calciner
 
during the WSEP program. Each run lasted for about 50 hours. An additional
 
1000 hours were obtained using simulated wastes at feed rates approaching
 
those to be used in conjunction with a full scale reprocessing facility
 
- 75 liters/hr versus 80 liters/hr required for a 5 MTU/day (1500 MTU/year)
 
plant (Reference 5-11, page 6.28). Though the anticipated waste product
 
has changed since the WSEP program began, making the WSEP calcined product
 
and phosphate glass forms obsolete, the WSEP program did provide important
 
process operation information on borosilicate glass. In particular it
 
provided verification of both process operability and maintainability
 
(Reference 5-9, page 5).
 
Since 1972, BNWL has been operating the Waste Fixation Pro­
gram (WFP) sponsored by the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Production Division
 
of ERDA. The goal of this program has been to fully develop a process
 
for the conversion of HLLW to a borosilicate waste-glass mixture.
 
The process currently receiving the major development efforts is spray
 
calcination and in-can melting (glass formation) (Reference 5-9, page 6).
 
5.2.1.3 Program Status and Plans. The Waste Fixation Program (WFP)
 
at BNWL is continuing to develop the spray calciner coupled to the
 
in-can melter. A full scale non-radioactive facility has been operating
 
since April, 1977, and has calcined at a rate up to 200 liters/hr
 
(Reference 5-12, page 1). A full scale remote operation and maintenance
 
non-radioactive facility is now in design that will allow experience to
 
be gained in- remote canister handling and maintenance techniques (Refer­
ence 5-9, page 20). Radioactive tests using high level waste from com­
mercial irradiated fuel will be carried out in late 1978, if this is
 
decided to be consistent with President Carter's decision to indefinitely
 
defer reprocessing. The pilot plant spray calciner/in-can melter process
 
planned to be used handles 15 liter/hr (Reference 5-12, page 1).
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5.2.1.4 Issues Related to Technology Status of Spray Calcination
 
5.2.1.4.1 Scientific Feasibility
 
Calcine Integrity and Stability. Federal Regulations require
 
a dry and stable high-level waste form for long-term disposal. The calcine
 
product resulting from the flash evaporation of the waste in the spray calciner
 
chamber consists of particles with a mean diameter of 10 micrometers (Reference
 
5-8, page 25). This very finely divided product is highly dispersable and
 
if contacted by water, would almost immediately release some of the radio­
nuclides to the contacting water - such as strontium and cesium (Reference 5-12,
 
page 1). Although tests have been undertaken to examine the pressurization
 
potential of calcines in sealed canisters subjected to high temperature, the
 
calcine product from the spray calciner is not considered a suitable form for
 
such canister storage of disposal (References 5-11 and 5-13). Other
 
calcination methods, such as fluidized-bed, wopld~be employed which could
 
produce a calcine that is less potentially dispersible and more suitable
 
for containment because of its granular form as opposed to the powder
 
obtained from the spray calciner (Reference 5-14).
 
The spray calciner has been developed in connection with
 
a melter, and as a result the calcine is immediately converted to glass
 
in this system. Since there is zero holdup time in the spray chamber,
 
the waste is only in a solid dry (fine powder) calcine form for the
 
period necessary for gravity feeding it into the melter-and to attain
 
fusion of the calcineglass frit mixture. Therefore, the issue of a
 
stable solidified form of the waste with respect to the spray calciner
 
should be addressed to the final product of the spray caloiner/in-can
 
melter - the vitrified waste (See Section 5.2.2.4).
 
5.2.1.4.2 Technical Feasibility
 
Process Operation. Component and total process reliability is
 
an important part of the operation of the spray calciner.
 
The early development phase of the spray calciner revealed the
 
metallic atomizing nozzle as an item that potentially would require frequent
 
maintenance due to erosion (Reference 5-8, page 28). A ceramic atomizing
 
nozzle was developed about 5 years ago and has replaced the metallic
 
one. This is a commercially available pneumatic atomizing nozzle with
 
a ceramic air cap (Reference 5-15, page 38). The ceramic unit is now
 
used in all calcination operations and has shown minor wear (0.01 mm
 
wear on the 6.3 mm nozzle orifice after 1000 operating hours). This
 
remotely replaceable nozzle is expected to therefore remain in service
 
for several months of operation (Reference 5-8, page 28).
 
The operation of the spray calciner is relatively simple with
 
startup commencing as soon as the furnace (spray chamber) can be"heated to
 
the operating temperature. Shutdown requires -discontinuation of the
 
liquid waste feed and a one minute nozzle flush (Reference 5-8, page 28).
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A major advantage of the spray calciner in relation to other
 
solidification processes is that there is no reliance on physical contact
 
of the waste on a hot surface. The incoming liquid waste concentration is
 
not considered by Battelle to be of concern (Reference 5-20, pages 43-69).
 
The drying of the waste is accomplished by a combination of radiative
 
and convective heat transfer. Wall mounted pneumatic vibrators are
 
periodically operated to prevent scale accumulation on the walls of the
 
spray chamber (Reference 5-15, page 39).
 
5.2.1.4.3 Engineering Achievability
 
Remote Operation and Maintenance. Remote operation and main­
tenance are important to provide a safe non-radioactive environment for the
 
facility personnel. It is also important to keep maintenance requirements
 
as low as possible.
 
The components identified that can be expected to either wear
 
out or fail are: the feed nozzle assembly, the off-gas filter assembly, and
 
the vibrators (Reference 5-15, page 38). Consequently, there are provisions
 
in the proposed BNWL full-scale remote facility (currently in design) for
 
remotely replacing these components as well as the entire segmented spray
 
furnace chamber. Figure 5-6 shows a number of the remote replacement items.
 
The spray calciner furnace connections for power and temperature
 
indicator leads utilize connectors which facilitate remote operation and
 
maintenance. The furnace is mounted on springs to reduce the vibration of
 
the heating elements during the vibrator operation to remove scale buildup
 
on the chamber walls. The vibration is set up by impact on a-stainless
 
steel plate attached to the furnace. If, and when, the furnace segments
 
require removal, an in-cell crane is utilized (Reference 5-15, page 40).
 
The off-gas filter assembly is connected to the calciner by
 
remotely removable flange bolts. Hanford-type connectors are used for
 
remote disconnection ability of the jumpers that supply blowback air to
 
the filters. The control valves for this blowback system are located
 
outside the cell (Reference 5-15, page 38).
 
The vibrators can be remotely installed as they are mounted on
 
Hanford-type connectors. In this case, the connectors serve a dual function
 
by also providing the required air connection (Reference 5-15, page 38).
 
The process cell arrangement is shown in Figures 5-7 and 5-8.
 
Arrangement considerations are given to operations, remote maintenance,
 
solids flow, system hydraulics, and connecting piping routes (Reference 5-15,
 
page 41). Operation considerations involve assuring adequate viewing and
 
providing in-cell crane and manipulator access where required. Remote
 
remaintenance provisions require that most major components are set for
 
direct over-head crane removal. Gravity flow of calcine and glass frit is
 
provided by equipment design and placement. To assist in decontamination
 
of the piping interior and to assure that there is no liquid holdup or
 
particle settling, all piping is sloped either to or from the point of
 
origin (Reference 5-15, page 42). Also, removable jumpers are used
 
to make all service and process connections.
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A full scale remote operation and maintenance non-radioactive
 
facility is under construction to gain experience in remote cannister
 
handling and maintenance techniques (Reference 5-9, page 20). Remote
 
operation and maintenance pilot scale tests in a hot-cell facility
 
(15 liters/hour) are to be carried out in 1978 (Reference 5-24, page 1).
 
5.2.2 Immobilization of Solidified Waste by Vitrification
 
The purpose of the incorporation of the calcined waste in a
 
matrix material is to reduce the dispersability, volatility, and
 
leachability of the waste solid. The characteristics of solidified wastes
 
that are required to meet these goals include
 
• adequate thermal conductivity
 
* good thermal stability 
* radiation resistance 
* mechanical ruggedness 
* minimal volume 
* process reliability and simplicity. 
Adequate thermal conductivity in the waste form is desired to
 
prevent excessive internal temperatures during the initial few years of
 
storage. A coherent ceramic waste form has a thermal conductivity that is
 
3 to 5 times higher than a loosely consolidated powdery oxide waste form.
 
The relative leachability of a particular waste form is a
 
function of the surface area and specific reaction rate with water. It is
 
important that neither radiation nor thermal effects deleteriously increase
 
the surface area or leach rate at any time during storage or transportation.
 
Also during transportation, because the canister is the first line of
 
protection, it is important that the mechanical ruggedness of the canister
 
not be weakened by the interactions between the waste and the canister.
 
With respect to plant operations, solidification should be done
 
economically and the solidified waste product should occupy a low volume.
 
Due to the fact that all solidification operations will take place in a
 
shielded cell,, process reliability and simplicity will be two major factors
 
in minimizing costs. Also, a volume reduction factor of 7 to 10 which is
 
generally achieved during solidification assists in minimizing the volume.
 
For the mainline system in the United States as well as in France, the
 
United Kingdom, Germany, and India, borosilicate glass has been selected
 
to be the matrix material.
 
5.2.2.1 Process Description. The vitrification process developed for
 
the U.S. mainline system is in-can melting (Reference 5-9, page 6). A
 
schematic diagram of the in-can melter is shown in Figure 5-9. The storage
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canister is located in a multi-zone furnace and coupled directly to
 
the calciner. Glass-forming frit is mixed with the calcined waste
 
and the mixture is fused in the canister at 1000 to 11000 C. As the
 
melt level rises, the lower furnace zones are turned off and cooling
 
is initiated. The off-gas effluents are vented through the calciner
 
offgas system. Once cooled, the canister is removed from the furnace,
 
sealed, weld integrity checked, decontaminated, and inspected again
 
prior to storage.
 
The glass-forming frit is metered continuously to the melter
 
at a rate proportional to the calcined product generation. The flow
 
rate is established from the known HLLW flow rate to the calciner and
 
the known total oxide content of the HLLW. With the metering and hopper
 
equipment located outside the hot cell the frit flow rate is easily
 
maintained (Reference 5-11, page 6.41). The metered frit falls through
 
an air lock and into a cone below the calciner. Thepotential for
 
batch sintering in processing equipment due to the self-heating of
 
the waste is minimized because the waste and frit are mixed just prior
 
to entering the melter (Reference 5-8, pages 23-30).
 
Two melting furnaces are located below the calciner--calcining
 
is a continuous operation and in-can melting is a batch process. A diverter
 
valve is situated in the feed ducts to the furnaces. Once a canister is
 
filled to the desired level, the calcine-frit mixture is diverted to the
 
second melting furnace. The unfixed material on the inside surface of the
 
canister above the final melt is melted in place (Reference 5-8,
 
pages 23-30).
 
The canister is planned to be held in the furnace for several
 
hours to assure complete melting, prior to being cooled, capped, and removed
 
from the furnace. The cap is welded, the canister and weld are leak checked,
 
decontaminated, and the integrity inspected before being sent to storage.
 
(See Figure 5-11.)
 
The borosilicate waste/glass produced in the in-can melter is a
 
vitrified, slightly fractured monolith which is sealed in a metallic
 
storage canister. The processing restraint (relatively low glass forming
 
temperature) of melting the waste in the storage canister prevents
 
the complete assimilation of all the waste oxides in the glass and
 
minor amounts of several different crystalline phases are dispersed
 
in the glass (Reference 5-16, pages 1-8). The leachability of the
 
glass has not been shown to be significantly increased by the presence
 
of crystalline phases (Reference 5-20, pages 43-70).
 
5.2.2.2 Development History. Between 1966 and 1970 the Waste
 
Solidification Engineering Prototypes program incorporated HLLW in
 
glass utilizing various calcination and vitrification methods and four
 
levels of simulated fuel exposure (Reference 5-10, pages 3.1-5.55). The
 
WSEP equipment was scaled to handle HLLW from a 1 MTU/day reprocessing
 
facility. In 1970, vitrification of HLLW using a spray calciner coupled
 
to an in-can melter was operated at Battelle Northwest Laboratories
 
during the WSEP program. Two fully radioactive engineering-scale runs
 
were made (Reference BNWL-1583). Further development was initiated in
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1974 in the Waste Fixation Program. Between October 1974 and 1975, 13
 
engineering-scale, nonradioactive in-can melting campaigns were carried
 
out. The in-can melter was coupled to a spray calciner for several of
 
the runs, with the remaining operations being carried out using a wiped­
film evaporator and a fluid-bed calciner (Reference 5-10, page 3.3).
 
5.2.2.3 Program Status and Plans. The Waste Fixation Program (WFP)
 
is continuing to develop the in-can melter coupled to a spray calciner.
 
A full-scale non-radioactive facility (150 liters/hour) was completed
 
and began operation in April 1977 (Reference 5-12,'page 1). A full-scale
 
non-radioactive remote operation and maintenance facility is in design
 
to gain experience in remote canister handling ahd maintenance techniques
 
(Reference 5-9, page 20). Radioactive tests will be carried out in
 
a pilot plant-scale spray calciner/in-can melter process (15 liters/hour)
 
in 1978 (Reference 5-12, page I).
 
5.2.2.4 Issues Related to Technology Status of In-Can Vitrification
 
5.2.2.4.1" Scientific Feasibility
 
Glass Integrity. The effect of the radioactive, thermal,
 
mechanical and chemical properties of the waste on the composite borosilicate
 
glass ability to retain the radionuclides is the major item of interest
 
under glass integrity.
 
Radiation Effects. The HLW-glass will be subjected to intense
 
levels of alpha, beta, and gamma radiation as well as considerable
 
levels of neutron radiation. After a period of storage, the major
 
radiation effects will be due to alpha radiation and the associated
 
alpha recoil nuclei. Beta and gamma radiation cause relatively minor
 
amounts of damage. Because of their low fluxes in the waste, neutrons
 
and fission recoils produce a minimal impact on the waste. The net
 
rate of radiation-induced defects in the waste glass depends on both
 
the defect formation rates and the defect recombination, or stabilization,
 
rates. The alpha radiation induces the buildup of stored energy, density
 
changes, mechanical structural changes, helium generation effects,
 
and changes in leach rate (Reference 5-20, pages 71-80). The results
 
of investigations of each of these phenomena are discussed below.
 
The buildup of stored energy in the solidified HLW-is the result
 
of displacement of atoms from their normal lattice position due predominantly
 
to alpha recoil interactions. If a large quantity of stored energy is
 
released in a short period of time, the result would be a sharp increase
 
in the temperature of the glass. Such a temperature rise could prove to
 
be detrimental to the integrity of the waste canister and the physical and
 
chemical properties of the solidified waste-glass (Reference 5-18, page 1.1).
 
To investigate the buildup of stored energy, three glass types
 
have been doped with Curium-244 for accelerated alpha radiation tests. The
 
buildup of the stored energy in all three glasses (zinc-borosilicate,
 
lead-borosilicate, and high silica glass) tended to be similar. The
 
energy increased rapidly to 17-20 cal/gram and then began to level off.
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No significant difference in energy buildup was observed in zinc-borosilicate
 
glass using 1% and 8% curium-244 (for 3,000 and 50,000 year simulations).
 
(Reference 5-22).
 
The amount of stored energy accumulated in glass decreases as
 
the temperature is increased, decreasing nearly linearly with increasing
 
storage temperature, reaching a negligible value at 3500C. The self­
heating of actual wastes will therefore reduce the amount of stored
 
energy, particularly during the first 50-100 years after vitrification.
 
The stored energy in zinc borosilicate glass will not likely
 
exceed 50 cal/g. If this amount were released adiabatically, temperature
 
rises in the glass would not be expected to exceed 2000C. Such a release of
 
stored energy was determined to possibly result only from a rapid rise in the
 
waste's temperature caused by an external heat source or lack of cooling
 
source (Reference 5-18, pages 7.1-7.4). With the maximum release rate found
 
to be 0.08 cal/°C gm there is expected to be no spontaneous or serious effect
 
on the glass (Reference 5-18, pages 6.1-6.4). Such temperature rises,
 
although significant, are not expected to have serious consequences
 
(Reference 5-18).
 
Effect of Alpha Particle Radiation on Densitv of Glass. Small
 
but measurable density changes (either positive or negative depending on
 
the specific glass formulation) have been observed as a result of alpha
 
particle radiation. Experimental results, using curium-doped (1%) zinc
 
borosilicate glass, indicated a density increase (shrinkage) of about 0.2%
 
for the devitrified glass and approximately 0.8% for vitrified glass
 
samples (Reference 5-20, page 76). The significant influencing factor
 
in these density changes does not appear to be radiation dose. For the
 
was only a very small difference in density increase at the apparent
 
maximum dose of 1018 alpha/gram (the density began to perceptively decrease
 
at higher doses) with glass samples doped with 1% and 8% curium. The
 
observed density increase of 1% for the 8% curium-doped zinc-borosilicate
 
vitrified waste could possibly be large enough to affect the cannister
 
design. (Reference 5-20, page 76). The affects of alpha radiation
 
on density can apparently be controlled, if necessary, by varying the
 
glass composition as indicated by the behavior of the three glass types
 
studied (1% Cm-doped, vitreous-and devitrified-, and 8% cm-doped vitreous
 
zinc-borosilicate glass). (Reference 5-20, page 77).
 
Effect of Contained Alpha Particle Radiation on Leachability
 
of Glass. Glass leach rates have been determined by examining the
 
behavior of curium and potassium in the glass samples used in accelerated
 
alpha experiments. As shown in Figure 5-10, leach rates based on potassium
 
are a hundred times greater than those based on cesium in the glass
 
specimens. The irradiated and nonirradiated data for potassium based
 
leach rates indicate there is only a slight increase in leachability of
 
the reference glass due to high alpha doses. It was concluded by Mendel
 
et al. that, since there was no significant difference in leach rates for
 
samples with different doses, the doses used in these experiments produced
 
radiation effects which exceeded the radiation saturation point of the
 
glass (Reference 5-20, page 77).
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Figure 5-10. 	 Leachability of 244Cm-Doped Zinc Borosilicate
 
Waste Glass (Reference 5.20, page 77)
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Helium Behavior in Waste Glass. The helium generated from the
 
alpha decay of the actinides must either be incorporated within the waste­
glass structures, or be diffused to the surrounding atmosphere. Due to
 
the waste-glass being contained in a sealed canister, there is a potential
 
for helium pressurization and of the glass swelling because of the formation
 
of helium bubbles. A detailed review of the experimental investigations
 
of helium diffusion in curium doped zinc borosilicate glass is presented
 
in Reference 5-21.
 
The glass samples examined contained 1-2 x 1018 helium atoms/cm3
 
glass. Equivalent self-radiation damage and helium concentrations would
 
be achieved after approximately 100 years of storage for glass containing
 
commercial LWR generated waste. One of the major conclusions has been that
 
in a canister with a 10 vol. % plenum, containing glass which is not a
 
monolith, the pressure will not exceed 15 lbs/in2 until the waste-glass
 
has been stored around 104 years (Reference 5-20, page 79).
 
Other Radiation Effects. Mechanical strength, and visible
 
surface changes are also being studied in the radiation effects task.
 
Preliminary work to date indicates that no marked changes in these
 
properties occur after alpha irradiation.
 
Thermal Effects.
 
Shock. During the cooling phase the waste-glass is expected
 
to undergo thermal shock. The effect of this thermal shock on the
 
reference reference zinc-borosilicate waste glass in a six-inch diameter
 
canister is presented in Figure 5-11. As indicated in the figure,
 
the surface area will increase by about a factor of 10 due to the thermal
 
shock from air cooling.
 
These experiments indicate that with time, a secondary thermal
 
cracking will occur for present waste disposal glass designs. For, as the
 
major heat producers decay the thermal gradient in the canister will decrease.
 
This decrease in gradient can produce sufficient stresses to crack the glass.
 
Due to the fact that the temperature distribution within a cylinder of uni­
form heat generation is parabolic, the major stress is expected to occur
 
near the canister walls. At the location near the walls the glass will
 
already be cracked from thermal shock. Therefore, additional cracking from
 
thermal stress will be limited (Reference 5.16, pages 1-8). What cracking
 
that does occur will be a function of initial thermal power in the canister,
 
the fin and canister design, the storage conditions, and the position of the
 
glass within the canister. Also, the thermal shock sensitivity of a waste­
glass will be dependent on the thermal conductivity, thermal expansion co­
efficient, and heat capacity of the glass--though variations in these
 
properties have been minor for different waste glasses (Further investigations
 
into this behavior of thermal cracking are planned for 1978).
 
5-23
 
77-69
 
20 WATER 
< QUENCHED
LU 
< 15 
C­
i., - FREE AIR:10COVT
10 CONVECTION 
w COOLED 
-JW ANNEAE SLOW COOLED 
0o I 
I I 1 
0.1 1 10 100 1000 10,000 
COOLING RATE, oC/HR 
Figure 5-11. Effect of Cooling Rate on the Generation of
 
Increased Surface Area in a 6-inch Diameter
 
Glass Casting (Reference 5-20, page 36)
 
5-24
 
77-69
 
Devitrification. As a result of prolonged self-heating
 
at certain temperatures devitrification may result, with corresponding
 
increases in the leachability and porosity of the glass. Devitrifica­
tion is the formation of crystals in glass. The rate of devitrification
 
and the types of crystals formed is strongly dependent on formulation
 
and thermal history but not significantly influenced by radiation
 
(Reference 5-19, pages 19-25).
 
In the reference borosilicate nonradioactive glass samples,
 
the maximum effects of devitrification occur between 7000 and 7500C
 
(Reference 5-20, pages 33-91). The major devitrification products are
 
zinc silicate crystals (Zn2 SiO4 ) and a strontium molybdate phase.
 
The zinc silicate crystals cause some minor cracking of the waste-glass
 
because of a mismatch of the thermal expansion with that of the glass.
 
The molybdate phase (either calcium, strontium, or barium) was found 
to have a greater water solubility than the waste glass. The reference 
glass properties are impacted to a smaller extent by the other phases 
present in the glass (Reference 5-20, page 57).
 
Long-term leach test results indicate that devitrification 
effects at 7000C increase the leachability of the reference glass by a. 
factor of 10 (Reference 5-20, page 50). The devitrification changes the 
glass such that it "leaches" mainly by corrosion while attack of the
 
vitreous glass is mainly by a true leaching mechanism.
 
Many complexities are involved in the leaching of vitrified
 
and devitrified waste glass by very slowly moving water. A general
 
indication of the durability of the reference zinc-borosilicate glass
 
has been obtained by the extrapolation of the leach rate results for
 
cesium and strontium by slowly moving 250C water (Reference 5-20, pages
 
49-54). The depth of leaching over a period of 1000 years is estimated
 
by Mendel et al. of Battelle-to be equivalant to one millimeter of the
 
original glass cylinder's diameter being leached from the devitrified
 
exterior area of the glass cylinder. The vitreous interior glass is 
estimated to be penetrated less than a tenth of a millimeter in 1000 years
 
(Reference 5-20, page 53). These estimates were based on cesium experi­
mental data (Reference 5-20, page 54). For estimates beyond 1000 years
 
strontium experimental data were used as the extrapolation base due to
 
the fact that in actual high-level waste the cesium will have decayed
 
away after 1000 years. The extrapolated results are interpreted by
 
Mendel et al. to indicate that after 100,000 years the devitrified
 
glass cylinder exterior could have been penetrated approximately one
 
centimeter and the vitreous interior glass less than one millimeter
 
(Reference 5-20, page 53). As stated previously, there are many complex
 
factors involved in extrapolating experimental results that have been
 
obtained over a relatively short period of time to long-term leaching
 
predictions. Further experimentation and analysis is necessary before 
such extrapolations can be made with confidence. 
Mechanical Shock Impact. Mechanical forces acting on a 
canister of solidified (e.g., vitrified) waste could not only breach the
 
canister wall, but also break the glass into smaller, potentially
 
respirable particles. The increased glass surface area would hasten
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dissolution and volatilization if driving forces for these were present.
 
Experiments have been performed (Reference 5-22) on the reference glass
 
to estimate 1) the quantity of respirable glass fines produced; 2) the
 
increase in glass surface area; and 3) the impact resistance of the filled
 
canisters. Even if all test canisters were to remain intact, the first
 
two items are needed because it cannot be guaranteed that every production
 
canister will be fabricated soundly and maintained properly.
 
Tests were conducted using nonradioactive reference waste glass­
in cylindrical 304L stainless steel canisters. Both series included speci-7
 
ments which were essentially glassy and those which had been partially devi­
trified by thermal treatment. The canisters breached only at the two highest
 
velocities (66 and 117 fps). The breaches were all very small cracks.
 
Pre- and post-test weight checks indicated that very little, if any,
 
glass escaped through the cracks. The inventory fraction of the resulting
 
fines smaller than 10 microns typically ranged from 10-8 for control
 
-
specimens to 10 4 for 80 mph impact. This compares with approximately
 
10-2 for nonimpacted calcined waste (and probably for impacted calcine
 
also). Geometric calculations were made of the surface area created.
 
The surface area typically increased by only a few percent of the initial
 
surface area for control specimens, but by a factor of 40 for 80 mph
 
impact.
 
No consistent difference was observed between the essentially
 
glassy and the partially devitrified specimens nor between small and large
 
canisters when the results were compared on a fractional breakup basis.
 
Testing of specimens which are more severely devitrified might lead to
 
observable differences between glassy and devitrified waste. Testing at
 
elevated temperature increased the quantity of large particles produced,
 
but no significant effect was observed on the quantity of particles
 
smaller than about 20 to 50 microns.
 
In borosilicate waste-glass, two types of non-homogeneity
 
have resulted: occlusion of some waste oxide near the bottom and on the
 
top of the melt; and a separate microcrystalline phase which collects at
 
the surface or as globules suspended within the melt (Reference 5-16,
 
page 8). Though the occlusion appears not to affect product quality
 
significantly, the separate phase is undesirable due to its being more
 
water soluble and more corrosive than the bulk melt. It is also enriched
 
in certain fission products -- cesium in particular. Either higher
 
temperatures or increased duration of thermal treatment decreases the
 
nonhomogeneity. According to McElroy of Battelle, these problems, which
 
arose in the WSEP program, have been largely eliminated by changes in
 
glass composition and thermal treatment (Reference 5-12, page 1).
 
5.2.2.4.2 Technical Feasibility
 
Glass Composition. The present program is concerned with
 
several reference glasses and the factors affecting the composition.
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There is not one specific type of waste glass suited to the 
immobilization of all LWR high-level wastes. Waste glass compositions must
 
be adapted to account for many variables, including (Reference 5-20, page 1):
 
o 	 Reprocessing plant - which affects the amount
 
operating mode of U and Pu in HLLW
 
* 	 Frequency of plant - which affects the amount of sod­
shutdowns ium and other inerts in the waste 
* 	 Waste vitrification - which affects restraints placed 
on allowable glass viscosity, 
electrical conductivity,
 
redox potential, etc.
 
* 	 Fuel type and burnup - which affects the ratio of 
fission product to inerts in HLLW, 
the amount of transplutoniums, 
and possible presence of fluoride 
* 	 Reprocessing plant - which affects the amount and 
flowsheet 	 type of inerts in HLLW (e.g. pre­
sence or absence of soluble
 
poisons, ILLW, Pu reductants).
 
Glass is created when a mixture of glass formers, intermediates,
 
and modifiers are heated. The glass formers are those oxides with high bond
 
strength (>80 kcal/mole) while intermediates have bond strengths between 60
 
and 80 kcal/mole and modifiers are any oxides that fall below 60 kcal/mole
 
(Reference 5-9, page 3).
 
One or more of the glass formers (Si0 2 , B203, and P205) are 
essential for any waste glass. The characteristics of the glass are deter­
mined by the intermediates and modifiers. The intermediates (such as Ti and 
Al) generally tend to increase the melting point as well as increase the 
durability. The modifiers (including alkalis and alkaline earths) aid in 
melting but can decrease durability. With the exception of some phosphate 
in the waste, the HLW constituents act as modifiers and/or intermediates. 
Supplemental intermediates and modifiers are then added to produce 
the desired waste-glass'characteristics (Reference 5-9, page 4). The 
general compositional range for borosilicate waste glasses is shown 
on the ternary diagram in 	Figure 5-12.
 
The properties of the waste-glass are determined by composition,
 
processing techniques, and handling. The current Waste Fixation Program
 
has examined in considerable detail a reference glass composition with 23 wt%
 
radioactive waste (Reference 5-8, page 12). This generic investigation is
 
being 	undertaken so a detailed definition of the behavior of one character­
istic 	glass formulation can be extrapolated to other formulations within
 
the same class with a less extensive number of experiments. In addition,
 
investigations have begun on three other waste glass compositions represen­
tative of post or planned 	fuel reprocessing plants. These are the formerly
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operational Nuclear Fuel Service Plant in West Valley, New York, and the 
proposed Allied General Nucleus Services (AGNS Burnwell, S.C.) and Exxon 
plants. These formulations will consider 23 wt% radioactive waste.
 
In general an empirical approach to establishing guidelines
 
for glass formulation has been made (Reference 5-9, page 12). The initial
 
testing guidelines are meltability (2-3 hours at 10500C) and leachability.
 
Meltability is improved by certain composition additions while leachability
 
is often increased by these additions (Reference 5-9, pages 12-13). Waste
 
oxides can be incorporated in all of the glasses investigated to a level
 
of between 40 to 50 wt%. But 23 wt% has been determined to be the optimum
 
amount by McElroy et al. of Battelle based on considering processing factors 
(volatility, homogeneity, corrosion), leachability and economic factors
 
(Reference 5-8, page 12). Reduced quantities of waste could be incorporated
 
in the glass if regulations required such a step -- although according to
 
McElroy the glass composition, that has been developed and studied, would not
 
be suitable for a waste content of less than 16 wt% (Reference 5-12, page 2).
 
5.2.2.4.3 Engineering Aehievability
 
Remote Operation and Maintenance. The potential difficulty of 
remote maintenance and the need for safe remote operations are areas of 
significant concern in the design and operation of the vitrification process. 
The in-can melter furnace in the proposed BNWL full-scale remote 
facility design is mounted on a structure that has service plugs extending
 
through the cell-wall to allow for external connecting of all service lines.
 
The furnace structure is set on rails to allow movement of the canister to 
a position under the spray calciner. The load cells (Figure 5-13) and furnace 
retort can be replaced remotely (Reference 5-15, pages 40-42). 
Itmay be required that the furnace retort have an inert
 
atmosphere during melting to reduce spall (scaling - oxidized surface
 
coating on stainless steel). This will be accomplished by a seal connected 
to the coupling assembly (Figure 5-13). The coupling assembly uses air
 
couplers and metal bellows. The bellows allow for misalignment, thermal
 
expansion, and provide vertical movement necessary during canister changing. 
Remote maintenance of the two in-can melters is obtained by an
 
in-cell crane once the melters are rolled to the back of the cell. At this
 
location the service plugs will have cleared the wall. Shielded viewing
 
windows and/or periscopes will be provided as required (Reference 5-15,
 
page 40).
 
With respect to the frit addition equipment, all failure compo­
nents will be located outside the cell. An air break and airlock to prevent
 
air inleakage to the calciner and backflow of contaminated material are
 
located in a shielded wall niche. All piping is sloping to assure free 
drainage and to assist in decontamination.
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Verification tests of selected remote features is currently

underway at BNWL on a "plant size" (150 liters/hour) scale. A full-scale non­
radioactive remote operation and maintenance cell will then be constructed.
 
Also, pilot scale (15 liters/hour) remote demonstration tests will be
 
undertaken in a hot-cell using commercial high-level waste in 1978.
 
5.2.3 Encapsulation
 
5.2.3.1 Process Description. The function of the canister is to provide
 
primary containment of the waste during its surface storage and possible
 
retrieval period in the geological formation. The main criteria for the
 
canister is that it has a strength and corrosion resistance over a range
 
of temperatures and retain a leak-proof seal.
 
The canister will be capped and removed from the furnace after
 
a sufficient cooling period for the melt. The cap will be welded; checked,
 
and the canister decontaminated prior to transfer to temporary storage.
 
A schematic diagram of this main process is included in Figure 5-14.
 
The option of overpacking (placing the primary canister in
 
a secondary canister) has been investigated and may-be required by
 
future Federal canister criteria for repository storage. Such criteria
 
requiring overpacking could involve reducing surface contamination
 
levels or the handling of the primary canister as a pressure vessel
 
(Reference 5-11, pages 6.8-6.9).
 
The simplified decontamination of the secondary canister and
 
the improved quality of external containment would be realized at the
 
cost of reducing the heat content of the primary canister and increasing
 
the waste containment expense (Reference 5-11, page 6.9).
 
5.2.3.2 Development History. The canisters used in the WSEP program
 
were from 6 to 12 inches in diameter and 8 feet long (Reference 5-10,
 
pages 7.1-7.4). The current typical canister design in the WFP program is
 
a cylindrical canister 14 inches (36 cm) in diameter and 10 feet (3 m) long
 
containing 245 245 liters of glass (Reference 5-9, pages 7-11). This
 
canister also has an internal fin arrangement which increases heat transfer
 
into the canister during melting and later assist in the removal of heat
 
from the waste-glass mixture. The fins can allow the almost doubling of
 
the canister diameter with the same center-line temperature over a non
 
finned design (Reference 5-9, page 7).
 
5.2.3.3 Program Status and Plans. The Federal repository criteria on
 
the canister design have not yet been finalized. Some of the probable
 
limits are considered to be (Reference 5-11, page 6.8):
 
* maximum diameter, 40 to 60 cm
 
• maximum length, 3 to 4.5 m
 
maximum heat density, 2.9 kW/linear meter
 a
I/ 
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HLW Canisters (Reference 5-11, page 6.9)
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* maximum radiation, 1 x 10-3 rem/hr neutron dose rate 
and 1 x 106 rem/hr gamma dose rate, measured 1 m from 
any canister surface point 
* 	 surface decontamination low enough to maintain 
acceptable contamination levels at the repository 
These limits will apply only after the solidified waste leaves the
 
solidification facility. Heat, radiation, and density limits will be
 
exceeded when the canister is being filled. At the time of storage, the
 
heat removal capabilities, and allowable centerline and surface
 
temperature are the limits.
 
Studies are continuing on container design and the finalization
 
of the design is considered one of the major development program objectives
 
of the solidification-immobilization program.
 
5.2.3.4 Issues Related to Technology Status of Encapsulation.
 
5.2.3.4.1 Scientific Feasibility. Canister materials factors are an
 
important consideration in the establishment of scientific feasibility of
 
the encapsulation process.
 
Those material factors that are significant during the melting
 
operation include internal and external corrosion and potential deformation
 
as a result of metal creep (Reference 5-9, page 8). Although no significant
 
canister deformation has occurred in the pilot plant runs utilizing 304L
 
stainless steel canisters, the molten glass level never rose above 4 feet
 
because of furnace limitations. A deeper furnace has been acquired
 
(April 1977) in order to study the effects of filling the longer canisters
 
with a full load of glass (Reference 5-24, page 1). Early results with 12
 
and 16-inch diameter cannisters with over 6 feet of glass are giving results
 
similar to the 4 foot fill data. (Reference 5-24, page 1). Stress rupture
 
tests have begun in order to obtain data on the chrome nickel steel canister
 
candidate materials for temperatures up to 10000C.
 
One of the two types of external corrosion is spalling (scaling)
 
of the oxide scale from the canister .surface. The scale can create crevices
 
for points of corrosion during water basin storage. The scale also falls
 
from the side of the canisters to the bottom of the furnace creating a minor
 
secondary waste (Reference 5-9, pages 8-9). To reduce scale formation, inert
 
gas purging of the furnace is being considered (Reference 5-15, page 40).
 
The second external corrosion problem, sensitization, (a time-temperature
 
process occurring at 400-900C) can be minimized with proper cooling
 
(Reference 5-9, page 8). During handling and storage the prolonged temper­
ature of the surface of the canister should remain below 400o0C to prevent
 
sensitization. The internal corrosion situation during melt is not con­
sidered a significant problem -- occurring at a rate of 0.1 inch/month
 
at 10500C (Reference 5-9, pages 7-11).
 
During most of the handling operations the canister will be air
 
cooled resulting in some temperature fluctuations. Decontamination (with
 
spray steam or water) of the canister and canister emplacement in a water
 
5-33
 
77-69
 
basin will cause rapid temperature changes. The removal from the water
 
basin for transport to the Federal repository will result in a temperature
 
rise. The results of the temperature fluctuations will be some fracturing
 
of the glass and a stressed condition on the canister. The stressed-con­
dition will be due to the lower thermal expansion of the glass compared to
 
the canister (Reference 5-9, page 9). Failures of the canister resulting
 
from the stress corrosion can be prevented if the water's chloride content
 
is less than 1 ppm and the pH is alkaline (Reference 5-9, page 9).
 
Other materials being examined besides the current 304L stainless
 
steel include 310 and 347 stainless steel, Inconel alloy 600 and 601, And
 
Incoloy alloy 800 and 802. If "overpacking" is required, mild steel or cast
 
iron could be used for the secondary container (Reference 5-9, page 9).
 
5.2.3.4.2 Technical Feasibility. The major issue in an acceptable techni­
cal process is the containment criteria the canister must meet. The current
 
requirements (10 CFR 50, Appendix F) for containment specify that the canis­
ter may be held for a maximum of five years at the reprocessing facility and
 
must retain its integrity for 90 days after emplacement at the repository.
 
As discussed in the Program Status and Plans section, Federal repository
 
criteria on the canister design are being developed to specify the specific
 
requirements the canister must meet once it leaves the solidification
 
(reprocessing) facility.
 
Process limitations on the canister dimensions result mainly from
 
the considerations of high temperature materials strength and heat removal.
 
Internal fins were included in the design in order to improve the transfer
 
of heat into the glass during processing and out of the glass during storage.
 
5.2.3.4.3 Engineering Achievability
 
Long-Term Canister Integrity. With a possible requirement for
 
retrievability of the waste glass canister from the geological repository
 
over some extended period of time, the long-term canister integrity
 
becomes of some concern.
 
During the WSEP program (1966-1970) 33 canisters were filled with
 
various waste-glass composition and placed in either water basin, air basin,
 
or ambient air storage (Reference 5-10, page 3.3). Of the three materials
 
used in the WSEP canister construction, only 304L and 310 stainless steel
 
were suitable for the in-can melting process (26 canisters). The canisters
 
are still in storage at BNWL (Reference 5-9, pages 9-11), under varying
 
conditions. The three canisters holding borosilicate glass were examined
 
after about 2.5 years of storage with no observable changes in the product
 
quality due to radiation decay (Reference 5-9, pages 9-11). One of the major
 
results of these examinations is that the outside surface becomes sensitized
 
during prolonged air storage at elevated temperatures (ambient air storage).
 
It was concluded by Battelle that to avoid canister failure due to sensitiz­
ing, such ambiently-stored canisters should not be subsequently stored in
 
water basints (Reference 5-13, pages 40-46). This and other results concern­
ing interim storage integrity obtained from the WSEP program have provided
 
a basis upon which to prevent such canister deterioration-during interim,
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storage and thereby assist in prolonging the canisters' retainment
 
abilities in the geological repository.
 
The current WFP program includes the examination of canister
 
corrosion under both processing and long-term storage conditions
 
(Reference 5-13). The actual canister material and design will be
 
dependent on the Federal repository requirements. A number of materials
 
and design configurations are being examined. It is expected that, from
 
these various designs and materials, a canister can be developed that would
 
provide the necessary long-term containment for possible retrievability
 
,to meet the presently non-finalized Federal repository requirements.
 
DEEP GEOLOGIC ISOLATION IN BEDDED SALT
 
5.3.1 Reference Repository Description. Figure 5-15 shows a cut­
away of a conceptual repository prepared by the Office of Waste Isolation
 
(OWI) which is managing the National Waste Terminal Storage (NWTS) Program
 
for DOE. This repository, in concept, consists of surface facilities;
 
shafts for waste, men, and material; and ventilation for a large number of
 
excavated rooms at depths between 800 feet and approximately 3000 feet
 
below the surface (Reference 5-25).
 
The reference repository will have an excavation underground
 
that will cover approximately 2,000 acres. DOE will acquire surface and
 
subsurface title to this land. On the surface, the waste receiving and
 
support buildings will occupy approximately 200 acres. This will be the
 
only visible evidence of the repository. The remainder of the 2,000 acres
 
may be leased for selective usage. Surrounding the 2,000 acre area over­
lying the excavation will be a controlled area for which ERDA will acquire
 
subsurface title. This would permit all deep mining and drilling opera­
tions to be controlled, with the intent of eliminating any compromise of
 
the safety and integrity of the disposal areas (Reference 5-25).
 
In the OWI concept, there are four shafts servicing the
 
repository; a ventilation shaft, a man-and-materials shaft, a low-level
 
radioactive waste shaft, and a remote waste handling shaft. The waste
 
would be delivered to the surface facilities of the repository in a
 
solidified form in specially designed containers. Before being lowered
 
to the disposal area through vertical shafts joining the surface to the
 
mine, each container will be examined for damage and surface contamination
 
and an further overpack shield will be provided, if necessary.
 
High-level remotely handled waste will be unloaded from
 
the delivering vehicle and lowered through the shaft to the disposal
 
area, where it will be received by a shielded transporter vehicle.
 
It will then be moved into one of the disposal rooms, where it will
 
*During the construction phase the mined rock and salt would be transported
 
away from the site by truck and/or rail, as inconventional large
 
scale underground construction projects. Decisions about the eventual
 
disposition of the mined salt have not yet been made.
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be lowered into a hole in the floor of the room, and the hole will 
be plugged with a shield for radiation protection. In the case of
 
low-level waste, the containers will be lowered through the shaft and
 
then stacked in the disposal rooms.
 
For the closed nuclear fuel cycle, all of the waste expected
 
to be produced through the year 2006, based on the scenarios of 510,000
 
MW(e) production by the year 2000, could be put in one repository. This
 
would require a repository to be designed to hold 6,000 cubic meters
 
of high-level waste, 10,000 cubic meters of cladding waste, 45,000 cubic
 
meters of intermediate-level,waste, and 136,000 cubic meters of low­
level waste. Of the total repository area, 70 percent is for high-level
 
waste, 25 percent for cladding and intermediate-level waste, and five
 
percent for low-level waste. (See Section 6.4.)
 
The mine layout is a conventional room-and-pillar layout.
 
All storage rooms that receive canisters will be designed to have only
 
one entry. This provides positive control for heat, ventilation, and
 
exhaust for each room. Rooms for low-level waste storage will be designed
 
as an open grid system to permit easy storage.
 
In the high-level waste disposal area, 32 containers will be
 
stored in each room in vertical holes bored in the centerline of each room
 
on 17-foot centers. Each room is about 150 feet long (Reference 5-25).
 
Ceiling heights of 18 feet may be required to allow equipment operation
 
and placement of waste canisters.
 
The waste will be retained in a retrievable mode so it can
 
be removed from the repository with relative ease should circumstances
 
develop that require this action. After the repository has operated
 
for a period of time (10-50 years) and if no difficulties have occurred,
 
the retrievable mode will be abandoned once the repository is full,
 
and the rooms will then be backfilled with salt and sealed. The surface
 
facilities will be decommissioned and dismantled, and all shafts will
 
be plugged and sealed. The location will then be permanently marked.
 
5.3.2 Development History. In 1955, a conference was held under the
 
auspices of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to discuss the
 
possibilities of disposal of high-level wastes in geologic formations.
 
This conference provided the first comprehensive discussion of deep
 
geologic salt formations for waste disposal. In 1957, a report by the NAS
 
Committee on Waste Management recommended salt as the most promising
 
method of disposal (Reference 5-26, Appendix D).
 
With this impetus, Operation Salt Vault and other projects
 
were initiated by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The experi­
ments in Operation Salt Vault were designed to determine the consequence
 
of exposing bulk salt to radiation and heat. An abandoned salt mine near
 
Lyons, Kansas was the chosen site. The experimental findings in the
 
Salt Vault project on thermal response of the salt to embedded heat
 
sources, thermal stresses in mine pillars, and emplacement and handling
 
of spent fuel have been overshadowed by the subsequent failure of the
 
Lyons, Kansas site as a possible repository. The repository project
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in Kansas was officially terminated in February 1972 (Reference 5-27).
 
But this failure is unrelated to the experimental findings. The experi­
mental results obtained in Salt Vault provided important verification
 
of the analytical heat transfer models and design concepts for a bedded
 
salt repository, at least in the "near-field" of the disposal layer.
 
5.3.3 Program Status and Plans. The National Waste Terminal Storage
 
(NWTS) program was established in 1976 to locate waste storage sites and
 
to develop and manage Federal repositories. The general plan calls for
 
the study of three types of geologic formations in 36 of the continental
 
states and the eventual construction of six radioactive waste repositories.
 
Locations of known large salt deposits in the U.S. are shown in Figure 5-16.
 
With the plan for studying salt formations and other geologic formations,
 
the number of site studies, and the number of planned repositories, ERDA
 
expects the following advantages:
 
(I) 	 A greater probability of timely operation of a terminal
 
storage facility is achieved due to simultaneous and
 
parallel activities;
 
(2) 	 Retrievability of waste is accommodated because other repos­
itories are available to receive the waste should it be
 
necessary to move it for any reason;
 
(3) 	 It will not be necessary for one site or location to
 
serve the entire country;
 
(4) 	 Waste transportation costs may be reduced if more than
 
one facility is used since they will be dispersed around
 
the country; and
 
(5) 	 The concern about Governmental reluctance to abandon a
 
proposed site after significant expenditure is alleviated
 
because other sites or repositories will be available.
 
The overall NWTS program calls for the establishment of six repositories;
 
the schedule for which this work is envisioned is that the initial phase of
 
operation of the first repository is planned to start late in 1985. The
 
remaining repositories are also scheduled on about a 2-year phasing plan.
 
A more detailed schedule for the design and construction of a repository is
 
shown in Figure 5-17 (Reference 5-25). Although no sites have been selected,
 
it is anticipated that Repositories One and Two will be established in salt
 
formations (Reference 5-11).
 
The mainline system is that subset of the NWTS program that
 
deals with the establishment of two commercial waste terminal storage
 
facilities in bedded salt deposits that are scheduled to begin pilot
 
plant operation in 1985. A concurrent system of similar intent, the
 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), has been set up to dispose of wastes
 
generated in the defense program (Reference 5-28). The WIPP site has
 
been selected; the repository will be constructed in a bedded salt
 
deposit, and is slated to begin operation in 1983. A time table is
 
presented in Figure 5-18 (Reference 5-28).
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(Reference 5-20) 
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5.3.4 Issues Related to Technology Status of Bedded Salt Isolation.
 
The purpose of this section of the report is to examine the status of
 
technology development for the use of bedded salt deposits as storage and
 
disposal sites for high level solidified waste.
 
There is one obvious reason why bedded salt deposits have
 
been the subject of long standing interest as sites for storage and
 
disposal of radioactive wastes: the.very existence of vertically thick
 
and laterally extensive beds of highly water-soluble evaporite salts
 
that have endured through long periods of geologic time demonstrates
 
that either (1) the interiors of these deposits have never been exposed
 
to circulating ground water; or (2) if they have been briefly exposed
 
to circulating ground water the cracks that allowed ingress of water
 
have apparently healed after formation.
 
The interiors of salt deposits, then, represent natural
 
nearsurface systems that have been apparently stable for long periods
 
of time (>10 6 years). Since circulating ground water would be the primary
 
mode of transport of radioactive wastes to the surface of the earth where
 
they can become entrained in the biosphere, salt deposits represent an
 
attractive site for long term isolation.
 
5.3.4.1. Scientific and Technical -Feasibility. The ultimate criterion
 
for the establishment of repositories is the ability to guarantee long
 
term isolation from the biosphere of the disposed waste. Any such
 
guarantee for repositories established in bedded salt deposits relies upon
 
the ability to predict:
 
(1) 	 the long term natural stability of any particular site,
 
including seismic stability,
 
(2) 	 changes in the long term stability of a given site
 
caused by mining operations during the establishment
 
of a repository,
 
(3) 	 effects on the long term stability caused by the
 
presence of radioactive wastes,- and
 
(4) 	 the possible modes of breaching primary isolation and
 
resultant transfer of materials from the disposal site.
 
Evaluation of the present or expected adequacy of the
 
knowledge base for making these predictions requires a close examination
 
of the following aspects of the data base:
 
(1) 	 thorough and lengthy geological, hydrological, geo­
physical, and seismic risk studies of individual
 
sites, chosen for specific examination after regional
 
surveys;
 
(2) 	 salt mining and emplacement/retrievability technology
 
and expertise; and bore hole plugging and shaft sealing
 
technology;
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(3) 	the results of two R&D projects involving the storage
 
of radioactive materials in abandoned salt mines;
 
(4) 	experimental theoretical, and field work on various
 
problems related to chemical, thermal, and mechanical
 
effects on salt caused by the presence of radioactive
 
and thermally hot materials; and
 
(5) 	 theoretical, experimental, and field work on the release
 
and transport of radionuclides by ground water intrusion.
 
5.3.4.1.1 Geology and Site Criteria Development. Site selection is the
 
end result of a nested set of studies and experiments that the OWI has
 
detailed as:
 
(I) 	Identification of formations of interest
 
(2) 	Reconnaissance surveys
 
(3) 	Area studies
 
(4) 	Detailed confirmation studies
 
(5) 	 In situ tests (Reference 5-25)
 
These studies are not necessarily carried out in a linear
 
sequence. The intent of these studies is twofold:
 
(1) 	to locate sites that satisfy general screening criteria,
 
and
 
(2) 	to acquire the knowledge necessary to predict the long
 
term stability of a given site
 
General screening criteriaare easy to establish and are dis­
cussed in a number of reviews (Reference 5-11, Volume 5). The information
 
necessary to predict stability for any given potential site must come out
 
of an integrated set of geological and hydrological studies whose
 
objectives are tailored to each unique environment.
 
The OWI has the responsibility for commissioning and
 
evaluating these studies. Their area coverage and progress towards site
 
selection is reviewed in Reference 5-25. None of their studies have
 
progressed beyond step (3)of the procedural outline above.
 
The weakest links in site evaluation and selection process
 
seem to be:
 
(1) 	specification of hydrogeological criteria necessary
 
to ensure site stability;
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(2) 	 understanding, measurement, and modelling of the current
 
ground water regime in any given area of interest; and
 
(3) 	 extrapolation of that ground water regime up to one
 
million years into the future.
 
(4) 	 understanding and prediction of transport of radio­
nuclides should groundwater intrusion occur. (See
 
Section 6.4)
 
There is no reason to anticipate that existing, planned,
 
and recommended work will not result in a scientific data base which
 
will permit site selection, although the anticipated schedule may be
 
too ambitious. Each of the three sites which have come under the most
 
intensive investigation has serious problems that has or could lead.
 
to its rejection as a repository. However, the extensive information
 
gained, and the extensive data base that has been obtained could lead
 
to better evaluation of new sites.
 
The Lyons, Kansas, Project Salt Vault site was an existing
 
mine selected initially for evaluation and for R&D on the concept. It was
 
later 	proposed as an actual repository for storage and isolation of fission
 
products up to 700 years but was rejected partially because of hydrological 
problems encountered in a nearby mine, and because the abundance of drill
 
holes 	(man-made hydraulic connections) in the surrounding (commercially
 
exploited) area (Reference 5-29) decreased confidence that the site could
 
meet the geologic and geographic isolation requirements.
 
In West Germany, the Asse salt mine near Karlsruhe was
 
selected as an existing mine with a body of geological and stratigraphic
 
knowledge available, which would be suitable for an R&D site for the
 
storage of radioactive waste. Upon evaluation there appeared an
 
incompletely understood but potentially serious hydrological problem.
 
Specifically, there was earlier flooding in nearly abandoned salt mines,
 
and there exists standing brine in the mine (Reference 5-30). This mine
 
was rejected as a possible site for high-level waste, and it is used
 
solely for low- and intermediate-level wastes to gain experience in
 
waste disposal operation.
 
The site-specific nature of the geological location required
 
is underscored by the experience at a proposed WIPP site in New Mexico.
 
Drilling at the WIPP site in Carlsbad, New Mexico, turned up unexpected
 
complexities in subsurface geology - features that are now understood, but
 
which resulted in a shift in location of the proposed facility by about 7
 
miles (Reference 5-31).
 
There exist at present no sites where one can begin
 
construction of a repository with the assurance of no future setbacks.
 
However, the location of sites that will meet all criteria, both developed
 
and as yet undeveloped, can be expected as the end product of the OWI site
 
selection activity although the OWI schedule that calls for beginning cold
 
testing operations by 1985 may require revision.
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Any OWI work must also be integrated with the additional studies
 
and experimentation being conducted by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and their contractors, such as the
 
Lawrence Livermore Laboratories (LLL) studies. The LLL studies will
 
develop performance criteria for solid waste and site suitability needed
 
for the NWTS program. The NWTS program also intends to develop necessary
 
and sufficient design criteria. The acceptability of the criteria will be
 
determined by numerous reviewers. Obviously legislative and judicial
 
hearings as well as public hearings and pending legislation will impact the
 
development of criteria, and the development of technology to meet the
 
criteria; as well as the scheduling of the activities.
 
5.3.4.1.2 Salt Mining and Emplacement/Retrievability Technology. Con­
ventional salt mining techniques and technology are adequate to design and
 
mine caverns in bedded salt deposits since (1) a repository is designed along
 
the lines of a conventional salt mine; and (2) abandoned salt mines have
 
been used with satisfactory performance for the retrievable storage of radio­
active materials at both Lyons, Kansas and Asse, West Germany. Reviews
 
of state-of-the-art mining technology are being carried out by both
 
OWI and Sandia Laboratories.
 
Backfilling of the cavern with salt is also feasible with
 
current technology, although it is not a normal practice in salt mining.
 
However, even with back-filling, storage and disposal of mine tailings
 
presents an unresolved serious ecological problem. A review of the
 
problem has been commissioned by OWI (Reference 5-25).
 
Problems of mine design are somewhat different than those of
 
conventional salt mines because of the mechanical and structural effects
 
of the augmented thermal regime created by the presence of heat generating
 
wastes (closure of excavated rooms due to increased plastic flow rates;
 
thermal expansion of the salt mass). Theoretical models of the
 
deformation behavior of bedded salt deposits are being constructed by both
 
Sandia and OWI. These models can utilize laboratory data on mechanical
 
behavior of both rock and mineral specimens in the temperature range of
 
interest. They can also utilize field data gathered at Asse, in Project
 
Salt Vault, and the planned Avery Island Heating experiment (Reference 5-25,
 
page 134). The Avery Island in situ experiments consist of placing canned
 
heaters in sleeves in dome salt to simulate the thermal characteristics of
 
actual radioactive waste emplaced in a retrievable configuration.
 
The tests will provide specific information characterizing
 
brine migration into the emplacement hole, temperature and temperature
 
gradients in the adjacent salt, and the effects of elevated temperatures
 
on salt during extended time periods. In addition, evaluations will be
 
made of the corrosion between the salt and-the carbon steel sleeves and
 
the stability, during heating, of a drilled hole in salt with no backfill.
 
In situ measurements of salt formation stresses, displacements,
 
temperatures, and material properties will be obtained and can be used to
 
verify the results of the rock mechanics analyses and to improve the
 
modeling parameters used in such studies.
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A further problem under investigation is that of keeping the 
shaft dry. To connect the repository to the surface it is necessary to
 
sink several shafts, which will of necessity penetrate aquifers above the
 
repository. The shaft must be sealed against leakage, so that no
 
hydraulic connection can be established between the aquifer and the salt
 
beds. Shaft leakage is presumably the cause of the flooding of abandoned
 
salt mines near Asse. The problem is being studied by OWI, by Sandia, and
 
at Asse. (References 5-25, 5-26, 5-30, 5-31). A related problem is
 
borehole plugging. Boreholes have already been or will be drilled
 
at all prospective repository sites, and must be plugged to prevent
 
access of water to the salt deposit. This problem is under intensive
 
study by OWl, and is not considered solved.
 
5.3.4.1.3 Experience in Storage of Radioactive Material in Salt Deposits.
 
Radioactive material has been stored in salt deposits in two R&D projects
 
--one in West Germany and one in the Unites States. Both of these
 
projects have utilized existing Abandoned salt mines. Their performance
 
provides an initial data base useful in evaluating transport, handling,
 
emplacement and recovery of radioactive materials, and in evaluating
 
the short term integrity of repositories. Furthermore, data collected
 
on chemical effects, mechanical behavior and the thermal regime in
 
the host rock during thdse operations provides a valuable check on
 
laboratory and theoretical studies, as well as a source of data for
 
numerical models. Some features of the R&D project are given below,
 
further details are available in selected reports (Reference 5-25).
 
Project Salt Vault was an experimental study carried out by
 
AEC/ORNL in an abandoned salt mine at Lyons, Kansas. The objectives of
 
the experiment were to:
 
(1) 
(2) 
Test the feasibility and safety of nuclear waste 
handling equipment and techniques. 
Determine the stability of salt under the influence of 
heat and radiation. 
(3) Collect information on the creep and flow of salt. 
Over the course of 18 months, 21 canisters (each containing two irrad­
icated fuel assemblies) were transported from the National Test Reactor
 
Site in Idaho to the mine site in Lyons, Kansas, installed in holes in the
 
floor of the salt mine, in some cases transferred from hole to hole, and
 
finally removed from the mine. Concurrently, radioactive waste simulation
 
tests were being conducted with electrical heaters. Valuable information
 
on effects on the long-term stability caused by the presence of radioactive
 
and heat generating wastes was accumulated (References 5-32, 5-33).
 
In West Germany, the Asse salt mine has served as a repository
 
for low level wastes since 1967, as a repository for intermediate level
 
since 1972, and as a test facility for the storage of high level wastes
 
since late 1976. In addition, a conventionally solution mined prototype
 
cavern is under construction at Asse, and is slated to receive intermediate
 
level wastes in 1979 (Reference 5-30). While detailed technical information
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is not generally available, it is clear that data collected during the
 
continued operation of this mine on a repository will be valuable in
 
evaluating all aspects of the long-term stability problem in salt caverns.
 
The Asse Salt Mine, however, is not in a bedded salt deposit.
 
The original horizontal sedimentary layering that defines bedded salt
 
deposits has been distorted by upwelling of the salt to form a salt anti­
cline. While many of the problems in evaluating long term site stability
 
are the same for flat lying salt beds, salt anticlines and salt domes,
 
there are differences in stratigraphy, hydrologic regime and tectonic
 
setting.
 
5.3.4.1.4 Rock-Radioactive Waste Interactions. Storage of radioactive
 
materials in bedded salt has a number of effects which have a bearing on
 
the long term integrity of the waste-salt system. These effects may be
 
categorized as thermal, mechanical, and chemical, but these categories are
 
not mutually independent.
 
The most obvious of these effects is an increase in host rock
 
temperature caused by the presence of radioactive wastes. Any analysis of
 
repository design and ultimate waste storage capacity will require the
 
prediction of the temperature distribution as a function of time. In
 
addition, many processes and properties are thermally driven or influenced
 
and cannot be analyzed thoroughly without detailed knowledge of the
 
thermal regime. The early development work in thermal analysis and
 
experimentation has been conducted, but more work is required to develop
 
thermal design criteria for the waste. These criteria, however, cannot
 
be developed without consideration of the mechanical, chemical, experi­
mental and overall system requirement influences. An iterative process
 
is envisioned before adequate and acceptable criteria can be established.
 
Two field studies, Project Salt Vault and Asse, have yielded
 
numerical data which have been reproduced by modeling. A third study,
 
the Avery Island Heating Experiment, is planned by OWl (Reference 5-25,
 
p. 34). Numerous model studies have been made. Despite the inherent
 
difficulty in making the calculations, and the need for data acquisition
 
of the thermal properties of the rocks present at each site, the pro­
blem of determining the thermal characteristics of bedded salt is tractable.
 
Thermally driven processes that might lead to the introduction
 
of water or brine into the disposal site include:
 
(1) brine migration, 
(2) Decrepitation of brine inclusions, 
(3) thermal decomposition of hydrous salts, 
(4) dehydration of shale partings (shale interbedded with, 
the salt),
 
Brine migration, the migration of natural inclusions of brine within salt
 
crystals up a thermal gradient, has been analyzed in single crystals in
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the laboratory (Reference 5-34). Data from Project Salt Vault have been
 
modeled fairly successfully. Field studies on the volumetric importance
 
of brine migration are presumably being carried out at Asse, and will be
 
-included as part of the experimental work carried out during the Avery
 
Island Heating Experiment. The process may be reasonably well understood;
 
however, its quantitative importance in geologic as opposed to laboratory
 
materials is not as well understood. If the repository is operated in
 
a retrievable mode for 10 years or more, brine inclusions that migrate
 
to the canister walls can be removed as vapor by the ventilation systems.
 
Decrepitation of brine inclusions is the vaporization and
 
explosion of natural brine inclusion upon heating. Calculations of
 
any effects of this upon either quantities of brine released and material
 
strength properties have not been made. Decrepitation does not occur
 
until a certain threshold temperature, (a function of brine inclusion
 
composition, size, and host crystal strength) is reached. A threshold
 
temperature of approximately 2500C at one atmosphere for brine in halite
 
is generally cited, so decrepitation may be avoided by maintenance
 
of temperatures below this critical value. (See Section 6.4.)
 
Several salts often present in evaporite assemblages contain
 
structural water, and are unstable at low temperatures. At Asse, a thick
 
seam of carnallite (KClJMgCl2 6H20), which decomposes at 110 0C with
 
attendant release of water, is present in the evaporite section. Any
 
analysis of the potential effects of the dehydration of hydrated salts is
 
very much site dependent, since mineralology, quantity and the three
 
dimensional distribution of such minerals are not predictable a priori.
 
The importance of the dehydration of shale will vary from site
 
to site. Project Salt Vault showed that operation of electrical heating
 
elements simulating radioactive waste in the vicinity of shale partings
 
caused inflow of water to the heating elements.
 
The long term effect of the introduction of modest quantities
 
of water or brine into the immediate vicinity of the waste containers is
 
not clear. Radiolysis of the brine could occur with the production of
 
gases and chemical species in solution (hydrochloric acid, chlorates and
 
perchlorates, hydrogen). The nature of these reactions and of these
 
products identify physical uncertainties and the need for research to
 
answer questions which may influence repository design and environmental
 
control. Additional concern is stated regarding the design and lifetime
 
of the canister. Short term effects may include some dispersion of
 
radioactive wastes, enhanced corrosion of containers, and problems in
 
operation, maintenance, and retrievability.
 
The amount of water produced is a function of amount of water
 
available and the thermal history, and will decrease with time as the
 
above-listed sources are tapped. Water produced in situ may pose no long
 
term effect, having been removed during routine repository operation.
 
Storage of energy in halite crystals as a result of gamma ray
 
exposure and radiolysis of halite resulting in the production of chlorine
 
gas have both been proposed as potential problems, but laboratory and field
 
studies thus far show them to be of little consequence (Reference 5-25).
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Mechanical effects are related to material properties as
 
a function of temperature, as was discussed briefly before.
 
5.3.4.1.5 Release and Transport of Radionuclides to the Biosphere.
 
Since the main barrier to the release of emplaced radionuclides into the
 
biosphere is to be long-term isolation in bedded salt deposits, it is
 
necessary to examine all ways in which this isolation could be breached.
 
Assuming loss of isolation, the pathways from the waste to the biosphere
 
must be evaluated in terms of rates of release and transport of the
 
various radionuclides, and modes of incorporation into the biosphere.
 
A number of scenarios can be constructed in which connection
 
between the repository and the biosphere is established:
 
(1) 	 Natural dissolution-of the salt beds by the action of
 
circulating ground water. This process must be looked
 
at in connection with all other scenarios.
 
(2) 	 Establishment of hydraulic connections between the
 
overlying aquifer(s) and the disposal horizon by failure
 
of mine slaft or borehold sealing, or faulting and/or
 
displacement upward of tie disposal horizon.
 
(3) 	 Establishment of hydraulic connection between overlying
 
and underlying aquifers resulting from failure of
 
borehole plugging or faulting.
 
Problems in evaluation of probability, time scale, and importance of these,
 
events stem from a geological and hydrological data base that is at
 
present inadequate to model the present and future groundwater regimes,
 
and rates of salt dissolution. Sandia has produced a reasonably detailed
 
assessment of the probabilities and consequences of such events for the
 
WIPP site (Reference 5-28).
 
Transport of radionuclides in groundwater is being examined in
 
a number of ways:
 
(1) 	 Laboratory studies on the interactions of radionuclides
 
with both individual minerals and rocks (pulverized and
 
drill core samples)
 
(2) 	 Construction of theoretical models
 
(3) 	 Examination of behavior of radionuclides in the field,
 
at the Hanford site, the Nevada Test Site, and the Oklo,
 
Gabon natural reactor site.
 
This problem is complicated and is still in the analysis and data acquisition
 
stage; models that have been constructed are one dimensional and simplistic.
 
(See Section 6.4.)
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SECTION 6
 
STATUS AND ISSUES RELEVANT TO COMPONENTS OF THE
 
SPENT FUEL STORAGE AND DISPOSAL SYSTEM
 
6.1 SPENT FUEL STORAGE AT REACTOR SITES
 
6.1.1 Refueling Preparations
 
The following description is based on the design and planned
 
operation of the spent fuel storage facility at the San Onofre pressurized
 
water reactors (PWR), units 2 and 3 (Reference 6-1). The San Onofre
 
spent fuel handling and storage facility arrangement and operation
 
are representative of PWRs in general. Specifically, the San Onofre
 
Units are representative of the majority of reactors either operating
 
or planned in California. (San Onofre 1, ' and 3, Rancho Seco 1, Diablo
 
Canyon 1 and 2, and the proposed Sundesert 1 and 2 are all PWRs. Hum­
bolt Bay, built in 1963, was the only BWR facility in California.)
 
The current BWR designs resemble the typical PWR spent fuel operations
 
and facility arrangements (such as San Onofre) to a large extent.
 
(As explained by Howard Friend and Keith Schwartztraber at the California
 
Energy Commission Hearing of March 10, 1977. (Reference Docket No. 76-NL-1,
 
pages 8 and 76.) The current BWR plant has the spent fuel storage
 
basin located in an auxiliary building adjacent to the reactor building.
 
The storage basin at a PWR is situated in a building devoted specifically
 
to fuel storage also located adjacent to the reactor building. The
 
major difference between PWR and previous BWR storage designs is that
 
the BWR pools were located within the reactor containment building
 
at an elevated level.
 
During the cooldown of the reactor, preparations are initiated
 
for the refueling operation. In the case of a pressurized water reactor,
 
PWR, (using San Onofre Units 2 and 3 as a reference base) (Reference 6-1
 
page 9.1-29 to 31) the first step is the removal of the missile shields.
 
The missile shields, as well as all the major components of the refueling
 
and spent fuel storage operation, are shown in Figure 6-1. The control
 
element drive mechanisms (CEDMs) are disengaged and the reactor vessel
 
head nuts and studs are then removed. The CEDM cooling shroud is discon­
nected and the vessel vent line are removed. Plugs are placed in
 
the empty stud holes and the reactor vessel flange is sealed to the
 
refueling pool floor in order tb prevent water from entering the lower
 
portion of the reactor vessel cavity. The refueling pool is filled
 
with borated water as a backup criticality safety measure prior to
 
the reactor head being removed to its storage position (Figure 6-1).
 
The next major operation involves moving the upper grid structure from
 
inside the reactor vessel to its storage location on the refueling
 
pool floor. This is accomplished by disengaging the CEDM's from their
 
control elements, withdrawing the in-core instrumentation, and then
 
lifting the structure with a special lifting rig. Once these operations
 
are completed (approximately 7 to 10 days) (Reference 6-2, page 2-260)
 
the refueling of the core can begin.
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Figure 6-1. 	 Arrangements of Major Components of the
 
Fuel Handling System (Ref. 6-1)
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6.1.2 Removal and Storage of Spent Fuel
 
The refueling machine is utilized to remove spent fuel from
 
the core and transport it to the transfer tube, to return new, or fresh,
 
fuel from the transfer tube to the core, and to arrange fuel within the core
 
to optimize fuel utilization. During movement, the fuel bundles are
 
carried .in the fuel hoist box to protect them from impacts and at a
 
sufficient, depth in the water to provide shielding for the refueling
 
personnel.
 
Once the refueling machine reaches the transfer tube end of
 
the refueling pool, the spent fuel bundle is discharged intoa vertically
 
standing transfer carriage (Figure 6-2). After the.new fuel,bundle is
 
extracted from the second chamber of the transfer carriage, the carriage
 
is then lowered to a horizontal position onto the transfer rails. The
 
fact that the transfer carriage has two chambers permits both the refueling
 
and spent fuel handling machines to travel loaded at all times--either
 
to and from the spent fuel pool/new fuel elevator and transfer tube,
 
or reactor and transfer tube.
 
The fuel bundle is transported through the tube to the spent
 
fuel area (Figure 6-I) by a cable drive mechanism. At the spent fuel pool
 
end the carriage is returned to the vertical position by the upending
 
machine (Figure 6-2). The spent fuel handling machine transfers a
 
new bundle from the new fuel elevator to the carriage and then moves
 
the spent fuel bundle through the spent fuel pool/transfer canal gate
 
to its designated rack position in the storage pool. The spent fuel
 
handling machine not only transports the spent fuel from the transfer
 
tube to the storage rack, but also moves the fuel from the racks and
 
deposits it in a shipping cask located in the cask loading pit. Numerous
 
interlocks and operational features are designed into the system to
 
prevent damage to, or dropping of, spent fuel assemblies. On the handling
 
machine hoist, interlocks are set to prevent attempting a lift if the
 
load is too great and also to interrupt the operation if the cables
 
go slack (Reference 6-1, page 9.1-25). Also travel stops on both
 
the spent fuel handling and refueling machine prevent fuel assemblies
 
from being hoisted to a point where less than 10 feet of water covers
 
the active portion of the assembly. With 10 feet of water covering
 
the fuel the radiation level at the water surface is limited to 2.5
 
mrem/hr (in the case of San Onofre 2+3) (Reference 6-1, page 9.1-34).
 
The spent fuel handling machine has a translation interlock which provides
 
speed restrictions on bridge and trolley movement unless the fuel is
 
in the full-up position (Reference 6-1, page 6.1-20). Zone switches
 
protect the handling machine from running the load into walls or the
 
gate of the storage area (Reference 6-1, page 6.1-20). Manual operation
 
of the spent fuel handling machine with direct visual contact by the
 
operator of the fuel movement operation provides a backup factor in the
 
event of an interlock failure. Redundant devices are provided in most
 
cases to perform the same operation as the interlock and to provide
 
the operator with information concerning the failure of the interlock
 
(Reference 6-1, page 9.1-17). Also all major handling components are
 
electrically interlocked with each other (Reference 6-I, page 9.1-33).
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The hoisting of the fuel assemblies is performed once the
 
grappling device is rotated by the actuator mechanism and engages the
 
assembly. Inadvertent uncoupling of the assembly is prevented by
 
positive locking of the grapple (Reference 6-1, page 9.1-25). During
 
the withdrawing or insertion of the fuel assembly by the spent fuel
 
handling machine, interlocks prevent any machine movement. Also during
 
hoisting operations the load on the cable is monitored to ensure that the
 
cable's movement is not restricted (Reference 6-1, page 9.1-25).
 
The controls for the spent fuel handling machine are located
 
on the trolley of the handling machine. The location of the trolley
 
is indicated by a pointer and target system while the coordinated location
 
of the bridge is indicated by synchros on the'console. In the event
 
of a power loss the bridge, trolley, and winch can be operated manually
 
by handwheels (Reference 6-1, page 9.1-25).
 
Prior to each fuel movement period recommended maintenance,
 
including any necessary adjustments and calibrations, is performed
 
(Reference 6-1, page 9.1-34). A dummy fuel assembly having the same
 
.weight, center of gravity, exterior size, and end geometry of an actual
 
assembly is run through the equipment prior to each fuel loading operation
 
as part of the preoperational testing sequence (Reference 6-1, page 9.1-33
 
and section 14.2).
 
Inservice inspections and tests, including checks of all
 
control circuits, interlocks and alarm functions, are undertaken periodically
 
on all components and systems (Reference 6-1, page 9.1-35).
 
During the reactor operation, the dry transfer tube is closed
 
by a manually operated valve on the spent fuel pool side (transfer canal)
 
and by a gasket flange inside the containment building (refueling pool)
 
(Figure 6-2). For fuel transfer operations, the flange is removed and the
 
refueling pool and transfer tube are filled with borated water. A common
 
-level in the spent fuel and refueling pools is reached prior to the valve
 
being opened.
 
6.1.3 Loading and Preparation of Cask for Off-Site Shipping
 
Eventually, the assemblies will be shipped off the reactor
 
site for storage or for reprocessing. The spent fuel shipping cask
 
arrives at the loading area and is lifted off the railroad car or truck
 
bed by a lifting beam. The overhead crane then moves the empty cask
 
to the washdown laydown (decontamination) area.
 
Once serviced and washed, the cask is lowered into the spent

fuel cask loading pit. The basic layout of the cask loading pit and
 
spent fuel storage pool make it impossible to move the cask over the
 
storage pool or storage racks -- the loading pit is the limit, of the
 
crane's movement (Reference 6-1, page 9.1-32). The first step of
 
this procedure is the placing of the cask on an intermediate ledge
 
of the pit to intercept the single lift over the fuel pool. The head
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of the cask is removed at this point and the short rigging is replaced
 
with long rigging -for the final descent to the floor of the loading pit.
 
The spent fuel handling machine transports the fuel bundle
 
underwater from the spent fuel pool rack through the pool gate and loads
 
it into the shipping cask. The cask is lifted to the ledge where the head
 
is reattached and the rigging again changed (this operation results in a
 
maximum potential cask drop distance being 30 feet) (Reference 6-1,
 
page 9.1-32). The cask is washed down as it is raised out of the pool
 
and transported to the decontamination area where the radioactivity
 
level on the exterior of the cask is reduced below the 10CFR71 limits
 
(Reference 6-4). After the washdown is completed and the area is drained,
 
the cask is moved to the shipping aisle and lowered onto the truck
 
trailer or railroad car.
 
6.1.4 Development History for Reactor Pool Storage
 
Ever since nuclear power plants first began operation approxi­
mately 35 years ago, the storage of irradiated nuclear fuel in water basins
 
(pools) has been standard practice. Originally, the water basin storage of
 
irradiated (spent) fuel was considered the first of several short interim
 
storage operations (i.e., at the reactor and at the reprocessing facility).
 
But as a result of the current U.S. policy of indefinitely postponing
 
reprocessing, reactor storage of spent fuel has currently become a
 
potential long term interim storage option. Consequently, additional
 
storage capacity will be required to meet this new situation.
 
Although some United States reactor fuel with zircalloy
 
cladding has been in water basin storage for up to 12 years for some
 
experimental stainless-clad fuel; up to 7 years for some commercial
 
stainless-clad fuel; and approximately 20 years for some unirradiated
 
stainless steel fixtures), water basin storage was not originally envi­
sioned as a long-term operation (Reference 6-39, page 12-15). In
 
the past, most nuclear power plants were designed on the assumption
 
that the reprocessing sector of the fuel cycle would be in operation
 
and that only a single batch (an annual discharge load) of spent fuel
 
would need to be stored at the reactor site. This spent fuel was expected
 
to remain at the reactor for less than a year (approximately 150 days)
 
(Reference 6-3, 1-96) before being shipped to a reprocessing facility.
 
Therefore, a spent fuel pool storage capacity of 1 1/3 core was considered
 
adequate for a single reactor--i 2/3 core capacity for two reactors
 
sharing a pool. This would allow complete unloading of the reactor
 
core, if necessary, for maintenance or inspection even if one batch
 
(1/3 core load) was already in the pool.
 
In the early 1970s, the projections concerning the introduc­
tion of wide-scale spent fuel reprocessing began to change. For, with
 
delays and cancellations in the operation of reprocessing facilities, it
 
became evident that there would not be sufficient reprocessing capacity in
 
the early 1970s. By late 1976, it appeared that reprocessing could not be
 
foreseen before 1980-81. In April, 1977, President Carter postponed
 
reprocessing indefinitely. The result is that an additional storage capacity
 
for the irradiated (spent) fuel must be obtained. In 1974, this need for
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increased pool capacity became apparent to the reactor operating utilities.
 
By mid-1975, expansion (reracking) of the reactor storage pools had
 
begun. This reracking operation involved the reduction of space between
 
stored fuel bundles. As of June 1, 1977, 16 nuclear reactors had obtained
 
NRC approval for this reracking operation: Another 18 reactors had submitted
 
expansion requests to the NRC at that time (Reference 6-5) (This was
 
out of a total of 63 operating nuclear power plants.)
 
6.1.5 Status and Plans
 
With the possibility of a shortage of spent fuel storage
 
capacity because of the delays and cancellations of reprocessing
 
operations, reactor operating utilities began to examine their available
 
options around the end of 1973. Together, the NRC and the nuclear
 
industry examined the three major options for extended spent fuel storage
 
(Reference 6-5, page 4). One of these options is the construction and
 
operation of independent spent fuel storage pools either at, or away
 
from, a reactor site. Another option is the transferring of spent
 
fuel from one reactor pool to another. The third option is the increasing
 
of the storage capabilities of the existing pools.
 
The possibility of the construction and operation of
 
independent storage pools either at, or away from, a reactor site is
 
currently at a very preliminary level of review. One architect­
engineering firm has discussed the development of an independent pool at
 
a reactor site with the NRC. Another firm (Stone & Webster) (Reference 6-7)
 
has produced a "topical report" on an independent spent fuel storage
 
facility. In December 1974,, the AEC issued a Regulatory Guide Number
 
3.24 (Reference 6-8) on independent spent fuel storage installations.
 
Discussion within the literature and industry on the subject of indepen­
dent storage pools (both at and away from reactor sites) has increased
 
greatly within the last year. In any case, the development time frame
 
for such independent pools is not expected to allow this option to
 
assist in alleviating the urgent limited capacity situation within
 
the next few years.
 
The transferring of fuel from one reactor storage pool to
 
another has been approved only for interfacility movement on the same
 
site (Reference 6-5, page 5). The NRC is presently reviewing the
 
possibility of transferring spent fuel between reactor sites (Ref­
erence 6-5, page 5).
 
The third option, reracking, is the method utilities are
 
expected to utilize first. To date, 30 applications (for 35 reactors)
 
have been submitted to the NRC to increase the storage capacity of the
 
original reactor pools. These requests vary from a 30% to a 250% increase
 
in the original pool's capacity. The median request of 120% corresponds
 
to an additional storage capability of 1 1/2 core's worth of fuel
 
(Reference 6-5, pg. 6). This should provide another four years of annual
 
discharge storage (1/3 of the fuel in the core is discharged per year).
 
The cost is estimated to be between $1-3 million for the entire operation
 
(from design through installation of one pool rerack) (Reference 6-6,
 
pg. 225). With respect to timing, current indications are that it will
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require 1 1/2 to 3 years between design and installation (Reference 6-9,
 
pg. 253). The present high-density rack design provides for a much
 
tighter packing of the fuel assemblies than earlier high-density designs
 
which reactor operators have either installed or are requesting NRC
 
for permission to install. New rack designs allow for the possible
 
storage of up to 8-12 years discharge (with a 1/3 core space reserve)
 
depending on the type and configuration of the fuel and rack design
 
(Reference 6-13, page 257, 6-12, page 258, 6-11, page 256). The result
 
of this timing situation and the size of the expansion is that sometime
 
around 1982-83 some of the reactor storage pools will again reach their
 
capacity limits (while still retaining the fuel core discharge capabilities).
 
Although future plants now being designed are being encouraged to con­
sider enough capacity for the storage of a plant's lifetime quantity
 
of irradiated fuel, there will still be a significant number of nuclear
 
reactors in the mid-1980's that must look to one of the other options.
 
The storage of spent fuel at an independent spent fuel pool and at
 
a spent unreprocessed fuel facility (SURFF) are examined in the following
 
sections (see section 6.2 and 6.3).
 
6.1.6 Issues -- Engineering Achievability
 
The situation of storing irradiated nuclear fuel at reactor
 
sites is currently in a period of transition. For, as mentioned, reactors
 
have been operated with the belief that reprocessing services would be
 
widely available and, therefore, a storage space of 1 1/3 core loadings
 
would be adequate. But with reprocessing an uncertain prospect for the
 
near future, all reactors are assumed to eventually request permission to
 
expand their existing storage capacity. Because of the economics of the
 
situation, the reactor operators are expected to rerack their existing
 
pools as a first step in increasing their storage abilities. As a result,
 
the major interest of those involved in spent fuel storage operations is
 
presently directed at high density storage of irradiated fuel. Specifi­
cally, the NRC has shown particular interest in the criticality, cooling,
 
and seismic analysis in addition to the design and quality assurance
 
specifications and codes (Reference 6-10, page 586).
 
6.1.7 Design Approach, Constraints, Regulations
 
The general approach of those companies involved in designing
 
reracking arrays or modules is either to establish a methodology which can
 
be applied to a variety of fuel rack designs, or to produce a "standard"
 
design independent of site conditions (References 6-11, 6-12, 6-13, 6-14).
 
The objectives that must be met are to store fuel as close as possible
 
while still maintaining a safe, subcritical array at a reasonable
 
cost. But in designing a new rack system to meet these objectives
 
and goals a number of constraining factors must be considered. The
 
allowable storage capacity of a pool may be limited not only by the
 
physical geometry of the pool, but also by the structural and seismic
 
loads that can be imposed on the walls and floors. Also, as is the
 
case of the BWR pools, a substantial increase in the storage capacity
 
for irradiated fuel will require the replacement of some equipment
 
in the pool for storage of other irradiated objects (such as control
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rod blades, flow channels, and other BWR hardware). Finally, if a
 
pool is already storing fuel, the new rack system must be installed
 
without compromising the safety and in some other manner than being
 
bolted to the floor -- such as being braced against the wall.
 
The racks are designed to meet ANSI N210 and use the ASME code
 
Section III, Appendices 17 and F as a guideline for stress limits for
 
normal and faulted conditions. The racks are classified as NRC seismic
 
category I equipment and ANS safety class 3.
 
New high density fuel storage racks have been designed and
 
constructed by each nuclear reactor vendor for their specific reactor fuel
 
as well as by several independent companies for various customers (such as
 
Exxon Nuclear-designed racks for Rancho Seco). The use of more accurate
 
criticallity codes, an allowable multiplication factor of 0.95 or less,
 
and fixed poisons in the racks has reduced the centerline-to-centerline
 
distance of the fuel in the racks for PWR assemblies from a previous value
 
of about 21 inches to about 12 inches. For BWR high density racks, the
 
reduction has been from about 10 inches to 8 inches (Reference 6-5, page 9).
 
Each rack is designed to hold from about 20 to 169 bundles
 
depending on the fuel type (PWR or BWR), specific reactor design (General
 
Electric, Babcock & Wilcox, Westinghouse, or Combustion Engineering) or fuel
 
assembly outer envelope dimensions (Reference 6-11, page 256; 6-12,
 
page 258; 6-13, page 257; 6-14, page 261).
 
6.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE
 
6.2.1 Process Description
 
The storage of irradiated nuclear fuel at an independent
 
fuel storage facility consists of four operational phased.
 
(1) 	 The receipt of the shipping cask
 
(2) 	 The unloading of the cask
 
(3) 	 Movement into, and storage in, the storage basin of the
 
spent fuel bundles
 
(4) 	 Preparation of the cask for reshipment
 
(5) 	 Shipment of spent fuel from Morris to a national
 
repository will presumably occur in the future.
 
The following discussion of the above four phases is based on The operation
 
of the General Electric Company's Morris Spent Fuel Storage Facility (the
 
only currently operational central spent fuel storage facility in the
 
United States (,Reference 6-15). The operation and basit design of
 
the spent fuel storage operation at the GE Morris Op-.u.on is repre­
sentative of the proposed Exxon storage system and the completed AGNS
 
system. The design of the Morris Operation is ato similar to that
 
proposed by Stone & Webster for an independent spent fuel storage facility
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(Reference 6-17). The details presented in the following sections
 
refer to the GE Morris Operation but similar facilities, components,
 
and operations will be provided for in any other independent spent
 
fuel storage ,system. The cask used in this description is the IF-300
 
multi-element cask. Similar procedures are followed for smaller, single­
element casks.
 
6.2.1.1 Cask Receipt. After entering the security fence gate, and
 
before moving into the receiving area, the transport vehicle is stopped
 
and the cask is inspected (Reference 6-15, page 1-17). A surface
 
smear for radioactive contamination is performed and surface radiation
 
levels are monitored. The vehicle then continues into the receiving
 
area (see Figures 6-3, 6-4) and is prepared for transfer of the cask
 
to the basin area. If decontamination of the cask is required, it
 
is performed in a specifically designed decontamination location. If.
 
excess radioactivity is encountered on the cask surface, the appropriate
 
reporting and radiation protection measures are taken. Minor damage
 
to the cask might be repaired if the damage is within the limited main­
tenance capacity of the Morris Operation prior to unloading (Ref­
erence 6-15, page 5-12).
 
Once preparations are completed, the cask is lifted by a 125­
ton capacity crane using an appropriate lifting yoke and is placed on the
 
decontamination pad (Figure 6-5). The work stand is positioned around the
 
upright cask and water and steam are used to remove road grime. The cask
 
is flushed with demineralized water through shielded piping. This flush
 
water is checked for radiation levels and i6 drained to the low activity
 
waste vault (Reference 6-15, page 5-11). When the flushing is complete,
 
an external radiation shield is attached at the parting line between
 
the cask head and body to provide shielding from radiation streaming
 
as the head is loosened. The nuts on the head are loosened (32 bolts
 
on the IF-300 cask) (Reference 6-15, page 1-23) and all but four are
 
removed. Cables are attached from the lifting yoke to the cask head
 
for removing the head at a later time. The cask is then moved to the
 
unloading pit.
 
The cask is lowered onto the unloading pit shelf and the
 
remaining head bolts are removed (Reference 6-15, page 1-23). This
 
shelf is protected from the impact of a dropped cask by two one-inch
 
thick steel plates separated by energy absorbing fins as seen in the
 
top of Figure 6-7. A long hook is attached and the cask is lowered
 
to the floor of the unloading pit (about 48 feet below the water's surface)
 
without getting the crane's cables or hook in the water (Reference 6-15,
 
page 5-13 to 5-15). Once on the unloading pit floor, the lifting yoke
 
is disengaged and the head is lifted by the four cables and moved to
 
an out of the way storage position in the pit.
 
6.2.1.2 Cask Unloading. The unloading of the fuel is done using
 
a 5-ton capacity bridge crane. A grapple is attached to a fuel bundle
 
which is then hoisted out of the cask and lowered into the appropriate
 
storage baskets (a PWR basket can hold 4 bundles, while a BWR basket
 
can hold 9 bundles) (Reference 6-16, page 3-5). The basket is latched
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Figure 6-3. 	 GE IF-0 Irradiated Fuel Shioing Cask: Mounted on 
a 100-ton railroad flat car, the IF-300 is in an 
enclosure assembly that provides redundant engine­
blower air cooling, as well as screen barriers to
 
prevent access to the cask surfaces. The IF-300 cask
 
is designed to carry 7 PWR fuel assemblies, or 18 BWR 
fuel assemblies. The Morris Operation administration
 
building is in the background. (Ref. 6-15) (Photo
 
Courtesy of General Electric)
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Figure 6-4. IF-300 Cask in Receiving Area: Preparations for 
lifting the cask from its transport vehicle are
 
performed in the cask receiving area. In this 
photograph, the IF-300 cask is being lifted from 
the rail car skid by the 125-ton cask crane. The 
steel-frame, insulated metal siding and other de­
tails of the cask receiving area are visible. 
(Ref. 6-15) (Photo Courtesy of General Electric)
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Figure 6-5. Cask Decontamination Area: The IF-300 cask is shown 
standing on the pad in the decontamination area with
 
the lifting yoke attached (notice the slack head lifting
 
been moved in place aroundcables). A work platform has 
the cask; different platforms are available to match
 
the cask involved. Tankage contains detergents, part
 
view faces south, towardsof the wash-down system. This 
the cask unloading basin and fuel storage basins.
 
The fuel-handling crane, mounted below the cask crane,
 
can be seen in the upper right of the photographs.
 
(Ref. 6-15) (Photo Courtesy of General Electric)
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Figure 6-6. IF-1OO Cask on Cask Shelf: Cask head closure 
nuts have been removed; the cask positioned on the
 
shelf; the yoke disengaged from the cask trunnion; 
and the yoke placed on the fixtures extending
 
from the basin walls. The extension hook
 
(cross-shaped object in foreground) is also stored 
on wall fixtures. Note the crushable surface pad
 
beneath the cask, used to absorb impact forces.
 
(Ref. 6-15) (Photo Courtesy of General Electric)
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Figure 6-7. Cask Unloading Basin Deep Pit: The cask is in position on 
the floor of the deep pit as the yoke is being withdrawn,
 
carrying the cask head supported by four cables. The
 
lower right opening is the entrance to Basin 1; the open,
 
cable-supported gate prevents fuel spills into the deep
 
pit if a basket should fall in that direction (see Section
 
6.2.4 ). Three positions in the pit are available for 
fuel baskets; a single PWR basket is in position. The 
crushable, energy absorbing plate on the basin shelf is
 
visible at the top. Baskets must be moved to the grid
 
position below the gate prior to lifting from the deep
 
pit. (Ref. 6-15) (Photo Courtesy of General Electric)
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in the supporting grid nearest the transfer gate leading to the storage
 
basin during loading (Figures 6-8 through 6-10). Once the loading
 
of the basket is completed, it is transferred past the basin door guard
 
(which prevents fuel from falling out of the basket in the event of
 
a basket tip) and into the storage basin by another crane (Figure 6-11)
 
(Reference 6-15, page 5-16 to 5-18).
 
6.2.1.3 Movement and Storage of the Fuel in the Basin. The upward
 
force exerted by the basin crane on the basket releases the basket latch
 
mechanism which fastens the basket to the supporting grid (Reference 6-15,
 
page 5-20 to 5-27). The basket is lifted from the grid, carried through
 
the gate and into the storage basin. The basket is lowered into its
 
designated position and set in the stainless steel support grid. The
 
upward force is released and the latching mechanism secures the basket
 
to the grid (Figures 6-11 and 6-12).
 
6.2.1.4 Cask Reshipping Preparation. Once the cask has been emptied
 
and the fuel transferred to its storage position, the cask is prepared
 
for shipment back to the reactor facility. The cask head is lowered
 
back on the body of the cask and the lifting yoke is reattached. The
 
crane then lifts the cask to the unloading pit shelf and the extension
 
hook is returned to its stowaway position. After the yoke is re-engaged
 
to the shorter lifting crane hook, the cask is hoisted out of the water.
 
The exterior of the cask is rinsed with demineralized water as the
 
cask clears the water (Reference 6-15, page 1-26). The water in
 
the interior of the cask is drained into the basin. After further
 
rinsing, the cask is moved to the decontamination pad. The head nuts
 
are inserted and tightened, a smear test for radiation contamination
 
is made for a radiation check, and the cask is loaded back onto the
 
transport vehicle (Reference 6-15, page 1-26).
 
6.2.1.5 Spent Fuel Reshipment. The eventual reshipment of the
 
spent fuel from the Morris Operation to a national repository will
 
be accomplished utilizing much the same procedures and checks as were
 
required in the receipt, unloading, and movement of the fuel. One of
 
the differences in reshipping an empty cask and one loaded with spent
 
fuel is that the cooling water inside a loaded cask must be sampled
 
for excess radiation -- a step requiring a 6 to 10 hour delay after
 
loading (Reference 6-41, page 10). Other fuel reshipment operations
 
would be the same (but in reverse order) as those previously described
 
for receipt of the fuel.
 
6.2.2 Development History
 
Although other storage pools located away from reactors have
 
been constructed for the holding of spent fuel, only the General Electric
 
Company's Morris Operation has been operated as a spent fuel storage
 
facility independent of any other fuel cycle process. The two other non­
reactor pools constructed for commercial spent fuel storage are at the
 
AGNS and NFS reprocessing facilities. The NFS pool has been used in the
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Figure 6-8. Fuel Grappling Operations: Viewed from south wall of 
the deep pit, a grapple has been attached to the fuel
 
handling crane and has engaged the bail of a BWR fuel
 
bundle in the cask. At the lower right, a partially

filled BWR fuel basket is in position. Underwater
 
lights (foreground) and an underwater closed-circuit
 
TV are available to facilitate fuel transfer operations.
 
(Ref. 6-15) (Photo Courtesy of General Electric)
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Figure 6-9. 	 Fuel Removal from Cask: The grappled fuel bundle is lifted 
from the cask and carried towards the fuel basket at lower 
right. Notice that the basin doorway guard is in the upright 
position; this is necessary during transfer operations. The 
length of the grapple and hoist height limit prevents lifting 
the fuel bundle above the depth of water required for 
shielding. (Ref. 6-15) (Photo Courtesy of General Electric) 
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Figure 6-10. 	 Fuel Basket Loading: The bundle is positioned over 
the basket, and lowered. Although baskets are designed 
to hold the bundles without significant lateral movement 
within the basket, the basket openings are large enough
for easy insertion of'the bundle. These operations 
continue until the basket(s) are full, or the cask is 
empty. (Ref. 6-15) (Photo Courtesy of'General Electric) 
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Figure 6-11. 	 Fuel Basket Transfer: To transfer a loaded basket from
 
the cask unloading pit the cask must be in the east
 
support grid position, and the fuel basin door guard
 
must be in the position shown (lower or "down" position).
 
The basket grapple, attached to the basin crane, engages
 
the basket lifting rods. Upward pressure by the crane
 
releases the basket latch mechanism, unlocking the basket
 
from the support grid. The basket is lifted upward,
 
through the door guard opening, and moved into the storage
 
basin area. (Ref. 6-15) (Photo Courtesy of General Electric)
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Figure 6-12. Fuel Movement In Storage Basins: The fuel basket is 
carried by the basin crane to a designated position
 
in either Basin 1 or 2. The basket is positioned in
 
the stainless steel support grid and when upward force
 
on the basket lifting rods is released, the basket
 
is looked in the grid. Fuel storage patterns in the 
basins are determined by administrative procedures.
 
(Ref. 6-15) (Photo Courtesy of General Electric)
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past for interim storage of spent fuel prior to reprocessing. The AGNS
 
pool has not been issued a license for receipt and storage of irradiated
 
commercial nuclear fuel. As a consequence, the GE Morris Operation is
 
used in this report as the basis for (current and future) design,
 
operation, and safety information concerning independent spent fuel
 
storage pools--either located at a reactor site or at a central location
 
for multi-rector usage.
 
The Morris Operation was built as an integral part of the
 
General Electric Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant (MFRP) and was licensed for
 
receipt of spent fuel in December 1971. Although the Atomic Energy
 
Commission subsequently terminated the MFRP Construction Permit (No.
 
CPCSF-3), in August 1974 the Materials License (SM4-1265) for the receipt
 
and storage of spent fuel at the Morris facility was continued. In 1975
 
the license was amended to increase the storage capacity from 100 MTU to
 
700-750 MTU (dependent on the ratio of BWR and PWR fuel in storage)
 
(Reference 6-15, page A.1-1 to A.1-3) by utilizing the former high­
level waste canister storage basin for fuel storage. The Morris facility
 
storage capabilities are provided under certain conditions to former
 
GE reprocessing customers who face a threat of shutdown due to the
 
lack of storage space because of the inoperability of the Morris reprocessing
 
plant. The storage capacity is currently not available for general
 
utility usage (Reference 6-40, page 6). It appears with the reracking
 
being undertaken or planned that the existing facilities at Morris will
 
serve GE's need and those of their original customers until about 1980.
 
6.2.3 Status and Plans
 
There are presently two tentatively planned away-from-reactor
 
storage facilities. The first is the expansion of the GE Morris facility
 
by 1100 MTU capacity through the addition of a third basin. The second
 
project is the spent fuel pool associated with the proposed Exxon repro­
cessing facility. (To be constructed only in connection with a reprocessing
 
facility.) (Reference 6-40, page 8.) The Exxon capacity would initially
 
provide space for 3500 MTV with a possibility of expanding it to 7000
 
MTU thereafter, if needed. General Electric has stated that they are
 
currently holding discussions with a few original reprocessing customers
 
to explore possible arrangements for a joint venture to construct their
 
expanded facility (Reference 6-42, page 2). GE indicates that they
 
have no current plans to offer commercial fuel storage (Reference 6-40,
 
page 6).
 
The Morris Operation expansion is expected to possibly be
 
available for fuel storage in the early 1980's (Reference 6-41, page 4).
 
On April 30, 1977, an application for a license to expand the present
 
Morris facility was sent to the NRC (Reference 6-41, page 4). The
 
application describes a new, or third, basin 92 feet long, 40 feet
 
wide, and 29.5 feet deep (water depth of 28.5 feet) (Reference 6-16,
 
page 3-4). The width is the same as the existing pools and will utilize
 
the same fuel movement crane and fuel storage system as is used in
 
Basins 1 and 2 (Figure 6-13). The storage system will consist of stainless
 
steel fuel baskets locked in a stainless steel support grid on the
 
basin floor. The proposed basin will eventually hold about
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Figure 6-13. 	 Fuel Storage Basin Areas: Viewed from the south wall of 
Basin 2, looking across both fuel basins towards the cask 
unloading basin and the decontamination area. The tall 
doors to the receiving area are open. In Basin 2 (fore­
ground) both PWR baskets (4 bundles per basket) and BWR
 
baskets (9 bundles per basket) are in place in the support
 
grid. The bridge of the basin crane is in the background.
 
(Ref. 6-15) (Photo Courtesy of General Electric)
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659 fuel baskets (around 1/3 PWR bundles and 2/3 BWR) representing 
1100 MTU in the stored fuel. (Reference 6-16, page 3-1, 6-40, page 9).
 
A new water cleanup system for Basin 3 will be provided. The
 
water will be cooled by operation of the presently idle cooling banks.
 
(Reference 6-16, page 3-6, 3-7). (Only one of the three cooling banks
 
is required for Basins 1 and 2; the remaining two banks are standby).
 
(Reference 6-16, page 3-6).
 
An air conditioning system will be installed in the existing
 
ventilation system to control temperature and reduce humidity in the basin
 
area. (Reference 6-16, page 3-8).
 
The building structures covering the basin and associated
 
equipment will be similar to the existing structures. (Reference 6-16,
 
page 3-1 to 3-11). (Figure 6-13.)
 
6.2.4 Issues--Engineering Achievability
 
The primary function of an independent spent fuel storage
 
facility is to receive, store, and eventually ship irradiated fuel
 
with minimal impact on the health and safety of the public--under both
 
normal and abnormal (accident) operating conditions. The specific
 
guidelines for the protection of the public from excessive exposure
 
to ionizing radiation are set down in Parts 20 (for normal operating
 
conditions) and 100 (for accident conditions), Title 10, of the Code
 
of Federal Regulations. With respect to accidental releases of radio­
active material the federal regulations (Part.100) indicate that an
 
individual's whole body total radiation dose is not to exceed 25 rems,
 
and that the dose to the thyroid from iodine exposure is not to exceed
 
300 rems. These upper guidelines are related to the dose a person located
 
at any point on or beyond the site boundary could receive from the
 
entire passage of a radioactive cloud. The cloud would be the result
 
of a postulated fission product release at the storage facility.
 
There are three principal sources of potential radiation hazard
 
to the public.
 
(1) 	Direct radiation from the irradiated fuel
 
(2) 	Liquid release to the environs from either an excessive
 
storage basin leak or low activity waste vault leak
 
(3) 	Airborne release from a potential fuel cladding rupture
 
or cooler leak
 
An event diagram for postulated accidents is shown in Figure 6-14.
 
The following accident safety analysis is based on information con­
cerning the GE Morris Operation. It is a summary of the analysis of postu­
lated accident events as utilized by GE to minimize the cause of such events,
 
quantitatively identify and mitigate the consequences, and evaluate the­
ability of the Morris Operation organization to cope with each situation
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should it occur. The information base for this analysis was obtained from 
in-house GE research efforts as well as from numerous other research organi­
zation (such as Dames and Moore, H. J. Sexton & Associates, Battelle Pacific 
Northwest Laboratories and the Programmed & Remote Systems Corporation)(References 6-43 thru 6-50). The various component and systems safety anal­
yses which have been published in numerous documents, reports, and license 
applications were brought together and presented in one major document - theConsolidated Safety Analysis Report. (Reference 6-15) It is from this 
report that the following material was obtained but representing the efforts 
of numerous people and organizations over a number of years. Such analyses
of the operating Morris facility is representative of similar efforts under­
taken for the AGNS storage facility and that which will be done for proposed
independent, or central, spent fuel storage systems (such as at the proposed 
Exxon reprocessing plant).
 
6.2.4.1 Direct Radiation. Direct radiation can occur only when the 
water level in the basin is too low to provide adequate shielding. This 
can be the case when there is either excessive evaporation (a cooling system
failure) or excessive basin leakage. These failures must occur in conjunc­
tion with an inadequate makeup water capability to pose a potential radiation 
hazard situation. Theoretically, a basket could be dropped in such a manner

that the fuel could spill out and come to rest in a critical array. Radia­
tion exposure to those persons in the basin area could possibly result due 
to water level being inadequate in depth to provide shielding from such a 
critical array. (See the fuel drop and missile impact sections for descrip­
tions of the events required to occur before criticality could result.) 
(1) Excessive Evaporation--Loss of Fuel Basin Cooling.
(Reference 6-15, page 8-4 to 8-5) The existing system for cooling the 
storage basin water at the Morris facility consists of three separate
cooling banks. The operating bank has a heat removal capacity of 1.76 
megawatts of heat (6 x 106 Btu/hr) while the two standby banks have 
a total capacity of 2.93 megawatts (10 x 106 Btu/hr). (Reference 6-15, 
page 1-39) These two idle banks will be placed in service as required

by the increased heat load as fuel is moved into the basins. The cooling

capacity is considered by GE to be adequate to handle either the present

two basin maximum heat load of about 1.9 megawatts (6.5 x 106 Btu/hr),
 
or the proposed three basin maximum of 3.98 megawatts (13.6 x 106 
Btu/hr). (References 6-16, page 3-6 and 6-15, page 5-39)
 
The planned basin expansion at Morris will include the 
installation of a new pump and associated valves and piping with pro­
visions to add another pump if required. Currently there are two 750 gpm
 
pumps at the facility. The temperature of the basin water at the Morris 
facility is maintained between 25-30 C (78-860 F) (Reference 6-41, page 6)

The Morris Operation cooler is not always operating as there is a significant 
amount of natural heat dissipation by the pool structure and atmosphere.
Most of the decay heat generated by the fuel is removed by evaporation and 
the remainder is conducted through the concrete walls. This conduction 
and evaporation is generally adequate to maintain the water temperature at 
less than 440C (111.2 0 F) without the cooling system in operation providing

there is sufficient cool makeup water. (Reference 6-15, page 5-39)
 
6-25
 
77-69
 
IC:I.rv" 
THISC1tAtr SHOWS NE CREDITFoR 
INIAIEO FORANV ACCiOfMI SOWN. 
Cc+QUIN[S 
EFFECTSER SABOTAGE F1tNMAENE 
TOIC to EVEVENTOSN  ACCIDEoMNT. 
TIICAUFTY - . ' 
EXCESSIVE 
EAPURAWtN 
SYTM 
] OEVAT WAElESVEIS 
MAKE UP C PAILTY 
OWNARACCI[UNT 
RIA"O 
f~SIELWFE 
AAILAAG E 
CASK$ FIR 
O-SITE AN ARIMW A AE 
NRef. 6-1, g. -3 
6-26X 
Figure 6-14i. Event Diagram for Postulated Accidents
 
(Ref. 6-15, pg. 8-3)
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The situation where the basin water could fall too low for 
adequate shielding must involve the failure of the cooling system and of the 
makeup water supply system to provide sufficient water to compensate for 
evaporative losses. For the case where both basins are filled with spent 
fuel and assuming the resulting heat load is 1.87 megawatts (6.4 x 106
 
Btu/hr) (the maximum two basin heat load), it has been calculated that
 
it would require at least nine days to evaporate the more than 39,000 ft3 of
 
water before the tops of the fuel would be exposed. (Reference 6-15,
 
page 8-5) In reaching the boiling point the water temperature would rise 
less than 20 F/hr for about three days and more slowly thereafter 
(Reference 6-18, pg. 25). Water level indicators and alarms would notify
 
operating personnel as soon as the water level began to decrease and
 
corrective action could then be taken before any major water loss occurred.
 
(2) Inadeouate Water Makeup Capability. The primary source of 
water for the Morris facility is a deep well (788 feet) located on the site. 
(Reference 6-15, page 2-2) A 100 gpm submersible pump provides water princi­
pally for sanitation purposes, with some water (up to 1400 gallons per day) 
for basin evaporation and utility boiler water makeup. (Reference 6-15, 
page 3-40) A backup well (383 feet deep) is located on the Morris site about 
1/4 mile to the east of the storage facility. Provisions have been made in
 
the event the situation requires it, to obtain makeup water from the nearby

(3/14 mile) Dresden Nuclear Power Stations. (Reference 6-15, page 2-2) Also
 
water can be obtained from the Kankakee River. As a result of these multiple 
sources of water, there is a very small probability that there would not be 
sufficient makeup water available in the event of a reduction of storage 
basin water level before the spent fuel was inadequately shielded.
 
(3) Excessive Basin Leakae--Cask Dron. Missiles. Earthouakes.
 
(Reference 8-11 to 8-15) There are no piping penetrations which, if
 
open, could drain the spent fuel storage basin. There are also no
 
potential siphoning pathways from the basin. Inadvertent drainage 
of the basin must therefore result from the penetration of the liner. 
The fuel unloading basin at the Morris facility is set directly 
against bedrock. (Reference 6-15, page 5-33 to 5-36) The walls and floor 
are reinforced concrete lined with stainless steel plates. The steel liner 
sheets, as seen in Figure 6-14 being installed in Basin 2 are welded together 
and placed flush against the concrete wall. Drain slots are formed in the 
concrete walls and floor to facilitate drainage of any water that may collect 
between the steel .liner and the concrete. These 1/2 inch by 1/2 inch drain 
slots, as seen in the top of Figure 6-14A, lead to a collection header at the 
base of the walls which drains the water into a sump (a six-inch pipe which 
extends from the top of the wall to a foot below the unloading pit floor). 
Liquid level detection monitors as well as a pump-out system is located in 
the sump. 
In June, 1972, an IF-O0 shipping cask tipped against the wall 
of the unloading pit. The pit liner was ruptured with the result that basin 
water entering the space between the liner and the structural concrete wall. 
(Reference 6-51, page 7-8, and a more detailed description is found in 
Reference 6-15, page 8-5 to 8-11) Only minor damage was sustained by the 
cask. A temporary patch was installed on the liner within 27 hours and a 
permanent repair was made in 12 days after the incident. There was some 
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Figure 6-14A. Stainless Steel Basin Liners: Both storage basins,
 
and the unloading basin are completely lined with stainless
 
steel sheets (304L) placed flush against the concrete
 
walls and floor, tack welded to a grid of stainless
 
steel back-up members (view facing north wall of Basin 2).
 
(Reference 6-15)
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seeping of water into portions of the canyon and main process building. A 
total of approximately 2500 gallons of water containing an estimated 6 mCi 
of activity (primarily Cs-134 and 137) was not recovered. (Reference 6-15, 
page 8-9). It was assumed that most, if not all, the water remained within 
the confines of the structure and was contained in minute fissures in the 
concrete around the fuel and waste storage basin and process cells. The 
result of the leak was concluded by the AEC Staff to be that any radio­
activity that may have been released as a result of the incident had no sig­
nificant impact on the environment. (Reference 6-51, page 8) No ground­
water contamination above background levels could be detected (Reference
 
6-15, page 8-5). As a result of this incident numerous operational, 
technical, and environmental monitoring steps were taken to prevent
 
and mitigate any such future accident. (Reference 6-15, page 8-11, 8-10) 
For future storage pools, both in conjunction with the reactor
 
and independent of the reactor, the liners are expected to be prefabricated 
in large sections at a central fabrication facility and assembled on the 
construction site. The drain channels will be welded directly to the back 
of the liner as opposed to being formed in the concrete wall. An example 
of such a pool liner is seen in Figure 6-14B. This liner, though for new 
fuel storage at a reactor site (constructed by the Boeing Company for WNP-1), 
is representative of such a prefabrication operation. Ease of fabrication 
and quality control are two of the major benefits of factory versus on-site 
fabrication. Other advantages are reduced labor cost and decreased inter­
ference with other pool construction operations.
 
At the Morris facility the floor of the unloading basin shelf 
and deep pit include provisions to dissipate impact loads from a maximum 
cask drop accident. The shelf has a fabricated, stainless steel crushable 
finned pad and a 2-inch steel plate on top of the stainless steel liner.
 
The floor of the pit is covered by a 1 3/4-inch steel plate under the 
stainless steel liner to dissipate the impact load from a 70-ton shipping
 
cask (IF-300) falling 31 feet. (Reference 6-15, page A. 7-1 to A. 7-8) 
The shipping cask is first lowered onto the shelf (18.5 feet
 
below the water surface) where the rigging is changed. The cask is then 
moved over the deep pit and lowered to the floor (another 29 feet). In
 
this manner the maximum postulated cask drop is 31 feet. The analysis of 
a cask drop considered the fall of an IF-300 cask (the largest shipping 
container to be handled at Morris within the immediate future) in such a 
manner as to allow minimum energy absorption by the cask fins and
 
therefore the highest load on the floor.
 
The strength of the cask fins will result in the total energy 
of the drop being absorbed by the pad. The finned pad on the unloading 
shelf (two 1-inch stainless steel plates separated by 4 inch high, 1/2 inch 
thick steel fins) is expected to absorb all of the cask's energy (with one
 
half the total drop energy being accounted for by force deflection curves
 
and the other one half being absorbed by the bending of the pad's fins)
 
(Reference 6-15, page A.7-I to A.7-8 and A.13-2 to A.13-9). For a drop on 
the shelf edge or pit floor, the load on the shelf concrete is less than
 
its ultimate dynamic load and from the analysis of the loads and materials
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Figure 6-14B
 
Dimensions are 17 feet deep, 0
 
Stainless steel pool liner for the new fuel storage pool at the WNP-1 reactor. 

34 feet long, and 10.5 feet wide. The drain channel can be seen behind the center weld running from the top
 
The exterior structure is for shipping strength. (Photo cour­collection header to the lower drain header. 

tesy of Boeing, Seattle, WA)
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strengths the integrity is expected to be proteted due to the distribution
 
of the fallen load forces over a relatively large area. (Reference 6-15,
 
page A.73-9 to 13-12)
 
If the concrete were to fail, penetration is expected to be less
 
than an inch and the stresses on a flat plate 'that is deflected an inch is
 
well within the elastic stress range for steel.- The conclusions -are that
 
the floor and shelf of the unloading pit-are adequately protected from a
 
postulated IF-300 cask fall of 31 feet from the shelf to'the floor or 18.5
 
feet to the basin shelf from its highest movement point. (Reference 6-15,
 
page A.7-1 to A.7-9, A.13-1 to A.1-3-12)
 
The facility structures and components essential for safety
 
are designed to withstand the effects of wind borne missiles without
 
the loss of the capability to retain the radioactive inventory. In
 
the analysis of a postulated airborne missile striking the fuel basin
 
liner, a 300 mph maximum velocity tornado was assumed. An examination
 
of the various objects which could potentially-damage the basin revealed
 
that only such objects in the general vicinity of the basin which were
 
too heavy to be lifted but could be accelerated by tornado winds and
 
deflected or dropped into the basin could pose any concern. (Reference
 
6-15, page 4-7 to 4-18) The analysis determined that a small (1800
 
pound) car being deflected into the basin at a maximum horizontal velocity
 
of-242 ft/sec (maximum vertical velocity of 171 ft/sec) would not have
 
sufficient energy to penetrate the 1/16 inch basin line or the 3/16
 
inch basin floor due to the large impact cross section. It was-also
 
concluded by the GE analysis that a 630 pound, 12 inch diameter
 
20 foot long telephone pole with a maximum horizontal velocity of 264
 
ft/sec (maximum vertical velocity of 187 ft/sec) may deform the liner
 
but could not penetrate the wall or floor liner of the fuel storage
 
basin. (Reference 6-15, page 4-9 to 4-19, 8-13 to 8-14)
 
6.2.4.2 Liquid Release to Environs
 
(1) Excessive Low Activity Vault Leakage. (Reference
 
6-15, page 8-15) The low activity vault is a reinforced concrete structure
 
with an internal holding tank. The vault is designed to withstand a
 
design basis earthquake. Being underground, the structure is protected
 
from the potential effects of a tornado or tornado generated missile.
 
Also no heavy objects are moved over the vault. As a result of the
 
design of the vault, GE has concluded that there is no credible accident
 
that could rupture the tank and the concrete sufficiently to release
 
liquid radioactive material to the environs. (Reference 6-15, 8-15)
 
The structure is equipped with a leak detection system and pumpout
 
system to handle minor leaks.
 
6.2.4.3 Airborne Release to the Environs. (Reference 6-15, page
 
8-15 to 8-21) The two potential methods for release of radioactive
 
gases are the ruptures of the fuel cladding and the leakage of the
 
cooling system heat exchanger. The fuel cladding may be ruptured by
 
either dropping the fuel bundle, dropping a loaded fuel basket, or
 
by having a missile strike the stored fuel.
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In the safety analysis for the Morris spent fuel facility,
 
a number of basic assumptions were made concerning the three potential
 
cladding rupture events. The fuel is considered to have a burn up
 
of 44,000 MWD/MTU and to have been cooled 90 days before storage in
 
the Mornis basin. Because of the negligible particulate activity available
 
for release, no solid fission products are considered released. The
 
ventilation air flow rate from over the basin to the environment via
 
the main stack (100 m) is assumed to be 6,500 cfm. The overall basin
 
water decontamination factor (ability of the basin water to retain
 
certain elements) for iodine is considered conservative at 500. A
 
factor of only 1 is used for noble gas due to water's negligible effect
 
on their removal. Also the worst case atmospheric dispersion factor
 
is considered to be 2.8 x 10-5 sec/m 3 . (Reference 6-15, page 8-20
 
to 8-21)
 
Of the fission gases which accumulate in the fuel during
 
irradiation, krypton-85 is the most abundant by the end of 180 days of
 
cooling. The other long-lived radioisotope in the fuel is Iodine-129.
 
Xenon131m, Xenon-133, and Iodine-131 all decay relatively rapidly.
 
The amount of radioactive gas released from the fuel is
 
dependent on the fuel temperature. Release fractions, or percentage
 
of gas produced during irradiation that is released from the fuel pellets,
 
ranges from 20 to 45% depending on the irradiation history. For fuel
 
with a burnup of 44,000 MWd/MTU and 90 days of cooling the percentages
 
used in the cladding/rupture analysis at the Morris facility were:
 
(Ref. 6-15, pg. 8-19)
 
Kr-85 30% of total inventory in fuel gaps
 
Xe-131m 10% 
Xe-133 10% 
1-131 2% 
1-129 2% 
Bundle Drop. (Reference 6-15, page 8-21 to 8-24) The
 
accidental drop of a fuel bundle which could result in mechanical damage
 
to the fuel and the subsequent release of fission products would most
 
likely occur in the unloading basin. The fuel is assumed to be dropped
 
from the maximum height it would be lifted during transfer. Although
 
it is a low probability event, all the fuel rods in the bundle are
 
assumed to rupture, releasing the fission gases to the basin water.
 
Based on the movement of air over the water basin and through the stack 
(6500 cfm) , and assumption that all released fission gases are expelled 
from the stack, and that the duration of release is 2 hours, the resulting 
radiation doses at the site boundary were calculated to be: (Ref. 
6-15, pg. 8-23) 
Body Organ BWR PWR
 
Whole Body 9x10-3 mrem 1.9x10-2 mrem
 
Thyroid 4.4xi0 -2 mrem 9.6x10-2 mrem
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Basket Drop. (Reference 6-15, page 8-24 to 8-26) The

maximum height a fuel basket would be above the floor of the fuel storage
basin would be 3 feet. In the unloading basin the basket would reach
 
a height of 22.5 feet above the basin floor (equivalent to a 12.6 foot
air drop distance). If the basket fell from this height the basin
 
liner, the basket, and the fuel could be damaged. To prevent the spillage

of the fuel from the basket in such a fall a guard structure is situatedin front of the entrance to the spent fuel basin, 
 The guard structure
holds the basket in a vertical orientation in the event of an accident.
 
Although the fuel is not likely to be severely damaged, for
the safety analysis it was assumed all the fuel rods in all the bundles in
the basket are ruptured and released all the fission gases in the rod
 gaps. Again the duration of the release was 2 hours. The maximum offsite 
exposure results were calculated to be: (Ref. 6-15, pg. 8-26) 
Body Organ BWR 
 PWR 
Whole Body -I -I
8.1xi0 mrem 7.84xi0 mrem
 
Thyroid 
 3-96x10- mrem 3.84xiO -1 mrem
 
Cooler Leak. (Reference 6-15, page 8-31 to 8-32) If the
 
coils of the cooler (heat exchanger) leaked, much (if not all), of
the water would be evaporated into the air stream which is blown across

the coils. 
 A 1.5 gpm leak is assumed for the safety analysis. A leak

of this size would result in a visible vapor plume. The radioactive
 
material concentration in the water flowing through the coils is generally

around 6 x 10-4 Ci/ml. 
 For the GE analysis all, the activity was
assumed to be Cs-134. 
 The maximum dose rate at the site boundary was
 
calculated to be 1 x 10-3 mrem/hour whole body and 7 x 10­4 mrem/hr
 
to the thyroid (Ref. 6-15, pg. 8-30).
 
The exposure levels at the site boundary as described in the

previous sections for various postulated incidents are only a fraction of
the Federal guidelines values. 
Also these exposure levels were determined
 
on the assumption that no corrective steps were taken andthat there was no

air filtration. 
Alarms for the decrease in the 
water level and airborne

radiation would notify the operating personnel as soon as an incident
 
occurred and corrective measures could then be taken. 
 The result would
 
be 
a very minor (a small fraction of the previously mentioned exposure
levels) or non-detectable level of radiation reaching the site boundaries
 
from the major events as postulated in the previous sections.
 
ENGINEERED INTERIM SURFACE OR SHALLOW SUB-SURFACE.
 
STORAGE
 
A interim alternative to the placement of spent fuel in a
geological repository (discussed in Section 6.4) is to take the unpackaged

spent fuel assemblies from either the reactor site or a centralized
 
storage basin to an engineered spent unreprocessed fuel facility (SURFF).

This facility would place the fuel assemblies in a metal container
 
to isolate the fuel rod cladding from the external environment, and
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would store them retrievably in an area that would provide biological 
shielding from the decay heat and radiation produced by the spent fuel. 
The use of an engineered surface storage facility for spent 
fuel has only recently been suggested as an option by the ERDA (Refer­
ence 6-24 pg. 3; and Reference 6-25, pg. 21). However, it is not a
 
new idea. Much of the design and development work was initiated in
 
the early 1970s during the development of a concept for the surface
 
storage of high-level waste from reprocessed fuel--the retrievable
 
surface storage facility (RSSF) (Reference 9).
 
It should be kept in mind that currently there are several
 
design concepts under consideration, thus this section discusses a set
 
of concepts. The packaging and surface storage of spent fuel is discussed
 
as one component because of the present lack of design specificity
 
and because of the close interrelationship of the technical problems
 
associated with packaging and surface storage.
 
At this time there are no performance criteria for a SURFF or
 
its related packaging facilities, but the existence of such criteria
 
would be unexpected given that the concept has only recently been
 
seriously proposed.
 
6.3.1 Process Description
 
As noted previously, a spent unreprocessed fuel facility
 
(SURFF) is a broad concept with many design alternatives. These
 
alternatives can be divided into two classifications: (1) unpackaged.
 
storage and (2) packaged storage, as shown in Table 6-1. The former is
 
considered in the TAD documents to be appropriate only for storage
 
for a 10 to 20 year period; otherwise packaged storage is suggested
 
(Reference 6-21, page 17.1). Although it is not yet clear how long,
 
a SURFF should or will operate, the latter classification appears to
 
provide more flexibility in storage strategy without a considerable
 
cost impact. Whether or not the packaging will cause complications
 
during reprocessing (if reprocessing is allowed) needs to be examined.
 
Another factor is that a passive or natural cooling system is preferred
 
over a forced cooling system in the SURFF concepts under consideration.
 
It is the emphasis on passive system that'most clearly differentiates
 
SURFF ,from central pool storage.
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Table 6-1. Summary Comparison of Spent Fuel Storage Alternatives
 
Means of Heat Removal 

Forced circulation of 

basin water 

Forced circulation of 

air
 
Forced circulation of 

basin water 

Natural circulation 

of air 

Natural circulation 

of or conduction to 

air
 
Conduction to earth 

Conduction to earth 

Method of
 
Controlling
 
Fuel Cladding 

Corrosion 

Water quality 

control
 
Low temperature 

Packaged in inert or 

noncorrosive medium 

Packaged in inert or 

noncorrosive medium
 
Packaged in inert or 

noncorrosive medium
 
Packaged in inert or 

noncorrosive medium
 
Packaged in inert or 

noncorrosive medium 

Maintenance 

Requirements 

High 

Moderate 

High 

Low 

Low 

Moderate 

Low 

Land Use 
(Surface) 
Low 
Moderate 
Low 
Moderate 
High(a) 
-4 
a, 
Low 4 
High 
g 
ci 
rt 0 
0-
Storage Alternative 

Unpacked Storage
 
Water basin 

Air-cooled vault 

Packaged Storage
 
Water basin 

Air-cooled vault* 

Concrete surface* 

silo 

Geologic 

Near-surface* 

heat sink 

Confinement 

Barriers in 

Addition to 

Cladding 

Filters 

Filters 

Filters & 

package 

Package 

Package 

Package, 

hole liner 

& filters
 
Package, 

hole liner 

2
 
a. Estimated to be -120,000 m per 1500 MT, assuming one MT per storage unit.
 
* These three are the major SURFF alternatives presently being evaluated 
Reference 3, page 17.2 
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6.3.1.1 Packaging. The use of multiple barriers for containment is
 
common to all of the design alternatives being studied by ERDA. The first
 
barrier for all modes of spent fuel storage is the fuel cladding.
 
"The cladding withstands a far more-severe environment
 
in the reactor than it would encounter in a storage facility,
 
although for a shorter period of time. In concept, a storage
 
facility is designed to protect the fuel cladding against
 
mechanical, chemical,or or thermal damage." (Reference 6-21,
 
page 17.1)
 
The second barrier is provided by sealing the fuel assembly
 
inside a container. This process could take place three to four years
 
after the fuel has been discharged to allow for a decrease in heat
 
generation and radiation. Preliminary cost analyses indicate that
 
the sealing or packaging would take place at the SURFF and not at the
 
originating reactors. Although such cost analyses were done in reference
 
to RSSF (Reference 6-19) the logic appears to still hold true for SURFF.
 
This procedure reduces the capital investment by not requiring packaging
 
facilities at each reactor. In addition, increased transportation
 
costs attributable to the increased weight of the container are also
 
avoided.
 
The centralized packaging facility dust carry out the following
 
functions:
 
* 	 receive and handle spent fuel (see description of 
the existing facilities at the Midwest Reprocessing
 
Facility in the previous section)
 
* 	 package spent fuel in a manner consistent with the
 
storage concept
 
* 	 overpackage the fuel bundles or spent fuel packages that
 
have failed in storage
 
* 	 transfer packaged fuel to storage
 
Over the last decade, packaged spent fuel from various reactors
 
has been stored at the Savannah River Plant (Reference 6-21, page 17.17),
 
and at the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment, Atomic Energy of
 
Canada, Limited, efforts have begun to package and store spent fuel in
 
facilities similar to SURFF. However, for the SURFF, as stated under
 
6.3, many design considerations of the fuel bundle package have not
 
been specified. For the RSSF designs, the metal cannister in which
 
the solid waste is placed would serve as the sole extent of packaging
 
before the HLW was placed in storage (Reference 6-31, page 392).
 
The Technical Alternatives Document (Reference 6-21) describes
 
a simple container for an intact BWR or PWR spent fuel bundle. The selected
 
container material would probably be low carbon steel. Low carbon steel
 
is more'economical than stainless steel or any other highly corrosion
 
resistant material, and highly corrosion-resistant materials would not
 
be necessary except in a water basin storage concept. Present indications
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are that the water basin concept with its nonpassive cooling concept will
 
not be considered seriously as a SURFF concept (Reference 6-27). "Low
 
carbon steel corrodes about 0.0005 cm/yr at 260 0 C when shielded from
 
weather" (Reference 6-21, page 17.19). Therefore, a proposed wall
 
thickness of 1.3 cm would be good for at least 100 years. The specific
 
design thicknesses given below are dependent upon the SURFF concept
 
utilized.
 
To transfer the heat generated by the spent fuel to the
 
container walls, a material with high thermal conductivity would be used
 
to fill the space between the fuel rods. Helium is most frequently
 
considered (Reference 6-21, page 17.19). Other possible transfer mediums
 
are zinc, powdered aluminum in a helium atmosphere, and air. The advantages
 
and disadvantages of each of these approaches need to be compared.
 
The Technical Alternatives Document notes that "additional
 
development is required on packaging concepts for long-term storage of
 
spent fuel". However, no technological barriers are anticipated.
 
Two to four years would be required prior to the final design of such
 
a facility (Reference 6-21, page 17.17)
 
6.3.1.2 The Storage Facility. Discussions with ERDA indicate that
 
there are three passive systems under consideration for a SURFF:
 
* Sealed Storage Cask Concept (SSCC)
 
* Air-cooled Vault Concept (ACVC)
 
* Storage in Near-surface Heat Sink Source (Reference 6-27)
 
The first two, in addition to storage in a water basin, were origin­
ally suggested in WASH-1539 as the RSSF concepts. The Committee on
 
Radioactive Waste Management (CRWM) of the National Academy of Science-

National Research Council, in its review of the RSSF concepts, recommended
 
that an optimized version of the Sealed Storage Cask Concept (SSCC) be
 
pursued (Reference 6-19, page 2). The present effort in Canada for
 
the storage of CANDU fuel is stressing the use of this alternative (Refer­
ence 6-21, page 17:41).
 
The SSCC calls for "spent fuel assemblies packaged in 5-cm­
thick, low carbon steel containers,, placed in concrete silos which serve
 
as neutron shields, and (are) stored vertically on outdoor concrete pads"
 
(Reference 6-21, page 17.35). The SSCC, like SURFF itself, is really a
 
conceptual design with various alternatives. Three specific concepts were
 
described in the RSSF Engineering Studies, and comparison of the design
 
specifications is shown in Table 6-2 (Reference 6-20, page 1-2). The
 
NAS review of RSSF found the SSCC-Shielded to be the "forerunner" of
 
the SSCC concepts. The SSCC-Thick Wall was considered to be "less
 
than optimum with respect to shielding efficiency and use of materials,
 
while the SSCC-Unshielded did not provide adequate biological shielding"
 
(Reference 6-19, pages 22 and 23). The Technical Alternatives Document
 
(TAD) describes only the use of a 5 cm thick package for spent fuel storage.
 
It is suggested that for cost efficiency, packaging of multiple assemblies
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Table 6-2. Comparison of Retrievable Surface-Storage Facility Concepts
 
Sealed Storage-Cask Concepts Air-Cooled Vault Water Basin Concepts 
SSCC-Shielded SSCC-Thick Wall SSCC-Unshielded Concept (ACVC) WBC WBC-OP 
Cooling method Air natural circu- Air natural circu- Air natural circula- Air natural circu- Water-forced circu- Water-forced circu­
lation lacion tion lation and cooling lation and cooling lation and cooling 
towers towers 
Confinement 2" Wall sealed 14" Wall sealed 8" Wall sealed 0.5" Wall carbon Water-filled steel- 0.5" Wall, stainless 
method carbon-steel carbon-steel carbon-steel cake steel overpack lined concrete steel overpack welded 
cask welded cask welded welded closure welded closure basin closure water-filled 
closure closure basin 
Bilological shlelding 38" Thick con- 11" Thick con- None (distance) Concrete vaults Water basin Water basin 
crete sleeve crete sleeve 
Storage concept Vertical outdoor Vertical outdoor Horizontal outdoor Vertical indoor Vertical indoor Vertical indoor 
on 20-foot centers on 20-foot centers 20 ft apart 
Mfax lmui no ri i 
operating teuperature 
(OF) 
Canister (outer 470 a 450 a 455a 62G b <128 484 
surfnce) 
Overpack (outer 245a 170a 180a 4N b MA 127 
surface) 
Concrete (inner 155 a 122 a NA 2SO b NA NA l 
sthrfaee) ko 
)ose ratLs (nren/h) 
Outside 6urface 2(concrete 2(concrete 14,000 <2(top of deck) <1 (water surface) 41 (water surface) 
sleeve) sleeve) 
Within array '4 <4 10,009 NA NA NA 
Pwsources (to 
year 2010) 
Iand (ares) 
Water(gal/yr) 
1,100 
75 x 106 
1,100 
75 x 106 
2,300 
75 x 106 
100 
75 x 106 
100 
1,500 x 106 
150 
1,500 x 106 ,V rA 
Cabon steel 0.28 x i06 2.3 x 106 0.98 x 106 0.15 x 106 0.10 x 106 0.22 x 106 
St)fnle steel 42 42 42 42 5,600 45,000 0. 
(tons) 
Concrete(yd l ) 2.7 x 106 1 x 106 0.09 K 106 0.34 x 106 0.1 x 106 0.14 x 106 
Per ...n I 330 330 330 280 250 330 
l'ower(kWe) 2,500 3,000 3,000 2,100 10,400 10,000 
Capital, 900 x 106 2,600 x 106 1,130 x 106 460 x 106 280 x 106 740 x 106 0 
(Ii 1973 dollars) 
Cumulative operae'- 220 x 106 200 x 106 190 x 106 164 x 106 170 x 106 220 x 106 0,3 
lungcosts(in 1973 
dollars through 
-
year 2010) 
ineerinq Studies, ARR-2888, Rev., Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company, KaiserSOURCE! Retriovabte Surface Storage Facility: Alternative Concept En 
Engineers (July 1974).

0

.30 1 ambient air teaperature. cincluding structural and reinforcing steel.
 
0
LI t r ambient air temperature. dlneludiag coat of steel overpacks and concrete shields 
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should be used to minimize the required number of casks or silos.
 
Cost efficiency considerations are dependent on the cumulative discharge
 
of spent fuel. Therefore it is useful to note that the RSSF was designed
 
to handle approximately 80,000 cannisters, which was expected to be
 
all of the high-level wastes generated through the year 2000. Present
 
projections by ERDA of operating plants indicate that by 1986, 96,000
 
fuel assemblies will have been discharged. A low case projection through
 
the year 2000 shows a cumulative discharge of 320,000 assemblies (See
 
paragraph 4.2.2). If 4 bundles could be stored in a container, 80,000
 
casks would be required by the year 2000. "The natural draft-cooled
 
concept could store up to 6 PWR or 15 BWR fuel assemblies in each cask."
 
These packages would generate about 3 kW of decay heat in 10 years
 
of cooling (Reference 6-21, page 17.35). (The RSSF was designed to
 
store a cannister that generated 3.25 kW of decay heat.) (Reference 6-19,
 
page 23). Because of the greater heat loads involved with multiple
 
containerization, longer cooling time might be required in multiple
 
packaging. However, it appears that there would be significant cost
 
reductions because of decreased land use, materials requirements, and
 
handling. Final determination of the optimal method is not possible
 
at this point due to the lack of data.
 
According to the TAD, the steel container for the SSCC
 
is to be placed in a thick (38-0m) concrete silo. The concrete acts
 
as biological shielding and represents a third barrier (Reference 6-21,
 
page 17.57). Criticality, heat removal, and corrosion are not seen
 
as problems. Monitoring for loss of containment of radioactive material
 
would be handled by area survey instruments and by observation (Ref­
erence 6-21, page 17.37). In addition, the natural cooling mechanism
 
provided by the annulus between the carbon steel cask and the concrete
 
shield, as shown in Figure 6-15, requires no routine maintenance.
 
Periodic inspection of the annulus and the monitoring instruments,
 
however, would still be required. If a problem, such as clogging of
 
the annulus, was discovered, the cask would be brought back to the
 
packaging facility to make the required changes.
 
As noted, Canada is presently examining this storage concept,
 
utilizing both conduction and convection natural cooling. Based on
 
the RSSF design work already completed, the TAD estimated that 7 years
 
would be required to develop an SSCC (Reference 6-21, page 17-39).
 
The Air-cooled Vault Concept also utilizes natural draft
 
cooling of the spent fuel cannisters. Again, the decay heat would create
 
the natural draft. The facility is made up of a partially buried concrete
 
vault that is divided into cells. The canisters are stored vertically in
 
the cells. Metal sleeves surround each storage position to help
 
distribute the incoming cool air (Reference 6-21, page 17-31) (see
 
Figure 6-16).
 
For the RSSF designs, the 'temperature differential would
 
create a draft with a maximum air speed of 6 feet (1.8 m) per second
 
can only be maintained without the use of high efficiency particulate
 
(HEPA) and carbon filters. Such filters would be required if the first
 
two barriers were breached. In that case, a forced cooling system would
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Figure 6-15. Concrete Surface Silo, Convection Cooled Concept
 
Source: Reference 6-21, page 17-36
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AIR OUTLET 
AIR INLET 
EXHAUSTPORT 
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SLEEVE 
PACKAGE 
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TEMPORARY AIR SEAL 
Figure 6-16. RSSF Air-Cooled Vault Concept10
 
.Source: Reference 6-21, page 17-31
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have to be employed. Inlet and effluent air ports would require periodic 
inspection to ensure that the natural cooling would continue throughout
 
the SURFF's operation.
 
The NAS review questioned "whether the proposed slab-shaped
 
stack would assure a sufficiently reliable air flow to maintain
 
temperature below design limits" (Reference 6-19, page 32). For instance,
 
the .report mentioned Taylor instabilities where local down-drafts of cool
 
air could reduce the effective draft and thus the air flow. These problems
 
still need to be addressed.
 
Presently, the spent fuel from gas-cooled reactors is being
 
stored in forced air-cooled vaults. The spent fuel is not packaged
 
(Reference 6-21, page 17.33). Again, based on the design work completed for
 
RSSF, TAD estimate that design and construction of an Air-cooled Vault
 
would require seven to nine years (Reference 6-21, page 17.33).
 
The near surface heat sink storage is a SURFF concept that
 
had not been proposed for HLW storage. The concept is similar to a
 
method used for storage of CANDU fuels (Reference 6-21, page 17.41).
 
The canister of spent fuel is placed into concrete lined holes in the
 
earth's surface which provide passive cooling and stable shielding.
 
According to the Technical Alternatives Document, the concept could
 
be "constructed and begin receiving fuel sooner than would facilities
 
based on any other concept" (Reference 6-21, page 17-41). One outstanding
 
question, which is an indication of the technical work needed to examine
 
this concept, is the description given in Figure 6-17 of'the packaged
 
fuel rods. The package is said to hold 10 rods. Since 49 is the smallest
 
number of rods in an assembly (BWR type), this requires the disassembly
 
of each bundle prior to packaging. Whether this is an oversight in
 
the use of the drawing or if it is based on criticality requirements
 
has not been determined.
 
6.3.2 Development History
 
SURFF is not a new idea. Simply stated it is update of the
 
Retrievable Surface Storage Facility (RSSF) concepts that were examined and
 
discarded in the early 1970's. The 1SSF concepts were designed for
 
the interim storage of high-level waste. SURFF would store spent fuel
 
bundles or assemblies. The storage of spent fuel was examined in the
 
Technical Alternatives Document (Reference 6-21, Section 17) but most of the
 
material appears to be based on the RSSF design concepts and the work done on
 
designs for spent fuel storage at reprocessing plants. Present studies are
 
now under the direction of the ERDA Richland Operation 0 Office (Richland,
 
Washington). The prime contractor is Rockwell International, Inc.
 
ERDA is aware of the similarity of the SURFF and RSSF program.
 
However, they are confident that the differences in the purposes of
 
the concepts and the differences in the existing political environments
 
will keep SURFF from being assessed in the way the RSSF was assessed,
 
as described below. The differences as seen by ERDA are that while RSSF was
 
an interim stop-gap facility for the storage of high-level waste, SURFF
 
is an anti-proliferation project (Reference 6-27). It is felt that SURFF
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Figure 6-17. Typical Concrete Tile Hole for Surface 
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Source: Reference 6-21, pages 17-41
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may be needed, since one of the results of the Carter policy to defer
 
reprocessing indefinitely for anti-proliferation reasons is that the
 
nuclear energy industry's storage capacity may be overstrained. Therefore,
 
ERDA feels it may have to provide a technology to relieve this capacity
 
problem until the geological disposal repositories are available.
 
However, ERDA still anticipates a public relations problem
 
with SURFF because of its similarity to RSSF. Because of this similarity,
 
it is useful to recall the brief history of RSSF.
 
By February 1972 the geologic repository project at Lyons,
 
Kansas was officially terminated. While plans were made to examine
 
novel waste management alternatives, the AEC decided it needed a short­
term waste management policy. "Under the direction of the new Director
 
of the Division of Waste Management and Transportation, Frank Pittman,
 
the notion of an engineered Retrievable Surface Storage Facility was
 
developed. Mausolea would be constructed in the West for the storage
 
of AEC and commercially generated waste." (Reference 6-28, page D-14)
 
In September 1974, a draft environmental impact statement
 
("Management of Commercial High level and Transuranium-contaminated
 
Radioactive Waste, WASH 1539) was issued. Although the scope of the
 
study included an engineered surface storage facility for the retrievable
 
storage of commercial high-level waste; geological formations and sites
 
for permanent disposal as well as retrievable storage for commercial
 
transuranium contaminated waste were also considered. Comments received
 
from environmental groups and from State and local governments were
 
generally critical. The Environmental Protection Agency in its unpub­
lished comments to the AEC, stated:
 
"The development of an environmentally acceptable system for
 
permanent disposal of commercially generated radioactive waste
 
would appear to be high priority program that is essential for
 
the development of nuclear power. However, the draft statement
 
does not contain adequate description of a program to develop
 
such a permanent disposal system, nor does it reflect either
 
the priority attached to this overall program by the AEC nor an
 
indication of the resources required. Because of the over­
whelming need to develop an environmentally acceptable ultimate
 
disposal method and the realization that there is a risk
 
of failure in any research and development effort, we believe
 
that work on promising alternatives should be pursued con­
currently."
 
"A major concern--the employment of the RSSF concept-- is the
 
possibility that economic factors could later dictate
 
utilization of the facility as a permanent repository,
 
contrary to the stated intent to make the RSSF interim in
 
nature. Economic factors would consist mainly of the fiscal
 
investment attendant to its construction and the activities
 
which arise in the commercial segment of the economy to
 
support its operation. Since there are controlling
 
environmental factors that must be considered before final
 
disposition of the RSSF, it is important that these factors
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never be allowed to become secondary to economic factors in
 
the decisionmaking process. Vigorous and timely pursuit of
 
ultimate disposal techniques would assist in negating such a
 
possibility." (Reference 6-29, page 2)
 
EPA's general concern was that the AEC's concentration on the
 
RSSF concept indicated a change in AEC's attention from the primary goal
 
of finding an ultimate disposal method to the secondary goal of finding
 
an interim method. EPA also felt that the technical cost/benefit was
 
inadequate:
 
"The draft statement is noticeably deficient in its lack of
 
any meaningful cost/benefit analysis supporting the RSSF
 
option as opposed to even the other alternatives that were
 
introduced." (Reference 6-29, page 2)
 
The draft environmental statement received EPA's lowest category of
 
evaluation. Significantly one of the first actions taken by Robert
 
Seamans after he became Administrator of ERDA was to withdraw his request
 
for funds to build the RSSF. Like the Lyons' salt mine before it, the
 
RSSF was officially dead. (Reference 6-30)
 
EPA and CEQ are already examining these arguments to see if
 
they will still hold. Admittedly, the political climate has changed and
 
the need for storage capacity has become a crucial factor in future
 
nuclear decisions. However, if a SURFF and a geologic disposal facility
 
are to be ready simultaneously, the latter is obviously preferred,
 
especially if the costs of retrieval are similar.
 
6.3.3 Program Status and Plan
 
Following President Carter's nuclear energy policy statement
 
on April 7, 1977, the Energy Research and Development Administration
 
stated that:
 
"The policy of indefinitely postponing reprocessing leads
 
to a requirement for storage of fuel elements in a manner
 
in which they may be easily recovered--either for permanent
 
disposal as waste or for reprocessing to recover fuel values
 
after an indefinite period. An essential feature of such
 
a storage technology is that the fuel elements should be
 
packaged in such a manner to cause minimum complication
 
to reprocessing consistent with safe storage. For such
 
a purpose an engineered facility located on the surface
 
appears at this time to be the preferred technical approach.
 
Accordingly a Spent Unreprocessed Fuel Facility or SURFF
 
for storage of spent fuel will be added to the ERDA program.
 
The development of this SURFF is expected to proceed concurrently
 
with the basic geologic repository program. The development of
 
SURFF will be paced so as to permit the operation of such a
 
unit by 1985. The SURFF like the repository i expected
 
to be licensed and regulated by the NRC." (Reference 6-24,
 
page 3, emphasis added; see also Reference 6-25, page 21).
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Recent conversations show that this is a development program
 
in flux. Carl Cooley, the project director for SURFF, says that SURFF
 
is presently only an option being developed for consideration. He
 
does not expect a final decision to be made on the acceptability of
 
using a SURFF until 1979.* The "program" for doing evaluation studies
 
is at the preliminary stages. Indeed, no budget decision on how the
 
FY 1978 commercial waste'management budget of $175,000,000 will be
 
allocated to SURFF studies has been made.
 
This statement also agrees with a careful reading of the
 
National Energy Plan (Reference 6-26, page 72). The Plan makes no mention
 
of an engineered surface facility but only of using geologic repositories
 
to store spent fuel (see next section) and improving methods of storing
 
fuel so that current storage capacity can be doubled "without constructing
 
new facilities" (Reference 6-26, page 73).
 
6.3.4 Issues
 
Although both the NAS review of the RSSF concepts and the Technical
 
Alternatives Document's description of the interim storage of spent fuel state
 
that the technology is available, some outstanding issues and questions should
 
be addressed. Because ERDA projects to examine SURFF as an option are just
 
beginning, this is only an indication of what component issues and
 
questions are being addressed. This is not the same as saying the
 
issues will be resolved or the questions answered, or even whether the
 
questions and issues are important. The four areas addressed are:
 
* 	 The effects of reactor environment on the material
 
integrity of fuel rods
 
* 	 Technical issues addressed in the NAS review of the RSSF
 
6.3.4.1 Scientific Feasibility - The Effects of Reactor Environment on
 
the Fuel Rods' Material Integrity. This section has frequently noted the
 
multiple barrier concept used in the SURFF concepts. The fuel cladding
 
which is the first barrier is exposed to extreme temperatures and
 
radioactivity over at least a two year period in the reactor core. Does
 
this exposure detract from the cladding's ability to confine fission
 
products? Presently there appears to be little scientific evidence for
 
this in the literature. The obvious, but possibly unproven assumption is
 
that the cladding, having survived the extremes, can therefore survive
 
lesser environments for 100 years.
 
This question will probably be addressed in the future studies by
 
ERDA through their Richland Office. In addition, adequate monitoring
 
capability should allow the facility operators to identify initial
 
confinement breakdowns prior to any damage to the other barriers.
 
*Telephone conversation: C. Cooley, ERDA with E. Edelson, JPL, June 23, 1977
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Although this now becomes an engineering management issue -- discussed 
below - it is disturbing to note in Reference 6-21 the following description 
of maintenance of an air-cooled vault: 
For the first several years of storage, a program of routine
 
inspection could be adopted to assess the integrity of
 
the container. The need for inspections would presumably
 
decrease should experience show that container integrity
 
was not diminishing with time. (Reference 6-21, page 17.33)
 
It appears that the opposite argument -- having been sub­
jected to the extremes of a reactor core, the cladding susceptibility
 
to deterioration over time increases -- is just as valid. This would
 
therefore require either an equal or an increasing number of inspections
 
as time goes by.
 
6.3.4.2 Technical Feasibility -- Related Technical Issues Addressed in
 
the NAS Review of the RSSF. This section has indicated the present lack
 
of detailed technical designs for SURFF. In addition, the similarities
 
between SURFF and RSSF have been noted. For these two reasons it is
 
useful to review the assessment of the RSSF made in 1975 by the Committee
 
on Radioactive Waste Management (CRWM) of the National Academy of
 
Sciences-National Research Council.
 
The CRWM called the accumulation of radioactive waste a
 
"Challenging, but resolvable, problem.. .Sufficient knowledge is available
 
to proceed immediately with developing a plan for interim, retrievable,
 
and safe surface storage." (Reference 6-19, page vii)
 
However, as one of its ten conclusions-'and recommendations,
 
the CRWM listed nine areas where "final specifications and designs have
 
not been determined and considerable additional engineering research
 
and development are necessary." Seven of these apply to SURFF. They are:
 
(1) Study of performance of each of the cited barriers,
 
including optimum materials for canister and over­
pack, and optimum specifications for concrete under
 
the various environments of operation
 
(2) 	 Study of possible deleterious interactions between
 
components of the waste and canister, overpack, or
 
concrete - each extrapolated to about 100 years
 
(3) 	 Procedures for fabricating or processing reliable and
 
economical components of the demonstration facility
 
(4) 	Study of criteria for nondestructive testing of the
 
components of the system
 
(5) 	 Procedures for filling, sealing, overpacking, and trans­
porting the canisters
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(6) 	 Procedures for monitoring thermal performance during
 
all stages of the demonstration facility
 
(7) 	 Procedures and techniques for the early detection of
 
leaks or other failures of the canister, cask, concrete
 
shield, or other structural members of the storage unit
 
(Reference 6-19, page 3)
 
Each of these areas must be addressed in sufficient detail
 
before the technology can be considered technically achievable.
 
Another technical feasibility question is why was the near­
surface heat sink never recommended for high-level waste storage?
 
Although this question might have a simple answer, at this time there
 
is no clear indication why this alternative which "could probably be
 
constructed and be receiving fuel sooner than would facilities based
 
on any other concept" was never evaluated in the Reference 6-22 for RSSF. 
The heat generation capacity of storage containers for RSSF and SURFF
 
is very similar. Radioactivity does not appear to differ much either.
 
The questions raised by the omission may indicate some technical or
 
legal problems concerning this concept that need closer examination
 
in the SURFF design studies.
 
6.4 	 DEEP GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL OF UNREPROCESSED SPENT FUEL
 
IN BEDDED SALT
 
6.4.1 Description of Repository and Packaging Facility Concepts. 
In concept, a repository for the long-term containment and isolation 
of spent fuel is similar to the repository for solidified, encapsulated 
HLW described in Section 5.31 However, the volume of spent fuel per 
GW(e)-year is about four times the volume of the corresponding solidified 
HLW (including fuel rod cladding). The length and volume of a spent 
fuel assembly, the method of packaging spent fuel in canisters for 
long-term storage, and the "decay heat" and radioactivity content per 
canister all influence major repository design features, such as diameter of 
the access shafts, height of the disposal rooms or "vaults," canister spacing, 
etc. [See Section 6.4.4 below]. A major design parameter is the duration 
of pre-storage, or "aging" before emplacement in the repository. This parameter 
determines the level of decay heat and radioactivity of the spent fuel at 
the time of its emplacement in the repository. The costs of pre-storage 
have to be weighed against the costs and technical difficulties associated 
with the bedded-salt repository as a function of the duration of pre-storage. 
At the present stage of development, the packaging facility
 
conceptual design must be versatile enough to handle at least two different
 
kinds of spent fuel shipment received:
 
() 	 Unpackaged spent fuel assemblies or fuel rod bundles
 
shipped to the irepository in casks from spent fuel
 
pools 	at reactor sites, or from central spent fuel
 
pools 	[Section 6.1 and 6.2].
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(2) Packaged spent fuel assemblies shipped from SURFFs;
 
these SFAs will generally require repackaging
 
[Paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3].
 
After discussing the brief history of geologic disposal of spent
 
fuel and the present national program and plans in Section 6.4.2, the 
major design parameters for the repository and packaging are analyzed 
in Section 6.4.31 
6.4.2 Developmental History and Program Status and Plans
 
From the time of the first report in 1957 of an advisory
 
committee of the HAS-NRC (Reference 6-33) up to April 7, 1977, the primary
 
emphasis of the national terminal waste storage program had been on the
 
development of a facility to bury high-level radioactive wastes from
 
the chemical reprocessing of spent fuel elements in bedded salt deposits.
 
Of course, it was always understood that most of the scientific and
 
technical problems associated with such a repository would be quite
 
similar if unreprocessed spent fuel was to be contained and isolated
 
for long times. The differences appear in packaging, in detailed canister
 
and repository design, and in long-term radioactivity content (Section 6.43).
 
However, President Carter's policy statement of April 7, 1977 deferring
 
reprocessing for an indefinite period of time has had a major impact
 
on the waste program, and this impact is not fully reflected in the
 
brief discussion of this question in "the National Energy Plan". To
 
quote from that document (Reference 6-34, page xxi):
 
"To ensure that adequate waste storage facilities are available
 
by 1985, ERDA's waste management program has been expanded
 
to include development of techniques for long-term storage
 
of spent fuel. Also, a task force will review ERDA's waste
 
management program. Moreover, improved methods of storing
 
spent fuel will enable most utilities at least to double
 
their current storage capacity without constructing new
 
facilities."
 
A very brief statement on pp. 72 and 73 of this document adds some
 
target dates:
 
"Prototype technologies, complete designs, and initial
 
environmental criteria for waste repositories will be developed
 
by 1978. Licensing of the first repository should be completed
 
by 1981. There will be an opportunity for thorough public
 
review at each of these stages. A task force under the
 
direction of the Assistant to the President for energy*
 
will review the entire ERDA waste-management program."
 
*Dr. James P. Schlesinger (now Secretary of the Department of Energy)
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An extensive public statement on May 16, 1977 by Dr. Colin
 
Heath, of ERDA3 (Reference 6-35) provides some elaboration of these
 
policy and schedule guidelines contained in the National Energy Plan.
 
The major milestones in the schedule for the 1985 repositories are
 
shown in Table 6-3, taken directly from Figure 4 of Dr. Heath's statement.
 
As explained by Dr. Heath, in order for ERDA to be able to start con­
struction, the agency will have to obtain construction licensing'approval
 
from NRC by 1981. "This action will be a clear signal to the American
 
public that the program is proceeding to a complete technical solution."
 
(pp. 11 and 12). Later on (pp. 20-21), Dr. Heath states that:
 
"An operating repository in salt by 1985 remains as the
 
primary goal of the Terminal Storage Program. Hence, we
 
do not expect any change in that part of the geological
 
program directed at the 1985 repository as a result of
 
the new national nuclear policy. The emphasis is being
 
altered, however, to give first consideration to spent
 
fuel elements as the waste form rather than solidified waste
 
from the reprocessing plant. Thereby, a disposal option
 
will be provided in the event that a decision is ultimately
 
made to permanently forego reprocessing and treat spent
 
fuel elements as waste. Capability to accept solidified
 
waste from "areprocessing plant will also be included but
 
primary emphasis will be on spent fuel elements."
 
On page 21, Dr. Heath also signals a significant shift in
 
emphasis in the site selection program. Because of the indefinite suspension of
 
reprocessing and the slower-than-planned build up of LWR plants, the pressure
 
for multiple repositories is lightened. Consequently, the development
 
of the four additional sites in crystalline rock or argillaceous formations
 
(shale) may be "stretched out" in time, although basic work on the geology
 
of these alternatives would continue. Clearly the primary emphasis is
 
on the development of two Federal repositories in bedded salt by 1985,
 
largely because of time constraints and the more highly developed state
 
of technology for bedded salt as compared to other alternatives. The em­
phasis on spent fuel elements as a "residual", either for an interim period
 
or for all time, is reflected in a considerable increase by ERDA in the
 
efforts to develop packaging methods for handling and storing spent fuel.
 
An important element of the waste management program is
 
the preparation by ERDA of the Generic Environmental Impact Statement
 
(GEIS), evaluating the potential releases to the environment of commercial
 
post-fission radioactive materials--either spent fuel or high-level
 
wastes from reprocessing and recycling operations with uranium only,
 
or with both uranium and plutonium. The activities examined are the
 
major ones of storage, treatment (if any), transportation, and final
 
disposition. A draft of this GEIS is expected to be issued in late
 
1977. Following public hearings, a final version of the GEIS will
 
be prepared in 1978, and this document will serve as a guide to future
 
decisions on the general nature of the waste repository program. Of
 
course, the GEIS does not eliminate the need for a site-specific EIS.
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Table 6-3. 	 Terminal Storage Program 
Goals
 
* Initiate major industry participation 	 1977
 
* Identify suitable geologic formations 	 1978
 
* Waste 	acceptance criteria and charges 1978
 
* Site selection -- first repositories 	 1978
 
* Draft 	EIS and firm facility cost estimate 1979
 
* Start 	construction -- first repositories 1981
 
* First 	repositories operational 1985
 
6.4.3 	 Technical Aspects of Spent Fuel Repository Design and
 
Packaging; Major Design Parameters
 
6.4.3.1 	 Radioactivity and Decay Heat of Spent Fuel. With a "burn-up"
 
rate of 33,000 MW(t) days per tonne, an energy density of 30 MW/tonne
 
and an average load factor of 80% the total radioactivity content of
 
the transuranics in the 27 tonnes of spent fuel is 3 x 106 Ci one
 
year after discharge, compared to a value of 108 Ci for the fission
 
products. (Reference 6-36) Most of this radioactivity in the transuranics
 
comes from P-radiation emitted by 241Pu which has a half-life
 
of 13.2 years. After ten years, the total radioactivity content
 
in the transuranics has declined slightly to 2 x 106 Ci, while the
 
radioactivity in the fission products has decayed to 107 Ci.
 
During the next 90 years, 241Pu virtually disappears.
 
One of the main contributors to P-radiation, 244Cm (half-life 17.6 years),
 
decays by a factor of 50, and 238Pu (half-life 86 years) decreases by
 
a factor of about 2.23. The net result is that the total radioactivity
 
content of the transuranics in the spent fuel after 100 years is 1.3 x
 
105 Ci, compared to a value of about 106 Ci for the fission products.
 
During the first 100 years of storage, the total radioactivity
 
of the spent fuel is generated mainly by the fission products, and
 
differs only slightly (15-20% higher) from the total radioactivity
 
in the high-level waste after reprocessing. A similar conclusion naturally
 
follows for the "decay heat". Thus, for the first 100 years, the containment
 
problem for the spent fuel in bedded salt is not much different in
 
principle from the problem for encapsulated HLW. The important design
 
inputs are 9.2 kw per metric ton of spent fuel after one year of storage;
 
2.3 kw per metric ton after 5 years; 1.4 kw per metric ton after ten
 
years; 0.3 kw per metric ton after 100 years (Figure 6-18).
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For storage times longer than 100 years, the time histories
 
of radioactivity content and decay heat for spent fuel and HLW differ
 
significantly. Since the spent fuel contains 200 times as much plutonium
 
initially as the HLW, the contributions made by 239Pu and 240pu
 
shown in Figure 6-19 in the early period, i.e., around one year after
 
discharge from the reactor. are multiplied by a factor of 200, until
 
240pu (half-life 6760 years) begins to decay. The build-up of 241Am
 
in the spent fuel during the first 10 years after discharge (Reference 6-36)
 
is also an important factor, until this isotope (half-life 458 years)
 
also decays. (243Am plays a secondary role.) The net result is
 
that the decay heat for spent fuel is more than 10 times higher than
 
the decay heat for HLW per metric ton of uranium in the discharged
 
fuel over the period 103-105 years (Figure 6-18). Thus the integrated
 
heat load for spent fuel over the first 104 years is much larger than
 
for HLW if the areal density in the disposal layer in kw/acre (or watts/m2 )
 
is the same at the time of emplacement in the repository. Thus, the
 
thermal design problems for the repository are broken down quite naturally
 
into two requirements: (1) the "near-field" problem concerned with
 
temperatures in the disposal layer itself and especially at the canister
 
wall during the first 100 years of storage; (2) the "far-field" problem
 
dealing with the temperature rises and thermal stresses in the entire
 
repository and surrounding geologic medium in the period 102_104
 
years after storage.
 
6.4.3.2 Packaging, Canister Spacing and Temperature Effects on 
Bedded Salt. 
6.4.3.2.1 Near-Field Considerations. The major design parameters 
for a 	spent fuel repository are as follows:
 
(1) 	 "Pre-storage" time elapsed between removal of spent
 
fuel from the reactor and emplacement of the spent
 
fuel in the repository.
 
(2) 	 Maximum allowable canister wall temperature rise in bedded
 
salt (ATMAX).
 
(3) 	 Lateral dimensions and shape of canister cross-section.*
 
(4) 	 Rate and cumulative amount of spent fuel to be shipped
 
to repository.
 
These four parameters determine the amount of spent fuel
 
and the "decay heat" per canister, the spacing betweei canisters, and
 
the number and cost of the canisters; the diameter and cost of the
 
canister access shaft (or shafts) to the repository; ease of handling,
 
transporter design, and size and height of storage rooms or "vaults".
 
ABased on the assumption that spent fuel rod integrity is maintained,
 
the minimum canister length is fixed at about 4 M.
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About 65 spent fuel assemblies are discharged from a typical 
PWR per GW(e)-year [70% load factor], or about 2.3 assemblies per metric 
ton of spent fuel. Each assembly is 22 cm by 22 cm in cross-section 
and about 4 m long, and contains 264 fuel rods. One year after discharge 
from the reactor each assembly generates about 4 kw of decay heat; 
after 5 years this heat rate drops to 1.0 kw-per assembly, and after 
10 years it amounts .to 0.6 kw per assembly. In dealing with the packaging 
problem for spent fuel, there are three main alternatives: 
(1) 	 Single-assembly canisters
 
(2) 	 Dismantling of fuel assemblies and subsequent packaging
 
of fuel rods/bundles in canisters to reduce volume
 
required by about 40% compared with (1)
 
(3) 	Multiple-assembly canisters
 
These alternatives must be carefully analyzed in terms of the major
 
design parameters listed above in order to develop optimum solutions.
 
Some of the main features of these design alternatives will be briefly
 
described here.
 
Maximum temperaturb rise at the canister wall (ATMAX)has
 
been calculated as a function of initial "decay heat" (or pre-storage time),
 
canister spacing and canister diameter for HLW canisters embedded in rock
 
or in salt. (References 6-37 and 6-38) The field of canisters is regarded
 
as a square, planar infinite array of cylinders embedded in a continuous,
 
static rock or salt bed. If it were not for the fact that the heat conductivity
 
of rock or salt depends on the temperature, the problem would be linear.
 
However, over the modest range of temperatures of interest to the designer
 
this effect is small and the problem is quasi-linear. Therefore one can
 
scale the results obtained for the HLW canisters to fit the case of canisters
 
containing spent fuel. Examining the wall temperature history for any one
 
particular canister, one finds that the temperature will increase at first
 
because of the heat flux from this canister and the adjacent ones.
 
However, the effect of the more distant canisters on the wall temperature
 
takes some time to be felt; in fact, this time interval is roughly
 
proportional to the square of the distance and inversely proportional
 
to the thermometric conductivity.* If the spacing between canisters 
is large enough, this time interval is long enough so that the "decay 
heat" emitted from each canister has dropped off appreciably from its 
initial value at the time of emplacement. Clearly, the temperature rise 
at the canister wall reaches a maximum value and then decreases with 
time thereafter. The numerical calculations show that this ATMAX drops
 
off quite rapidly with increasing canister spacing up to a spacing of about
 
10 meters (Figure 5, Reference 37). Beyond this value only slight reductions
 
in ATMAX are obtained at increasing cost. The maximum temperature
 
*Thermometric conductivity, y is k/pCp, where k is thermal conductivity
 
in watts/m/OC, p is density in kg/m3 and Cp is specific heat in
 
joules/kg/C.
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at the canister.wall is also sensitive to the "effective diameter"
 
of the canisters (Figure 5, Reference 37). These results can be utilized
 
to describe some of the main features of packaging alternatives (1)
 
and (3) above.
 
If the single assembly alternative is selected, 65 canisters
 
would be required per GW(e)-year, as compared with about 10 canisters
 
for encapsulated HLW. These canisters could be of square cross-section
 
(28 cm x 28 cm) and about 4 m long, filled with helium gas or zinc
 
powder for good thermal conduction and protection of the fuel cladding
 
against corrosion and oxidation. A stainless steel wall thickness
 
of 1.3 cm is adequate for radiation shielding, so that each canister
 
would have an internal volume of about 0.2 m3 and would weigh about
 
0.7 metric tons. If the spent fuel is packaged and placed in the repository
 
5 years after removal from the reactor, each canister would generate
 
1 kw of decay heat; if the pre-storage time is 10 years, the decay
 
heat per canister is 0.6 kw. With a canister spacing of 10 meters,
 
the ,ATMAXat the canister wall is about 600 C for 5 years of
 
pre-storage and about 350C for 10 years of pre-storage (Table 6-4).
 
These maximum temperature rises are well below the values at which
 
any significant difficulties are expected because of brine migration
 
in the salt, or salt decrepitation (Section 5.3.4).
 
On the other hand, the multiple fuel assembly mode might
 
involve packaging 4 spent fuel assemblies, for example, in a canister
 
of square cross-section 50 cm x 50 cm, and about 4 m long, with an
 
interior volume of about 0.3 m3 . For a wall thickness of 1.3 cm, the
 
canister weight is about 3.2 metric tons. Only 17 such canisters
 
are required per 27 MTU (one annual discharge) compared with 65 canisters
 
for the single-assembly mode, and 10 canisters for encapsulated HLW.
 
In this case, taking into account the larger "effective radius" of
 
the canister, ATMAX at the canister wall with a canister spacing
 
of 10 meters is about 1750C if the pre-storage time is 5 years. This
 
value decreases to about 1050C if the pre-storage time is 10 years
 
(Table 6-4). Of course the diameter of the canister access shaft(s)
 
to the repository would have to be at least 70 cm, compared with about
 
40 cm for the single assembly case. As we shall see shortly, this
 
alternative of a multiple fuel assembly mode is probably not acceptable
 
when the integrated heat loads are considered in the "far-field" around
 
the disposal layer.
 
For all three packaging alternatives, the length of the
 
canister is about 4 m if the integrity of the fuel rods is to be preserved.
 
This length should be compared with the proposed length of about 3 m
 
for the canisters containing encapsulated HLW (Section 5.2:). The design
 
height of a storage room or vault in the repository would have to be
 
increased somewhat in order to accomodate canisters containing spent
 
fuel.
 
6.4.3.2.2 "Far-Field" Considerations. Lincoln and Parry (Reference 6-38)
 
have pointed out that either "near-field" thermal response in and near the
 
disposal layer, or "far-field" long-term thermal response of the bedded salt
 
and surrounding geologic medium may determine the permissible level of
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Table 6-4. Design Characteristics for Spent Fuel Disposal
 
TMAX at Canister Wall 
Canister Canister Canister No. of 
Packaging Cross-section Weight Canisters per 
Mode (MT) Annual Discharge to = 5 years to z 10 years 
Single
 
Fuel Assembly 28 cm x 28 cm 0.8 65 60 C 35 C
 
Multiple 0 
Fuel Assembly 50 cm x 50 cm 3.2 17 175°C 105 C 
(4) 
Typical 1000 MW(e) PWR operating at 70% load factor:
 
33,000 MW(t) days/MT and 30 MW/MT
 
Canister spacing = 10 meters
 
to = Time interval between discharge from reactor and emplacement in repository
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"power density" in the disposal layer. From Figure 6-18 showing the
 
time history of the decay heat, one can roughly estimate the integrated
 
heat load for HLW and for unreprocessed spent fuel over the period
 
10-104 years, as follows: (Here AQ is measured in watt-years per 
MTU) 
Period (years) AD (HEW) AQ (Spent Fuel) 
10 - 100 25,000 30,000
 
100 - 1000 22,000 66,000
 
1o3 - 104 13,000 200,000
 
10 - 104 Cumulative Cumulative
 
AQ = 60,000 AQ = 300,000
 
So if there were a requirement on the "far field" to maintain the integrated
 
heat load for spent fuel and for HLW at the same levels over the first
 
1A years, the areal density in the disposal layer for spent fuel would
 
have to be about 1/5 that for HLW.
 
Now, if the HLW canisters are spaced 10 meters apart on
 
centers, there is one canister per 100 m2 , and if 15 are utilized to
 
contain the encapsulated HLW from 30 MTU of reprocessed spent fuel
 
(I GW(e)-year output), each canister emits a decay heat rate of 2.2
 
kw if it is emplaced in the repository ten years after discharge from
 
the reactor. In other words, the power density is 22 w/m3 , or 110
 
kw/acre. In order to produce the same integrated heat load for spent
 
fuel over 10 years, the power density would have to be about 4 w/m2
 
or 22 kw/acre. It is interesting to note that this power density is
 
matched very closely by adopting the single fuel assembly per canister
 
Packaging mode discussed in Section 6.4.4.2.1. Of course the number
 
of canisters required per GW(e)-year is increased from 15 for HLW to
 
75 for spent fuel. It should be emphasized that with these integrated
 
heat loads, the present 1-D models show temperature rises in the range
 
of only 10°-15 C at a distance of 500 m above the disposal layer after
 
104 years of storage.
 
All of the thermal calculations known to the present authors
 
utilize a one-dimensional model. This approach is certainly justified
 
for the first 100 years of storage, because the "heat pulse" from the
 
disposal layer will have produced appreciable temperature increases
 
out to distances of about 100 m away from the disposal layer, which
 
is assumed to be a planar array of the order of 3000 m x 3000 m. But
 
after 104 years, the "heat pulse" will be felt out to a distance of
 
the order of 1000 m, and a 3-D analysis is required. A schematic diagram
 
of the isotherms around the disposal layer is shown in Figure 6-19
 
for storage times of the order of 1000 years. Clearly there are steeper
 
thermal gradients around the edges of the disposal layer than in a
 
vertical mid-plane. These thermal gradients, acting over long periods
 
of time, would be accompanied by stresses which could produce undesirable
 
cracks or faulting in the bedded salt or surrounding geologic medium.
 
One method of minimizing this possibility is to "taper" the distribution
 
of power density in the disposal layer toward the edges. The Dhenomena
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associated with the long-term response of bedded salt and surrounding
 
earth and/6r rock to modest temperature gradients requires careful
 
study utilizing a more realistic 3-D model.
 
For the "open" LWR nuclear fuel cycle, the total number
 
of canisters and the size of the-repository (or repositories) required
 
for containment and isolation of spent fuel over the entire'life of
 
the LWR can be estimated on the basis of these design considerations.
 
Recent estimates of total U.S. reserves of U308 made by a special panel
 
of the National Academy of Sciences places these reserves (known, probable,
 
possible and suspected) at about 2 x 106 tons. Using current technology
 
this reserve would produce 3 x 105 tons,of.UO2 fuel-enriched to a 235U
 
content of 3.5%. If the.multiple-assemblypackaging alternative were
 
adopted (for example), about 1.7 x.10 5 canisters would be required.
 
These canisters could be arranged in a square array (plan view) with
 
a spacing of 10 meters between canisters. The volume occupied by the
 
3
canisters alone is 1.4 x 105m . The entire array would occupy an area
 
4.2 x 103 meters by 4.2 x 103 meters, or 17 square kilometers (about
 
6 square miles). According to the revised National Waste Terminal
 
Storage (NWTS) program, the spent fuel would most likely be stored
 
in at least two separate repositories in bedded salt. In that case,
 
each storage component of a repository would occupy an area of about
 
3 mi2 , or about 2000 acres. If the "far-field" thermal considerations
 
discussed above lead to the alternative mode of packaging a single
 
fuel assembly in one canister then obviously 4 times as many canisters
 
are involved and 8 separate repositories each occupying a disposal
 
layer area of 2000 acres are required.
 
6.4.3.3 Long-Range Considerations
 
Clearly, the key questions about the viability of geologic con­
tainment and isolation of radionuclides are concerned with the engi­
neering design of the repository, based on the hydrology and geology
 
over long periods of time, and the possible pathways to the biosphere.
 
fIn Section 5.3.4 the weak links in,the repository site evaluation
 
and selection process are outlined, and several possible scenarios are
 
constructed in which a connection between the repository and the biosphere
 
could be established. The most important geospheric transport mechanism
 
is the intrusion of flowing ground water. If the hydrogeological criteria
 
for site stability can be established, and the existing ground water
 
systems measured and modeled for a specific site (see Section 5.3),
 
the probability of the intrusion of ground water in a carefully selected
 
and designed bedded salt repository over .the first 103 years is virtually
 
zero. Many examples can be found in human history of the successful
 
preservation of entombed objects for several thousand years. A containment
 
period of 1o3 years is adequate to insure that practically all the
 
fission products of any consequence in the HLW or the spent fuel have
 
disappeared with the exception of 1291 and Techneciuin 99.
 
The probability of ground water intrusion over time intervals
 
longer than 103 years is low,' but it is difficult to estimate with any
 
degree of confidence. Therefore it is useful to make the conservative
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assumption that such ground water flow does in fact take place, and then
 
to examine the main geologic parameters that control the rate of transport
 
of the long-lived radionuclides to the nearest interface with the biosphere.
 
The most important index of the effectiveness of the geologic barrier
 
for any particular radionuclide is the ratio of the geospheric transport
 
time to the half-life of the nuclide (T1/2 ). This transport time depends
 
upon two parameters:
 
(1) 	 The "quality" of the geologic formation in terms of its 
permeability, P in m/sec1 and porosity, or void 
fraction,E . These parameters are combined to give 
the mean pore velocity of the mobile phase, Vp = 
Phl/E-(in meters/sec), where hl is the hydraulic 
gradient in meters of "head" per meter of path length;. 
(2) 	 The "hold-up" factor, K, or the ratio of mean pore velocity
 
to the nuclide migration velocity. This factor depends
 
on the degree of sorption of the radionuclide in
 
the geologic barrier by the processes of ion exchange,
 
ion absorption, etc.*
 
The ratio (R) of the geospheric transport time to the half­
life of the nuclide is then
 
R 3 	x 10-8 Ir/2
 
where L is the path length to the nearest interface with'the biosphere in
 
meters, and T1 /2 is measured in years, e.g., for 2 3 9pu, T1 /2 = 25,000
 
years. Neglecting diffusion and dispersion the "exit" -radioactivity
 
concentration in the flowing groundwater is related to the initial
 
concentration at the repository by the expression (Ci/m3)EXIT =
 
(-ci/m 3 )e-0. 69R.,
 
The present brief discussion is not concerned with the
 
ultimate fate of the radioactivity (in ci/m 3 ) along its pathway to
 
man, but we will utilize the "exit" value of (Ci/m) in comparison
 
with the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) of a particular radionuclide
 
as an index of geospheric containment. Following Marsily, et al
 
(Reference 6-54) the simplest and most probable situation involves
 
*The hold-up factor K can be shown to be given by the relation K
 
I + KdP/E, where p is the mass per unit volume of the immobile phase,
 
E is the effective porosity, and Kd, the "distributior coefficient,"
 
is the ratio of the concentration of the particular element per unit
 
mass in the immobile phase to the concentration of this element per
 
unit volume of the mobile phase, under eouilibrium conditinns (see
 
References 6-52 and 6-53).
 
6-60
 
77-69 
upward flow of groundwater across the repository disposal layer in
 
response to a vertical hydraulic gradient. In that case the radioactivity
 
concentration of a particular nuclide in the groundwater at the repository
 
is given by
 
MN(Ci/g)N

= 3 , 10-8
(ci/m3) 

TL_ )(fEV p)(m 2/CANISTER)
 
where MN is the mass of a specific nuclide per canister in -grams- (Ci/g)N
 
is the curies per gram of a speef~ic nuc ide, T D is the leaching or
 
dissolution ti'e'for-al- of his---iiclde toie discharged into the water
 
in years, e Vp is the Darcy velocity -n m/see, or flux of water/m2 across
 
the disposal layer. For example, for spent fuel with an area distribution
 
of 1 canister per 100 m2 , and a relatively poor geologic formation
 
characterized by e = 0.02 and Vp = 5 x 10-6 m/sec, the concentration for
 
239Pu at the disposal layer is
 
.4
 (Ci/m 3 )0 

so that
 
(Ci/m 3 )0 = 4 x 10-3 if TL.D = 100 years, and
 
(Ci/m 3 )0 = 4 x 10-2 if TL.D = 10 years.
 
Thus attenuation factors of the order of 10-3 to 10-4 are required
 
along the transport path to the environment in order to maintain the
 
exit level of radioactivity concentration below the MPC. In other
 
words the "hold-up" factor K must be large enough so that the transport
 
time for 23 9pu is 10 to 14 half-lives for this particular formation,
 
or 250,000 to 350,000 years.
 
Although this simplistic discussion turns out to contain
 
the essential features of the problem, the actual details of the situation
 
including diffusion and dispersion and the nuclear chain.reactions
 
in the spent fuel or HLW are quite complicated. Radionuclide migration
 
in geologic media has been analyzed by Schneider and Platt (Reference 6-38)
 
and by Burkholder in the U.S. (Reference 6-53), and by Marsily, Ledoux,
 
Barbreau and Margat in France (Reference 6-54) using one dimensional
 
models.
 
Burkholder utilizes fixed values of K and Vp. In his
 
work Vp = 1 foot per day 4 x 10--m/seo and (for example) K for
 
pu is taken as 104 for a non-salt repository, corresponding
 
to the best available value of Kd (see footnoteg. 6-60) for U.S.
 
western desert soil. Burkholder's calculations illustrate the combined
 
effects of path length, canister integrity (or time to failure), and
 
leach rate (for HLW) or discharge rate at the repository, on the leakage
 
of radioactivity in terms of Ci/year. Burkholder is primarily concerned
 
with the possibility of horizontal transport of radionuclides by the
 
(-rl
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groundwater to streams or rivers that are located 10-100 km away from
 
the repository. The nuclides released from the repository are assumed
 
to be diluted by a river flowing at a rate of 104 cubic feet per second
 
(about 7 x 106 acre-feet/year). These nuclides are assumed to accumulate
 
in this medium for 50 years at their peak discharge rates, and the
 
individual receiving the maximum dose is assumed to be exposed to that
 
50-year accumulation for another 50 years. In view of the simplified
 
discussion given above, it is not surprising that with his assumed
 
values of K, reasonable combinations of canister integrity, leach rate
 
and path length can be found for which the expected incremental "dosage"
 
to the "maximum individual" is no larger than the "background" level
 
taken to be 120 in rem/year. However, as Burkholder himself points
 
out, the values of the hold-up factor K under actual geological conditions
 
for a bedded salt repository are not known at present.
 
The French paper by Marsily, et al, adopts a quite different
 
point of view--the authors are concerned mainly with the relative
 
importance of the tquality" of the geologic formation, as expressed by Vp
 
and E, and the hold-up factor K. They regard vertical movement of ground 
water as the most likely transport mechanism, because significant vertical 
gradients of piezometric head are often found. The distance from the 
repository to the surface is taken as 500 meters. They consider five 
possible geologic formations listed in order of increasing quality in 
Table 6-5. In order to study the extreme cases they take two values of K 
for 239 pu; Kd = 0 and K = 1 (no sorption), and Kd = 2000 ml/g, 
or K = (5 x 103) E (strong sorption). For 2 37Np they take Kd = 15 
ml/g, or K 40/E, while for 129, it is well-known that Kd = 0 
and K = 1. The results including dispersion-diffusion labeled "Hypothesis 2" 
in Tables 6-6 and 6-7 tell the story. Under Hypothesis 2 the glass 
encapsulating the HLW retains its integrity for 104 years, and then the 
glass matrix structure is damaged and the total load of HLW is released 
into the leaching water over the next 5000 years (TLD). In 
these calculations the areal density is 1 canister per 25 m2 and 
1N = 100 g of 239 pu per canister. 
The following significant conclusions can be drawn from the
 
results of this simplified calculation:
 
(1) 	Without sorption, even an excellent confining formation
 
(Case 4) only introduces a delay in the transport of
 
the radionuclide to the environment; it does not retain
 
it. [In Case 1 the transport time to the surface for
 
an appreciable concentration without sorption is about
 
5 years; in Case 4 it is about 14,000 years.]
 
(2) 	 With a high degree of sorption (Kd = 2000) even a
 
relatively poor geologic formation (Case 1) retains
 
the 239pu for a sufficiently long time so that radioactive
 
decay prevents it from reaching the environment.
 
These conclusions would be qualitatively the same for spent
 
fuel, because the attentuation factor for Kd =°2000 is of the order of
 
10-6 for Case 1, and very much smaller for Cases 2-4. In fact, one
 
could go one step further, and point out that there is a direct proportion­
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Table 6-5. Parameters of the Geologic Formations
 
Resulting Velocity 
of Water 
Darcy's Effective 
Geologic Permeability Hydraulic Porosity Darcy's Mean Pore 
Formation -(m/sec) Gradient (%) (m/see) (m/sec) 
-
1 10-6 1/10 2 10 7 5 x 10- 6
 
-
2 10-6 1/50 2 2 x 10 8 10-6
 
- -9 8
3 10 7 1/50 5 2 x 10 4 xi0 ­
4 10-8 1/50 10 2 x 10- 10  2 x 10-9
 
10- 10  - - 11
 5 1/50 20 2 x io 12 10

Table 6-6. Plutonium Migration under Hypothesis 2 (Not Sorbed)
 
Geologic Ratio of Years until
 
Geologic Formation Concentration Maximum is
 
Formation (Velocity of Water m/see) to its MPC Observed
 
1 5 x 10-6 1.3 10,000
 
-
2 10 6 6.0 10,000 
3 4 x 10- 8 66.0 10,700 
4 2 x 10-9 470.0 20,000 
5 10-11 8.5 x 10- 10  700000 
Table 6-7. Plutonium 
-239 Sorbed
 
Ratio of Years until
 
Geologic Concentration Maximum is
 
Formation to its MPC Observed
 
1 3 x 10-9  460,000
 
2 1.4 x 10- 24  1,150,000
 
3 0
 
4 0
 
5 0
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ality between the hold-up factor, K, required and the mean pore velocity.
 
For example, for Case 3 (Vp = 4 x 10-8 m/sec and 0.05) a value
 
of K = 700 or Kd = 15 ml/g would be sufficient to duplicate the attenuation
 
achieved in Case 1 with Kd = 2000 ml/g.
 
The degree of sorption depends critically on the complex
 
geochemistry of plutonium. When plutonium is in its usual valence states
 
of +4 or +6, it will be strongly sorbed. But.the concentrations of
 
plutonium in the flowing groundwater are very low in the cases just
 
considered, and the presence of small amounts of negative ions (silica or
 
carbonate, for example) may lead to the formation of complex plutonium
 
molecules that are electrically neutral and therefore not sorbed. These
 
observations show the necessity for a comprehensive program of laboratory
 
and field studies on the interactions of radionuclides with both
 
individual minerals and rocks. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the 'exit
 
-level of the radionuclide in Ci/ 3 to mean pore velocity, hold-up factor 
and path length when R is of the order of 10-20, credible predictions of 
radionuclide behavior cannot be made without this information. 
At the present time the Scientific Feasibility of deep
 
geologic disposal of both encapsulated high-level waste and unreprocessed
 
spent fuel in bedded salt has not Vet been proven. However, there is no
 
scientific reason to anticipate that existing, planned and recommended work
 
will not create a scientific data base that will reduce the hydro-geological
 
uncertainties to acceptably low levels, although the proposed time schedule
 
may be too optimistic.
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SECTION 7
 
STATUS AND ISSUES OF SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION
 
The previous two sections have described in detail the
 
prodess, development history, and major issues concerning most of the
 
majot components of two distinct systems for handling the back-end.
 
of the fuel cycle. These two waste management systems are intended
 
fTr the disposal of two distinct forms of high level waste-unreprocessed
 
spent fuel, and high level waste from a reprocessing plant. This
 
chapter will examine the issues concerning the integration of these
 
components into their respective systems. The reason that the
 
system-level issues are important is because it is only at this level
 
of analysis that the problems of the capability of the components to
 
handle the demands made on the entire system (system inputs) can be
 
examined; because the disposal of the actual system inputs is the problem
 
in need of a solution.
 
One last introductory remark concerns the overlap of com­
ponent objectives in the spent fuel storage/disposal system. The indepen­
dent spent fuel pool, the SURFF, and geologic storage are all designed
 
to handle spent fuel on an interim basis. It is doubtful that any one
 
reactor would have all of its fuel transferred sequentially to each
 
one of these facilities. However, during this initial development period
 
for the back-end of the fuel cycle, it is possible that the public
 
sector along with the private sector may develop various combinations
 
of the components in different regions of the country. Such a variety
 
of constructed facilities would provide actual data to make comparisons
 
for future decision. Because of the likelihood of the use of each
 
of the overlapping alternatives, it was considered important to include
 
each of these in the component level discussion. In order to provide
 
a useful parallel to the High-Level Waste System discussion, all of the
 
components in the spent fuel storage/disposal system will be integrated.
 
7.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION
 
The following is a list of the important system factors which
 
are discussed in the paper.
 
* Transportation
 
* Facilities required
 
* Major R&D program required
 
* System cost and ownership
 
* Institutional responsibility
 
A discussion and comparison of each of these factors follows below.
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7.2.1 Transportation
 
In Section 3 a simplified projection of the annual number of
 
shipments was presented for the growth of nuclear generating capacity to
 
380 GWe. Figure 4-6 showed projections for (1) all shipments by truck;
 
(2) all shipments by rail; and (3) shipments by a mixture of truck and
 
rail. The problem of transportation is examined in Reference 7-1. To
 
quote from the main findings of that report: .
 
"Increased concern-over the safety of shipments of spent
 
fuel and high-level waste has been expressed by state and
 
local governments, by railroads, and by organized intervenor
 
groups. Some state and local governments have attempted
 
to restrict or prohibit the shipment of radioactive materials
 
through their regions. ERDA has challenged these actions
 
on the basis of federal preemption of the regulations of
 
such shipments. Resolution of these cases adds uncertainty
 
to the cost of the existing facilities and the siting of
 
future nuclear facilities. The American Association of
 
RailRoads believes that special trains with speed limited
 
to 35 miles per hour that stop when other trains pass by
 
are required for shipping of nuclear materials. If a train
 
were to carry spent fuel rods, it would not be permitted'
 
to carry any other freight. The proposed tariff charges
 
that the railroads have filed before the Interstate Commerce
 
Commission have been protested by ERDA and the nuclear
 
industry. ERDA and the nuclear industry have challenged
 
the railroads' position that they are common carriers of,
 
nuclear materials. The ICC has allowed the proposed tariff
 
charges to go into effect pending a final'decision on their
 
propriety. Under this new tariff, all rail shipments of
 
nuclear spent fuel and waste must be moved only in special
 
trains, at a cost in addition to the regular freight charge
 
of about 20 dollars per mile, or about 30,000 dollars each
 
for a 1,500 mile one-way trip."
 
"In contrast the position of the trucking industry appears to
 
be enthusiastic about shipping nuclear materials. However,
 
the extensive use of trucks could lead to increased costs of
 
unloading the spent fuel rods from the reactor spent fuel
 
pools. The truck spent fuel shipping casks hold one fuel
 
assembly, while the rail casks (IF-300) hold 7 assemblies. In
 
addition, the increased number of shipments could,have an
 
adverse impact on the public acceptability of these shipments.
 
According to the ERC Nuclear Sub-Committee staff, "If a com­
bination of economic and regulatory constraints make all
 
present transportation modes infeasible or unacceptable, the
 
possibility of Federal control of all shipping of nuclear
 
waste may have to be considered. Concern over theft or diver­
sion of fissile materials has. already led to discussion of
 
this possibility, and the Federal government has recently taken
 
over all shipments of nuclear materials in the Department
 
of Defense programs." (Reference 7-1, Vol. I pages 31 & 32)
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When comparing spent fuel storage/disposal to HLW disposal,
 
the difference in transportation requirements is dependent on the location
 
of facilities with respect to reactor and other fuel cycle facilities.
 
For example, if a spent fuel disposal-packaging facility were colocated
 
with the ultimate disposal site, then the external transportation require­
ment from the packaging plant to the disposal site would be eliminated.
 
The low mileage impact that these shipments would have on the total rail and
 
track shipment in the U.S. (as shown in Section 4.2.3) holds for any case.
 
One variable that needs to be considered is the supply and
 
demand for shipping casks since there are now only 6 truck casks and 4
 
ttain casks available (Reference 7-2). The number of shipping casks
 
required depends on the projected growth in number of LWR's, the amount
 
of spent fuel per cask, and the turn-around time per shipment. For
 
example, if each truck cask contains I PWR assembly, or about 0.4 MTU of
 
spent fuel, and current operating practice of 42 shipments per truck per
 
year is followed, then each cask is capable of transporting approximately
 
17 MTU of spent fuel per year from a reactor site to a geologic repository. 
If reprocessing is delayed indefinitely, the total LWR capacity in the U.S. 
may reach a level of about 300 GW(e), and then remain virtually constant 
for 25-30 years thereafter. In that case about 9,000 MTU per year of 
spent fuel would be discharged and about 530 casks are adequate to ship 
this spent fuel to a repository. If production of these casks were to 
begin in 1980 at a rate of about 50 casks per year, the supply would keep 
pace with demand by the time the Federal repository is available. A 
larger number of shipping casks would be required if spent fuel is shipped 
first to a centralized or regional storage facility, or to a SURFF, and
 
then transported later to a Federal repository for permanent disposal.
 
7.2.2 Facilities Required
 
Reactor Storage Capability
 
In ERDA 77-25 (Reference 7-3, pg. 11) the number of U.S. LWR's
 
that would require additional spent fuel storage capability to permit
 
scheduled discharges is estimated for the period 1977-1986. As stated in
 
that report (page 5), "Where only preliminary planning* was indicated, no
 
expansion was considered in this report." It is useful to look first at the
 
estimates contained in ERDA 77-25, and then analyze the nature of the problem
 
confronting the utilities. The ERDA estimates were made for three cases:
 
Case 1 corresponds to currently available facilities,
 
including re-racking of existing spent fuel pools at reactor sites, and
 
expansion "as planned" (early 1977), plus the GE Morris facility at 700
 
MT. Case 2 is simply Case 1 plus additional storage capacity of 1100 MT 
in 1980. Case 3 is the most optimistic and anticipates the additional 
storage of 1100 MTU at the General Electric Morris facility (as requested
 
on April 30, 1977), and the avilability of an Exxon storage basin of 3500
 
MTU in 1982 with additional expansion up to 7000 MTU as needed.
 
*by the utilities
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For Case 1 the ERDA projections show that by 1986 27 of
 
the 179 operating reactors would have utilized their full fuel core
 
reserve and additional storage capacity, and would not be able to permit
 
scheduled discharge. This conclusion is the -reason for the observation
 
by the Nuclear Assurance Corporation that:
 
"The utilities and AFR storage vendors indicate a
 
high degree of awareness of the spent fuel disposition
 
situation, and both industry segments are now taking
 
positive action to assure sufficient spent fuel storage
 
capacity." (Reference 8-3, page 5).
 
These ERDA estimates are based on the first re-racking designs (1974-1976),
 
which did not make optimum utilization of available storage space because
 
of the assumption that reprocessing, although delayed, would come "on
 
line" in the early 1980's. Current designs take into account the decision
 
to delay reprocessing indefinitely. These designs utilize all space to
 
the maximum.possible extent consistent with the constraints imposed by
 
cooling requirements and noncriticality. Typical high-density racks
 
design now provide for 3 or greater core loads, plus one full core load
 
in reserve, or approximately 10 years of storage, as compared with 4 years
 
of storage for the early designs.
 
If no decision on fuel reprocessing is made in the next few
 
years the utilities will have two choices:
 
(1) Transfer of spent fuel from one pool to another. 
(2) Construct independent storage pools either on-site or 
away from the reactor (AFR). 
The decisions will be made on a utility-by-utility basis;
 
7.2.3 R&D Program
 
The estimated FY 78 budget for the ERDA Fuel Cycle R&D program
 
showed $33,400,000 for LWR Fuel Reprocessing, $71,050,000 for Terminal
 
Storage R&D and $35,500,000 for waste processing, R&D and demonstration.
 
Budget estimates for the recently initiated work on SURFF have not yet
 
been determined. However, it is unlikely that the R&D required for SURFF
 
would exceed the R&D that would be needed for LWR Fuel Reprocessing and
 
waste processing. This is mostly due to the amount of existing research
 
completed under the Retrievable Surface Storage Facility (RSSF) program.
 
The $71 million for terminal storage R&D is unaffected by the decision on
 
reprocessing, since a program for geologic disposal is similar, especially
 
in the near term, for HLW disposal and spent fuel disposal.
 
7.2.4 Cost and Ownership
 
When examining the cost of the back-end of the fuel cycle, the
 
additonal mills per kilowatt is found to be quite small. This follows
 
from the large number of kilowatt hours that can be produced by nuclear
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reactors. Consider the low growth scenario. The cumulative kilowatt
 
hours produced at an assumed 60% capacity factor between 1976 and 2000 is
 
21 x 1012 Kw-hrs. If we assume a total waste disposal system cost of as
 
high as $10 billion, the additional cost per kilowatt hour is 0.46 mills.
 
In comparison, the average bus bar generating cost for the nuclear reactor
 
operated by Commonwealth Edison was 14.2 mills per kilowatt-hr in 1976.
 
The cost of the back-end of the fuel cycle would represent an increment
 
of 3 percent. However, this level of analysis can be misleading. One
 
needs to look at the individual or micro-level decisions that are being
 
made. Such an economic analysis is beyond the scope of this document.
 
However one important aspect that demonstrates the difference between
 
considered here is the ownership of the fissile material.
 
Under the HLW disposal system the ownership of the radioactive
 
materials was fairly well defined. At the reactor, the utility owned the
 
fuel. During the transportaiton of the spent fuel to the reprocessing
 
plant the spent fuel was owned by the utilities, but the transportation
 
company was liable for any injury caused by the radioactive material.
 
CThis phase would be covered by the Price Anderson Act). Under this plan
 
upon arrival at the reprocessing plant the utility buys the reprocessing
 
service. Incorporated in the price would be some credit for the extracted
 
fissile materials. Also incorporated in the cost are the costs of processing
 
the waste, storing the waste, transporting the waste and final disposal of
 
the waste. The material at the reprocessing plant presumably would be
 
owned by the reprocessors, until it is received at a Federal repository.
 
At that time, present regulations state that the NRC will become the owner
 
of the HLW. NRC has indicated that there is a typographical error in the
 
present regulations and that the intended owner of the HLW is DOE.
 
Under the Spent Fuel Storage/Disposal options, several ownership
 
schemes are possible. At this time, there are no firm plans as to the even­
tual ownership scheme. As an example, one could imagine the utilities paying
 
for the storage and disposal cost at the time it first ships its spent fuel
 
from the reactor to a storage facility, with a provision of a credit for the
 
fissile material if reprocessing is eventually approved. Because of the
 
uncertainty in the eventual decisions on reprocessing, the determination of
 
an equitable storage/disposal fee would be complicated. As an alternative
 
ownership example, the utilities could retain ownership of the spent fuel
 
for as long as they wish, while paying a rental fee to the storage facility.
 
Here again, the uncertainty in national spent fuel policy will make the
 
determination of an acceptable storage fee difficult.
 
7.2.5 Institutional Aspects
 
The institutional aspects of nuclear waste management are quite
 
complex. An exploratory study of these institutional constraints has been
 
performed by JPL (Ref. 7-4). This brief discussion of ownership and
 
storage fee determination is closely related to other institutional factors.
 
At the industry level, the prospect of no reprocessing has not been a wel­
come concept. However, as Reference 7-3 pg. 1 points out, the "survey (of
 
LWR spent fuel disposition capabilities) clearly indicates that utilities
 
and the utility serving industry recognize that aggressive actions are
 
required to insure sufficient spent fuel storage, and have identified plans
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to provide the needed storage." This observation was made prior to the
 
President Carter's April 7, 1977 decision to indefinitely defer reprocessing.
 
The utilities face other decisions in addition to establishing
 
adequate storage until Federal actions provide a longer term solution.
 
One is their own determination of the value of holding on to the spent
 
fuel. Related to this is the determination of whether the spent fuel on.
 
hand can be 	considered an asset, because of the potential fuel content, or
 
a liability, because of the future costs of storage and disposal. Such
 
decisions will probably not be made just on the basis of economic effi­
ciency. The public relations aspect of declaring spent fuel a waste,
 
will also be taken into account by the utilities. The licensing and
 
public hearings phases of the expansion of spent fuel storage capabilities
 
at reactor 	sites are also important factors in decision-making. The
 
differences 	between the two systems appear to be significant. However,
 
most of the 	problem and uncertainty are due to the transition from
 
the reprocessing model to an interim storage model.
 
This uncertainty is responsible for many of the well defined and
 
some poorly defined problems at the Federal level. Reference 7-1 describes
 
some likely institutional interactions that could take place during the
 
licensing of the facilities required for HLW disposal. Similar types of
 
interaction will exist between the Environmental Protection Agency (setting
 
of standards for high-level waste), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 
(criteria setting, approvals, and licensing) and the Energy Research and
 
Development Administration (site selection, program definition, design,
 
construction, and operation) for a Federally operated central pool, SURFF
 
or a geologic repository. However, all existing programs in each of these
 
bureaucracies must now be modified to account for the possibility of spent
 
fuel storage and disposal. At this time it is too soon to establish how
 
quickly this can be done in comparison to the ongoing development work
 
for the HLW disposal system.
 
7.3 	 FLOWCHARTS OF U.S. MAINLINE PROGRAM FOR COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEVEL
 
NUCLEAR WASTES
 
The flowchart displayed in Figure 7-1 is presented to provide
 
guidance in determining the interactions between technology activities
 
and the approval cycle to develop a waste disposal system. Figure 7-1
 
is divided into two main sections of flow. The upper section indicates
 
high-level waste repository development and approval activities. The
 
lower section indicates treatment and packaging technology development
 
and approval activities.
 
The principal Federal interactions between EPA, ERDA, and
 
NRC are shown in this figure. This diagram represents a procedure
 
requiring quite strong, formal regulatory action by NRC. To date the
 
NRC has not decided whether to require either a formal site review
 
or a construction license before ERDA builds the high-level waste reposi­
tory. In the portion of the diagram for solidification and packaging,
 
assumption has been made that this plant is to be built as a private
4the 

facility; hence it requires NRC licensing. If the plant were built as an
 
ERDA facility, present law does not require a NRC license.
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An analysis of the HLW management programs and plans is pro­
vided in Reference 7-1. This analysis was performed for the Office of
 
Science and Technology Policy specifically examines broad approval
 
categories of public policy and acceptability, programs and plans to
 
identify strengths and inconsistencies, schedule implications, and
 
needed work activities. On the subject of interagency coordination,
 
this report makes the following observations:
 
"The resources devoted to high-level waste management by
 
NRC and EPA have been inadequate in view of the critical
 
roles these agencies play in developing standards, cri­
teria and regulations. The budgets of these two agencies
 
have recently been increased substantially. However, we
 
question whether the resources available to these two
 
agencies are commensurate with their responsibilities.
 
There appears to be a lack of an adequate platform for
 
systematic discussion of the sufficiency of the scientific
 
data base for geologic disposal. An important outcome of
 
such discussion would be the development of decisions as
 
to what parameters should be monitored, and for how long,
 
during the test phase of a specific repository site. In
 
addition, there appears to be a need for improved coordi­
nation of the nation's high-level nuclear waste program."
 
To operate a repository for commercial high-level nuclear waste 
by 1985, a complex set of activities must be undertaken by the Federal 
government. An Ad Hoc Interagency Task Force on Commercial Nuclear Waste 
Management was formed in the spring of 1976 (Ref. 7-6) to ensure internal 
compatibility of the Federal government's activities in this area. The 
task force was chaired by OMB and included representatives from CEQ, EPA, 
ERDA, NRC, and USGS. This task force was phased out at the end of July 1976 
(Ref. 7-7) and replaced by the White House Fri Committee (Ref. 7-8, pg. 112). 
The Fri Committee provided information for President Gerald Ford's Nuclear 
Policy Statement on October 28, 1976. At present, there appears to be no 
interagency committee for coordinating the Federal government's efforts in 
commercial nuclear waste management, although such a group is called for 
in the National Energy Plan (Ref. 7-9, pg. 72). 
A JPL modification of the OMB interagency task force flow chart
 
showing the interconnection of the government's high-level waste management
 
activities is presented in Figure 7-2. This chart shows considerably more
 
detail than Figure 7-1, which focused principally on regulatory activities.
 
The major milestone activities are high-lighted with ellipses at the top
 
of the chart. These major activities include providing a better definition
 
of high-level waste; determining regulations for interim storage; preparing
 
environmental standards for high-level waste disposal; development of general
 
regulations by NRC; docketing of the environmental reports and applications,
 
and construction of the repository; obtaining an operating license; and
 
finally, receiving the high-level waste at the national repository. A
 
similar flow chart should be prepared for spent fuel disposal.
 
The sub-activities which must be accomplished in order to lead
 
to each major activity are shown below the respetive major activities.
 
Alternate setsc-f sub-activities have been shaded in order to make the
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chart easier 
Figure 7-2: 
to read. The following abbreviations have been used in 
TAD Technical Alternatives Document 
DGEIS 
EIS 
INT 
Draft Generic Environmental Imp
Environmental Impact Statement 
International 
act Statement 
ENV Environment 
ACRS 
DEIS 
PEIS 
SEE 
FSAR 
FSER 
Advisory Committee on Reactor S
Draft Environmental Impact State
Final Environmental Impact State
Safety Evaluation Report 
Final Safety Analysis Report 
Final Safety Evaluation Report. 
afeguards 
ment 
ment 
Figure 7-2 shows that the majority of the activities occur during
 
1977 and 1978. In order to ascertain the credibility of the proposed schedule,
 
and also to determine if there are major technological or regulatory gaps in
 
the proposed schedule, it is necessary to examine the nuclear waste programs
 
of EPA, NRC, and ERDA. A detailed examination of the available material from
 
EPA, NRC, and ERDA is -resented in Appendices B, C & D of reference 7-1.
 
7.3.1 Timing of the Development of Required Facilities
 
The development of the facilities required for the back-end of
 
the fuel cycle has had a history of poor performance as described in each
 
of the component sections in Sections 5 and 6. Whether or not a SURFF or
 
a geologic repository will be available by 1985 is still an open question.
 
The comparison between the two systems discussed in this chapter is dif­
ficult to make at this time because of the relative newness and lack of
 
preciseness in the definition of the spent fuel storage and disposal system.
 
Therefore, any attempt at comparison of the availability of the
 
two systems would be inappropriate. One reason is the often quoted statement
 
that the further away a technology is from actual industrial development the
 
better it looks and vice versa. The HLW option has been studied for-many years.
 
Research and Development on the long-term spent fuel storage and disposal op­
tion has begun only recently. Though this study has not been able to find
 
"nough established research to make the comparison, it can be noted that the
 
1985 date appears to us to be unrealistic for either high level waste manage­
ment option.
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SECTION 8
 
CONCLUSIONS
 
In the preceding sections of this report we have examined the
 
technical status of two major U. S. programs for high-level nuclear waste
 
management. Each major component of both the "old mainline program" for
 
HLW from reprocessing plants, and the newly-developing program for disposal
 
of unreprocessed spent fuel has been analyzed for its Scientific Feasibility,
 
Technical Achievability, and Engineering Achievability. Systems aspects
 
common to both programs, such as transportation and logistics, also have
 
been examined. Our principal findings and observations are summarized
 
in this Section.
 
8.1 "OLD MAINLINE HLW" PROGRAM 
Even though calcination, vitrification, and packaging of the
 
HLW are planned to be operated.as an integrated process, the technical
 
status of each of these specific steps is discussed separately. Because
 
the concept of geologic isolation in bedded salt is common to both
 
the HLW and spent fuel systems, it is discussed in Paragraph 8.3.
 
8.1.1 Interim Liquid Containment of High-Level Waste
 
The three issues of concern in this area were: (IT)stability
 
of the liquid during interim containment, (2) compatibility of the acid
 
liquid waste and the steel tanks, (3) availability of adequate control
 
technology to take care of off-gases coming from the tank. Based on an
 
extensive review of the literature and conclusion that the experiences at
 
INEL were pertinent, these issues are now considered to be resolved.
 
Specifically, there appears to be no significant change in the composition
 
of the liquid waste, over time, that would affect future operations.
 
The history of storage at INEL and measurements from test-coupons
 
in the tank indicate that liquid acid-waste and the existing steel
 
storage tank are compatible for interim storage. The filter and monitoring 
control systems have'been adequate to handle the off-gases.
 
8.1.2 Solidification of the Liquid in a Spray Calciner
 
The Scientific Feasibility of the spray calciner concerns its
 
ability to produce a solid, dry waste form that is chemically, radio­
lytically, and thermally stable. The spray calciner has been developed
 
in connection with an in-can melter, and as a result the calcine is
 
immediately converted to glass in this system. Since there is zero
 
holdup time in the spray chamber, the waste is in a solid, dry (fine
 
powder), calcine form only for the period necessary for gravity-feeding
 
it into the melter and to attain fusion of the calcine glass frit mixture.
 
Therefore, the stability issue should be addressed to the final product
 
of the spray calciner/in-can melter, namely, the vitrified waste (see
 
Paragraph 8.1.3).
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Technical Achievability of the spray calciner depends largely
 
on the reliability of the nozzle that atomizes the incoming liquid waste
 
fuel. A pneumatic atomizing nozzle with a ceramic air cap is now com­
mercially available, and has shown minor wear (0.01 mm wear on a 6.3 mm­
nozzle orifice after 1000 operating hours). This remotely replacable
 
nozzle is a significant improvement over the earlier troublesome, metallic
 
atomizing nozzle, and is expected to remain in service for several months
 
of operation. The incoming liquid waste concentration is not a matter of
 
concern, because there is no reliance on physical contact of the waste
 
with a hot surface. Drying of the waste is accomplished by a combination
 
of radiative and convective heat transfer.
 
So far as Engineering Achievability is concerned, spray
 
calcination has been under development at the Battelle Northwest
 
Laboratories (BNWL) for over 16 years.A full scale non-radioabtive
 
facility has been operating since April 1977, and has calcined at a rate
 
of up to 200 /hr. A full scale remote operation and maintenance non­
radioactive facility is now in design that will allow experience to be
 
gained in remote canister handling and maintenance techniques. Radio­
active tests using high-level waste from commercial irradiated fuel will
 
be carried out in late 1978 utilizing a pilot plant spray calciner/in-can
 
melter process (15 i/hr). Based on this program and the experience gained
 
in the earlier-WSEP program between 1966 and 1970 with fully-radioactive
 
engineering scale operational runs, engineering achievability of this
 
technique appears likely.
 
8.1.3 Immobilization of Solidified Waste by Vitrification
 
Principal effects that determine the Scientific Feasibility of
 
incorporating the calcined waste in a composite borosilicate glass are as
 
follows: (a) radiation effects; (b) thermal effects; including thermally
 
induced stresses and devitrification; and (c) mechanical shock.
 
The principal radiation effects on the glass will be produced
 
by a-radiation; P and Y radiation cause relatively minor amounts of
 
damage, and neutrons and fission recoils produce only minor damage because
 
of their low fluxes in the waste. Experiments with Curium-244 "doped" glass
 
which have attempted to simulate 3,000 and 50,000 year exposure times show
 
that the stored energy in zinc borosilicate glass will probably not exceed
 
50 cal/gram. The-adiabatic release of this stored energy would lead to
 
temperature increases in the glass not exceeding 2000C. Such a release of
 
stored energy (at 0.08 cal/°C gm) could possibly result only from a rapid
 
rise in the waste's temperature caused by an external heat source or lack
 
of cooling source. Similar results were obtained with both lead borosili­
cate and high-silica glasses. The effects of a-radiation on glass density
 
and helium generation also appear to be small. The effects of a-radiation
 
on long-term glass leach rates, which are determined by experiments with
 
potassium-doped glass, exhibited increases in leachability by about a
 
factor of 2.
 
Thermal shock effects will be produced in. the glass as a con­
sequence of the thermal stresses causedby both the initial cooling of the
 
solidifying glass and by the decreasing thermal gradient in the canister
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with time as the "decay heat" of the fission products decreases (secondary
 
cracking). The extent of this "secondary cracking" which does occur will be
 
a function of initial thermal power in the canister, the fin and canister
 
design, the storage conditions, and the position of the glass within the
 
canister. -Also, the thermal shock sensitivity will be dependent on the
 
thermal conductivity, thermal expansion coefficient, and heat capacity
 
of the glass. An example of potential stressing factors might be thet
 
cracking effect due to variations in the thermal expansion coefficients
 
of unmelted feedstock and the surrounding glass; Tests to examine this
 
and other factors on a simulated long time scale are planned by BNWL
 
for 1978. The initial cracking will result from the free-air cooling
 
of the canister at a rate of 400°C/hour and produce an increase in
 
the surface area of the glass by a factor of 10.
 
Devitrification, or crystal formation, in the zinc borosilicate
 
glass can be a problem at temperatures of the order of 700-750°C. Simulated
 
long-term leach test results indicate that deitrification effects at'7000 C
 
increase the leachability by a factor of 10.. The leach rate o some simulated
 
samples has been initially observed to be as low as 10-7 gm/cm. /day. Devit­
rification effects reduce the time interval required for slowly moving water
 
to leach 10% of the glass from about 4 x l04 years to about 4 x l03 years.
 
The Technical Achievability of the waste-glass is being investi­
gated by means of an empirical approach in order to establish guidelines
 
for composition, processing techniques and handling. A considerable amount
 
of information has been obtained for a reference glass composition with
 
28 wt.% radioactive waste, and investigations have begun on three other
 
waste compositions representative of the range expected in the discharge
 
from various types of reprocessing.plants. A level of waste oxides
 
of 23 wt.% has been determined to be the optimum considering processing
 
factors (such as volatility, homogeneity, and corrosion), leachability and
 
economic factors'
 
The most important aspect of Engineering Achievability concerns 
the potential difficulty of remote maintenance and the need for safe remote 
operations. Vitrification tests of selected, important remote features are 
currently under..wzy-at BNWL on.a scale of 150 J/hr (nearly full scale). 
Next, a full-scale non-radioactive remote operation and maintenance cell 
is planned to be constructed. Pilot plant remote demonstration'tests 
at a scale of 15J/hr are plannedto be carried out in a "hot-cell" 
using commercial high-level waste. 
8.1.4 Encapsulation 
The major factors in establishing the Scientific Feasibility
 
of the encapsulation process are: (1) material problems during melting,
 
including internal and external cdrrosion of the canister, and deformation
 
as a result of metal creep; and (2) temperature fluctuations in the
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canister wall caused by air cooling, water cooling, or by removal from a
 
water storage basin, during handling operations. Because of the lower
 
thermal expansion coefficient of the encapsulated glass, thermal stresses
 
can cause some fracturing of the glass. Also stress corrosion can occur in
 
the canister. Stress corrosion in water can be minimized if the chloride
 
content of the water is less than 1 ppm and the pH is alkaline. Other
 
materials being examined besides the current 304L stainless steel are 310
 
and 347 stainless steel, and Inconel alloys 600, 800, and 802.
 
Technical and Engineering Achievability of the encapsulation
 
stage depend sensitively on the containment criteria for both processing
 
and long-term storage conditions. Canisters made of 304L and 310 stain­
less steel were filled with various waste-glass compositions during the
 
WSEP program, and stored in a water basin, an air basin, and in ambient
 
air storage. After about 2 1/2 years of storage no significant changes
 
caused by radiation were found, and the canisters are still in storage.
 
The current WFP program is examining canister corrosion under both pro­
cessing and long-term storage conditions. From the various designs and
 
materials under study, it appears that a canister can he developed that
 
will provide the relatively short-term containment needed for interim 
 -
retrievability.
 
The conclusions pertinent to disposal of both reprocessed HLW
 
and unreprocessed spenL fuel are presented together in section 8.3, since
 
many of the considerations are similar.
 
8.2 DISPOSITION OF UNREPROCESSED SPENT FUEL 
8.2.1 Spent Fuel Storage at Reactor Sites 
A spent fuel capacity of 1 1/3 "reactor cores" for a single 
1000 NW(e) reactor was considered adequate in the 1960s, in order to
 
provide a full-core reserve storage in the event of emergency situations,
 
or maintenance and inspection, even if one year's discharge (1/3 core) was
 
Because of the delays in developing fuel reprocessing
already in the pool. 

plants in the early 1970's, and especially the 1977 Presidential decision
 
to deter reprocessing indefinitely, re-racking, or "densification" of the
 
storage pools became essential. The important technical issues here are
 
"criticality", cooling, and seismic effects.
 
New high-density fuel storage racks have been designed and
 
constructed by each nuclear reactor vendor for their specific.reactor fuel
 
as well as by several independent companies for various customers (e.g.,
 
Exxon Nuclear-designed racks for Rancho Seco).. The use of more accurate
 
criticality codes, and fixed poisons in the racks has reduced the
 
centerline-to-centerline distance of the fuel in the racks for PWR
 
inches to about 12 inches.
assemblies from a previous value of about 21 

For BW1lhigh-density racks, the reduction has been from about 10 inches to
 
8 inches.
 
As a result, it is now feasible to increase the storage
 
- 1 2/3 reactor cores up
capacity of an existing reactor pool from 1 1/3 

to 3 - 4 cores by re-racking. Allowing for a full-c6re reserve, this
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expansion would permit up to 9 years of storage capacity for the storage
 
of spent fuel for a single reactor.
 
As of July 1, 1977, 16 nuclear reactors had obtained NRC appro­
val for re-racking, and an additional 18 reactors had submitted requests
 
for approval to NRC. This constitutes a total of 34 reactors out of 63
 
operating nuclear plants in the U.S. These re-racking requests vary from
 
a 30% to a 250% increase in spent fuel pool capacity, with a median of 120%.
 
If all 34 reactors expand their spent fuel storage capacity by re-racking
 
to a capacity of 4 full cores, the total available storage capacity in-,
 
excess of a full core reserve would amount to 10,200 MTU. As of December
 
31, 1977, the cumulative amount of spent fuel discharged is expected to
 
total 2,650 MTU, of which about 1,000 MTU can be stored at the GE facility
 
at Morris, Illinois and at NFS, West Valley, New York. Thus, 8,700 MTU
 
capacity would be available for future discharge, or the equivalent of 6
 
year cumulative discharge for all 63 reactors operating at 70% 'load factor.
 
This estimate assumes that NRC will approve all 18 pending requests for
 
re-racking and will also permit intra-utility and inter-utility transfers, 
if necessary.
 
8.2.2 Independent Off-Site or On-Site Spent Fuel Storage
 
If the decision to reprocess spent fuel is deferred indefinitely,

the utilities will be faced with some difficult choices in the next few years.

Possible options include: (1)Provide additional on-site spent fuel pool
 
storage; (2) Join in a private consortium to construct independent off-site
 
spent fuel pool storage, or contract with potential builders and operators
 
of such facilities; (3) Declare the spent fuel as "waste" and call upon the
 
Federal government to accept it. Obviously, these decisions will be strongly

influenced by economic factors. For example, the cost of storage is 
now
 
estimated at $10,000 per MT in 1977 dollars, so that the annual cost
 
of storing spent fuel in water pools increases by about $330,000 per
 
year. Over a ten-year period the cumulative cost is $18.5 million,
 
which amounts to about 0.3 mills/kwh in 1977 dollars. In order to
 
decide whether it could be profitable to continue storing spent fuel,
 
these costs have to be compared with the estimated value of the spent
 
fuel, should reprocessing be approved at some future date.
 
While this report was in preparation, Exxon announced (August
 
1977) that it was not even seriously considering building spent fuel
 
storage capacity without a decision to go forward with reprocessing. Mr.
 
Ray Dickeman, President of Exxon Nuclear, stated that "I just did not
 
consider such an alternative to be responsive to this nationts long-term
 
energy needs."* Thus, either the utilities could build such capacity
 
themselves, or the Federal government might have to- assume responsibility
 
for construction and operation of interim off-site spent fuel storage

facilities as insurance against the possibility of unforeseen delays in
 
the 1985 operational schedule for the Federal repository in bedded salt.
 
This decision by the Federal government may also be strongly influenced by
 
*Nuclear Fuel, August 8, 1977, page 8
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the need to provide storage capability for foreign reactors operating on
 
enriched uranium fuel provided by the U.S.
 
In addition to these economic and international political factors,
 
there are several important technical factors to be considered in designing
 
a spent fuel storage facility so as to minimize radiation hazards to the
 
public. These include: (1) direct radiation from the irradiated fuel;
 
(2) liquid release to the environs from either an excessive storage
 
basin leak or low activity storage vault leak; (3) airborne release
 
from a potential fuel cladding rupture or cooler leak.
 
Direct radiation could occur only if the water level in the
 
basin is too low to provide adequate shielding because of excessive eva­
poration (cooling system failure), or excessive basin leakage, and at the
 
same time, the make-up water capability is inadequate. The water depth
 
would also be inadequate to provide shielding in the event of a "fuel
 
drop" accident that might result in the formation of a critical array.
 
For the case where both basins at the Morris, Illinois, G.E. facility
 
are filled (700 MTU of spent fuel), the maximum water temperature is
 
calculated to be 850C (185 F), and it would require at least 9 days
 
to evaporate the more than 39,000 ft3 of water before the tops of the
 
fuel rods would be exposed. The temperature would rise at a rate less
 
than 20 F/hr for about 3 days, and more slowly thereafter. Because multiple
 
backup sources of water are provided, there is a very small probability
 
that there would not be sufficient make-up water available in the event
 
of a temporary drop in storage basin water level.
 
Conceivably, inadvertant drainage of the spent fuel basin could
 
also be caused by penetration of the stainless steel liner. The floor of
 
the unloading basin shelf and deep pit include provisions to dissipate impact
 
loads from a maximum cask drop accident. The shelf has a fabricated, stain­
less steel crushable finned pad and a 2-inch steel plate on top of the
 
stainless steel liner. The floor of the pit is covered by a 1 3/4-inch
 
steel plate under the stainless steel liner to dissipate the impact load
 
from a 125-ton shipping cask falling 31 feet.
 
The strength of the cask fins will result in the total energy
 
of the drop being absorbed by the pad. The finned pad on the unloading
 
shelf (two 1-inch stainless steel plates separated by 4-inch, 1/2-inch
 
thick steel fins) is expected to absorb all of the cask's energy. For a
 
drop on the shelf edge or pit floor, the load on the shelf concrete is
 
less than its ultimate dynamic load and the stress is expected to be less
 
than ultimate stress of the floor concrete due to the distribution of the
 
load over a relatively large area.
 
If the concrete were to fail, penetration is expected to be
 
less than an inch and the stresses on a flat plate that is deflected an
 
inch are well within the elastic stress range for steel. The conclusions
 
are that the floor and shelf of the unloading pit are adequately protected
 
from a postulated IF-300 cask fall.
 
So far as liquid release to the environs is concerned, the
 
structure is equipped with a leak detection system and pump-out system to
 
handle potential leaks. The low activity vault is capable of withstanding
 
8-6
 
7769
 
a design basis earthquake. Also, no heavy objects are moved over the vault.
 
There is no credible accident that could rupture the tank and concrete
 
sufficiently to release liquid radioactive material to the environs.
 
The two possible paths for airborne release of radioactive
 
gases are: (1) rupture of the fuel cladding; (2) leakage of the cooling
 
system heat exchanger. The fuel cladding could be ruptured by dropping a
 
fuel bundle or assembly, or by dropping a loaded fuel basket containing 4
 
PWR bundles or 9 BWR bundles. Both of these occurrences are low probability
 
events. In the first case, if all the fuel rods in a bundle are ruptured,
 
releasing the fission gases to the basin water, and all released fission
 
gases are expelled from the stack over a period of 2 hours, the maximum
 
resulting radiation'levels have been calculated to be 10-1 mrem whole
 
body dose (for BWR) and 1 mrem thyroid (PWR). In the second case,
 
if a fuel basket fell from the maximum height of 22.5 feet above the
 
basin floor, and all the fuel rods in all the bundles were ruptured
 
(an extremely unlikely event) the maximum off-site exposures would
 
be about 80 mrem. So far as cooling system leakage is concerned, even
 
a postulated leak rate as large as 1.5 grams per minute would result
 
in maximum release rates of 10-3 mrem/hour whole body dose and 7 x
 
10-4 mrem/hour for the thyroid dose.
 
8.2.3 	 Engineering Interim Surface or Shallow Sub-Surface
 
Storage (SURFF Storage)
 
If a Federal repository for deep, geological disposal of spent
 
fuel were not available by 1985, unpackaged spent fuel assemblies at a
 
reactor site or in a centralized storage basin might be taken to an eng­
ineered spent unreprocessed fuel storage facility (SURFF). This facility
 
would place the fuel assemblies in a metal container to isolate the fuel
 
rod cladding from the external environment, and then store them retrievably
 
in an area that provides biological shielding from the radiation produced
 
by the spent fuel.
 
At the present time, SURFF is a "concept" that is being
 
developed for further consideration, rather than a formal "program".
 
The similarities between SURFF and the old RSSF for high-level waste
 
storage are 	obvious.: The three passive systems studied under the RSSF
 
program are 	also candidates for SURFF, namely (1) Sealed Storage-Cask;
 
(2) Air-Cooled Vault; (3) Storage in Near-Surface Heat Sink. The Committee
 
on.Radioactive Waste Management (CRWM) of the NAS-NRC in its review of
 
the RSSF concepts in 1975 recommended that an optimized version of the
 
Sealed Storage Cask Concept be pursued. However, in this same report 
the Committee listed nine areas where "final specifications and designs
 
have not been determined and considerable additional engineering R&D
 
are necessary." Seven of these areas apply to SURFF. In the absence
 
of program definition and specification of design criteria by ERDA,
 
no conclusions can be drawn at the present time about the Technical
 
or Engineering Achievability of SURFF.
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8.2.4 	 Packaging of Unreprocessed Spent Fuel for Disposal
 
Studies of techniques for packaging unreprocessed spent fuel
 
for disposal are in a preliminary stage. This status is due largely to
 
the relatively recent emphasis placed on this technology by President
 
Carter's April 7, 1977 statement indefinitely defering commercial repro­
cessing. In the absence of clear program definition and specification
 
of design criteria no. conclusions can be drawn at the present time
 
about the technical achievability or engineering achievability of the
 
technology for packaging unreprocessed spent fuel for disposal.
 
8.3 	 GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL OF ENCAPSULATED HIGH-LEVEL WASTE AND
 
UNREPROCESSED SPENT FUEL; DEEP GEOLOGIC ISOLATION IN
 
BEDDED SALT
 
8.3.1 	 General Conclusions
 
From the time of the first report in 1957 of an advisory commit­
tee of the NAS-NRC1 up to the present, deep geologic isolation of nuclear
 
wastes in bedded salt has been recognized as the most promising method for
 
containment 	of the radioactivity in these wastes over periods of time as
 
long as a million years. The experiments conducted in Project Salt Vault
 
demonstrated that the technical and engineering problems associated with
 
the safe handling of highly radioactive materials in an underground environ­
ment, the behavior of the bedded salt in response to the radioactivity and
 
decay heat emitted by the encapsulated waste (or spent fuel), and the struc­
tural design of the underground repository, are all solvable with currently
 
available technology. Differences of opinion about the risks inherent in
 
this method of waste disposal therefore center (or rather, should center)
 
around the long-term integrity of the repository, taking into account man's
 
intrusion into the salt bed during construction, testing and monitoring.
 
The principal open questions are concerned with the possible intrusion of
 
circulating water in significant quantities, followed by dissolution of
 
a portion of the salt in the disposal layer, and subsequent geologic
 
transport of radionuclides to the biosphere and thence to man.
 
8.3.2 	 Technical Aspects of Repository Design: Packaging, Canister
 
Spacing and Temperature Effects on Bedded Salt
 
During the first 100 years of storage, the total radioactivity
 
of the spent fuel is generated mainly by the fission products, and differs
 
only slightly (15-20% higher) from the total radioactivity in the high­
level waste after reprocessing. A similar conclusion naturally follows for
 
the "decay" heat rate. Thus, for the first 100 years, the containment
 
problem for the spent fuel in bedded salt is not much different in
 
principle from the problem for encapsulated HLW.
 
For storage times longer than 100 years, the time histories of 
radioactivity and decay heat rate for spent fuel and for HLW differ sig­
nificantly. The decay heat rate (per metric ton of uranium) is more than 
10 times higher for spent fuel than for HLW over the period 103 - 10 
years after discharge from the reactor. To maintain the integrated heat 
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load for spent fuel and HLW at the same levels over the first 104 years,
 
the initial areal power density in the disposal layer for spent fuel must
 
be 1/5 that for HLW. This power density is achieved by packaging a single
 
spent fuel assembly in each canister and spacing the canisters about 10
 
meters apart. Of course the number of canisters required per GW(e)-year
 
is increased from 15 for HLW to 7g for spent fuel. Present 1-D models
 
show temperature rises of only 10 - 150 C in the "far-field" at a dis­
tance of 500 m above the disposal layer after 104 years of storage. The
 
phenomena associated with the long-term response of bedded salt and sur­
rounding earth and rock to thermal gradients requires careful study using
 
a more realistic 3-D model.
 
The most important design parameters for the "near-field" are
 
the canister spacing and the duration of pre-storage, or "aging" before
 
emplacement in the repository. For example, if each canister contains
 
a single spent fuel assembly and the pre-storage time is 100years, the
 
maximum temperature rise at the canister wall (ATMAX) is 35 C for a
 
canister spacing of 10 meters. ATMAX is 60 C if the pre-storage time
 
is 5 years. For HLW the maximum temperature rise at the canister wall
 
with a canister spacing of 10 meters is 1700C if the pre-storage time,
 
To, is 5 years and 100 C if the pre-storage time is 10 years, based
 
on an areal power density of 100 kw/acre or 20 watts/m2 . Except for
 
HLW with To = 5 years, these maximum temperature rises are well below
 
the levels at which any significant difficulties are expected because
 
of salt decrepitation or brine migration in the salt toward regions
 
of higher temperature (or higher salt solubility). The sensitivity
 
of ATMAX to the design parameters of pre-storage time and canister
 
spacing is great enough so that the designer can readily select these
 
parameters to meet any conceivable restrictions on ATMAX

-

For the "open" LWR nuclear fuel cycle, the total number of 
canisters and the size of the repository (or repositories) required for 
containment and isolation of spent fuel over the entire life of the LWR 
can be estimated on the basis of these design considerations. Recent 
estimates of total U.S. reserves of U308 made by a special panel of the 
National Academy of Sciences places these reserves (including known, 
probable, possible and suspected) at about 2 x 106 tons. Using current 
technology this reserve would produce 3 x 105 tons of U02 fuel enriched 
to a 235U content of 3.5%. If the single fuel assembly packaging alter­
native were adopted, about 7 x 105 canisters would be required to contain 
this amount of U02. Suppose these canisters are stored in 8 separate 
repositories. In each repository the canisters could be arranged in a 
square array (plan view) with a spacing of 10 meters between canisters. 
The entire array would occupy an area 3 x 103 meters by 3 x 103 meters 
or 9 square kilometers (about 3 square miles) or about 2000 acres. 
8.3.3 Long-Term Repository Integrity
 
Obviously, it is impossible to demonstrate the long-term
 
(106 years) integrity of a bedded salt repository experimentally.
 
Therefore, current and past geologic evidence and analytical techniques
 
must be utilized to establish the range of probabilities for the escape of
 
some significant amounts of radioactivity from the repository. At the
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present time the weakest links in the site evaluation and selection
 
process are as follows:
 
(1) 	Specification of hydrogeological criteria necessary
 
to ensure site stability;
 
(2) 	Understanding, measurement, and modeling 'f the current
 
ground water regime in any given area of interest;
 
(3) 	Extrapolation of that ground water regime up to one
 
million years into the future;
 
(4) 	Understanding of geospheric transport mechanisms,
 
and especially the sorption factors for the long-lived.
 
radionuclides in the actual geophysical environment.
 
Experience to date with the sites at Lyons, Kansas; Asse, West
 
Germany; and Carlsbad, New Mexico, show that a number of "scenarios" can
 
be constructed in which a connection between the repository and the
 
biosphere is established. These include:
 
(C) 	Natural dissolution of the salt beds by the action
 
of circulating ground water;
 
(2) 	Establishment of hydraulic connections between the
 
overlying aquifer(s) and the disposal horizon by
 
failure of mine shaft or borehole sealing, or faulting
 
and displacement upward of the disposal horizon;
 
(3) 	Establishment of hydraulic connection between overlying
 
and underlying aquifers resulting from failure of
 
borehole plugging or faulting.
 
The estimated probability of each of these scenarios is
 
closely related to the inadequacy of the data base required in steps
 
(M)-C) listed above. Sandia has attempted to produce a reasonably
 
detailed assessment of the probabilities and consequences of such events
 
for the WIPP site near Carlsbad, New Mexico. If ground water flow
 
through the repository does in fact take place, the most important
 
index 	of the effectiveness of the geologic barrier for any particular
 
radionuclide is the ratio of the geospheric transport time to the half­
life of the nuclide (T1/2). This transport time depends upon two param­
eters: (1)the "quality" of the geologic formation, as expressed by
 
the mean pore velocity of the mobile phase; (2)the "hold-up" factor,
 
K, or ratio of mean pore velocity to the nuclide migration velocity.
 
This factor K depends on the degree of sorption of the radionuclide by
 
the processes of ion exchangesion absorption, etc. The following signif­
icant conclusions for 239Pu are drawn from simplified one-dimensional
 
'calculations:
 
(1) 	Without sorption, even an excellent confining geologic
 
formation only introduces a delay in the transport
 
of the radionuclides to the environment; it does
 
not retain it.
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(2) 	 With a high degree of sorption (K - 105) even
 
a relatively poor geologic formation retains the
 
239Pu for a sufficiently long time so that radioactive
 
decay prevents it from reaching the environment.
 
The degree of sorption depends critically on the complex
 
geochemistry of plutonium. A comprehensive program of laboratory and
 
field studies is required on the interactions of radionuclides with both
 
individual minerals and rocks. Credible predictions of radionuclide
 
behavior cannot be made without this information. Useful information can
 
also be obtained by examining the behavior of radionuclides in the field,
 
e.g., at the Hanford site, the Nevada weapons test site, and the Oklo,
 
Gabon 	"natural reactor" site.
 
The Office of Waste Isolation has the responsibility for com­
missioning and evaluating a set of studies and experiments designed to
 
answer some of these questions. Their studies to date include: (1) iden­
tification of salt formations of interest; (2) reconnaissance studies;
 
(3) area studies. This work has not yet progressed to the next levels of
 
detailed confirmation studies and in-situ tests. In addition, ERDA and
 
NRC have not yet developed design criteria, site suitability criteria, and
 
site selection criteria. Thus, extrapolation of existing information to
 
predict Engineering Achievability is very difficult.
 
At the present time the Scientific Feasibility of deep geologic
 
disposal of encapsulated high-level nuclear waste and unreprocessed spent
 
fuel in bedded salt has not vet been proven. However, there is no scientific
 
reason to anticipate that existing, planned and recommended work will not
 
create a scientific data base that will reduce the hydrogeological uncer­
tanties to acceptable low levels, although the proposed time schedule may be
 
too optimistic. The possibility of surrounding the repository with a man­
made geochemical barrier (such as clay) should not be ruled out.
 
During the 10-20 year period of testing, monitoring, data
 
analysis and projections, the geologic repository will necessarily be
 
operated if d retrieVable mode. This procedure has two important favorable
 
by-products: (1) By storing spent fuel in the repository the pressure for
 
continual expansion of on-site or independent off-site spent fuel pool
 
capacity is considerably reduced, if not eliminated, and the need for
 
SURFF may also be eliminated; (2) If a decision to proceed with repro­
cessing should be made during this period, spent fuel could be retrieved
 
and transported to a fuel reprocessing plant. The solidified high-level
 
waste discharged from the FRP could be encapsulated in canisters designed
 
to fit into the storage vaults and emplacements previously occupied by
 
the spent fuel canisters. The discussion of major design parameters for
 
the repository in Fec. 8.3.2. shows that such a plan is well within the
 
capabilities of current technology.
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8.4 Matrix Summary
 
In Section 3, a matrix method of summarizing the technological
 
status of high level waste management systems was described. This method
 
is applied in Figure 8-I and 8-2, in order to visually summarize the
 
findings of this report for both HLW from a reprocessing plant, and
 
unreprocessed spent fuel, respectively. The numbers shown in the matrix
 
elements refer to sections in the conclusions where these findings are
 
summarized.
 
8.5 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
 
Transportation system requirements produce issues relating to
 
transportation facilities, R&D, institutional interactions, cost, and owner­
ship. The "special train" issue is of great significance for transportation
 
considerations. Trains carrying spent fuel or solidified high-level waste
 
would be limited to the following constraints: One shipment is allowed
 
per train; other freight and passengers are prohibited; a maximum speed
 
of 35 mph is imposed; and the train is required to stop when other trains
 
pass by. These constraints, coupled with the projected number of shipments,
 
could cause significant problems to the entire rail network.
 
The number of spent fuel shipping casks required to service a
 
300 GW(e) nuclear power industry is estimated to be 530. If production of
 
these were to begin at a rate of 50 casks per year in 1980, the supply
 
would keep pace with demand by the time a federal repository for High-

Level Waste is available. This cask production rate is feasible, although
 
it necessitates a considerable increase in present fabrication rates.
 
Analysis by ERDA has indicated that the utilities may be faced
 
with a shortage of spent fuel storage capacity which could significantly
 
lead to the shut down of a significant number of reactors. The utilities
 
and spent fuel storage vendors are aware of this potential problem and are
 
taking corrective action through approaches such as high-density re-racking
 
of spent fuel pools at the reactor, and also considering building centralized
 
spent fuel storage at away-from-reactor sites.
 
The R&D program for disposal of high-level waste has been signi­
ficantly impacted by President Carter's decision to indefinitely defer
 
reprocessing. The "old mainline program" for solidified high-level waste
 
is no longer viable. A new program is being developed for the permanent
 
disposal of spent fuel. This program is in the early formative stages so
 
it is difficult to make a detailed analysis of its credibility. However,
 
statements by ERDA spokesmen that this program will meet the 1985 repository
 
date appear overly optimistic.
 
Uncertainties regarding both the potential for commercial
 
reprocessing and the economics of reprocessing complicate the issue of
 
long-term ownership of spent fuel. If the utilities continue to store the
 
spent fuel, they will bear the additional costs in the hopes of making
 
some future economic gain. If, on the other hand, the utilities declare
 
the spent fuel as waste, the government may have to bear these storage
 
costs. This issue is presently unresolved.
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Figure 8-1. 	 Matrix Summary of the Technical Status of Components
 
of the "Old Mainline" High-level Waste Disposal System
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APPENDIX A
 
ORIGIN, NATURE & DISPOSAL OF HIGH LEVEL WASTE
 
A.1 SCOPE OF THIS APPENDIX
 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a brief and simple
 
account of the origin, nature and disposal of high level waste. It is
 
a background paper and does not go into the detail of the main report
 
and it does not justify or give references for every statement made.
 
It is 	hoped that it may help a non-specialist reader to get an idea of
 
the present state of knowledge and technology.
 
The appendix deals not only with high level waste in the waste
 
stream from a reprocessing plant (IOCFR50 Appendix F), but also with
 
other material of comparable radioactivity, such as spent fuel.
 
A.2 	 SOURCE AND NATURE OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
 
When a nuclear reactor is refueled, four types of radioactive
 
materials are removed in the "spent fuel":
 
(1) 	Fission products; these are a highly radioactive mixture of
 
elements formed by the splitting of atoms of uranium and
 
plutonium in the fuel. The radioactivity consists in the
 
emission of -particles (fast moving electrons) and y-rays
 
(energetic X-rays). The radioactivity of the fission
 
products is discussed in Section A-5 below.
 
(2) 	Unburnt uranium which was part of the fuel with which the
 
reactor was charged.
 
(3) 	Transuranic elements; these are elements heavier than uranium
 
they are formed by the addition of neutrons to atoms of the
 
fuel. The principal elements present are neptunium (Np),
 
plutonium (Pu), americium (Am), and curium (Cm). If the
 
reactor fuel included plutonium, some of it would remain in
 
the spent fuel. in addition to that formed in the reactor.
 
Many of the isotopes of the transuranic elements emit
 
a-particles (fast moving helium nuclei) and y-rays, others
 
emit P-particles and y-rays. The radioactivity of the
 
transuramics is discussed in Section A-5 below.
 
(4) 	 Radioactivity induced by neutron bombardment in structural
 
materials, particularly in the tubes in which the fuel is
 
contained. The radioactivity of this material is qualita­
tively similar to that of the fission products but the amount
 
of radioactivity is less by a factor of about 100.
 
When the spent fuel is removed from a reactor, it is contained in
 
tubes made of Zircaloy (an alloy containing 98% of zirconium). These
 
"fuel rods" vary from one reactor to another; in the Pressurized Water
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Reactor (PWR), which is the commonest type of Light Water Reactor (LWR),
 
they are 3.85 m long and 1.0 cm in diameter (Figure A-i). The rods are
 
arranged in groups called "assemblies"; in a PWR each assembly contains
 
264 rods, it is 4.06 m long and 22 x 22 cm in cross section (Fig­
ure A-2). In a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) the rods are larger and
 
there are only 64 of them in an assembly, the assemblies are smaller
 
in cross section than those of a PWR.
 
The spent fuel is removed from the reactor as assemblies; These
 
assemblies are initially stored, just as they come, from the reactor,
 
in pools of water at the reactor sites. Owing to uncertainties in the
 
rate of construction of reactors, the prediction of the number of
 
assemblies to go into storage in the future is subject to great uncer­
tainty. Recent estimates are much below those current a few years ago
 
(compare, for example, References A-2 and A-3). The EDRA estimate in
 
Reference A-3 is, perhaps as good as any. It was made in August 1976
 
and predicts that by the year 2000 there will be a nuclear generating
 
capacity of 510 GW3 in the U.S. (the estimate may well turn out to be
 
high by as much as a factor of 2 but, for planning purposes, it is
 
important not to under-estimate the problems). The load-factor of
 
these stations is estimated to be 55% averaged over their 40-year life,
 
but in the year 2000, most of them will be in their prime and are
 
expected to have a load factor of 70%. If these prophecies prove
 
correct, the annual production of spent fuel in that year would be
 
34,000 assemblies (Reference A-3, page 17) containing about 5 million
 
fuel rods and weighing 15,000 metric tonnes (all'tons in this appendix
 
are metric tonnes, a metric tonne is 1000 kg or 1.1 short tons of
 
2000 lb; the distinction is of no importance here and a metric tonne
 
will be called a ton throughout). In 1976, 2400 assemblies of spent
 
fuel weighing 940 tons were discharged.
 
If all the reactors were LWRs fueled with slightly enriched
 
uranium (3.3% U-235) and no plutonium, then-15,000 tons of spent fuel
 
would contain:
 
Substance Amount (tons) 
Uranium oxide (about 0.8% U-235) 11,320 
Fission products 400 
Plutonium oxide 100 
Other transuranic elements 16 
Structural materials 1,164 
15,000
 
If the reactors were fueled with a mixture of uranium oxide and 1.5%
 
plutonium oxide, the amount of plutonium oxide in the 15,000 tons of
 
spent fuel would be about 190 tons instead of the 100 tons, for fuel
 
containing uranium oxide only.
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A-4
 
77-69
 
A.3 	 TEMPORARY STORAGE AT REACTOR SITES
 
When the spent fuel is removed from a reactor, it is too radio­
active to be transported and must be stored in a pool of cooling water
 
at the reactor site. When these pools were designed it was envisioned
 
that the fuel would be removed after 160 days and transported to a
 
reprocessing plant. In fact there are, at present, no reprocessing
 
plants for the spent fuel from commercial power reactors, and the
 
spent fuel is accumulating at the reactor sites. Further, the President
 
has decided that reprocessing will be indefinitely postponed.
 
A decision as to what to do with the spent fuel is needed since,
 
if nothing is done, before 1985 31 reactors will be forced to close
 
(Reference A-4). A larger number-will not have enough space to store
 
their fuel if it were necessary to unload the whole core (the provision
 
ot storage space for this is a condition in the licenses of some, but
 
not all, reactors).
 
There 	are two possibilities:
 
(1) 	 To extend the storage at reactor sites by enlarging the
 
pool's or packing the assemblies closer together (additional
 
neutron absorbing materials are then needed to prevent the pool
 
becoming a reactor). The spent fuel could then be kept
 
in the pools until either reprocessing is started or geological
 
storage is available. The earliest date for either of
 
these events is 1985 and, in view of the slowness of the
 
licensing process, considerable delay beyond this is possible.
 
The accumulation by 1985 has been estimated as (Reference
 
A-3, page 17) 58,000 assemblies and by 1990 as 128,000
 
assemblies. A decision is needed as to whether so much
 
storage distributed at reactor sites is acceptable from
 
the point of view of possible deterioration of the fuel
 
rods or of possible terrorism.
 
(2) 	 To limit storage at reactor sites and remove the spent fuel
 
to protected storage at a few centralized highly protected
 
sites either under federal control or operated by private
 
industry. Since the spent fuel at these storage sites would 
be several years old, it might be possible to dispense with
 
water cooling.
 
A.4 	 REPROCESS, STOW AWAY, THROW AWAY
 
If the President's decision to postpone reprocessing indefinitely
 
became a permanent ban, then the spent fuel must be regarded as waste
 
and permanent storage must be provided for it. This is the "throw
 
away" option. The option involves the loss of about 98% of the energy
 
potentially available from the fuel if both reprocessing and breeders
 
were operating.
 
Until it is clear that not to reprocess is a fixed U.S. policy,
 
it would be prudent to arrange storage in such a way that the spent
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fuel could be recovered from storage for reprocessing. This. is the
 
"stowaway" option. The ability to recover is, in any case, desirable
 
during the development phase of permanent storage. Storage would,
 
presumably, be in containers, each holding one or more assemblies of
 
fuel rods.
 
If, at some time in the future, the decision not to reprocess
 
were reversed and reprocessing were restarted, the accumulated speht
 
fuel would be sent to reprocessing plants and emerge as a nitric acid
 
solution containing the fission products, about 0.5% of the uranium
 
and plutonium and almost all the other transuranic isotopes (the
 
removal of neptunium would be practicable, the removal of americium
 
and curium is more difficult and no operable process at present
 
exists). The uranium and plutonium (or perhaps the uranium only) would
 
be re-used as reactor fuel. The solution of fission products, actinides,
 
and the residual 0.5% of fuel would be solidified. The solidified
 
high level waste would be mixed with suitable inert ingredients and
 
melted to a glass in a metal can. These cans would be the form in
 
which the high-level waste would be stored.
 
If the 15,000 tons of spent fuel considered above were reprocessed,
 
the waste would emerge as a glass containing-:
 
Substance 	 Amount (tons)
 
Uranium oxide 57
 
Fission products 230
 
Plutonium oxide 0.5
 
Other transuranic elements 16
 
Glass making oxides (Sia2, B203 etc.)
 
Total 1,200
 
-Areprocessing plant also produces other radioactive waste
 
streams which must be carefully managed. These are:
 
(I) 	 The chopped zircaloy tubes from the fuel rods; these hulls
 
would-be washed, packaged and stored with the high-level waste.
 
(2) 	 Gaseous and volatile fission products which are released
 
from the fuel rods when they are dissolved. The important
 
ones are Krypton-85, Iodine and Tritium. Krypton can be
 
stored in gas cylinders or absorbed in zeolites; iodine and
 
tritium can be converted to solid compounds and stored.
 
(3) 	Filters, ion-exchange resins, contaminated plant, and trash
 
from the reprocessing plant. These could be concentrated
 
and put with the high-level waste or buried in shallow
 
trenches according to the degree of hazard involved.
 
In addition to the spent fuel and waste from-commercial reactors,
 
there is a large quantity of high level waste derived from reprocessing
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the spent fuel from reactors operated to produce plutonium for military
 
purposes. This waste is contained in tanks at Hanford, Washington;
 
Savannah River, South Carolina; and Idaho Falls, Idaho. The waste at
 
Hanford is contained, for the most part, in mild steel tanks--a number of
 
which have leaked. Double walled stainless steel tanks have proved satis­
factory. This military waste is being solidified. Most of the uranium,
 
plutonium'and part of the cesium and strontium have been removed and are
 
stored separately (see Reference 6; Table following page 109 for details).
 
The material originally consisted of about 760,000 m3 of liquid. When all
 
is solidified it will weigh about 400,000 tons. The disposal of this
 
waste will not be discussed in any detail in this paper; there are severe
 
problems, but they arise from choices made in the past, and the matter has
 
little relevance to waste disposal from present or future commercial power
 
programs, except as a warning of the degree of care needed.
 
The problem of the disposal of commercial waste is essentially to
 
prevent the radioactivity of spent fuel or of the solidified high-level
 
waste from a reprocessing plant from coming into contact with people
 
during its period of toxicity. In practice this implies the protection of
 
the whole biosphere. There is no possibility of absolute protection, some
 
detectable quantity of radioactivity from every phase of the fuel cycle
 
may appear in air and water. It is therefore necessary to define accept­
able limits to the effluents, and to ensure that the arrangements for the
 
disposal of spent fuel or solidified high-level waste, from a reprocessing
 
plant stay within these limits. The limits set by NRC will be found in
 
IOCFR20 Appendix B, Table 2 (see also IOCFR2O.106). The matter is
 
further discussed in Section A-5 below.
 
A.5 RADIOACTIVITY OF SPENT FUEL AND WASTE
 
In a discussion of the radioactivity of spent fuel or solidified high
 
level waste, it is desirable to consider the fission products and the heavy
 
elements (that is uranium plus the transuranics and their decay products)
 
separately since their chemical and biological properties are very dif­
ferent, as also is the decline of their radioactivity with time.
 
The fission products are the main contributors to the radio­
activity of waste and spent fuel for the first 100 years after it is 
produced. Initially, the fission products are a complex mixture of
 
many different radioactive isotopes. Many of these have short decay
 
times and, after 10 years, 92% of the radioactivity is in the isotopes
 
strontium-90 and cesium-137 and their immediate decay products. After
 
1000 years, these are reduced to a negligible level. There still
 
remain minute quantities of a-few long-lived fission product isotopes,
 
such as technetium-99 but their radioactivity is less than that of
 
.the transuranic elements, even in reprocessed fuel. Table A-I 
lists
 
the main contributors after 10 years of cooling.
 
The radioactivity of the transuranic elements (of which plutonium
 
is one) is initially less than that of the fission products but, since
 
it decays more slowly, it becomes the predominant contribution for all
 
times over 600 years for reprocessed waste. For unreprocessed spent
 
fuel, plutonium is the main contributor to the radioactivity after
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TABLE A-I
 
Radioactivity of fission products in spent fuel from 1 tonne of U 10.5
 
years after removal from a Pressurized Water Reactor (U enriched to
 
3.2% U-235, 30 MW/ton, 33000 MWd/ton). All isotope contributing more
 
than 0.1% to the total curies from fussion products are included (from
 
reference A-2 Table 4-2, Pg. 18).
 
Isotope 1/2 Life Curies
 
H-3 12.3y 403 
Kr-85 10.8y 5960 
[Sr-90 28.1y 60700 
Y-90 64 hr 60700[Pd-106 367d 550 
Rh-106 130m 550 
Sb-125 2.7y 678 
Cs-134 2.05y 8380 
Cs-137 30.Oy 85600LBa-137 
 2.6m 80000
 
Pm-147 2.62y 7750
 
Sm-151 87y 1160
 
En-154 16y 4530
 
Total 318000
 
The short period isotopes in the bracketed fairs are daughters of the
 
long period ones and decay with them. For other isotopes and times
 
see references A-2 and A-3.
 
200 years. Reprocessing reduces the amount of uranium and plutonium
 
without much affecting the other transuranic elements.
 
For a general view of the variation of radioactivity with time, it
 
is convenient to consider the decline in the number of atoms disinte­
grating per second without reference to their chemical nature or to the
 
type of decay or energy release involved. Radioactivity, in this sense,
 
is measured in curies. One curie of radioactivity is 3.7 x 1010 disinte­
grations per second (this apparently arbitrary number has an historical
 
origin; it is the number of disintegrations per second in a gram of
 
radium). The variation in the radioactivity of fission products and of
 
the heavy elements in reprocessed waste is shown in Figure A-3. Unfor­
tunately, no reliable figures for the radioactivity of unprocessed spent
 
fuel for times exceeding 10 years are available to the writer. The radio­
activity of the fission products in spent fuel will be close to that in
 
the reprocessed waste shown in Figure A-3. Since 99.5% of the uranium and
 
plutonium are assumed to be removed in reprocessing, the radioactivity
 
of the heavy elements is greater in spent fuel than in reprocessed
 
waste. After 10 years the difference is a factor of 30.
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TABLE A-2
 
Radioactivity of transuranic elements in spent fuel from 1 tonne of U at
 
10.5 years after removal from a reactor (conditions as for Table A-I). All
 
isotopes giving more than 0.1% of the total curies from transuranic elements
 
are included (from Tables 4-3, Pg. 20 and 5-8, Pg. 54 of Reference A-2).
 
Curies
 
Isotope 1/2 Life at 10 yr
 
Pa-233 27d
 
Np-237 2.1 x 106y
 
Np-239 2.4d
 
Pu-238 86y 2700
 
Pu-239 24400y 323
 
Pu-240 6580y 479
 
Pu-241 13.2y 65300
 
Am-241 458y 1410
 
Am-242 152y
 
Am-243 7950y ­
Cm-244 17. 6y 1670
 
Cm-245 9300y
 
By the year 2000, the annual addition to the high-level waste
 
is estimated to be 1250 million curies and the amount in storage, after
 
allowing for decay, to be 5900 million curies (Reference A-3). These
 
estimates depend on the estimate of future nuclear power production
 
and assume reprocessing. The radioactivity of spent fuel, if there
 
were no reprocessing, would be slightly greater.
 
The radioactivity of the accumulated military waste is said to be
 
590 million curies of which 150 million has been separated and encapsulated
 
(Reference A-6; Table 3 following page 109). A hundred thousand curies
 
of cesium and strontium and 650kg of plutonium have been intentionally
 
buried or accidentally spilled. At present, the radioactivity of this
 
military waste exceeds that of the accumulated commercial waste. After
 
the mid-1980s, the radioactivity of the commercial spent fuel and waste
 
will exceed that of the military waste. This discussion does not include
 
the radioactivity of stored military spent fuel.
 
Radioactivity stated in curies is a poor measure of biological effects.
 
It is therefore necessary to consider the other physical and biological
 
factors that influence the biological changes produced by radioactivity.
 
A.6 BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIOACTIVITY
 
The radioactivity of nuclear waste measured in curies is known
 
but is insufficient to estimate its biological effects, or to set
 
standards for the amount that can be allowed to escape into the air,
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rivers, or the ground. It is necessary to consider various scenarios
 
in which radioactive material comes in contact with animals or human
 
beings. Typical scenarios are:
 
(1) 	 Radioactive Krypton-85, which is a gas, escapes into the
 
air, is dispersed by the wind and is breathed into the
 
lungs.
 
(2) 	 Ground water is contaminated by coming in contact with
 
buried waste, it emerges from the ground and gets into
 
a river and thus into a water supply.
 
(3) 	 Particles of waste are blown by the wind into a field,
 
they settle on the grass and are eaten by cows.
 
The examples illustrate two important features of the biological
 
effects. The krypton in the first example is chemically inert, it
 
will get into the blood stream from the lungs and will become uniformly
 
spread through the body. In the course of a few days or weeks, it
 
will work its way out through the lungs or in urine. Whether the result
 
is likely to be serious depends on the amount of radioactive material
 
breathed, but it is at any rate better to have it make only a temporary
 
stay than to have it settle permanently in the body.
 
The strontium-90 eaten by a cow will, in large part, stay per­
manently in her body. It ischem'ically similar to calcium and most
 
of it will settle in bone and remain there for the rest of the cow's
 
life. Another part will go, again with calcium, into the cow's milk.
 
If this is drunk by a baby it will go into the baby's bones, which
 
are particularly liable to radiation damage. This is an example in
 
which a radioactive material passes up the food chain and whatever
 
organism is at the top of the chain gets an unexpectedly large dose.
 
Clearly, the effects of the escape of radioactive waste depend in
 
a complicated way not only on the physiology of a single animal, but on
 
the whole network of relations between all living things. Even if all
 
this were completely understood, which it is not at the present time,
 
there 	still remains the problem of specifying what dose is acceptable.
 
It is not possible here to go into the details of this very com­
plicated question an admirable account will be found in Reference 5. The
 
present regulations governing the amount of each isotope allowed in air 
or
 
water will be found in 10CFR20 (see especially 20.4 for units, 20.101 for
 
doses and Appendix B to section 20 for allowed amounts in air and water).
 
The regulations for waste disposal sites have not yet been issued by the
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but may be expected to follow the provisions
 
of 1OCRF20 and to require licenses issued under conditions similar to those
 
of IOCFR50 which apply to reactors. In its response to a draft of this
 
report EPA has indicated that "...although EPA has not yet proposed an
 
environmental radiological protection standard for management of HLW it is
 
unlikely that the standard when promulgated will permit radiation doses as
 
large 	as those permitted by 1OCFR Part 20."
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The system of allowable doses of radiation is based on energy absorbed
 
in tissue. The unit of absorbed energy is the rad which is defined as 0.01
 
Joule/kg. Since the biological effect depends not only on the amount of
 
energy absorbed but also on the type of radiation, it is usual not to use the
 
rad directly but a unit called the rem. The number of rems is obtained by
 
multiplying the absorbed dose in rads by a factor to account for differences
 
in biological effectiveness due to the quality of radiation and its spatial
 
distribution in the body. The factor is unity for X-rays, -particles and
 
-rays, and 10 for -particles (this last factor is not clearly stated in the
 
regulations). The allowable dose averaged over the whole body of an indi­
vidual may not exceed 5 rem/year for a person working in a "restricted place"
 
(i.e. 	a nuclear facility such as a reactor building) or 0.5 rem/year for a
 
person in an unrestricted area. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
 
specifies in 40 CFR 190 that the environmental standards of the uranium
 
fuel cycle operations shall provide reasonable assurance that: "The annual
 
dose equivalent does not exceed 25 millirems to the whole body, 75 millirems
 
to the thyroid, and 25 millirems to any other organ of any member of the
 
public as the result of exposures to planned discharges of radioactive
 
materials, radon and its daughters excepted, to the general environment from
 
uranium fuel cycle operations and to radiation from these operations." All
 
these doses are additional to the inevitable dose due to cosmic rays and the
 
natural radioactivity of the ground, water and air. The natural dose varies
 
from place to place, in the USA the range is 0.07 to 0.22 rem/year. The
 
actual doses at the boundary of a reactor site are normally less than 1%
 
of the EPA limit for the general public.
 
In addition to the general limits on whole-body dose, there are
 
limits to the amount of each radioactive isotope allowed in air and
 
in water flowing out of a restricted area. These limits have been
 
chosen so as to take account of the tendency of certain isotopes to
 
concentrate in particular organs (e.g., iodine in the thyroid, strontium
 
,in bone) and also of the possibilities of concentration in food chains.
 
A few examples (from 10CFR20 Appendix B) are given in Table A-3 as
 
an illustration of the magnitudes involved. The extremely low limit
 
set for plutonium in air is noteworthy, at this limit the plutonium
 
in a litre of air would give only one disintegration in 5 days.
 
This elaborate system of limits is not based on detailed experi­
ments on human subjects and obviously could not be. The belief that
 
it represents a satisfactory safeguard against radiation-produced
 
cancer or harmful mutations is based on:
 
(1) 	 The fact that the dose in rem to the whole body and to
 
critical organs is less than the natural dose,
 
(2) 	 The experience of the Hiroshima survivors, and the results of
 
accidental exposure of human beings to radiation, particularly
 
.',(3) The results of animal experiments
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Table A-3. Amounts of a few radioactive isotopes
 
allowed in air and water for
 
unrestricted use (from 10CFR20
 
Appendix B)
 
Air Water
 
Isotope Ci/m Ci/m
 
- 8
Strontium-90 3 x 10-11 3 x 10

8
Iodine-129 2 x 10-11 13 x iO­
Cesium-137 2 x 10-9 2 x 10-5
 
Plutonium-239 6 x 10-14, 5 x 10-6
 
Americium-241 2 x 10-13 4 x 10-6
 
NOTE
 
These are the limits for soluble compounds; different limits are set
 
for insoluble compounds.
 
It is not practicable to make experiments at the low levels of interest
 
in regulating contamination from nuclear facilities; the whole point of
 
such regulations is to ensure that the number of cancers or genetic errors
 
produced in a small, and preferably an undetectably small, proportion of
 
those occurring naturally. To keep and store even a million mice is
 
hardly practicable, and, in any case, forms only an indifferent model of
 
the U.S. population. The results for very low doses are therefore deduced
 
from those at higher doses by assuming a linear relation between dose
 
and casualties.
 
The assumption of linearity has been attacked both by those who
 
believe there is a threshold dose below which no harm is done by radiation
 
and by those who believe low doses are proportionately worse than high
 
ones. This question seems more likely to be resolved by the development
 
of understanding of the processes of damage and repair through the study
 
of molecular biology than by direct experimentation on animals at low
 
doses. The report of the National Academy of Sciences (Reference 5)
 
discusses the matter at great length and recommends the use of a linear
 
law for extrapolation to low doses.
 
In addition to numerical limits for exposure of individuals and
 
populations, and for contamination of air and water, the NRC regulations
 
contain the provision (10CFR20.1) that "persons.. .should...make reasonable
 
effort to maintain radiation exposures, and releases of radioactive
 
materials in effluents to unrestricted areas, as low as is reasonably
 
achievable". "Reasonably achievable" means "... taking into account the
 
state of technology, and the economics of improvements in relation to
 
benefit to the public health and safety, and other societal and socio­
economic considerations, and in relation to the utilization of atomic
 
energy in the public interest." 1OCFR50 Appendix I contains further
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discussion and specifies as a "guide" the expenditure of $1000 to achieve
 
a reduction by one man-rem as "reasonable".
 
The concept of a "hazard index" is of some help in envisioning
 
the magnitude of the problem of protecting people from radioactive
 
substances. The hazard index is the amount of pure water that must
 
be mixed with a given mass of radioactive material to render the mix­
ture acceptable for unrestricted use as drinking water. Figure 4 shows
 
the hazard index of the spent fuel and waste from one ton of fuel.
 
The absolute value is not of great interest except to emphasize the
 
need for care. In section 2 it is stated that 15,000 tons of spent
 
fuel is expected to be withdrawn from reactors in the year 2000. After
 
1-year's cooling, this would require dilution with 2 million cubic
 
kilometers of water if the mixture or solution is to meet the standard
 
for drinking water. This shows that dilution is an impractical method
 
of disposal.
 
Of much more significance is the comparison with the radioactivity
 
of the ore required to produce the fuel. The waste and the spent fuel
 
both start with a radioactivity 2000 times above the level of the ore
 
but at all times after 600 years the radioactivity of the reprocessed
 
waste is below that of the ore. At 600 years the spent fuel is about
 
a factor of 5 above the ore and does not reach equality till about
 
10,000 years. Uranium ore is harmless if buried in its natural site
 
(or at any rate no one is seriously concerned about it at present).
 
If it is exposed by mining without adequate ventilation, it is a
 
serious danger; for example almost all workers in the pitchblend mines
 
of Bohemia in the 16th century died of a mysterious "Bergkrankeit"
 
before they were 40. If the spent fuel or waste could be contained­
as well as nature contains high grade uranium ore, then the waste
 
disposal problem would be solved for all times over 1000 years (unless
 
of course someone were foolish enough to dig it up).
 
A.7 LONG-TERM STORAGE OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
 
As shown in Figure A-4, the danger of nuclear waste to living
 
things decreases by several factors of 10 during the first 1000 years
 
after it is produced. After this, decay is very slow and there is
 
no strong reason for choosing any particular time as the limit to-the
 
time for which the waste must be isolated. Times of 100,000 to
 
1 million years are commonly mentioned. The degree of isolation needed
 
and the consequences of failure decrease as time goes on.
 
The main requirement is to put the waste somewhere where it cannot
 
contaminate air or water; it is also desirable that it should be in
 
a place that is inaccessible to likely human activities. Thus the
 
requirements are for isolation and for inaccessibility. Of these,
 
isolation is the more important since it concerns the prevention of
 
harm to large numbers of people. Inaccessibility is less important
 
since imprudent access or attempts at theft would kill only those few
 
people immediately concerned.
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The material to be stored may be either spent fuel in the form
 
of assemblies packed in some kind of container, or the calcined output
 
of a reprocessing plant incorporated in glass. In disposing of spent
 
fuel there is little freedom of choice in the form of the waste. The
 
disposer must take it as he finds it, to chop it up would be to lose
 
much of the advantage of treating the spent fuel itself as waste; extra
 
operations would be needed, subsidiary waste streams would be created,
 
and new paths to the outside world (e.g., the escape of gases) would
 
be created. The only choices are in the form of the container and
 
the means adopted for removing the heat generated in the material.
 
Most methods for the permanent disposal of spent fuel as waste
 
have a serious long-term disadvantage; they provide posterity with a.
 
plutonium mine. After 1000 years the fission products have decayed
 
and, if the spent fuel has been buried, hundreds of tons of plutonium
 
would be available. The balance of risk between burying plutonium and
 
burning it in reactors is by no means clear. Treating spent fuel as
 
waste does not, in itself, remove the "plutonium problem."
 
The waste from a reprocessing plant contains 200 times less
 
uranium and plutonium that does spent fuel, and it is possible this
 
could be further reduced by a factor of 5 or 10 if this were considered
 
desirable and worth the extra cost. Neptunium could also be removed
 
by the same methods as are employed to remove uranium and plutonium,
 
but the removal of americium and curium is more difficult; methods for
 
this are at present in an early stage of development. If the trans­
uranic elements were removed they could be burned in a reactor. Since
 
americium is the element that contributes most to the radioactivity of
 
reprocessed waste for times from 500 to 10,000 years, the matter is
 
of some significance.
 
If the high-level waste from a reprocessing plant is calcined
 
and incorporated in glass cylinders, there is a good deal of freedom
 
in the choice of the concentration of waste in the glass and in the
 
size of the cylinders. Cylinders of bore-silicate glass 10 feet long
 
and 1 foot in diameter containing 25% of waste are commonly discussed.
 
The choice depends on the temperature that can be tolerated within
 
the glass and thus on the age of the waste. Too high a temperature
 
leads to rapid de-vitrification (that is crystalization) and cracking
 
of the glass, this usually increases the rate at which radioactive
 
material can be leached from the glass. A lower concentration of
 
waste would decrease the temperatures and also decrease the hazard
 
remaining after long times. To take an extreme case, if the waste
 
were diluted in the glass to the point where, after 1000 years, its
 
radioactivity was no greater than that of uranium ore, then it would
 
need no protection other than burial to make it as safe as an ore body.
 
Such dilution is probably too expensive to be practicable, but some
 
concentration of waste in the glass less than they maximum technically
 
possible may be a worthwhile compromise. Another possibility is
 
deliberately to crystalize the glass-waste mix and sinter the crystals
 
into a ceramic. Considerable investigation would be needed to deter­
mine how to produce crystals that would incorporate the principal
 
radioactive elements into the crystal lattice.
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When it has been decided what it is that is to be stored, it is
 
necessary to choose a place and a method of storage. Many places and
 
methods have been suggested and some have been worked out in consider­
able detail. The principal ones are:
 
(I) 	 Deep Geological disposal, that is, deep burial on land.
 
This is the method proposed by ERDA for the first repository
 
which is planned to be in operation in 1985.
 
(2) 	 Geological disposal beneath the sea floor.
 
(3) 	 Disposal in ice sheets.
 
(4) 	 Engineered surface, or near surface, storage.
 
(5) 	 Extra-terrestrial disposal in earth orbit, solar orbit,
 
on the moon or by ejection out of the solar system or into
 
the sun.
 
These concepts are each.considered below, most attention being
 
paid to the ones that are nearest to implementation.
 
(I) Geologic -storage on land. Oil and gas, as found in nature,
 
have commonly been stored where they are found for 10 to 100 million
 
years. An oil field consists essentially of a porous rock containing
 
oil and gas kept from escaping by an impermeable layer (salt, clay
 
or shale are typical materials in the impermeable layer) and a geometry,,
 
such as an arch (an "anticline"), that allows the oil and gas to be
 
trapped in a limited area. The-success of nature's system of storage
 
suggests that geological storage of nuclear waste for long periods
 
may be possible.
 
Storage of waste in liquid form is not seriously considered,
 
probably because a liquid is inherently more mobile than a solid and
 
large 	and sudden escapes through cracks could conceivably occur. Storage
 
of solids in an excavated cavity is the method usually suggested. One or
 
more shafts would be excavated and a series of horizontal tunnels bored
 
outwards from the shafts; the storage would be in vaults, leading off from
 
the tunnels. In order to provide support to the roof and shielding from
 
y-rays, the walls between the vaults would be of a thickness about the
 
same as the width of the vaults. The depository would initially be
 
'operated in such a way that the waste could be recovered. Later, when
 
confidence had been gained by some years of experience, the excavation
 
would be back filled and the waste regarded as permanently entombed.
 
Extensive monitoring would be carried out in the early stages to detect
 
unexpected leaks. The spacing of individual containers would be suffi­
cient 	to avoid criticality foliowing an extremely severe accident, such
 
as complete flooding of the vaults.
 
Such a disposal scheme pruvides a series of barriers to the spread
 
of radioactivity. The main ones are:
 
(1) The glass
 
A-17
 
77-69
 
(2) The canister
 
(3) The surrounding rook (including hold up by absorption)
 
If the vault remains dry and the waste has cooled for 10 or 20 years
 
before emplacement, the glass, and the canister should provide useful
 
isolation during the time when the radioactivity is at its greatest
 
intensity. If the vault is flooded, which is unlikely but not impossible,
 
the canister and the glass could not be relied on indefinitely to prevent
 
dispersion of the radioactive materials.
 
Thus, in the worst case, the security of the isolation depends not
 
only on the packaging but also on the slowness of the migration of the
 
radioactive material through the overlying rock. Diffusion of water
 
through intact rock is slow. The diffusion of radioactivity is even
 
slower, particularly through a fine grained sediment, since it is held
 
back by absorption on the surfaces of the mineral grains. Experimental
 
and theoretical studies suggest (e.g. Reference A-7.) that many geological
 
materials would be satisfactory from this point of view. The slowing
 
of the spread of radioactivity is very great, factors of 100 to 1,000,000
 
being found.
 
Unfortunately, diffusion along grain boundaries is not the only
 
process for the movement of solutions in rocks. It is also possible for
 
fluids to nove by bulk flow through cracks and to emerge as springs. This
 
is perhaps the most dangerous pathway by which buried waste could reach
 
the surface. The first requirement for the rock surrounding a waste
 
repository is that it should not be cracked, it is also necessary that it
 
should be impervious (for example most sandstones would be unsuitable). In
 
general, hard rocks which have solidified from the molten state are liable
 
to cracking, and a very careful study would be necessary to ensure that
 
the rock at a particular site was not cracked. This has been recognized
 
in Sweden where it is proposed that waste should be stored in a granite
 
repository and surrounded on all sides by 3 m of clay.
 
In limestone there is a special danger that cracks can be widened by
 
solution and form caves and underground rivers. No doubt there are bodies
 
of granite, basalt, or limestone that are free from cracks and suitable
 
for the excavation of a repository; the difficulty is to demonstrate the
 
soundness of the rock before the repository is excavated and to be sure
 
that cracks will not develop as a result of excavation.
 
The main attraction of rock salt (see Figure A-5) is that it is an
 
impervious medium in which cracks can be healed by flow of the slightly
 
plastic material. There is extensive experience in mining salt and in
 
containing fluids in large cavities. Natural traps for oil and gas have
 
also been studied in great detail by the oil industry. The main new
 
feature introduced by the storage of waste is the generation of heat in
 
the vault. This may have local effects in breaking up the salt and
 
possibly more widespread effects which may be more important. As the heat
 
spreads out from the vault it is retained in the overlying rocks for many
 
thousands of years. The heating will cause the rooks to expand and will
 
produce stresses. In a plastic medium such as salt these will be taken up
 
by flow, and no serious consequences are likely to follow.
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In some districts where salt occurs, there are salt springs. These
 
are usually formed by the flow of surface water through porous beds over­
lying the salt; the water cannot penetrate the salt and therefore flows
 
along its surface, dissolves as much salt as it can hold, and emerges
 
again, usually at a lower level in a valley. Clearly, it is desirable to
 
choose a salt bed overlain by impervious material such as shale or clay.
 
The effectiveness of this is shown by the survival of salt beds beneath
 
the floor of the Red Sea, a layer of fine grained sediment has protected
 
the salt for over 10 million years. It is also desirable that the
 
depository be below the level of the bottom of all nearby valleys. An
 
overlying layer of clay or shale also has the advantage that, as described
 
above, it will greatly retard the movement of the radioactive materials if
 
they escape from the glass, the canister and the salt.
 
Storage in salt has been explored in the U.S. without any irremedi­
able difficulty being found. There are sites where a repository can be
 
expected to remain dry for an indefinite period and where flooding, if it
 
occurred, is not expected to cause disastrous results. The literature
 
on this subject includes a discussion by ERDA (Reference A-I, Volume 4),
 
preliminary performance criteria and fault trees are discussed in
 
Reference A-8.
 
(2) Geological Storage Beneath the Sea Floor (Reference 9). The
 
bottom of the deep sea is the most remote and least frequented part of the
 
earth's surface. In depths exceeding 5000 m it is usually floored by "red
 
clay" which is a fine-grained mud or clay composed of insoluble grains
 
left from the solution of shells or skeletons of calcarious animals,
 
volcanic ash, and chemically-precipitated material, mostly iron and man­
ganese oxides. It has been suggested that waste could be emplaced in
 
this mud by drilling a hole in a place where the sediment is several 100 m
 
in thickness. The techniques of drilling in deep water are well-developed,
 
and there is no difficulty in principle in emplacing the waste and filling
 
the hole afterwards. It is difficult to predict what proportion of canis­
ters would stick at less than the intended depth.
 
The choice of site would be important. The surface of the earth is
 
divided into plates which move at a speed of 1 to 10 cm/year away from the
 
mid-ocean ridges, where they are created, towards the ocean trenches,
 
where they plunge downwards into the interior of the earth. It has been
 
suggested that the waste might be deposited near ocean trenches. This
 
seems imprudent since the sediment on the downgoing plate is often scraped
 
off and piled up on the edge of the island arc or continent beneath which
 
the plate is sinking. In addition the speed of the plate (less than 1km
 
in 19,000 years) is too slow to be useful.
 
A much more favorable site is provided by the center of a plate.
 
Here the site is away from the earthquakes of the ridge, which are
 
associated with its creation and is also far from the earthquakes
 
associated with its destruction. The middle of a plate is not entirely
 
free from earthquakes, but they are as rare as they are anywhere on earth.
 
The main doubts about the disposal of waste at mid-plate -sites is the
 
effect of the heat generated by the waste on the stability of the clay in
 
which it is emplaced. This is a matter which requires further investiga­
tion. Work is at present proceeding on a rather small scale to establish
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the scientific principles on which the practicability of sea bed storage
 
can be judged (Reference A-9).
 
(3) Storage in Ice Sheets. It would be easy to emplace canisters
 
of waste deep in an ice sheet; in fact, a canister placed on the surface
 
would melt its way to the bottom. If the ice were moving, the canister
 
would be torn to pieces either by the shearing of the ice or by being
 
dragged along the rocky bottom of the ice sheet. What would happen
 
then depends on whether the ice is melted at the bottom, (as it is
 
in the glaciers of temperate climates) and on whether the water can
 
escape. Doubtless these questions about the movement of ice and water
 
and the possibility of the waste re-appearing at the edge of the ice
 
sheet could be resolved; however, questions of climatic stability on
 
the required time scale cannot be answered in the present state of
 
Climatology. The two largest ice sheets are in Greenland and Antarctica.
 
Greenland belongs to Denmark and there is a treaty forbidding the use
 
of Antarctica. There seems no reason to regard disposal of waste in
 
ice sheets as a method likely to be used in the foreseeable future.
 
(4) Engineered storage. Surface structures have been successfully
 
used for temporary storage of spent fuel and less successfully for pro­
cessed waste from military programs. There appears to be no technical
 
reason why it should not be successful for, say, 1000 years, but for
 
a much longer term, many doubts arise. The doubts are not only
 
technical, such as changes of climate and flooding of sites, but also
 
political. Any surface structure is subject to destruction by human
 
interference, and it seems, on the whole, imprudent to embark on such
 
a scheme for the storage of very active commercial waste.
 
(5) Extra-terrestrial disposal. Eitra-terrestrial disposal is
 
attractive in that it permanently removes objectionable material from
 
the earth. The objections to this disposal option are:
 
(a) 	 The possibility of accidents in which a consignment crashes
 
on land or burns in the atmosphere; to avoid this and give
 
safe re-entry and landing would greatly increase the weight
 
to be transported.
 
(b) 	 The possiblity of contamination of the stratosphere with
 
the products of combustion of the fuel needed to get the
 
consignment off the earth.
 
(c) 	 The cost which is likely to significantly exceed that
 
of a geological repository.
 
The whole question of scape disposal is being investigated by
 
NASA who are considering many possible options. Until these efforts
 
have reached their conclusions, it would be premature to discuss the
 
matter further.
 
It appears clear that the only permanent storage facility that
 
is likely to be available during the 1980s is the one being designed
 
by ERDA to be constructed in bedded salt. This has received far more
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attention than any other method. It is ERDA's intention to operate it in
 
a way that will allow the waste to be recovered if irremediable faults are
 
found before the disposal site is converted from a retrievable to an
 
irretrievable mode. The main problem is to be sure that a particular site
 
is similar to the ideal site for which the plans are made and that there
 
are no cracks that allow water to circulate in the salt and which may
 
allow the water to get into the workings.
 
Other materials are also being investigated including basalt,
 
granite, shale and clay. Since Hanford is underlain by basalt it would be
 
most economical if its waste could be safely deposited in basalt. The
 
main problem in igneous rocks is to demonstrate the absence of cracks.
 
A suitably fine grained shale might prove an excellent choice, but no
 
extensive study has been made.
 
A.8 OTHER FUEL CYCLES
 
This discussion has been directed to the high-level waste from a PWR
 
fueled with slightly enriched uranium. There are many other types of
 
reactors in use and still more are possible. The problems posed by the­
waste are very similar for all of them. All produce about the same amount
 
of fission products for a given amount of power. The transuranic elements
 
differ more than do the fission products between different reactors. All
 
give the same isotopes but the proportions of them depend on the fuel and
 
on the neutron spectrum. These differences do not qualitatively affect
 
the problems of storage, certainly not to the extent that the decision to
 
reprocess or not to reprocess does; it is therefore unnecessary to go into
 
the details of waste from other types of reactors in a background paper
 
such as this.
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APPENDIX B
 
GLOSSARY
 
The following list of terms abbreviations, and acronyms frequently
 
used in discussions of nuclear waste management was prepared for the
 
staff of the California Energy Resources Conservation and Development
 
Commission. The selection of terms was based on experience with the
 
relevant literature.
 
Sources for the terms include:
 
(1) 	Nuclear Terms, A Brief Glossary, U.S. Atomic Energy
 
Commission, available from U.S. ERDA, Division of Technical
 
Information Extension, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
 
(2) 	 "Glossary", Oceanus, William H. MacLeish, Editor, Volume 20
 
Number 1, p. 64, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
 
Woods Hole, Massachusetts, 02543, Winter 1977.
 
(3) 	 Alternatives for Managing Wastes from Reactors and Post­
fission Operations in the LWR Fuel Cycle, ERDA-76-43,
 
Volume 5, Appendix A, available from National Technical
 
Information Service, Springfield Virginia, 22151, May 1976.
 
(4) 	 Willrich. M.. Radioactive Waste Management and Regulation,
 
Report to the Energy Research and Development Administration
 
from the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory (draft, MIT-EL-76-011,
 
Sept. 	1, 1976.
 
Quantitative prefixes and their symbols are listed on the last
 
page of this Appendix.
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Absorbed Dose 

Absorber 

Absorption 

Actinide Series 

Activation 

ACVC 

AEC 

When Ionizing Radiation passes through matter,
 
some of its energy is imparted to the matter.
 
The amount absorbed per unit mass of irradiated
 
material is called the absorbed dose, and
 
is measured in rems and rads. (See threshold
 
dose.)
 
Any material that absorbs or diminishes the
 
intensity of ionizing radiation. Neutron
 
absorbers, like boron, hafnium, and cadmium,
 
are used in control rods for reactors. Con­
crete and steel absorb gamma rays and neutrons
 
in reactor shields. A thin sheet of paper or
 
metal will absorb or attenuate low energy
 
alpha particles and all, except for the most
 
energetic of the beta particles. (Compare
 
moderator; see poison.)
 
The process by which the number of particles
 
or photons entering a body of matter is
 
reduced by interaction of the particles or
 
radiation with the matter; similarly, the
 
reduction of the energy of a particle while
 
traversing a body of matter. This term is
 
sometimes erroneously used for capture.
 
(Compare capture; see stopoing fower.)
 
The series of elements beginning with actinium
 
element No. 89 and continuing through lawrencium
 
element No. 103, which together occupy one
 
position in the Periodic Table. The series
 
includes uranium element No. 92 and all the
 
transuranic elements. The group is also referred
 
to as the "Actinides". (Compare lanthanide
 
series, transuranic elements.)
 
The process of making a material radioactive
 
by bombardment with neutrons, protons, or
 
other nuclear particles. Also called
 
radioactivation.
 
Air Cooled Vault qoncept. A concept developed
 
as an option for RSSF and for SURFF. Suggested
 
in WASH 1539.
 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. In 1975, the
 
Atomic Energy Commission was divided into two
 
separate agencies. The regulatory portion
 
became the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and
 
the reactor development portion became part
 
of the Energy Research and Development
 
Administration.
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Aftercooling 	 The cooling of a reactor after it has been
 
shut down.
 
Afterheat 	 The heat produced by the continuing decay of
 
radioactive atoms in a reactor after fission
 
has stopped. Most of the afterheat is-due to
 
the radioactive decay of fidsion products.
 
AGNS 	 Allied-General Nuclear Services.
 
Alpha Particle 	 A positively charged particle emitted by
 
certain radioactive materials. It is made up
 
of two neutrons and two protons-bound together.
 
It is the least penetrating of the three
 
common types of radiation (alpha, beta, gamma)
 
emitted by radioactive material, and is usually
 
stopped by a sheet of paper.
 
Aqueous Raffinate 	 Liquid left in the solvent extraction system,
 
from which the uranium has been extracted by
 
contact with an immiscible (two liquids that
 
do not mix and form more 	than one phase when
 
- brought together) organic solvent. The 
solvent is tributylphosphate in hexane (TBP). 
Atom 	 A particle of matter indivisible by chemical
 
means. It is the fundamental building block
 
of the chemical elements. The elements, such
 
as iron, lead, and sulfur, differ from each.
 
other because the contain different kinds of
 
atoms. There are about 6 x 1021 atoms in an
 
ordinary drop of water. According to present
 
day theory, an atom contains a dense inner
 
core (the nucleus) and a much less dense
 
outer domain consisting of electrons in
 
motion around the nucleus. Atoms are
 
electrically neutral. (Compare element, ion,
 
molecule; see matter.)
 
Atomic Explosion 	 An explosion in which energy is produced by
 
nuclear fission or fusion. (Compare device.
 
nuclear.)'
 
Atomic Weight 	 The mass of an atom relative to other atoms.
 
The present day basis of the scale of atomic
 
weights is carbon; the commonest isotope
 
of this element has arbitrarily been assigned
 
an atomic weight of 12. The unit of the
 
scale is 1/12 the weight of the carbon 12
 
atom, or roughly the mass of one proton or
 
one neutron. The atomic weight of any
 
element is approximately equal to the total
 
number of protons and heutrons in its nucleus.
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Back End of the Fuel 

Cycle 

Background 

Radiation 

Barrier Shield 

Beta Particle 

Benohmark 

BeV 

Biological Dose 

Biological Half-life 

Biological Shield 

Biosphere 

Includes reactors, spent fuel storage, fuel
 
reprocessing, mixed-oxide fuel fabrication,
 
transportation, and waste management.
 
The radiation in man's natural environment,
 
including cosmic rays and radiation from the
 
.naturally radioactive elements, both outside
 
and inside the bodies of men and animals.
 
It is also called natural radiation. The
 
term may also mean radiation that is unrelated
 
to a specific experiment.
 
A wall or enclosure shielding the operator
 
from an area where radioactive material is
 
being used or processed by remote control
 
equipment.
 
An elementary particle emitted from a nucleus
 
during radioactive decay, with a single
 
electrical charge and a rest mass equal to
 
1/1837 that of a proton. A negatively
 
charged beta particle is identical to an
 
electron. A positively charged beta particle
 
is called a positron. Beta radiation may
 
cause skin burns, and beta emitters are
 
harmful if they enter the body. Beta particles
 
are easily stopped by a thin sheet of metal.
 
A standard by which others may be measured
 
or evaluated.
 
Symbol for billion (or 109) electron volts.
 
The radiation dose absorbed in biological
 
material. Measured in rems. (See absorbed dose.)
 
The time required for a biological system,
 
such as a man or an animal, to eliminate,
 
by natural processes, half the amount of a
 
substance (such as a radioactive material)
 
that has entered it. (Compare half-life;
 
see half-life, effective.)
 
A mass of absorbing material placed around a
 
reactor or radioactive source to reduce the
 
radiation to a level that is safe for human
 
beings. (See absorber, shield, thermal shield.)
 
That part of the earth (upwards at least to a
 
height of 10,000 m, and downwards to the depths of
 
the ocean, and a few hundred meters below the
 
ground surface) and the atmosphere and hydrosphere
 
surrounding it, which is able to support life.
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Blanket 	 A layer of fertile material, such as uranium
 
238 or thorium-232, placed around the fission­
able material in a reactor. (See fertile
 
material, seed core.)
 
BNFP 	 Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant -- a reprocessing
 
plant in South Carolina which has not been
 
licensed for operation.
 
BNWL 	 Battelle Northwest Laboratories.
 
Body Burden 	 The amount of radioactive material present
 
in the body of a man or an animal.
 
Boiling Water A reactor in which water, used as both coolant
 
Reactor (BWR) and moderator, is allowed to boil in the core.
 
The resulting steam can be used directly to
 
drive a turbine.
 
Bone Seeker 	 A radioisotope that tends to accumulate in the
 
bones when it is introduced into the body.
 
An example is strontium-90, which behaves
 
chemically like calcium.
 
Breeder Reactor 	 A reactor that produces fissionable fuel as well
 
as consuming it, especially one that creates more
 
than it consumes. A new fissionable material is
 
created by capture in fertile materials of neutrons
 
from fission. The process by which this occurs is
 
known as breeding. (Compare converter reactor;
 
LMFBR see fertile material.)
 
Breeding Ratio 	 The ratio of the number of fissionable atoms
 
produced in a breeder reactor to the number
 
of fissionable atoms consumed in the reactor.
 
Breeding gain is the breeding ratio minus
 
one. (Compare conversion ratio.)
 
Burial Grounds 	 Areas designated for storage of containers of
 
treated radioactive wastes by burial in geologic
 
media.
 
Burnable Poison 	 A neutron absorber (or poison), such as boron, which,
 
when purposely incorporated in the fuel or fuel
 
cladding of a nuclear reactor, gradually "burns up"
 
(is changed into nonabsorbing material) under
 
neutron irradiation. This process compensates for
 
the loss of reactivity that occurs as fuel is con­
sumed and fission-product poisons accumulate, and
 
keeps the overall characteristics of the reactor
 
nearly constant during its use. (See poison,
 
reactivity.)
 
Burner Reactor 	 A converter reactor
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Capture 
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A measure of reactor fuel consumption. It
 
can be expressed as (a) the percentage of
 
fuel atoms that have undergone fission, or
 
(b) the amount of energy produced per unit
 
weight of fuel in the reactor.
 
Any radioactive material (except source
 
material or fissionable material) obtained
 
during the productionor use of source material
 
or fissionable material. It includes fission
 
products and many other radioisotopes produced
 
in nuclear reactors. (Compare fissionable
 
material, source material.).
 
Boiling Water Reactor
 
A process in which an atomic or nuclear system
 
acquires an additional particle; for example, the
 
capture of electrons by positive ions, or capture
 
of electrons or neutrons by nuclei.
 
To calcine; generally, to heat (or roast) ores or
 
ore concentrates so aa to remove its water, C02 , or
 
sulfur content. In nuclear technology, to roast
 
pre-dried ammonium diuranate (ADU) in a reducing
 
atmosphere (H2 and N2 ) so as to obtain UO2 in a
 
powdery form. In the reprocessing of high-level
 
liquid wastes, to calcine is to solidify, through
 
roasting, waste material and convert it to a high
 
temperature stable oxide.
 
The UO2 powder which cones from roasting pre-dried
 
ammonium diuranate (ADU) in a reducing atmosphere
 
(H2 and N2 ). This pertains to the fuel fabrication
 
process (of. LWR Fuel Cycle). In the solidification
 
reprocessing of high-level liquid wastes, the end
 
product in the form of powdery or granular material
 
or a porous cake, depending on the particular
 
process.
 
A stable isotope, or a normal element to which
 
radioactive atoms of the same element can be added
 
to obtain a quantity of radioactive mixture
 
sufficient for handling, or to produce a radioactive
 
mixture that will undergo the same chemical or bio­
logical reaction as the stable isotope. A substance
 
in weighable amount which, when associated with a
 
trace of another substance, will carry the trace
 
through a chemical, physical or biological process.
 
A connected arrangement of units of eouipment for.
 
separation of isotopes. A single device or process
 
usually can produce only a small amount of isotopic
 
separation, but if a number of these are connected
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CFR 

Chain Reaction 

Cladding 

Cladding Waste 

Closed-Cycle Reactor 

System 

Coffin 

Containment 

Containment Vessel 
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together the effect can be multiplied and a signi­
cant amount of separation achieved. An example is a
 
cascade of barriers for the gaseous diffusion pro­
cess. (See gaseous diffusion, isotope separation.)
 
Code of Federal Regulations is a codification
 
of the general and permanent rules published
 
in the Federal Register by the Executive depart­
ments and agencies of the Federal Government.
 
A reaction that stimulates its own repetition. In a
 
fission chain reaction a fissionable nucleus absorbs
 
a neutron and fissions, releasing additional neu­
trons. These in turn can be absorbed by other fis­
sionable nuclei, releasing still more neutrons. A
 
fission chain reaction is self-sustaining when the
 
number of neutrons released in a given time equals
 
-or exceeds the number of neutrons lost by absorption
 
in non-fissioning material or by escape from the
 
system.
 
The outer jacket of nuclear fuel elements. It pre­
vents corrosion of the fuel and the release of fis­
sion products into the codlant. Aluminum or its
 
alloys, stainless steel and Zirconium alloys are
 
common cladding materials.
 
Spent fuel rods after removal from a reactor are
 
broken up and fissionable fuel is chemically leached
 
out. The remaining residue, principally radioactive
 
cladding material, insoluble nuclear fuel, fission
 
products, and transuranium nuclides, is called
 
cladding waste.
 
A reactor design in which the primary heat of fis­
sion is transferred outside the reactor core to do
 
useful work by means of a coolant circulating in a
 
completely closed system that includes a heat ex­
changer. Compare direct-cycle reactor system, indi­
rect-cycle reactor system, open-cycle reactor
 
system.)
 
A heavily shielded shipping cask for spent (used)
 
fuel elements. Some coffins weigh as much as
 
75 tons.
 
The provision of a gastight low pressure shell or
 
other enclosure around a reactor to confine
 
fission products that otherwise might be released
 
to the atmosphere in the event of an accident.
 
A gas tight low pressure shell or other enclosure
 
around a reactor. (Compare pressure vessel; see
 
containment.)
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(See radioactive contamination.)
 
A rod, plate, or tube containing a material
 
that readily absorbs neutrons (hafnium,
 
boron, etc.), used to control the power of
 
a nuclear reactor. By absorbing neutrons, a
 
control rod prevents the neutrons from causing
 
further fission. (See absorber).
 
Theratio of the numbdr of atoms of new fission­
able material produced in a converter reactor
 
to the original number of atoms of fissionable
 
fuel consumed. (Compare breeding ratio.)
 
A reactor that produces some fissionable
 
material, but less than it consumes. In
 
some usages, a reactor that produces a
 
fissionable material different from the fuel
 
burned, regardless of the ratio. In both
 
usages the process is known as conversion.
 
(Compare breeder reactor.)
 
A-substance circulated through a nuclear
 
reactor to remove or transfer heat. Common
 
coolants are water, air, carbon dioxide, liquid
 
sodium, and sodium potassium alloy (NaK).
 
An open pond in which water, heated through
 
use in an industrial process is allowed to
 
cool through evaporation before re-use.
 
The central portion of a nuclear reactor
 
containing the fuel elements and usually the
 
.moderator, but not the reflector.
 
Capable of sustaining a chain reaction. (See
 
criticality.)
 
An assembly of sufficient fissionable material and
 
moderator to sustain a fission chain reaction at a
 
very low'power l6vel. This permits study of the
 
behavior of the compo nents of the assembly for
 
various fissionable materials in different geometrical
 
arrangements. (Compare nuclear reactor.)
 
A facility where a critical mass of fission­
able material or sub critical mass of fissionable
 
material is used in experiments or stored.
 
The smallest mass of fissionable material that
 
will support a self-sustaining chain reaction
 
under stated conditions.
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Criticality 

Curie 

Daughter 

Decay Chain 

Decay Heat 

Decay, Radioactive 

Decommissioning 

Decontamination 

The state of a nuclear reactor when it is
 
sustaining a chain reaction. (See dry criticality,

multiplication.)
 
The basic unit to describe the intensity of
 
radioactivity in a sample of material. The
 
Curie is equal to 37 billion disintegrations
 
per second (3.7 x 1010 dis/sec), which
 
is approximately the rate of decay of 1 gram
 
of radium. A curie is also a quantity of any
 
nuclide having 1 curie of radioactivity.
 
Named for Marie and Pierre Curie who discov­
ered radium in 1898. (Compare rem, roentgen.)
 
A nuclide formed by the radioactive decay of another
 
nuclide, which in this context is called the parent.
 
A radioactive series.
 
The heat produced by the decay of radioactive nu­
clides. (See afterheat; decay, radioactive; SNAP.)
 
The spontaneous transformation of one nuclide into
 
a different nuclide or into a different energy state
 
of the same nuclide. The process results in a
 
decrease, with time, of the number of the original
 
radioactive atoms in a sample. It involves the
 
emission from the nucleus of alpha particles, beta
 
particles (or electrons), or gamma rays; or the
 
nuclear capture or ejection of orbital electrons.
 
Also called radioactive disintegration. (See
 
half-life, nuclear reaction, radioactive series.)
 
Preparation of worn out or obsolute nuclear
 
facilities for retirement. Decommissioning opera­
tions remove facilities such as reactors, reactor
 
containments, reprocessing plants, and burial
 
grounds from service and reduce or stabilize radio­
active contamination. Concepts include dismantling,
 
entombment, and mothballing which evolve:
 
* 	 Demolition and restoration to original
 
conditions requiring no control
 
* 	 Partial demolition and fixation of
 
residues
 
* 	 Minimal demolition followed by isola­
tion and control of residues
 
The removal of radioactive contaminants from
 
surfaces or equipment, as by cleaning and
 
washing with chemicals. (See radioactive
 
contamination.)
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Deep Continental 

Geologic Formations 

Depleted Fuel 

Depleted Uranium 

Deuterium 

Difussion Plant 

Direct-Cycle-

Reactor System 

Disintegration, 

Radioactive Disposal
 
Distribution Factor 

Geologic media beneath the continents and isolated
 
from biologic species and phenomena. Distinguished
 
from ice sheets and sea floor geologic media.
 
(See depleted uranium, spent fuel.)
 
Uranium having a smaller percentage of
 
uranium-235 than the 0.7% found in natural
 
uranium. It is obtained from the spent
 
(used) fuel elements or as by-product tails,
 
or residues, of uranium isotope separation.
 
(Compare natural uranium, spent fuel.)
 
An isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains one
 
neutron and one proton and is therefore about twice
 
as heavy as the nucleus of normal hydrogen which
 
has only a single proton. Deuterium is often
 
referred to as heavy hydrogen; it occurs innature
 
as 1 atom to 6500 atoms o normal hydrogen. It is
 
nonradioactive. (See heavy water, heavy hydrogen.)
 
(See gaseous diffusion.)
 
A nuclear power plant system in which the coolant
 
or heat transfer fluid circulates first through
 
the reactor and then directly to a turbine.
 
(Compare indirect-cycle reactor system.)
 
Equivalent to radioactive decay.
 
Operations designed to eliminate wastes from
 
existence on earth or to permanently isolate them
 
from mankind and his environs with no expectation
 
of retrieval.after emplacement. Isolation concepts
 
include
 
* 	 placement in subsurface geologic
 
formations using technologies that
 
offer no practical method for recovery
 
* 	 emplacement into or beneath sea floors
 
* 	 dispersion 
Elimination concepts include extraterrestrial
 
disposal and transmutation.
 
A term used to express the modification of the
 
effect of radiation in a biological system attribut­
able to the nonuniform distribution of an internally
 
deposited isotope, such as radium, being concentrated
 
in bones. (See absorbed dose, dose equivalent.
 
quality factor.)
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Dollar 

Dose 

Dose Equivalent 

Dose Rate 

Doubling Time 

Dry Criticality 

Dual-Cycle Reactor 

System 

Dual Purpose Reactor 

Effective Half-life 

Effective Multipli-

cation factor
 
(or constant)
 
Electromagnetic 

Radiation 

A unit of reactivity. One dollar is the
 
maximum amount of reactivity in a reactor
 
due to delayed neutrons alone.
 
(See absorbed dose, biological dose, maximum
 
permissable dose, threshold dose.)
 
A term used to express the amount of effective
 
radiation when modifying factors have been
 
-considered. The product of absorbed dose
 
multiplied by a quality factor multiplied'
 
by a distribution factor. It is expressed
 
numerically in rems.
 
The radiation dose delivered per unit time and
 
measured, for instance, in rems per hour.
 
(See absorbed dose, rem.)
 
The time required for a breeder reactor to
 
produce as much fissionable material as the
 
amount usually contained in its core plus
 
the amount tied up in its fuel cycle (fabri­
cation, reprocessing, etc.). It is estimated
 
as 10 to 20 years in typical reactors. (See
 
breeder reactor, fuel cycle.)
 
Reactor criticality achieved without a coolant.
 
(Compare wet criticality; see criticality.)
 
A reactor-turbine system in which part of the
 
steam fed to the turbine is generated
 
directly in the reactor and part in a separate
 
heat exchanger. A combination of direct
 
cycle and indirect-cycle reactor systems.
 
A reactor designed to achieve two purposes,
 
for example, to produce both electricity and
 
new fissionable material.
 
(See half-life, effective.)
 
(See multiplication factor.)
 
Radiation consisting of associated and
 
interacting electric and magnetic waves that
 
travel at the speed of light. Examples:
 
light, radio waves, gamma rays, X-rays.
 
All can be transmitted through a vacuum.
 
(Compare ionizing radiation; see guantum.)
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Element 

Encapsulate 

Energy Research and 

Development 

Administration (ERDA) 

Engineered Storage 

Enriched Material 

Enrichment 

EPA 

Excess Reactivity 

One of the over 100 known chemical substandes
 
that cannot be divided into simpler substances
 
by chemical means. A substance whose atoms all
 
have the same atomic number. Examples:
 
hydrogen, lead, uranium. (Not to be
 
confused with fuel element.) (See atom,
 
matter, nuclide.)
 
To encapsulate: To hermetically seal the
 
container that has in it one or several spent
 
fuel assemblies and the "filler material"
 
which enhances heat conductivity.
 
In 1975, the Atomic Energy Commission was
 
divided into two new agencies. The regulatory
 
portion became the Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission and the reactor development
 
portion became part of the Energy Research
 
and Development Administration.
 
The storage of radioactive wastes, usually
 
within suitable-sealed containers, in any of
 
-avariety of structures especially designed
 
to protect them from water and weather, and
 
to help keep them from leakage to the
 
biosphere by accident or sabotage. They may
 
also provide for extracting heat of radio­
active decay from the waste.
 
Material in which the percentage of a given
 
isotope present in a material has been artifi­
cially increased-, so that it is higher than
 
the percentage of that isotope naturally
 
found in the material. Enriched uranium
 
contains more of the fissionable isotope
 
uranium-235 than the naturally occurring
 
percentage (0.7%). (See isotonic enrichment.)
 
Isotopic enrichment.
 
Environmental Protection Agency. EPA's statutory
 
authorities for radiation protection are primarily
 
concerned with the promulgation of environmental
 
standards and guidelines. EPA also has limited
 
authority for effluent regulation and enforcement
 
activities in some areas; however this responsi­
bility is mainly under the purview of NRC
 
More reactivity than that needed to achieve criti­
cality. Excess reactivity is built into a reactor
 
(by using extra fuel) in order to fuel burnun
 
and the accumulation of fission-Qisons during
 
operation. (See criticality, reactivity.)
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Exclusion Area 

Excursion 

Experimental Reactor 

External Radiation 

Fast Breeder 

Reactor 

Fast Neutron 

Fast Reactor 

Federal Repository 

Feed Materials 

Fertile Material 

Final Storage 

An area immediately surrounding a nuclear
 
reactor where human habitation is prohibited
 
to assure safety in the event of accident.
 
(See low population zone.)
 
A sudden, very rapid rise in the power level
 
of a reactor caused by supercriticality.
 
Excursions are usually quickly suppressed by
 
the negative temperature coefficient of the
 
reactor and/or by automatic control rods.
 
A reactor to test the design of new reactors.
 
(Compare research reactor, test reactor.)
 
Radiation from a source outside the body.
 
A reactor that operates with fast neutrons
 
and produces more fissionable material than it
 
consumes. (See breeder reactor, fast neutron,
 
fast reactor.)
 
A neutron with energy greater than approx­
imately 100,000 electron volts. (Compare
 
intermediate neutron, thermal neutron.
 
A reactor in which the fission chain reaction
 
is sustained primarily by fast neutrons rather
 
than by thermal or intermediate neutrons.
 
Fast reactors contain little or no moderator
 
to slow down the neutrons from the speeds at
 
which they are ejected from fissioning nuclei.
 
(Compare intermediate reactor, thermal reactor.)
 
Federally operated disposal or storage
 
facility for high-level and transuranic
 
contaminated wastes.
 
Refined uranium or thorium metal or their pure
 
compounds in a form suitable for use in nuclear
 
reactor fuel elements or as feed for uranium
 
enrichment processes. (See enriched material.)
 
A material, not itself fissionable by
 
thermal neutrons,'which can be converted into
 
a fissile material by irradiation in a
 
reactor. There are two basic fertile
 
materials, uranium-238 and thorium-232.
 
When these fertile materials capture neutrons.
 
Storage operations for which a) no subsequent
 
waste treatment or transportation operations
 
are anticipated and b) conversion to disposal
 
(i.e., termination of monitoring and human
 
control) is considered possible.
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The current concept for final storage is emplacement
 
of wastes in geologic formations. The geologic
 
formations may be either on the earth's surface
 
and augmented by engineering technology (e.g.,
 
burial grounds), or subsurface and augmented with
 
engineering technology. Fissile material, while
 
sometimes used as a synonym for fissionable material,
 
this term has also acquired a more restricted mean­
ing, namely, any material fissionable by neutrons
 
of all energies, including (and especially) thermal
 
(slow) neutrons as well as fast neutrons;
 
for example, uranium-235 and plutonium-239t
 
(See fissionable material.)
 
The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two
 
approximately equal parts (which are nuclei
 
of lighter elements), accompanied by the
 
release of a relatively large amount of
 
energy and generally one or more neutrons.
 
Fission can occur spontaneously, but it usually
 
is caused by nuclear absorption of neutrons,
 
gamma rays, or other particles. (Compare'­
fusion; see chain reaction, nuclear reaction.)
 
The two nuclei which are formed by the fission
 
of a nucleus. Also referred to as' primary
 
fission products. They are of medium atomic
 
weight, and are radioactive. (See fission
 
products.)
 
The absorption or capture of neutrons by
 
fission products in a reactor, decreasing its
 
reactivity. (See poison.)
 
The nuclei (fission fragments) formed by the
 
fission of heavy elements, elements, plus
 
the nuclides formed by the fission fragments'
 
radioactive decay. (Compare fission fragments;
 
see decay, radioactive.)
 
The amount of energy released by fission in a
 
thermonuclear (fusion) explosion as distinct
 
from that released by fusion. Also the amount
 
(percentage) of a given nuclide produced by
 
fission. (Compare yield; see thermonuclear
 
reaction, TNT equivalent.)
 
Commonly used as a synonym for fissile
 
material. The meaning of this term also has
 
been extended to include material that can
 
be -fissioned by fast neutrons only, such as
 
uranium-238. Used in reactor operations to
 
mean fuel. (Compare fertile material,
 
fissile material.)
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Fluidized Bed 

Calciner 

Fluid Fuel Reactor 

Fluidized Bed Reactor 

Flux (Neutron) 

Food Chain 

Frit, Frits 

FRP 

Fuel 

Fuel Bundle 

Fuel Cycle 

Fluidized bed calciner, used to convert high
 
level liquid radioactive waste (HLLW) to a dry
 
solid. The HLLW is atomized into a fluidized
 
bed, heated by inbed combustion (kerosene jet
 
burning with oxygen input), the bed temperature
 
being 500°C - 6000C. Evaporation occurs 'at the
 
surface of the particles and results in granular
 
bed material and powdered calcine.
 
A type of reactor (for example, a fused-salt
 
reactor) whose fuel is in fluid form.
 
A reactor design in which the fuel ranges in
 
size from small particles to pellets.
 
Although the fuel particles are solid, their
 
entire mass behaves like a fluid because a
 
stream of liquid or gas coolant keeps them
 
moving.
 
A term used to express the intensity of
 
neutron radiation. The number of neutrons
 
passing through a unit area in unit time.
 
For neutrons of given energy, the product of
 
neutron density with speed.
 
The pathways by which any material (such-as
 
radioactive material from fallout) passes
 
from the first absorbing organism through
 
plants and animals to man.
 
Chemically complex glasses used in a ground
 
condition to incorporate further chemicals
 
in a resulting final composite glass
 
product.
 
Fuel Reprocessing Plant. (See Fuel
 
Reprocessing.)
 
Fissionable material used or usable to produce
 
energy in a reactor. Also applied to a
 
mixture, such as natural uranium, in which
 
only part of the atoms are readily fission­
able, if the mixture can be made to sustain
 
a chain reaction. (See fissionable material.)
 
A designed array of fuel elements in the
 
holder or in a moderation matrix.
 
The series of steps involved in supplying
 
fuel for nuclear power reactors. It includes
 
mining, refining, enrichment, fabrication of
 
fuel elements, use in a reactor, chemical
 
processing to recover the fissionable material
 
remaining in the spent fuel, re-enrichment of
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the recovered uranium, refabrication into new
 
fuel elements, transportation of materials
 
between these various stages, and management
 
of radioactive wastes.
 
A rod, tube, plate, or other mechanical shape
 
or form into which nuclear fuel is fabricated
 
for use in a reactor. (Not to be confused
 
with element.) (See nuclear reactor.)
 
The processing of reactor fuel to recover the
 
unused fissionable material. (See recvcling,
 
spent fuel.)
 
A type of reactor that uses molten salts of
 
uranium for both fuel and coolant.
 
The formation of a heavier nucleus from two
 
lighter ones (such as hydrogen isotopes),
 
with the attendant release of energy (as in
 
a hydrogen bomb). (Compare fission; see
 
nuclear reaction, Sherwood.)
 
An atomic weapon using the energy of nuclear
 
fusion, such as a hydrogen bomb.
 
High-energy, short-wavelength electromagnetic
 
radiation. Gamma radiation frequently accom­
panies alpha and beta emissions and always
 
accompanies fission. Gamma rays are very
 
penetrating and best .stopped or shielded against
 
by dense materials, such as lead or depleted
 
uranium. Gamma rays are essentially similar to
 
X-rays, but are usually more energetic, and
 
are nuclear in origin. (See decay radioactive,
 
photon.) 
A method of isotopic separation in which
 
heavy gaseous atoms or molecules are separated
 
from light ones by centrifugal force. (See
 
isotope separation.)
 
A nuclear reactor in which a gas is the coolant.
 
A method of isotopic separation based on the
 
fact that gas atoms or molecules with dif­
ferent masses will diffuse through a porous
 
barrier (or membrane) at different rates.
 
The method is used by the AEC to separate
 
uranium-235 from uranium-238; it requires
 
large gaseous-diffusion plants and enormous
 
amounts of electric power. (See cascade,
 
isotope separation, uranium hexafluoride.)
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Genetic effects of 

Radiation 

Genetically Signifi-

cant Dose (GSD). 

Geosphere 

GESMO 

Half-life 

Half-life Biological 

Half-life, Effective 

Head End of the Fuel 

Cycle 

Health Physics 

Heat Exchanger 

Heat sink 

Heavy Hydrogen 

Radiation effects that can be transferred,
 
from parent to offspring. Any radiation
 
caused changes in the genetic material of
 
sex cells. (Compare radiomutation, somatic
 
effects of radiation.)
 
The gonadal dose which, if received by every
 
member of the population, would be expected
 
to produce the same total genetic effect on
 
the population as the sum of the individual
 
doses that are actually received. It is not
 
a forecast of predictable adverse effects on
 
any individual person or his/her unborn
 
children.
 
The solid mass of earth, as distinct from
 
the atmosphere or hydrosphere.
 
General environmental impact Atatement for
 
mixed oxide fuels (recycle plutonium in
 
light-water-cooled reactors.)
 
The time in which half the atoms of a particu­
lar radioactive substance disintegrate to
 
another nuclear form. Measured half-lives
 
vary from millionths of a second to billions
 
of years. (See decay, radioactive.)
 
(See biological half-life.)
 
The time required for a radionuclide contained
 
in a biological system, such as a man or an
 
animal, to reduce its activity by half as
 
a combined result of radioactive decay and
 
biological elimination. (Compare biological
 
half-life; see half-life.)
 
Mining, milling, enrichment, and fabrication
 
of U02 fuel.
 
The science concerned with recognition,
 
evaluation, and control of health hazards
 
from ionizing radiation.
 
Any device that transfers heat from one
 
fluid (liquid or gas) to another or the
 
environment.
 
Anything that absorbs heat; usually part of
 
the environment, such as the air, a river,
 
or outer space.
 
Another name for deuterium
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Water containing significantly more than the
 
natural proportion (one in 6500) of heavy
 
hydrogen (deuterium) atoms to ordinary
 
hydrogen atoms. Heavy water is used as a
 
moderator in some reactors because of its
 
effectiveness in slowing down neutrons and
 
because of its low cross section for absorp­
tion of neutrons.
 
A reactor that uses heavy water as its
 
moderator. Heavy water is an excellent
 
moderator and thus permits the use of
 
inexpensive natural (unenriched) uranium as
 
a fuel.
 
Righ fficiency aarticulate air filters.
 
Pleated fiberglass filters with high surface
 
area and small pore size dsigned to remove
 
aerosols with a minimum efficiency of 99.'97%
 
for 0.3 micrometer particles.
 
A reactor in which the fuel is separate from
 
the moderator and is arranged in discrete­
bodies, such as fuel elements. Most reactors
 
are heterogeneous: (Compare homogeneous
 
reactor.)
 
Those aqueous wastes resulting from the operation
 
of the first cycle solvent extraction system,
 
or equivalent, and the concentrated waste from
 
subsequent extraction cycle, or equivalent, in
 
a facility for reprocessing reactor fuels.
 
Radioactive wastes including high-level liouid
 
waste, and spent fuel, -- if it is declared
 
to be waste -- or any equivalent radioactive
 
waste material.
 
A reactor in which the temperature is great
 
enough to permit generation of mechanical power
 
at good efficiency using gas as the coolant.
 
A reactor in which the fuel is mixed with or
 
dissolved in the moderator or coolant.
 
Example: a fused-salt reactor.
 
(Compare heterogeneous reactor.)
 
Highly radioactive
 
A surface area of higher-than-average
 
radioactivity. Also a part of a fuel
 
element surface that has become overheated.
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The remnant outer casing or solid cladding
 
waste of fuel bundles after most of the fuel
 
pellets have been removed by nitric acid
 
leaching.
 
A nuclear weapon that derives its energy
 
largely from fusion. (See thermonuclear
 
reaction.)
 
Treatment and/or emplacement of the wastes so
 
as to impede their movement.
 
A reactor system in which a heat exchanger
 
transfers heat from the reactor coolant to a
 
second fluid which then drives a turbine.
 
(Compare closed-cycle reactor system,
 
direct-cycle reactor system.)
 
A neutron having energy greater than that of
 
a thermal neutron but less than that of a
 
fast neutron. The range is generally con­
sidered to be between about 0.5 and 100,000
 
electron volts. (Compare fast neutron,
 
thermal neutron.)
 
Waste other than high level waste containing
 
concentrations and or quantities of radioactive
 
materials requiring some kind of action to protect
 
personnel from radiation from the materials.
 
Storage operations for which a) monitoring
 
and human control are provided and b) sub­
sequent action involving treatment, trans­
portation, or final disposition is expected.
 
Concepts for interim storage include bulk and unit­
ized storage of solid, liquid, and gaseous wastes.
 
Alternative interim storage technologies include:
 
* tank storage of liquids
 
* canister storage in air-cooled vaults
 
& spent fuel storage in water basins.
 
Radiation from a source within the body (as
 
a result of deposition of radionuclides in
 
body tissues).
 
An atom or molecule that has lost or gained
 
one or more electrons.- By this ionization it
 
becomes electrically charged. Examples:
 
an alpha particle, which is a helium atom
 
Ionizing Radiation 

Ion Exchange 

Irradiation 

Isobar 

Isointensity 

Contours 

Isolation 

Isotone 

Isotope 
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minus two electrons; a proton, which is a
 
hydrogen atom minus its electron.
 
Any radiation displacing electrons from atoms
 
or molecules, thereby producing ions.
 
Examples: alpha, beta, gamma radiation,
 
Ionizing radiation may produce severe skin or
 
tissue damage. (See radiation, radiation
 
burn, radiation illness.)
 
A chemical process involving the reversible
 
interchange of various ions between a solution
 
and a solid material, usually a plastic or
 
a resin. It is used to separate and purify
 
chemicals, such as fission products, rare
 
earths, etc., in solutions.
 
Exposure to radiation, as in a nuclear reactor
 
(See spent fuel.)
 
One of two or more nuclides having about the
 
same atomic mass but different atomic
 
numbers, hence different chemical properties.
 
Example:14 C, 14 N and 14 0 are isobars.
6 7 8 
(Compare isotope).
 
Imaginary lines on the surface of the ground
 
or water, or lines drawn on a map, joining
 
points in a radiation field which have the
 
same radiation intensity at a given time.
 
A term encompassing both final storage and/or
 
disposal in geologic formations.
 
One of several nuclides having the same num­
ber of neutrons but a different number of
 
protons in their nuclei.
 
Example: postassium-39 (39 K) and
 
19
 
calcium-40 (40 Ca) are isotones. (Compare isotope).
20
 
One of two or more atoms with the same atomic
 
number (the same chemical element) but with
 
different atomic weights. An equivalent state­
ment is that the nuclei of isotopes have the
 
same number of protons but different numbers
 
of neutrons. Thus, 12C , 13C, and I4C are
 
6 6' 6 
isotopes of the element carbon, the subscripts 
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denoting their common atomic numbers, the super­
scripts denoting the differing mass numbers, or
 
approximate atomic weights. Isotopes usually
 
have very nearly the same chemical properties,
 
but somewhat different physical properties.
 
(Compare isobar, isotone, nuclide; see radio­
isotope.)
 
The process of separating isotopes from
 
one another, or changing their relative
 
abundances, as by gaseous diffusion or
 
electromagnetic separation. Isotope separa­
tion is a step in the isotopic enrichment
 
process.
 
A process by which the relative abundances of ­
the isotopes of a given element are altered, 
thus producing a form of the element which 
has been enriched in one particular isotope. 
Example: enriching natural uranium in the 
uranium-235 isotope. (See enriched material, 
gaseous diffusion.) 
A prefix that multiplies a basic unit by
 
1000.
 
The energy of a nuclear explosion which is
 
equivalent to that of an explosion of
 
1000 tons of TNT. (See TNT eguivalent,
 
yield.)
 
The series of elements beginning with
 
lanthanum, Element No. 57, and continuing
 
through lutetium, Element No. 71, which
 
together occupy one position in the Periodic
 
Table, of the elements. These are the "rare
 
earths," which all have chemical properties
 
similar to lanthanum. They also are called
 
the "lanthanides." (Compare actinide
 
series; see rare earths.)
 
An orderly array or pattern of nuclear fuel
 
elements and moderator in a reactor or
 
critical assembly. Also, the arrangement
 
of atoms in a crystal.
 
The rate of extraction of a material per unit
 
area by contacting it to a solvent (water,
 
acids, or alkalies).
 
In nuclear engineering, the escape of neutrons
 
from a reactor core. Leakage lowers a reactor's
 
reactivity. (See neutron economy.)
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LET 

Licensed Material 

Light Hydrogen 

Light Water 

LLW 

Long-lived Nuclides 

Low-level Waste 

Low Population Zone 

LMFBR 

LWR 

LWR Fuel Cycle 

Mass Number 

Linear Energy Transfer -- average energy locally
 
imparted to a medium per unit length of charged
 
particle travel.
 
Source material, special nuclear material,
 
or by-product material received, possessed,
 
used or transferred under a general or
 
special license issued by the NRC or a state.
 
Ordinary hydrogen.
 
Ordinary water (H20), as distinguished
 
from heavy water (D20).
 
Low-level waste (containing minimal trans­
suranic elements).
 
Radioactive isotopes with half-lives of
 
several years or greater. Most nuclides of
 
interest to waste management have half-lives
 
on the order of tens to millions of years
 
(239pu - 24,400 years; 99Te - 2.1 x 105 years;
 
1291 - 1.6 x 1o7 years).
 
Wastes containing types and concentrations
 
of radioactivity such that shielding to
 
prevent personnel exposure is not required.
 
An area of low population density sometimes
 
required around a nuclear installation. The
 
number and density of residents is of concern
 
in providing, with reasonable probability,
 
-that effective protection measures can be- ­
taken if a serious accident should occur. 
(See exclusion area.) 
Liquid-Metal Fast Breeder Reactor.
 
Light-water Reactor.
 
Light-water reactor fuel cycle. A system of
 
operation and facilities for the preparation,
 
utilization, and reconstitution of the LWR
 
fuel. The main operations'involve:
 
1. Mining of fore; 2. Milling (ore concen­
tration and purification); 3. Conversion of
 
U308 to UF ; 4. Enrichment; 5. Conversion
 
of UF6 to U02; 6. Fuel fabrication; 7. Irra­
dation in a reactor, and 8. Reprocessing.
 
The sum of the neutrons and protons in a
 
NUCLEUS. It is the nearest whole number to an
 
atom's atomic weight. For instance, the mass
 
number of uranium-235 is 235.
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Matter 

Maximum Credible 

Accident 

Maximum Permissible 

Concentration (MPC) 

Maximum Permissible 

Dose 

Mega 

Megaton Energy 

Megawatt-day Per Ton 

MeV 

MFRP 

Micro 

The substance of which a physical object is
 
composed. All materials in the universe have
 
the same inner nature, that is, they are com­
posed of atoms, arranged in different (and
 
often complex) ways; the specific atoms and
 
the specific arrangements identify the
 
various materials. (See atom and element.)
 
The most serious reactor accident that can
 
reasonably be imagined from any adverse com­
bination of equipment malfunction, operating
 
errors, and other forseeable causes. The
 
term is used to analyze the safety character­
istics of a reactor. Reactors are designed
 
to be safe even if a maximum credible acci­
dent should occur.
 
The amount of radioactive material in air,
 
water, or food which might be expected to
 
result in a maximum permissible dose to per­
sons consuming them at a standard rate of
 
intake. (See radiation protection guide,
 
radioactivity.)
 
That dose of ionizing radiation established
 
by competent authorities as an amount below
 
which there is no reasonable expectation of
 
risk to human health, and which at the same
 
time is somewhat below the lowest level at
 
which a definite hazard is believed to exist.
 
An obsolescent term. (See radiation pro­
tection guide.)
 
A 'prefix'that multiples a basic unit by
 
one million.
 
The energy of a nuclear explosion which is
 
equivalent to that of an explosion of one
 
million tons (or 1000 kilotons) of TNT. (See
 
TNT eouivalent, yield.)
 
A unit used for expressing the burnup of fuel
 
in a reactor; specifically, the number of
 
megawatt-days of heat output per metric ton
 
of fuel in the reactor. (See burnun.)
 
One million electron volts.
 
Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant: a General Electric
 
Reprocessing Plait located at Morris, Ill.
 
that was built but not operated.
 
A prefix that divides a basic unit by
 
one million.
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(See Pico)
 
The ore and other material introduced into the
 
milling process.
 
A prefix that divides a basic unit by
 
one thousand.
 
A material, such as ordinary water,-heavy
 
water or graphite, used in a reactor to slow,
 
down high-velocity neutrons, thus increasin
 
the likelihood of further fission. (Compare
 
reflector; see absorber, thermal neutrons.)
 
A group of atoms held together by chemical
 
forces. The atoms in the molecule may be
 
identical, as in H2 , S2, and S8, or different,
 
as in H20, and C02. A molecule is the smal­
lest unit of matter which can exist by.itself
 
and retain all of its chemical properties.
 
(Compare atom, ion.)
 
A fused-salt reactor.
 
Mixed oxide reactor fuel (containing both
 
plutonium and uranium.)
 
Maximum Permissible Concentration in air. See
 
Maximum Permissible Concentration
 
laximum P.ermissible Concentration in water. See
 
Maximum Permissible Concentration.
 
Metric tons.
 
Metric Ton of Uranium fuel.
 
(Symbol K) The ratio of the number of neutrons
 
present in a reactor in any one neutron generation
 
to that in the immediately preceding generation.
 
Criticality is achieved when this ratio is
 
equal to one. The "infinite" multiplication
 
factor is the ratio in a theoretical system
 
from which there is no leakage, that is, a
 
reactor of infinite size; for an actual reactor
 
(from which leakage does occur), the terms
 
effective multiplication factor, which is
 
the ratio based on neutrons available after
 
leakage, is commonly used. (See generation
 
time, leakage, neutron, neutron, reactivity.)
 
A permanent change in the characteristics
 
of an offspring from those of its parents.
 
(Compare radiomutation.)
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Nano 

Natural Circulation 

Reactor 

Natural Radiation 

Natural Uranium 

Neptunium Series 

(sequence) 

Neutralized Waste 

Neutron 

Neutron Economy 

Non-high Level 

Waste
 
Normal Uranium 

NFS 

A prefix that divides a basic unit by one
 
billion (109)
 
A reactor in which the coolant (usually water)
 
is made to circulate without pumping, that is,
 
by natural convection resulting from the dif­
ferent densities of its cold and reactor­
heated portions.
 
background radiation
 
Uranium as found in nature, containing 0.7%
 
of 2 35U, 99.3% of 238U, and a trace of 234U.
 
It is also called normal uranium. (See
 
uranium.)
 
The series of nuclides resulting from the
 
radioactive decay of the man-made nuclide,
 
neptunium-237. Many other man-made nuclides
 
decay into this sequence. The end-product of
 
the series is stable bismuth-209, which is
 
the only nuclide in the series that occurs in
 
nature. (See decay, radioactive.)
 
Liquid nuclear waste which was originally a
 
nitric acid solution has been treated subse­
quently by Sodium Hydrozide so as to suppress
 
its corrosiveness to the container wall.
 
An uncharged elementary particle, with a mass 
slightly greater than that of the proton, and
 
found in the nucleus of every atom heavier
 
than hydrogen. A free neutron is unstable
 
and decays with a half-life of about 13 min­
utes into an electron, proton, and neutrino.
 
Neutrons sustain the fission chain reaction
 
in a nuclear reactor. (See fast neutron,
 
intermediate neutron, and thermal neutron.)
 
The degree to which neutrons in a reactor are used
 
for desired ends instead of being lost by leakage
 
or nonproductive absorption. The ends may include
 
propagation of the chain reaction, converting
 
fertile to fissionable material, producing isotopes,
 
or research. (See leakage, reactivity.)
 
Intermediate- or low-level waste.
 
natural uranium 
Nuclear Fuel Services. A reprocessing plant
 
located at West Valley, N.Y. that operated
 
from 1966 to 1972.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission; a federal
 
agency, successor to regulatory functions of
 
the Atomic Energy Commission.
 
The energy liberated by a nuclear reaction
 
(fission or fusion) or by radioactive decay.
 
(See decay, radioactive; fission; fusion;
 
nuclear explosive; nuclear reactor.)
 
(See fission.)
 
(See fusion.)
 
Any device, machine, or assembly that con­
verts nuclear energy into some form of useful
 
power, such as mechanical or electrical power.
 
In a nuclear electric power plant, heat -. 
produced by a reactor is generally used to­
make steam to drive a turbine that in turn 
drives an electric generator. 
A reaction involving a change in an atomic
 
nucleus, such as fission, fusion, neutron
 
capture, or radioactive decay, as
 
distinct from a chemical reaction, which is
 
limited to changes in the electron structure
 
surrounding the nucleus.
 
A device in which a fission chain reaction
 
can be initiated, maintained, and controlled.
 
Its essential component is a core with fis­
sionable fuel. It usually has a moderator, a
 
reflector, shielding, coolant, and control
 
mechanisms. Sometimes called an atomic
 
"furnace," it is the basic machine of nuclear
 
energy. (See fission.)
 
Superheating the steam produced in a reactor
 
by using additional heat from a reactor. Two
 
methods are commonly employed;: recirculating
 
the steam through the same core in which it
 
is first produced (integral superheating)
 
or passing the steam through a second and
 
separate reactor. (See superheating.)
 
Plural of nucleus.
 
A constituent of an atomic nucleus, that is, a
 
proton or a neutron.
 
The positively charged center of an atom.
 
A general term applicable to all 4tomic forms of
 
the elements. The term is often erroneously
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used as a synonym for "isotope," which properly
 
has a more limited definition. Whereas isotopes
 
are the various forms 'of a single element (hence
 
are a family of nuclides) and all have the same
 
atomic num ber an(number of protons), nuclides
 
comprise all the isotopic forms of all the
 
elements. Nuclides are distinguished by their
 
atomic-number, atomic mass, and energy state.
 
Volatile substances released during operation of
 
fuel cycle from system components such as milling,
 
reactor, and reprocessing plants. Off gases may be
 
subsequently scrubbed and filtered before release,
 
A reactor system in which the coolant passes
 
the reactor core only once and is then dis­
carded. (Compare closed-cycle reactor
 
system.)
 
Broad classification of waste management
 
activities in terms of their basic function
 
(e.g., waste storage, treatment, transporta­
tion or disposal.)
 
Uranium trioxide.
 
The region occupied by an electron as it moves
 
about the nucleus of an atom.
 
A reactor that uses organic chemicals, such as
 
mixtures of polyphenyls (diphenyls and
 
terphenyls) as coolant.
 
Secondary (or additional) external contain­
ment for packaged nuclear waste.
 
The transient pressure over and above
 
atmospheric pressure caused by a shock wave
 
from a nuclear explosion.
 
Any absorption (as in a reactor) of neutrons in
 
reactions which do not cause further fission
 
or the production of new fissionable material.
 
In a reactor the process is undesirable.
 
(See absorption, capture, neutron economy.)
 
A radionuclide that upon radioactive decay
 
or disintegrationyields a specific nuclide
 
(the daughter),, either directly or as a
 
later member of a radioactive series. (See
 
daughter, radioactive series.)
 
The separation of uranium and plutonium from
 
the spent fuel .solution through the solvent
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extraction process. This pertains to repro­
cessing (Cf. LWR Fuel Cycle).
 
The process of separating liquid waste into
 
two or more fractions. In this report,
 
partitioning is used specifically with ref­
erence to the removal of certain radioiso­
topes from the waste in order to facilitate
 
subsequent waste storage and disposal.
 
"Isotope mining" is used to describe the
 
fractionation of waste when radioisotopes are
 
extracted and used in other applications.
 
A reactor in which the fissionable fuel (and
 
sometimes also the moderator-) is in the form'
 
of packed or randomly placed pellets, which
 
are cooled by gas or liquid.
 
The time required for one cycle of a regularly
 
repeated series of events. In a nuclear reactor, it
 
is the time required for the power level to change
 
by the factor 2.718, which is known as e (the base
 
of natural logarithms). (See Periodic Table.)
 
The carrier of a quantum of electromagnetic energy.
 
Photons have an effective momentum but no mass
 
or electrical charge. (See radiation, Quantum.)
 
A prefix that divides a basic unit by one
 
trillion (1012). Same- as micromicro.
 
Old term for nuclear reactor. This name was
 
used because the first reactor was built by
 
piling up graphite blocks and natural uranibm:
 
[Symbol Pul A heavy, radioactive, metallic
 
element with atomic number 94. Its most impor­
tant isotope is fissionable plutonium-239,
 
produced by neutron irradiation of uranium­
238. It is used for reactor fuel and in weapons.
 
Any material of high absorption cross section
 
that absorbs neutrons unproductively and
 
hence removes them from the fission chain
 
reaction in a reactor, decreasing its
 
reactivity. (Compare burnable poison.)
 
A reactor in which the fuel elements are
 
suspended in a pool of water that serves as
 
the reflector, moderator, and coolant.
 
Popularly called a swimming pool reactor, it
 
is usually used for research and training.
 
(Compare tank reactor.)
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Power Density 

Power Reactor 

Pressure-tube Reactor 

Pressure Vessel 

Pressurized Water 

Reactor (PWR) 

Primary Wastes 

Process Heat Reactor 

Production Reactor 

Prompt Criticality 

Prompt Neutron 

Provisional Storage 

The rate of heat generated per unit volume of
 
a reactor'core. (See specific Dower.)
 
A reactor designed to produce useful nuclear
 
power is distinguished from reactors used
 
primarily for research or for producing
 
radiation or fissionable materials. (Compare.
 
production reactor, research reactor.)
 
A reactor in which the fuel elements are
 
located inside tubes containing coolant
 
circulating at high pressure. The tube
 
assembly is surrounded by a tank containing
 
the moderator at low pressure.
 
A strong-walled container housing the core of
 
most types of power reactors; it usually also
 
contains moderator, reflector, thermal
 
shield, and control rods. (Compare
 
,containment vessel.)
 
A power reactor in which heat is transferred
 
from the core to a heat exchanger by water
 
kept under high pressure to achieve high
 
temperature without boiling in the primary
 
system. Steam is generated in a secondary
 
circuit. Many reactors producing electric
 
power are pressurized water reactors.
 
As-generated forms and quantities of wastes.
 
A reactor that produces heat for use in
 
manufacturing processes.
 
A reactor designed primarily for large-scale
 
production of plutonium-239 by neutron
 
irradi&tion of uranium-238. Also a reactor
 
used primarily for the production of radio­
active isotopes. (Compare power reactor,
 
research reactor.)
 
The state of a reactor when the fission chain
 
reaction is sustained solely by prompt neutrons,
 
that is, without the help of delayed neutrons.
 
(See criticality.)
 
Neutrons that are emitted immediately following
 
nuclear fissions, as distinct from delayed
 
neutrons, which are emitted for some time
 
after fission has occurred. Prompt neutrons
 
comprise more than 99% of fission neutrons.
 
Storage in a planned disposal medium while
 
disposal feasibility is assessed.
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Pulsed Reactor 	 A type of research reactor with which
 
repeated short, intense surges of power and
 
radiation can be produced. The neutron flux
 
during each surge is much higher than cobuld be
 
tolerated during a steady-state operation.
 
Purex 	 Abbreviation for plutonium-uranium extraction.
 
Purex Process 	 An aqueous reprocessing method which consists
 
of the following steps: (1) Solvent extrace
 
tion which effects the fission products and
 
partition of uranium and plutonium, (2) purifi­
cation of uranium and plutonium, (3) conversion
 
of uranium to UF6 and plutonium to PuO2-

Purex Redox 	 Redox is the abbreviation for reduction and
 
oxidation. This implies that it is a Purex
 
process which involves both the reduction and
 
oxidation steps in the solvent extraction.
 
PWR 	 tressurized Water Reactor.
 
Quad 	 A unit equal to 1015 Btu.
 
Quantum 	 Unit quantity of energy according to the
 
quantum theory. It is equal to the product of
 
the frequency of radiation of the energy in
 
sec -1 and 6.6256 x 1027 erg-see. The photon
 
carries a quantum of electromagnetic energy.
 
(See electromagnetic radiation, radiation.)
 
Quality Factor 	 The factor by which absorbed dose is to be
 
multiplied to obtain a quantity that
 
expresses on a common scale, for all ionizing
 
radiations, the irradiation incurred by
 
exposed persons. (See dose equivalent,
 
distribution factor.
 
Rad 	 (Acronym for radiation absorbed dose). The
 
basic unit of absorbed dose of ionizing
 
radiation. A dose of one rad means the
 
absorption of 100 ergs of radiation energy
 
per gram of absorbing material. (Compare
 
rem, roentgen; see absorbed dose.)
 
Radiation 	 The emission and propagation of energy through
 
matter or space by means of electromagnetic
 
disturbances which display both wave-like
 
and particle-like behavior; in this context
 
the "particles" are known as photons. Also,
 
the energy so propagated. The term has.been
 
extended to include streams of fast-moving
 
particles (alpha and beta particles, free
 
neutrons, cosmic radiation, etc.). Nuclear
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radiation is that emitted from atomic nuclei
 
in various nuclear reactions, including
 
alpha, beta and gamma radiation and neutrons.
 
(See electromagnetic radiation, ionizing
 
radiation, quantu
 
Accidents resulting in the spread of
 
radioactive material or in the exposure of
 
individuals to radiation.
 
Any accessible area in which the level of
 
radiation is such that a major portion of an'
 
individual's body could receive in any one
 
hour a dose in excess of 5 millirem, or in
 
any 5 consecutive days a dose in excess of
 
150 millirem. (See absorbed dose, rem.)
 
(See radiobiologv.)
 
Radiation damage to the skin. Beta burns
 
result from skin contact with or exposure to
 
emitters of beta particles. Flash burns ­
result from sudden thermal radiation. (See
 
beta particles, flash burn, ionizing
 
radiation,, thermal burn.)
 
The branch of chemistry that is concerned
 
with the chemical effects, including
 
decomposition, of energetic radiation or
 
particles on matter. (Compare radiochemistry.)
 
A general term for the harmful effects of
 
radiation on matter.
 
An acute organic disorder that follows
 
exposure to relatively severe doses of
 
ionizing radiation. It is characterized by
 
nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, blood cell
 
changes, and in later stages by hemorrhage
 
and loss of hair. (See ionizing radiation.)
 
Continuous or periodic determination of the
 
amount of radiation present in a given area.
 
(See monitor.)
 
Legislation and regulations to protect the
 
public and laboratory or industrial workers
 
against radiation. Also measures to reduce
 
exposure to radiation. (See radiation
 
standards.)
 
A radioactive metallic element with atomic
 
number 88. As found in nature, the most
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common isotope has an atomic weight of 226.
 
It occurs in minute quantities associated
 
with uranium in pitchblende, carnotite and
 
other minerals; the uranium decays to radium
 
in a series of alpha and beta emissions. By
 
virtue of being an alpha- and gamma-emitter,
 
radium is used as a source of luminescence
 
and as a radiation source in medicine and
 
radiography.
 
A radioactive element, one of the heaviest
 
gases known. Its atomic number is 86, and its
 
atomic weight is 222. It is a daughter of
 
radium in the uranium radioactive series.
 
A group of 15 chemically similar metallic
 
elements, including Elements 57 through 71
 
on the Periodic Table of the Elements, also
 
known as the Lanthanide Series. (See
 
lanthanide series.)
 
A measure of the departure of a nuclear
 
reactor from criticality. It is about equal
 
to the effective multiplication factor minus
 
one and is thus precisely zero at criticality.
 
If there is excess reactivity (positive
 
reactivity), the reactor is superoritical
 
and its power will rise. Negative reactivity
 
(suberiticality) will result in a decreasing
 
power level. (See criticality, dollar,
 
excess reactivity, multiplication factor,
 
subcritical assembly, supercritical reactor.)
 
(See nuclear reactor.)
 
The reuse of fissionable material, after it
 
has been recovered by chemical processing
 
from spent or depleted reactor fuel,
 
reenriched, and then refabricated into new
 
fuel elements. (See fuel cycle, fuel
 
reprocessing, spent fuel.)
 
A layer of material immediately surrounding a
 
reactor core which scatters back or reflects into
 
the core many neutrons that would otherwise escape.
 
The returned neutrons can then cause more fissions
 
and improve the neutron economy of the reactor.
 
Common reflector materials are graphite, beryllium,
 
and natural uranium. (Compare moderator.)
 
A factor used to compare the biological
 
effectiveness of different types of ionizing
 
radiation. It is the inverse ratio of the
 
amount of absorbed radiation, required to
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produce a given effect, to a standard ,(or
 
reference) radiation required to produce the
 
same effect. (See absorbed dose, distribution
 
factoroualitv factor, tad, rem.)
 
Activity is a measure of the rate at which a
 
material is emitting nuclear radiations, and
 
is usually given' in terms of the number of
 
nuclear disintegrations occurring in a given
 
quantity of material over a unit of time. 'The
 
standard unit of activity is the curie (Ci),
 
which is equal to 3.7 x 1010 disintegrations
 
per second. The words "activity" and
 
"radioactivity" are often used interchangeably.
 
The concentration of radioactive material in
 
an environment which would result in doses
 
equal, over a period of time, to those in the
 
Radiation Protection Guide. This Federal
 
Radiation Council term replaces the former
 
maximum permissible concentration.
 
The body of knowledge and the study of the
 
principles, mechanisms, and effects of
 
ionizing radiation on living matter.
 
The body of knowledge and the study of the
 
chemical properties and reactions of
 
radioactive materials.
 
The body of knowledge and the study of the
 
effects of radiation on species of plants
 
and animals in natural communities.
 
Of radioactive origin; produced by radioactive
 
transformation. (See decay, radioactive;
 
transmutatibn')
 
A radioactive isotope. An unstable isotope of an
 
element that decays or disintegrates spontaneously,
 
emitting radiation. More than 1300 natural and
 
artificial radioisotopes have been identified.
 
(See decay, radioactive; isotope.)
 
The dissociation (or decomposition) of molecules
 
by radiation. Example: A small proportion of
 
water in a reactor core dissociates into hydrogen
 
and oxygen during operation of the reactor.
 
A permanent transmissible change in form,
 
quality, or other characteristic of a cell or
 
offspring from the characteristics of its
 
parent, due to radiation exposure. (See
 
genetic effects of radiation, mutation.)
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Radionuclide 

Radiation Shielding 

Radiation Standards 

Radio 

Radioactivation 

Radioactive 

Radioactive Chain 

Radioactive 

Contamination 

Radioactive Decay 

Radioactive Half-Life 

Radioactive Isotope 

Radioactive Series 

A radioactive nuclide.
 
Reduction of radiation by interposing a shield
 
of absorbing material between any radioactive
 
source and a person, laboratory area, or.
 
radiation-sensitive device. (See absorber,
 
shield.)
 
Exposure standards, permissible concentra­
tions, rules for safe handling, regulations
 
for transportation, regulations for industrial
 
control of radiation, and control of radia­
tion exposure by legislative means. (See
 
radiation protection.)
 
A prefix denoting radioactivity or a
 
relationship to it, or a relationship to
 
radiation.
 
Activation.
 
Exhibiting radioactivity or pertaining to
 
radioactivity.
 
A radioactive series.
 
Deposition of radioactive material in any
 
place where it may harm persons, spoil
 
experiments, or make products or equipment
 
unsuitable or unsafe for some specific use.
 
The presence of unwanted radioactive matter;
 
Also radioactive material found on the walls
 
of vessels in used-fuel processing plants, or
 
radioactive material that has leaked into a
 
reactor coolant. Often referred to only
 
as contamination. (Compare background
 
radiation; see decontamination.)
 
Disintegration of the nucleus of an unstable
 
nuclide by spontaneous emission of charged
 
particles and/or photons.
 
(See half-life.)
 
A radioisotope.
 
A succession of nuclides, each of which
 
transforms by radioactive disintegration into
 
the next until a stable nuclide results. The
 
first member is called the parent, the "
 
intermediate members are called daughters,
 
and the final stable member is called the
 
end product. (See decay, radioactive.)
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Radioactive Waste 

Rem 

Repository 

Reprocessing 

Research Reactor 

Retrievability 

Rod 

Roentgen 

RSSF 

Safe Guards 

(See waste, radioactive.)
 
(Acronym forroentgen gquivalent man.) The
 
unit of dose of any ionizing radiation
 
which produces the same biological effect as
 
a unit of absorbed dose of ordinary X rays.
 
The RBg dose (in rems) = RHE x absorbed dose
 
(in rads). (Compare curie, roentgen.)
 
A location containing wastes in storage or
 
disposal.
 
Fuel reprocessing.
 
A reactor primarily designed to supply
 
neutrons or other ionizing radiation for
 
experimental purposes. It may also be used
 
for training, materials testing, and
 
production of radioisotopes. (Compare
 
experimental reactor, power reactor,
 
production reactor, test reactor.)
 
Capability to remove waste from its place in
 
final storage. The method and rate of removal
 
and the subsequent location of the waste must
 
satisfy retrievability criteria.
 
A relatively long, slender body of material
 
used in or in conjunction with a nuclear
 
reactor. It may contain fuel, absorber, or
 
material in which activation or transmutation
 
is desired. (See control rod.)
 
(Abbreviation r). A unit of exposure to ion­
izing radiation. It is that amount of gamma
 
or x rays required to produce ions carrying 1
 
electrostatic unit of electrical charge
 
(either positive or negative) in 1 cubic
 
centimeter of dry air under standard condi­
tions. Named after Wilhelm Roentgen, German
 
scientist who discovered X rays in 1895.
 
Retrievable Surface Storage Facility. A faci­
lity or system for interim storage of high
 
level waste. Allows placement of packaged
 
waste in controlled area mausoleums for even­
tual retrieval for reprocessing or for
 
retrieval for permanent disposal.
 
Precautionary regulations or measures -to ward
 
off possible nuclear theft, sabotage and
 
terrorist activities.
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Salt Cake 

Scram 

Secondary Wastes 

Seed (and Blanket) 

Core 

Sherwood 

Short-lived Nuclides 

Single-cycle Reactor 

System
 
Slow Neutron 

Sludge 

SNM 

Sodium-graphite Reactor 

Solidification 

The solid residue resulting from a concentra­
tion of high-level waste in underground waste
 
storage tanks.
 
The sudden shutdown of a nuclear reactor,
 
usually by rapid insertion of the safet rods.
 
Emergencies or deviations from normal reactor
 
operation cause the reactor operator or auto­
matic control equipment to scram the reactor.
 
Forms and quantities of all wastes that result
 
from applying waste treatment technologies to
 
primary wastes.
 
A reactor core which includes a relatively
 
small volume of highly enriched uranium (the
 
seed) surrounded by a much larger volume of
 
natural uranium or thorium (the blanket). As a
 
result of fissions in the seed, neutrons are
 
supplied to the blanket where more fission takes
 
place. In this way, the blanket is made to
 
furnish a substantial fraction of the total
 
power of the reactor. Also called a spiked core.
 
The Atomic Energy Commission program for research
 
in controlled thermonuclear reactions.
 
Radioactive isotopes with half-lives no greater
 
than about 30 years, e.g., 137Cs and 90Sr.
 
A direct-cycle reactor system.
 
A thermal neutron.
 
A wet solid settling out from a pump sump, e.g.,
 
the solid waste which comes from liquid effluents
 
from process clean up operations, generated during
 
enrichment process. The sludge thus collected con­
tains soil runoff from ground water, small quanti­
ties of precipitated metals, various suspended
 
solids, and a detectable amount of radioactivity.
 
-SpecialRuclear Material. -- In atomic energy'law,
 
this term refers to plutonium-239, uranium-233,
 
uranium containing more than the natural abundance
 
of uranium-235, or any material artificially

enriched in any of these substances.
 
A reactor that uses liquid sodium as coolant
 
and graphite as moderator.
 
Conversion of radioactive waste to a dry,
 
stable solid.
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Solvent Extract 

Somatic Effects of 

Radiation 

Source Material 

SNAP 

Soxhlet Test 

Special Nuclear 

Material (SNM)
 
Specific Power 

The extracted metal salt (uranium) from the
 
ore concentrates, through the selective trans­
fer of the desired metal (Uranium) salt from
 
the aqueous liquor into an immiscible (two
 
liquids that do not mix and form more than one
 
phase when brought together) organic solvent
 
(tributyl-phosphate in hexane) after initial
 
stirring followed by phase separation. This
 
is also used in the partition process.
 
Effects of radiation limited to the exposed
 
individual, as distinguished from genetic
 
effects (which also affect subsequent, unex­
posed generations). Large radiation doses can
 
be fatal. Smaller doses may make the indi­
vidual noticeably ill, may merely produce
 
temporary changes in blood-cell levels detect­
able only in the laboratory, or may produce no
 
detectable effects whatever. Also called phys­
iological effects of radiation. (Compare gene­
tic effects of radiation; see radiation
 
illness.
 
In atomic energy law any material, except
 
special nuclear material, which contains
 
0.05% or more of uranium, thorium, or any
 
combination of the two. (See licensed mate­
rial, special nuclear material.)
 
(Acronym for Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary
 
Power.) An Atomic Energy Commission program
 
to develop small auxiliary nuclear power
 
sources for specialized space, land, and sea
 
uses. Two approaches are deployed: the first
 
uses heat from radioisotope decay to produce
 
electricity directly by thermoelectric or
 
thermionic methods; the second uses heat from
 
small reactors to produce electricity by ther­
moelectric or thermionic methods or by turning
 
a small turbine and electric generator.
 
A test which pertains to the continuous
 
extraction of a solid substance with a solvent,
 
consisting of a distillation flask, a reflex
 
chamber, and a cylindrical vessel fitted between
 
them,-to which a siphon system is attached.
 
See SNM
 
The power generated, in a nuclear reactor per
 
unit mass of fuel. It is expressed in kilo­
watts of heat per kilogram of fuel. (See
 
tower density.)
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Nuclear reactor fuel that has been irradiated
 
(used) to the extent that it can no longer
 
effectively sustain a chain reaction. (Com­
pare depleteduranium; see burnup.)
 
Reactor fuel elements which must be replaced
 
due to a. Swelling or bursting, b. Burn-up
 
or depletion, c. Poisoning by fission frag­
ments. The fissile material is not neces­
sarily exhausted and the so-called spent fuel
 
rods could be reprocessed subsequently.
 
The accidental release of radioactive material.
 
Fission that occurs without an external stim­
ulus. Several heavy isotopes decay mainly in
 
this manner; examples: californium-252 and
 
californium-254. The process occurs occasion­
ally in all fissionable materials, including
 
uranium-235.
 
A technique to convert high-level liquid radio­
active waste (HLLW) generated in the reprocessing
 
of spent power reactor fuel to a dry-solid.
 
The HLLW is pumped to an internal mixing
 
pneumatic atomizing nozzle in the top of the
 
heated (wall temperature 7000C) Spray,Calciner
 
barrel. The atomized droplets are flash dried
 
and calcined as they fall through the hot barrel.
 
Sealed Storage CacheConcept. A concept
 
developed as an option for RSSF and SURFF.
 
Suggested in WASH 1539.
 
Incapable of spontaneous change. Not radioactive.
 
An isotope that does not undergo radioactive
 
decay. (Compare radioisotope.)
 
Temporary placement of wastes, usually in a
 
pool or other structure, that will allow cool­
ing and radioactive decay in safety pending
 
shipment to a reprocessing plant or repository.
 
Chemical corrosion, such as reactor pressure
 
vessels, that is accelerated by stress con­
centrations, either built into or resulting
 
from a load.
 
A reactor consisting of a mass of fissionable
 
material and moderator whose effective multi­
plication factor is less than one and that
 
hence cannot sustain a chain reaction. (See
 
criticality, multiplication factor, reactivity.)
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Subcritical Mass 

Supercritical Mass 

Supercritical Reactor 

Superheating 

Surface Contamination 

SURFF 

TAD 

Tails 

Tank Reactor 

Target 

TBP 

Technologies 

An amount of fissionable material insufficient
 
in quantity or of proper geometry to!sustain a
 
fission chain reaction. (See critical mass,
 
criticality;)
 
A mass of fuel whose effective multiplication
 
factor is greater than one. '(See critical
 
mass, multiplication factor.)
 
A reactor in which the effective multiplica­
tion factor is greater than one; consequently
 
a reactor that is increasing its power level.
 
If uncontrolled, a supercritical reactor would
 
undergo an excursion. (See criticality,
 
excursion, multiplication factor.)
 
The heating of a vapor, particularly saturated
 
(wet) steam, to a temperature much higher than
 
the boiling point at the existing pressure. This
 
is done in power plants to improve efficiency
 
and to reduce condensation in the turbines.
 
The deposition and attachment of radioactive
 
materials to a surface. (See radioactive
 
contamination.)
 
Spent Unreprocessed Fuel Facility. A facility'
 
or system for storage of spent fuel bundles
 
from nuclear reactors. Differs from RSSF in
 
that SURFF emphasizes anti-proliferation
 
features using waste-management technology.
 
Technical Alternative Document; ERDA-76-43.
 
Alternatives for Managing Wastes From Reactors
 
and Post-fission Operations in the LWR Fuel Cycle.
 
(See depleted uranium.)
 
A reactor in which the core is suspended in a
 
closed tank, as distinct from an open pool
 
reactor. These are commonly used as research
 
and test reactors. (Compare pool reactor.)
 
Material subjected to particle bombardment (as
 
in an accelerator) or irradiation (as in a
 
research reactor) in order to induce a nuclear
 
reaction; also a nuclide that has been bom­
barded or irradiated.
 
Tributyl Phosphate
 
The specified methods for implementing con­
cepts. An example is calcination of liquid
 
high-level waste by using a spray calciner.
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Radiation emitted by naturally occurring
 
radionuclides such as potassium-40; the natural'
 
decay chains uranium-238, uranium-235, or
 
thorium-232; or from cosmic-ray induced radio­
nuclides in the soil. %
 
A reactor specially designed to test the behavior
 
of materials and components under the neutron
 
and gamma fluxes and temperature conditions
 
of an operating reactor. (Compare experimental
 
reactor, research reactor.)
 
A breeder reactor in which the fission chain
 
reaction is sustained by thermal neutrons.
 
A neutron in thermal equilibrium with its
 
surrounding medium. Thermal neutrons are those
 
that have been slowed down by a Moderator to an
 
average speed of about 2200 meters per second
 
(at room temperature) from the much higher initial
 
speeds they had when expelled by fission. This
 
velocity is similar to that of gas molecules at
 
ordinary temperatures. (Compare fast neutron,
 
intermediate neutron; see fission.)
 
A reactor in which the fission chain reaction is
 
sustained primarily by thermal neutrons. Most
 
reactors are thermal reactors. (Compare fast
 
reactor, intermediate reactor; see thermal neutron.)
 
A reactor in which the fission chain reaction is
 
sustained primarily by thermal neutrons. Most
 
reactors are thermal reactors. (Compare fast
 
reactor, intermediate reactor; see thermal neutron.)
 
A layer or layers of high density material
 
located within a reactor pressure vessel or
 
between the vessel and the biological shield
 
to reduce radiation heating in the vessel and
 
the biological shield. (See biological
 
shield, shield.)
 
A process for the recovery of Thorium and 233U 
from fission products by the use of tribityl­
phosphate extraction. .­
[Symbol Th] A naturally radioactive element
 
with atomic number 90 and, as found in nature,
 
an atomic weight of approximately 232. The
 
fertile thorium-232 isotope is abundant and
 
can be transmuted to fissionable uranium-233­
by neutron irradiation. (See fertile material,
 
transmutation.)
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Thorium Series 

(sequence) 

Threshold Dose 

TNT Equivalent 

Tonne 

Tracer, Isotopic 

Transmutation 

Transplutonium Element 

Transportation 

The series of nuclides resulting from the
 
radioactive decay of thorium-232. 4Many man­
made nuclides decay into this sequence,. The,
 
end product of this sequence in nature is
 
lead-208. (See decay, radioactive; radio­
active series.)
 
The minimum dose of radiation that will pro­
duce a detectable biological effect. (See
 
absorbed dose, biological dose:.) - -
A measure of the energy released in the detonation
 
of a nuclear explosive expressed in terms of the
 
weight of TNT (the chemical explosive, trinitro­
toluene) which would release the same amount of
 
energy when exploded. It is usually expressed
 
in kilotons or megatons. The TNT'equi~alende
 
relationship is based on the fact that 1 ton of
 
TNT releases one'billion (109) calories of-energy.
 
Metric ton; 1000 kilograms.
 
An isotope of an element, a small amount of
 
which may be incorporated into a sample of
 
material (the carrier) in order to follow (trace)
 
the course of the element through a chemical,
 
biological, or physical process, and thus also
 
follow the larger carrier. The tracer may be
 
radioactive, in which case observations are made
 
by measuring the radioactivity. If the tracer is
 
stable, mass spectrometers, density measurement,
 
or neutron activation analysis may be employed to
 
determine isotopic composition. Tracers are also
 
called labels or tags, and materials are said
 
to be labeled or tagged when radioactive tracers
 
are incorporated in them.
 
Conversion of a radioactive nucleus to another
 
isotope by bombarding it with radiation or
 
nuclear particles.
 
An element above plutonium in the PERIODIC
 
TABLE, that is, one with an atomic number
 
greater than 94. (See transuranic element.)
 
Movement of materials between sites. Intra­
site movement is not considered. Includes
 
alternative methods for packaging, handling,
 
and transport of waste materials and plutonium
 
compounds. Concepts include all conventional
 
methods of land and water transport required
 
by the waste management system.
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An element above uranium in the PERIODIC
 
TABLE, that is, with an atomic number greater
 
than 92. All 11 transuranic elements are pro­
duced artificially and are radioactive. They
 
are neptunium, plutonium, americium, curium,
 
berkelium, californium, einsteinium, fermium,
 
mendelevium, nobelium, and lawrencium.
 
Elements with mass number greater than 92. They
 
include neptunium, plutonium, americium, and curium.
 
Any waste material measured or assumed-to contain
 
more than a specified concentration (e.g., presently
 
proposed as 10 nanocuries of alpha emitters per
 
gram of waste) of transuranic elements.
 
A transuranic element.
 
Operations intended to benefit safety or
 
economy by changing the waste characteristics.
 
Four basic treatment concepts are defined:
 
* Volume reduction
 
* Immobilization of radioactivity
 
* Change of composition
 
* Removal of radioactivity from the waste
 
A radioactive isotope of hydrogen with two neu­
trons and one proton in the nucleus. It is"
 
man-made and is heav-ier than deuterium (heavy
 
hydrogen). Tritium is used in industrial thick­
ness gauges, and as a label in experiments in
 
chemistry and biology. Its nucleus is a triton.
 
(Compare deuterium; see hydrogen.)
 
Transuranic.
 
A radioactive element with the atomic number
 
92 and, as found in natural ores, an average.
 
atomic weight of approximately 238. The two
 
principal natural isotopes are uranium-235
 
(0.7% of natural uranium), which is fission­
able, and uranium-238 (99.3% of natural ura­
nium) which is fertile. Natural uranium also
 
includes a minute amount of uranium-234.
 
Uranium is the basic raw material of nuclear.
 
energy, (See fertile material, fissionable.
 
material, natural uranium.)
 
Uranium-235.
 
(See isotopic enrichment.)
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Uranium Hexafluoride 
Uranium Series 

(sequence) 

Uranium Tetrafluoride 

Uralium Trioxide 

Vitrification 

Waste, radioactive 

Water-boiler 

Wet Criticality-

WSEP 

Wt% 

Yield 

"A Volatile confpound of uranium and fluorine. 
1UF6 gas is the process fluid in the gaseous
 
diffusion process." (See isotope separation.)
 
The series of nuclides resulting from the radio­
/ 	 active decay of uranium-238, also known as the 
uranium-radium series. The end product of the 
series is lead-206. Many man-made nuclides decay 
into this sequence. (See decay, radioactive.) 
A solid green compound qalledgreen salt. -An
 
intermediate product in the production of uranium
 
hexafluoride. (See uranium hexafIuoride.)
 
An.intermediate product in the refining of
 
uranium, also called orange oxide.
 
The formation of glossy or non-crystalline
 
material out of nuclear wastes, when subjected
 
to temperatures between 950 0 C and 11500 C.
 
This technique is used for the near-term
 
immobilization of reactor wastes.
 
Equipment and materials (from nuclear opera­
tions) which are radioactive and for which
 
there is no further use. Wastes are generally
 
classified as high-level (having radioactivity
 
concentration of hundreds to thousands of
 
curies per gallon or cubic foot), low-level
 
(in the range of 1 microcurie per gallon or
 
cubic foot), or intermediate (between these
 
extremes). (Compare fission products.)
 
A 	research, reactor whose core consists of a
 
small metal tank filled with uranium fuel in
 
an aqueous solution. Heat is removed by a
 
cooling coil in the core. Not to be confused
 
with boiling water reactor.
 
Reactor criticality achieved with the coolant
 
present. (Compare dry criticality.)
 
Abbreviation for waste solidification evalua­
tion program, which includes calcination.
 
Weight percent.
 
The total energy released in a nuclear explo­
sion. It is usually expressed in equivalent
 
tons of TNT (the quantity of TNT required to
 
produce a corresponding amount of energy).
 
Low yield is generally considered to be less
 
than 20 kilotons; low 'ntermediate yield from
 
20 to 200 kilotons; intermediate yield from
 
.,B-43 
77-69
 
200 kilotons to 1 megaton. There is no stan­
dardized term to cover yields from 1 megaton
 
upward. (Compare fission yield, see TNT
 
equivalent.)
 
Z The symbol for atomic number.
 
Multiples 
and 
Submultiples Prefixes Symbols 
1018 exa E 
1015 peta P, 
1012 tera T 
109 giga G 
106 mega M 
1o3 kilo k 
102 heoto h, 
101 deka da 
10-1 deci d 
10-2 centi a 
10-3 milli m 
10-6 micro 
10-9 nano n 
10-12 picO p 
10-15 femto f 
10-18 atto a 
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APPENDIX C
 
SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL REVIEW COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT
 
In order to ensure that this report meets high standards'of
 
quality and objectivity, it has been reviewed internally and externally.
 
The internal review was performed by both the Caltech/JPL Nucleat Waste
 
Management Review Board and appropriate members of JPL management.
 
Following this internal review the report was modified to incorporate
 
many of the improvements that were suggested by the internal reviewers.
 
It should be noted that during this process, the authors were at complete
 
liberty to either include or reject suggestions as they saw fit.
 
A final draft of the report was then submitted to external
 
review by a sampling of persons or organizations who were judged by the
 
authors to have significant insight into the current state of high level
 
nuclear waste management. A list of the persons and organizations is
 
presented in Table C-I. A conscious attempt was made to choose knowl­
edgeable external reviewers who represent a broad variety of viewpoints
 
including those of environmentalists, utilities, and pertinent state
 
and federal officials. We have received review comments from the Depart­
ment of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental
 
Protection Agency, the California-Energy Resources Conservation and
 
Commission, and the Swedish Embassy. In general the comments of the
 
reviewers are presented following this introduction. In the case of
 
the comments from the California Energy Resources Conservation and
 
Development Commission's Nuclear Assessments Office, only the summary
 
comments (5 pages) are included since they chose to make extensive
 
comments in the margin of the text. These comments are on file at JPL
 
for interested parties.
 
Following this external review, the report was modified to
 
incorporate many of the suggested improvements. Once again, it should
 
be noted that during this final revision the authors were free to
 
incorporate or reject comments according to their own judgment. Hence,
 
the responsibility for the contents of this report is solely that of
 
the authors. The authors are grateful to all of these reviewers for
 
making helpful comments and criticisms which contributed to improving
 
this report.
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Table C-i. External Reviewers of This Report
 
NAME ORGANIZATION 
Mr. Phil Compton NASA Headquarters 
Dr. Joel Snow Office of Science and Technology Policy 
Mr. Chuck Guttman Marshall Space Flight Center 
Dr. William Bishop Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Dr. William Rowe Environmental Protection Agency 
Dr. Hannes Alfven Scripps Institution of Oceanography 
Mr. Amory Lovins Friends of the Earth, Ltd 
Mr. James Helt Dept. of Water & Power r(.Ay 
Dr. James Teem* Association of Universities for Research 
in Astronomy, Inc. (AURA) 
Dr. John Holdren University of California, Berkeley 
Dr. Gerald Brubaker Council on Environmental Quality 
Dr. Lars Helander Swedish Embassy 
Dr. Fredrick Weinhold Energy Office, Executive Office of 
the President 
Dr. John Ahearne Energy Office, Executive Office of 
the President 
Dr. Terry Lash Natural Resources Defense Council 
Dr. Carl Kuhlman Energy Research and Development 
Administration 
Dr. Alex Perge Energy Research and Development 
Administration 
Dr. Pasternak California Energy Resources Conservation 
and Development Commission 
Mr. Varanini California Energy Resources Conservation 
-and Development Commission 
Dr. Doctor California Energy Resources Conservation 
and Development Commission 
M . Moretti California Energy Resources Conservation 
and Development Commission 
Mr. Maullin California Energy Resources Conservation 
and Development Commission 
Mr. Golliher California Energy Resources Conservation 
Nuclear Assessment Office Staff and Development Commission
 
Dr. Joseph Coates Office of Technology Assessment
 
Mr. Maurice Axelrad Lowenstein, Newman, Reis and Axelrad,
 
'Dr. Joe Lieberman Nuclear Safety Association
 
hr. Bryant Brooks Tennessee Valley Authority
 
Mr. Jim Muckerheid Energy Research Group
 
Mr. Alan Hansen Yankee Atomic
 
Mr. Ralph Postian Duke Power
 
Mr. Harvey Bristol Department of Energy, ERDA, San Francisco
 
Dr. Lou Bernath San Diego Gas & Electric
 
Mr. Gene Cramer Southern California Edison
 
Mr. Owen Davis Pacific Gas & E1ectric
 
Mr. Roger Powers SMUD
 
Mr. Dan Brosnan Los Angeles Department of Water & Power
 
* Member of Nuclear Waste Management Review Board while at Caltech 
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Department of Energy OCT , 
Washington, D.C. 20545 
Dr. Thomas D. English
 
Project Manager
 
Nuclear Waste Management
 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
 
California Institute of Technology
 
4800 Oak Grove Drive
 
Pasadena, CA 91103
 
Dear Dr. English:
 
Thank you for the opportunity to conment on your September 16, 1977
 
draft of "An Analysis of the Technical Status of High-Level Radio­
active Waste and Spent Fuel Management Systems." My compliments to
 
you and your associates on a thorough, well-organized treatment of
 
a complex subject.
 
Inmy opinion, the description of technology and technical programs
 
is comprehensive and presented in a balanced professional manner.
 
The conclusions with respect to feasibility and achievability I agree
 
with in general, However, I tend to take exception to the conclusion
 
that scientific feasibility of deep geologic isolation in bedded salt
 
is not proven. Viewed from the perspective of man's knowledge of the
 
rates and mechanisms associated with significant geological changes, we
 
can certainly say with confidence that a site can be found in a bedded
 
salt formation where the risk to man as a consequence of the emplacement
 
of radioactive waste would be insignificant.
 
Sincerely,
 
Alex F. Perge
 
Senior Technical Assistant
 
Division of Waste Management,
 
Production and Reprocessing
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SRGUNITED STATES 
0' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
I. A .- WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 
Dr. T. D. English
 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
 
California Institute of Technology
 
Pasadena, California
 
Dear 	Dr. English:
 
This confirms our phone converstion of the 7th. During that
 
conversation, I made the following observations on your document
 
5030-90.
 
1. 	The discussion of INEL's experience in calcining liquid
 
waste and spent fuel storage did not appear to reflect
 
the relative status accurately.
 
*2. 	The discussion of thermal effects resulting from the
 
emplacement of waste in a repository did not include
 
a far field consideration. (I have arranged for a copy
 
of our limited study in this area to be sent to you.)
 
3. 	The discussion on page 6-44 regarding near surface heat­
sink storage suggested technical limitations, and did
 
not reflect-that possibility that avoidance of this
 
option may well be a political or legal (patent) question.
 
4. 	The discussion on page 7-5 regarding NRC's ownership of
 
fuel did not include an explanatory statement about the
 
existence of a typographical error in the rule..
 
5. 	Relative to the statement on page 7-9 regarding NRC
 
hearings delaying operation of a repository, it is
 
my opinion that NRC activities need not act to delay
 
the initiation of operation of a repository. As you
 
noted elsewhere in the report, the major delay appears
 
to be the lack of decisive action by the Federal Govern­
ment.
 
6. 	It seemed to me'that the underlined emphasis on page 8-11
 
tends to bias the reader, before he reads the following
 
qualffying sentences.
 
As I mentioned in our talk, I feel that your study is a very thorough
 
and relatively balanced review of waste management. I hope that the
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California board makes the fullest use of it. I would appreciate
 
receiving several additional copies of it and of your report
 
JPL 77-59, Volumes I and II.
 
Please call on us for futher consultations at any time.
 
Sincerely,
 
5. J. S. Parry 
High-Level and Transuranic 
Waste Branch 
Division of Fuel Cycle
 
and Material Safety
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
WASHINGTON. D.C 20460 
3 NOV 1977
 
Dr. Thomas D. English
 
Project Manager, Nuclear Waste Management
 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
 
California Institute of Technology
 
4800 Oak Grove Drive
 
Pasadena, California 91103
 
Dear Tom:
 
Thank you for the opportunity to review your draft report
 
"An Analysis of the Technical Status of High-Level Radioactive Waste
 
and Spent Fuel Management Systems." The reviewer found it to be a
 
generally thorough and well-written report.
 
There seems to be some problem with the appendices, however.
 
Section 7.3 mentions examining the nuclear waste programs of EPA,
 
NRC-and ERDA and refers to an examination of material from EPA,
 
NRC and ERDA in appendices B, C, and D, but the-draft report contains
 
no appendices C and D, and has a glossary as appendix B. Appendix
 
A is also significantly inferior in quality to the main body of
 
the report.
 
Detailed comments are enclosed. I hope they prove useful to
 
you in preparation of the final report.
 
Sincerely yours,
 
0'.Rowe, Ph.D.
.
 
Deputy Assistant Administrator
 
for Radiation Programs (AW-458)
 
Enclosure
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Comments on Draft JPL Report "An Analysis of the Technical Status
 
of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management Systems"
 
1. This draft report provides too little discussion of disposal
 
alternatives other than geologic isolation in bedded salt, and of
 
containing media other than borosilicate glass. Approaches which might

be given serious consideration by other countries, such as disposal in
 
rock in the seabed, should be treated more extensively.
 
2. Some remark should be added to the summary with regard to the
 
reasons for the emphasis in this report on deep geologic isolation in
 
bedded salt and on borosilicate glass as the containing medium for
 
high-level waste (HLW), rather than on other potential choices.
 
3. A statement should be added to the Introduction explaining the
 
recent creation of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the dissolving
 
of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and its
 
Office of Waste Isolation (OWl).
 
4. The discussion on page 1-4 should acknowledge that the Nuclear
 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has draft proposed site suitability criteria.
 
5. Environmental and safety considerations should be specifically
 
addressed in the analysis of major components (referred to in the first
 
complete paragraph, page 2-2), in order to indicate whether they are
 
potential obstacles to successful utilization of the components.
 
6. The discussion in the Introduction of the content of the report's
 
sections refers to the sections by Roman numerals although they are
 
numbered in Arabic numerals, and the numbers do not correspond through­
out. For instance, there is no section IX; section 8 contains the
 
conclusions.
 
7. Some discussion of inconsistencies in the literature with regard
 
to canister spacing and temperature of adjacent salt should be made
 
to indicate the lack of decision on such design considerations.
 
Similarly, the chronology and sequence of operations in the reoository
 
'mine is ill-defined.
 
8. The last paragraph on page 4-1 ascribes too great a thermal power
 
to irradi9'ated fuel "at the time of discharge." The value.given is
 
closer to that at the time of shutdown of the nuclear chain reaction.
 
Section 6.1.1 implies delays of a week or more before discharge.
 
9. The last sentence of the second paragraph on page 4-4 is misleading
 
with regard to the importance of corrosion products; Table 4-1 to
 
which it refers indicates that the nickel, chromium and iron make up
 
only 1.4% of the weight of the HLW.
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10. With regard to section 4.4.1, some explanation should be provided
 
for the decision to keep the growth of nuclear capacity in the analysis
 
the same regardless of the decision about reprocessing..
 
11. Some of the figures andIblds should be labeled more thoroughly.
 
One example is Figure 4-7 which has units of MTU but is entitled
 
"Cumulative Liquid High-Level Waste...." Another example is Table 4-5
 
which is titled "Generation of Solidified High Level Waste Fuel
 
Reprocessed (MT)" but does not indicate what form of material is
 
referred to, i.e. whether it is MT of glass containing HLW or something
 
else.
 
12. Quantities quoted are not consistent throughout; compare pages
 
4-5 and 5-1.
 
13. The discussion on page 5-26 on the extrapolation of leach-rate
 
information ispoor and illogical.
 
14. Itis asserted on page 8-3 that 23 wt % waste oxides in glass is
 
optimum, but it is asserted on page 5-28 that 28 wt % is optimum.
 
15. Section 5.2.3.4.3 refers to a conclusion indicating ambiently
 
stored cansiters should not be subsequently stored inwater. This
 
implies that perhaps they should also not be stored in geologic media
 
where they will be exposed to water if continued retrievability is
 
desired.
 
16. Figure 5-15 gives no indication of the on-site storage of the
 
mined rock or salt from the waste storage areas. The accompanying
 
text (page 5-37) implies that itwill not be left at the site (inthat
 
the support buildings"...will be the only visible evidence of the
 
repository.") Some indication should be given of the plans for ship­
ment and disposal of what is obviously more than 197,000 cubic meters
 
of material. This is partially acknowledged in section 5.3.4.1.2.
 
17. On page 5-38, reference is made to sealing the repository when it
 
is full; some estimate should be made of the year inwhich this will occur.
 
18. The argument at the bottom of page 5-38 suggests that a plurality
 
of significant expenditures is of less concern than a single significant
 
expenditure.
 
19. Some discussion should be included in Section 5.3.4 of the
 
potential for chemical, thermal, and mechanical effects of the HLW on
 
salt to affect the mode and duration of operation of a repository. The
 
text, particularly that at the bottom of page 5-45, implies that the
 
repository design is to be such that it can stand open with minimal
 
maintenance for decades. The required behavior of the salt for this
 
mode of operation should be considered in view of the potential effects
 
of the HLW on the salt behavior.
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20. With regard to scenario (2)in section 5.3.4.1.5, it is not clear
 
that displacement upward of the disposal horizon is necessary if a
 
combination of adequate water supply and sufficient fault action occurs.
 
21. Section 6.1 contains a wealth of unnecessary detail.
 
22. The reason "Because of the -negligible particulate activity 
available for release, ... " given at the bottom of page 6-28, seems 
incorrect considering the source is impacted spent fuel. The presence 
of media and systems which will retain the material appears to be a 
better argument. 
23. Some of the design features for spent fuel disposal appear unneces­
sarily costly compared to those for HLW from reprocessing. An example
 
is the canister wall thickness of 3 cm stainless steel for the spent
 
fuel (page 6-49) compared to 1.3 cm for the HLW from reprocessing.
 
Similarly, the need for the repository vault to be 6.4 meters high to
 
accommodate placing canisters only 4 meters long is not apparent. Also,
 
the difference'in canister diameters would be unlikely to influence
 
the mine shaft diameter appreciably.
 
24. Section 6.4.4.3 contains a comparison of the spent fuel activity
 
at different times to the radium-226 activity in the original uranium
 
ore; this comparison in curies is incorrect because the ore commonly
 
contains not just uranium and radium but all the other radioactive
 
products of the decay of uranium.
 
25. Section 7.3 refers to material in appendixes B, C and D which was
 
not included in the draft report.
 
26. Section 8.4discusses shipment by rail, and then cask requirements.
 
To avoid misunderstanding, the discussion of cask requirements should
 
distinguish between rail casks and truck casks.
 
27. Some reference should be provided for the assertion on page A-7
 
that "...some detectable quantity of radioactivity from every phase
 
of the fuel cycle will appear in air and water", if it applies to a
 
sealed repository functioning as intended.
 
28. In the statement on page A-8 "At present, the radioactivity of
 
this military waste exceeds that of the accumulated commercial waste.",
 
insert "reprocessed" before "commercial." The amount of radioactive
 
waste contained in stored spent fuel is appreciable.
 
29. The example 'using krypton-85 (page A-10) can be faulted for a
 
number of reasons. It is most easily corrected by discussing instead
 
the aspect of the krypton-85 in the air as source of beta radiation
 
irradiating the skin. See NCRP Report No. 44.
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30. The statements on page A-10 with respect to regulation of
 
waste disposal sites and 10 CFR Part 20 may be misleading, in that,
 
although EPA has not yet proposed an environmental radiological

protection standard for management of HLW it is unlikely that the
 
standard when promulgated will permit radiation doses as large
 
as those permitted by 10 CFR Part 20.
 
31. EPA has authority to set generally applicable environmental
 
protection standards.and has used it to promulgate a standard
 
applicable to the operations of the uranium fuel cycle (excluding
 
mining, transportation, and waste). A copy of the standard, 40 CFR
 
Part 190, is enclosed for reference in revising the material at the
 
top of page A-1i.
 
32. On page All, the reference to accidental exposure of human beings
 
should be revised so that it does not indicate that the experiences
 
at Hiroshima were due to an accident.
 
33. On page A-12, delete "(presumably per year)."
 
34. The parenthetical remark at the bottom of page A-14 is seriously
 
in error, because only a minor fraction of the mined uranium is con­
tained in the spent fuel (the rest is enrichment plant tails), because
 
efficient commercial recycling of fission fuels isyet to be satis­
factorily demonstrated and is unlikely to achieve such efficiency, and
 
because some of the uranium is converted into isotopes of uranium and,
 
plutonium which are relatively useless in fission reactors.
 
35. It is not considered likely that repository closure will include
 
intentional collapse of the overlying rock as indicated on page
 
A-16.
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PART VII 
1934­
,ENVIRONMENTAL 
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RADIATION PROTECTION
 
PROGRAMS
 
Environmental Radiation Protection 
Standards for 
Nuclear Power Operations 
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2858 RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Title 41-Protection of Environment lations on May 29, 1975. Letters were Agency has made its intent regarding 
CHAPTER I-ENVIRONMENTAL received from a broad cross-section of realistic implementation clear, as. for ex-
PROTECTION AGENCY representatives of the general public, the ample, in the discussion of these mattersindustry, professional groups, the States, in the Final Environmental Statement 
SUBCHAFOR F-RADIATION PROTECTION and Federal agencies In addition. 17 and will continue to do so if necessary as 
PROGRAMS parties participated in three days of pub- implementation proceeds, to assure that 
IflL ess-SI lichearings and, in many cases, sub- unnecessary conservatism does not occur 
PART 190-ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION mitted extensive additional written testi- In this regard, the NRC has recently 
PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR NU. mony, In all, the contributed record issued a revised set of regulatory guides 
CLEAR POWER OPERATIONS comprises over 3500 pages, Comment let- for light-water-cooled reactors which 
On May 10, 1974. the Environmental ters, a transcript of the public hearing, Implement their announced intent to use 
Protection Agency (EPA) published an and all submitted testimony are avail- the most realistic models available when 
advance notice of intent to propose en- able for viewing and copying iN the adequate experimental data exist to per­avonmenti e proiosen- Agency's Public Information mit a prudent and scientific determina­raditnt Reference 
v fronmental radiation protection stand- Unit, Room 2922, U.S. Environmental tion. These models are intended for use 
ards for theIranium fuel cycle (39 Protection Agency, 401 M Street SW, in Implementing the recently-issued Ap­
1O96) and invited public participation Washington, D.C 20460. The Agency has pendix I to 10 CYOR Part 50. which defines 
On May 29, 1915. ErA proposed regu- considered all of this record in reaching design and operating criteria for single 
ltons setting forth such standards (4 its conclusions for these final regulations reactor units EPA has examined Ap­
23420) pursuant to the Atomic En- At the time these standards were pro- pendix I and the accompanying regula­
ergy Act. as amended, and Reorganiza- posed, EPA released a Draft Environ- tory guides and agrees that they provide 
tion Plan No. 3 of 1970 (35 FR 15623). mental Statement and solicited public the basis for realistic implementation of 
Numerous written comments were re- comments A Final Environmental State- these standards for single reactor units 
ceived, and a public hearing was held on ment is being made available concur- The existence of these requirements, 
March 8-10, 1976 (41 FR 1124 and 41 rently with the promulgation of these coupled with the realization that most 
PR 5349l. standards. This statement contains the existing reactor licenses are for no more 
These regulations setting forth enw- comments received on both the proposed than one or two units on a site. makes it 
ronmental radiation standards are here- standards and the draft statement, and unnecessary, in the Agency's judgment, 
by promulgated in final form. The stand- EPA's response to these comments, Single to reexamine the license conditfons of 
ards specify the levels below, which, copies of the Final Environmental State- these licensees for compatibility with 
normal operations of the uranium fuel ment aid an additional document con- these standards, unless the nearest 
cycle are determined to be environmen- taming EPA's detailed responses to testi- neighboring site covered by this stand­
tally acceptable. A number of changes mony received in connection with the ard is within ten miles In these latter 
have been made in the proposed regu- public hearing are available from the cases small adjustments may be neces­
lations in response to comments received. Director, Criteria and Standalrds Division sary. However, in the vast majority of 
These changes modify and clarify the (AW-460), Office of Radiation Programs, situations, the sum of all reasonably 
areas of applicability of the standards Environmental P ro t e c t1o n Agency. postulable contributions from sources 
and their effective dates, and expand Washington, D.C. 20460. Persons inter- other than the immediate site will be 
the conditions under which vari~ces ested in a summary discussion of the small compared to these standards and 
may be granted. The numerical levels of background, rationale, interpretation, should be ignored in assessing compli­
the standards have been retained as and significance of these standards ance It would not be reasonable to at­
proposed, should consult the notice proposing these tempt to incorporate into compliance 
The Agency has benefited from exten- regulations and, for greater detail, the assessment doses which are small frac­
sive public participation during the Final Environmental Statement tions of the uncertainties associated with 
course of the development of these regu- MAJOR ISSUES RAISED DUaRNG REVIEW the determination of doses from the pri­
lations Sixteen comment letters were mary source of exposure The Agency 
received in response to the Agency's May Three major Issues were raised by has also concluded that. except under 
10, 1974, notice of intentto propose commenters. These werez (1) concern highly improbable circumstances, con­
standards, and 92 comment letters fol- that procedures for implementation of formance to these criteria should provide 
lowing the publication of proposed regu- the standards would be unnecessarily reasonable assurance of compliance with 
- conservative or costly, (21 disagreement these standards for up to five units on a 
I in 'this connection the Agency received over the need for and cost-effectiveness site This conclusion is based, among 
requests on behalf of Allied-General Nuclear of control of environmental releases of other considerations upon realistic con-
Services AGNS) on October 4 and Decem- krypton-85 and other long-lived radio- sideration of anticipated site sizes and 
bar 2. 1976. for a supplemental hearing on nuclides, and (3) disagreement over the the relative location of individual units. 
certain aspects of this rulemaking, on the form of the relationship between effects as well as -the stochastic nature of 
grounds that the Agency is.in part. relying on health and radiation dose assumed in effluent releases. 
upon Information acquired subsequent to deriving these standards. A number of commentel s including the 
the puiblic hearing which. in the view of A large number of commenters ex- NRC, also noted that shutdow~n of nu-
AGNS,would be an essential basis for the 
rulemaking but is erroneous The Agency has pressed the view that implementation clear facilities for minor deviations from 
re,teed the materials submitted in support would lead to more restrictive control of the standards would not be reasohable 
of this request and concluded that they effluents than intended due to the use of The Agency agrees, and notes that the 
%ouldnot provide a sufficient basis for alter- unnecessarily conservative models for use of such an extreme measure is not 
ing its conclusions. A response to new mat- source terms, control capability, and required under present compliance pro­
ters addressed by this material has been environmental transport, and due to re- cedures for licenses issued pursuant to 
appended to the Agency's commentary on quirements for unreasonably large mar- the Atomic Energy Act, and that these 
testimony received in connection vith the public hearing on these standards In addi- gins between normal operating levels regulations do not add such a require­
tion it is noted that the Agency bas pretl- and the standards, especially at sites con- ment A graded scale of action is an ap­
ously 140 FR 23420) made public its intent tatning a number of facilities The au- propriate regulatory response for achiev­to maintain a continuing re'lov thority to regulate fuel cycle facilities 
of the appropriateness of these environmen- under these standards resides in the example, requirements for corrective ac
tel standards m * and to revise them, if Nuclear Regulatory Commission INRC), tlons, appropriate penalties, and, in ex­
. - - . ing conformance. This may include, for 
necessary on the bais of information that or, in some cases, the States. under agree- treme cases, cessation of operations. The 
deselops in the 'Interali' In view of the ments with NBC, The standards have Agency Is confident that the NRC will 
above. the Agency has concluded that it Is been expressed in terms of the dose to implement these standards in such a 
neither necessary nor appropriate to grant
 
now the additional public herring requested members of the public, rather than to
 
We will of course, welcome 'the submission hypothetical receptors. in order to on- reasonable manner. 
courage the use of realistic models by the Some commenters expressed the view of additional factual data on the matters 
concerned as it becomes available regulatory agency In addition, the that it was not feasible to monitor con-
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 42, NO, 9-THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 1977 
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formance with these standards through
the use of environmental measurements 
The Agency agrees that routine monitor-
ing based exclusively upon environment-
al measurements would not be a reason-
able means for assuring conformance 
and the regulations do not contain such 
a requirement. Environmental objectives 
are-generally best achieved through con-
trols exercised at the source. For this 
reason effluent monitoring is generally 
preferable and such measurements, when 
combined with regulatory models for en-
vironmental transport, would provide
quite adequate demonstration of con-
formance with the standards for the 
vast majority of situations, based upon
existing experience. However, since vary-
ing degrees of conservatism and uncer-
tainty exist in all environmental models, 
the Agency believes it will often be ap-
propriate to supplement effluent monitor-
ing with confirming environmental meas-
urements, as is now the regulatory prac-
tice. In the case of light water reactors, 
models and monitoring requirements for 
demonstrating conformance with Appen-
dix I of 10 CPR Part 50 are generally 
adequate for demonstrating conformance 
with these standards Similar models and 
measurements would, in general, be ap-
propriate for most other types of fa-
cIthess. ciliies 
In the special case of possible wind-
blown effluents from mill tailings, the 
existence of operational measures (e g.,than an order of magnitude lower thantemporary or permanent stabilization) limting costs now specified in regula-
should normally be the criterion used for 
verifying compliance, in lieu of effluent 
and environmental monitoring, because 
of the difficulty associated with such 
measurements. It should be noted that 
doses resulting from exposure to radondose resltinexservative
and Its daughters, which are discharged
from a mill site (or result from material
which has been discharged), are ex-
eluded, but that gamma radiation cross-
ing site boundaries from -any on-site 
source is covered. 
In situations where members of the 
public are actually exposed, these stand-
ards, in effect, preempt those regulationswhihare aseffdt thsepe eraglRaios
hic  are b sed upon the Fed ral Radia- 
tion Protection Guides (25 FR 4402) in-
sofar as of the public is dueexposure lower risk estimates based upon atoroeratos dex to e uicude insuppliers. The Agency, therefore, believes behef that dose-rate dependent phenom­re
to operations defined to be nmcluded in that 1983 is an achievable implementa­
the uranium fuel cycle For example, the 
dose limits in 10 CR Part 20 would not 
be the limiting consideration regarding 
exposure of members of the public as a 
result of uranium fuel cycle operations
These standards do not, however, replace 
application of the Radiation Protection 
Guides to the regulation of sources notincluded within the seop of teuraniu mcucih h cpe of the uranim 
fuel cycle Finally, the graded scale of
actionsastestablished  h   in 1 9 6 1 (2re6 P R9057) 57 
for use in implementing the Radiation 
Protection Guides do noof m-premeittn sof not apply to 
plementtion of these standards, but
would remain in effect for implementa-
tion of radiation protection guides for 
other radiation sources 
Several commenters expressed the view 
that a requirement for control of the un-
restricted release of krypton to the eii-
vironment from fuel cycle operations 
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was: (a) beyond the jurisdiction of EPA, (b) unreasonably costly, (c)not achiev-
able by 1983, the proposed inplementa-
tion date (or, in the view of some corn-
menters, was achievable prior to 1983), 
or (d)not a reasonable requirement of 
domestic industry until international 
agreements are achieved to restrict emis-
sions from foreign sources 
The Agency has concluded that its jurisdiction is clear. Reorganization Plan 
No. 3 of 1970 specifically transferred to 
EPA from the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion the authority to establish standards 
for "...quantities of radioactive ma-
terals in the environment - * " and 
attaches no conditions to this authority 
except a requirement that the standards 
apply outside the boundaries of licensees. 
EPA has carefully reexamined the 
costs of control systems for krypton and 
has concluded that a substantial portion 
of the additional costs presented at the 
public hearings js correct. This analysis 
is renewed in the Final Environmental 
Statement. However, in spite of these in-
creased costs, the installation of con-
trols for krypton-85 is believed to be justified by the public health benefits 
achievable In today's dollars, the cost 
per unit radiation dose reduction at fu-
ture reprocessing facilities will be $50-$7 Permanren, fr whle odydos$75 per an-rem for whole body doses, 
and considerably less than this for doses 
to other organs. These values are more 
tmns governing the licensing of individ-
ual nuclear power reactors. It is recog-
mnzed that the cost of retrofitting efacility which is expected to be in opera-
tion before 1983 will involve greater 
costs, and the regulatory agency is n-fro
couraged to explore means to mininize 
costs to this facility in its implementa-tion of the standard for this pilot case. 
Regarding the achievability of control 
over the release of krypton-85 to the en-
vironment by 1983, it is noted that this 
or similar contiol technology is already
being offered commercially for nuclear 
reactors and fuel reprocessing facilities,and is currently being installed, or is on addition to risk Estimates based upon theor er, at several 13 S. reactors and ataadiontrskeimesbedunth 
foreign fuel reprocessig faciity by U.S. National Academy of Sciences report, 
forsome 
ion date However, a more accelerated ena exist for low linear energy transfer 
sceueradiation (ganna rays and beta par­
schedule s not considered justified, in ticles) which reduce the carcinogenic 
ew of the small amount of reprocessing

loctlek of operating experience with 
present
krypton controls 
Finally, we have examined arguments
concerning the need for internatmnal 
areetpirt h salsieto 
establis ent of 
si e l y s v l 
sie EPA fully supports the development
international agreements, and is pres-
standardsE A andf do notp o find them persua- t t h d p m n 
ently participating in the development ofinternational guidance for control of
radioactive effluents from the fuel cycle
under the auspices of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. A number of 
countries are already committed to or 
are in the process of committing them-
selves to control of krypton releases The 
Agency supports this trend and has con-
,iut, That the control of U.S. releases 
- i . pton-85 is warranted on the basis 
of reducing its potential worldwide pub­
lichealth Impact. In initiating a require­
ment for this control, the United States 
fulfills its iesponsibility, as the world's 
largest user of nuclear power, to pro­
vide leadership in this matter. 
A number of commenters suggested 
that the proposed regulations should be 
amended to include standards for car­
bon-14 and, in some cases, other long­
lived radionuclides The Agency has 
studies of sources and controls for these 
materials underway and anticipates that 
proposals for appropriate environmental 
standards for carbon-14 can be made 
shortly, with consideration of proposals 
for other materials following at a later 
date. However,the knowledge base is not 
yet sufficien to permit incorporation into 
Comments were received reflecting 
many points of view on health effects is­
sues One group agreed with the Agency's 
prmr rne o i rik e Aecpro 
vided by the recent report to EPA of the 
National Academy of Sciences ("The 
Effects oPopulations of Exposureto Low 
Levels of Ioniuation" Report of the Ad­
vsof onittee ot oegA
 
visory Committee on the Biological 
Effects of Ionizing Radiation, NAS-NRC,
1972). These estimates are primarilybased upon a linear interpolation be­
tween existing data on human popula­
tions and the assumption of no effects at 
zeo dse Aother gr o evects
model s not sufhicenrly conservative to 
adequately protect public health, based 
upon several investigators' hypotheses 
concerg the sao thotse­
concerni t seo thdo up 
relationship at low doses. A third group 
believed these estimates to be too con­
at low doses and low dose-ratesFre tr en ws bys ad te
 
Frequent reference was made by thethird group to a report of the NationalCouncil on Radiation Protection and 
Measurements (Report No 43) which 
implies that radiation standards should 
nqt be based upon numerical estimates 
of health effects, and a recent report of 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NUREG-75/014) which presents, in 
effect of radiation to levels lower than 
those predicted by the linear model. TheAgency has examined the evidence for
each of the above ews and concluded 
that while each may have validity under 
various assumptions or for various spe­
cific situations, the weight of currently
available scientific evidence supports the 
continued use of a linear. nonthreshold 
model for deriving standards to protect public health 
Chanqes M de in the Proposed Regu­
latmis 
A numbei of changes have been made 
in response to comments received on the 
plioposed iegulations The foiloaing de­
sc ibes and pro ides the i easons for each 
of these changes. 
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2860 RULES AND REGULATIONS 
1. Paragraph, 190 02(b) has been standards would occur in such cases to the Agency and NRC that a four-year
changed to delete transportation as an a degree that the added risk to the gen- implementation period is required at
operation covered by these standards and eral public is small and the environ- mills, rather than the three years pro.
to specIfically exclude waste dislosal mental effect is acceptable in comparison vided for all other fuel cycle operations.
sites, which were previously not men- to the economic penalty that would be 7. Section 190 12(b) has been changed
tioned. The Agency is addressing the de- associated with cessation of operation to clarify the Agency's original xnwnt 
veloprient of critena and standards for or the anticipated public health and en- that the standards specified in para­
management of radioactive wastes as a virormental impact of available alterna- graph 190 10(b apply to radioactive ma­
separate matter, as mentioned in the no- tive sources of power. For this reason, terials produced after the effective date
tice proposing these standards. . the variance provision has been broad- The Agency anticipates that pronul-A number of commenters, including the ened so that the regulatory agency may. gation of these standards will serve, In 
NRC and the Department- of Trans- if.it deems it to be in the public interest, addition to providing for necessary pro­
portaton, pointed out the difficulty of grant a variance in such situations It tection of public health, to alleviate some 
implementing these standards for trans- should be noted, however, that the vari- of the uncertainties associated with theportation activities, particularly noting ance provision applies only to temporary design of environmental controls for fuel
the problems near nuclear facilities, and unusual situations. It is expected cycle facilities, and the consequent eco-In such cases an apportionment of that continued operation under the vari- nomic penalties, through stabilizing andthe dose limits would appear to be neces- ance provision will be predicated upon providing direction to the process of de­
sary in order to avoid unreasonably ex- an approved plan to achieve compliance velopment of standards and regulations.
tensive monitoring requirements for in an expeditious fashion, that is. in as The economic and inflationary impacts
members of the public. Since studies short a time as is reasonably achievable, of these regulations have been evaluatedby both EPAand NRC show that most The requirement for public docunen- in accordance with Executive Order
transportation-related doses are tation of variances has been clarified andex- 11821 and it has been determined that anpected .to remain at small fractions of extended to apply to this broadened pro- Inflation Impact Statement is not re­these standards in any case, the.imple- vision. EPA will not review individual quired (The estimated annual cost of
mentation difficulty does not appear to variances or compliance plans, which additional effluent controls required by
warrant their inclusion in these stand- will be made public in accordance with these regulations is in no case greater
ards limiting doses to individuals from the provisions of paragraph 190.11(b). than ten to twenty million dollars. which
uranium fuel cycle operations. The but will maintain a general overview is significantly less than the one.hun-Agency will instead address this matter through periodic review of the use of dred million dollar annual cost cut-off,
under its broad authority inherited from this Section, established as the minimum for whichthe former Federal Radiation Council. 6. Section 190.12(a) has been changed an Inflation Impact Statement is re­through the development of more gen- to provide that the effective date for the quired.)
eral guidance to all Federal agencies con- standards limiting doses to individuals Notice is hereby given that pursuant to
cerning radiation exposure arising from shall be December 1. 1979. for all opera- theAtomicEnergy Actof 1954. as amend­
the transportation of all types of radio- tions except the milling of uranium ore. ed. and Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
active materials, not just those from the for which the effective date shall be 1970 Title 40. Chapter 1. of the Code of
uranium fuel cycle. December 1,1980. Federal Regulations is amended by add­2. Paragraph 190 02(d) is changed to The NRC has carefully examined its ing a new Subchapter F and Part 190 as
reflect the definition of"site" implied by existing programs for implementation of set forth below.
Reorganization Plan No 3of 1970. Appendix I at light-water-cooled reac- Dated: December 28, 19763. Paragraph 190 02(f) is changed by tors, and the feasibility of integrating
adding the word "spontaneously" to re- implementation of these standards into RUSSELL E. TRAIN,flect the Agency's original intent, that on-going process, as well as, i Administrator.4 Paragraph r90 02(g) is deleted and parallel, implementing these standards A new Subchapter F, consisting of Part
subsequent paragraphs in Section 190 02 at other types of fuel cycle facilities 190. is added to 40 CFR Chapter I as 
are renumbered. This paragraph defined through development and Promulgation follows:
uranium ore as ore contamingo.O5% or of new regulatory guides and individual SUBCHAPTER F-RADIATION PROTECTION 
more uranium by weight AS pointed out license conditions Finally, there are PROGRAMSby one commenter, it is not desirable to matters regarding reactors which will PART 190-ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATIONexclude ores containing less than this require generic treatment, such as the PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR NUjquantity of uranium, since future conditions required for compliance when CLEAR POWER OPERATIONSdemand for ore may make the use of there are multiple units on single sites. SubprtA-Gnerai Proisloni
such ores economically feasible It is the conclusion of the NRC, and the 
5. Section 190.11 has been broadened Agency concurs, that the originally pro- Sec 
to permit a greater degree of discretion posed two-year implementation period is 19001 Applicability.
to the regulatory agency to develop and insufficent and that three years will be 19002 Definitions
apply conditions for the granting of var- required to complete this process. The Subpart B-Envronmental Standards for the 
mances As pointed out by a number of NRC review of these matters regarding Uranium Fuel Cycle
commenters, it is not reasonable to prod- implementation has revealed that the 100 10 Standards for normal operations.icate the justification for variances solely case of mills is unique, since better in- 19011 Variances for unusual operations 
on public need for orderly delivery of formation is required concerning a num- 190 12 Effective date. 
power. 'For example, a facility may have ber of alternatives for stabilization of ArHorerry: Atomic Energy Act or 1954, atinstalled a control system which, in spite tailings-both as to their relative merit amended: Reorganization Plan No 3. of 1970
of good faith Performance on the part and the degree of eriodic maintenance Subpart A-General Provisions
of the supplier and the user. may fall required. On June 3. 1976. the NRC pub­to achieve operational capability on a lished (41 PR 22430) a notice of intent § 190.01 App icribilitv.timely basis, or. once installed may ex- to prepare a generic environmental The provisions of this Part apply to ra­
perience operational failure at some statement on uranium milling opera- diation doses received by members of thetime, yet operation of the facility may tions This effort will be completed in public in the general environment and to
not be essential to the "orderly delivery approximately two years. and includes radioactive materials introduced into the

of electrical Powen" In addition, some field measurements with participation of general environment as the result of op­portions of this standard are predicated both EPA and NRC personnel. In addi- erations which are part of a nuclear fuel
 
upon the use of waste treatment systems tion, the NRC Issued proposed new efflu- cycle.

not yet in general commercial use. Al- ent reporting requirements at mills on

though in no case should opeation con- November 17. 1975 (40 Ph 53230). In t 190.02 Definitlions.

tinue if safety is compromised, it may view of the, above considerations 
 it is (a I "Nucleai fuel cycle" means the op­
easily be that excursions above these the jointly agreed upon conclusion of erations defined to be associated with the 
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production of electrical power for public
use by any fuel cycle through utilization 
of nuclear energy
(b)"Uranium fuel cycle" means the
operations of milling of uranium ore,
chemical conversion of uranium. isotopic
enrichment of uranium, fabrication of 
uranium fuel, generation of electricity by
a hght-water-cooled nuclear power plant
using uranium fuel, and reprocessing of 
spent Uranium fue, to the extentonaoprodutin
these directly supportt the 
poer foelectrcal publicusutilizing
electrical Power for publicu e utilizing
nuclear-

erations, operations at waste disposal
sites, transportation of any radioactive 
material in support of these operations,
and the reuse of recovered non-uranium 
special nuclear and by-product materials 
from the cycle. 
(ct "General environment" means the 
total terrestrial, atmospheric and aquatic
environments outside sites upon which 
any operation which is part of a nuclear 
fuel cycle is conducted. 
(d)"Site" means the area contained 
within the boundary of a location under
the control of persons possessing or using
radioactive material on which is con-
ducted one or more operations covered 
by this Part 
(e)"Radiation" means any or all of
the follo ing' alpha, beta, gamma, or X-
rays; neutrons; and high-energy elec- tivities to assure compliance with such 
trons, protons, or other atomic particles:but not sound or radio waves, nor visible,infrared, or ultraviolet light 
"Radioactive materil" 

material which spontoneously emits 
radiation 
(g) "Curie" (Ci) means that quantity
of radioactive material producing 37 bil-
hon nuclear transformations per second,
'One milicurie (mCi) =0 001 Ci.) 
(h "Dose equivalent" means theproduct of absorbed dose and appropriatefactors to account for differences in blo-
77-69 
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logical effectiveness due to the quality
of radiation and its spatial distribution 
in the body. The unit of dose equivalent
is the "rein." (One millirem (Ltrer)0.001 rem.) 
(i)"Organ" means any human organ
exclusive of the dermis, the epidermis. 
or the cornea,(j) "Gigawatt-year" refers to the 
quantity of electrical energy produced at 
the busbr of a generating station A gig-of a gonertin satn A gig-

awatt is equal to one billion watts. A gig-awatt-year is equivalent to the amount 
of energy output represented by an av-
erage electric power level of one gigawatt
sustained for one year. 
ik) "Member of the public" means 
any individual that can receive a radi-
ation dose in the general environment,
whether he may or may not also be ex-posed to radiation in an occupation m-
sociated with a nuclear fuel cycle How-
ever, an individual is not considered a
member of the public during any period
in which he is engaged in carrying out 
any operation which is part of a nuclear 
fuel cycle
(1)"Regulatory agency" means the 
the government agency responsible for 
issuing regulations governing the use of 
sources of radiation or radioactive ma-
terials or emissions therefrom and car-
rying out inspection and enforcement ac-
regulations. 
Subpart B-Environmental Standards for 
tf) FuelCycle 
§ 190.10 Standards for normal opera-
lions, 
Operations covered by this Subpart
shall be conducted in such a manner as to 
provide reasonable assurance that: (a) The annual dose equivalent does 
not exceed 25 millrems to the wholebody, 75 millirems to the thyroid, and 25
millireins to any other organ of any 
member of the public as.the result of ex­
posures to planned discharges of .adio­
active materials, radon and its daugh­
.ters excepted, to the general environmentfrom uranium -fuel cycle operations and 
to radiation from these operations.(b The total quantity of radioactive 
materials entering the general 'environ.. 
ment from the entire uranium fuel cycle. 
per gigawatt-year of electrical energy
produced by the fuel cycle, contains lessthan 50,000 curies of krypton-85. 5 muli­
crocuries of iodine-129, and 0 5 millicuries 
combined of plutonium-239 and other
alpha-emitting transuranic radlonuclides 
with half-lives greater than one year. ­
§ 190-11 Variances for unusual opera­
lion., 
The standards specified in 9 190.10 maybe exceeded if: ­(a) .The regulatory agency has granted 
a variance based upon its determination 
that a temporary and unusual operating

condition exists and continued operation

Is in the public interest, and
 
(b)Information is promptly made a 
matter of public record delineating the 
nature of unusual operating conditions. 
the degree to which this operation is ex­
pected to result in levels in excess of the 
standards, the basis of the variance, and 
the schedule for achieving conformance 
with the standards. 
§'190.12 "Effeethe date.
 
(a) The standards in§ 190 10(a) shallhe effective December 1,1079, except thatfor doses arising from operations associ­
ated with the milling of uranium ore the 
effective date shall be December 1. 1980. 
(h)The standards in 190.10(b) shallbe effective December 1,1979, except that 
the standards for krypton-a5 and iodine­
129 shall be effective January 1, 1983, for 
any such radioactive materials generatedby the fission process after these datesfVR Doc.77-399 Filed 1-12-77;8.45 am) 
I F 
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA-THE RESOURCES AGENCY - EDMUND G. BROWN JR., Oo,.rno 
ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION -
AND. DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION 
1111 HOWE AVENUE 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 738M 
(916) 322-6925
 
October 18, 1977
 
Dr. Thomas Siglish
 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
 
California Institute of Technology
 
Pasadena, California
 
Dear Tom:
 
The Safety and Compliance Office (SCO) Staff have performed a cursory
 
review of your report entitled "An Analysis of the Technical Status
 
of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management Systems,"
 
dated September 16, 1977. The staff have no substantive comments to
 
offer.
 
The evaluation of the health and safety aspects of the back-end of
 
any fuel cycle is a complex problem. The problem is compounded in
 
the nuclear industry because of the extreme sensitivity associated
 
with the risk to the public health and safety due to long-lived radio­
nuclides. It is anticipated that your report, and in particular sections
 
4 through 7,will be'used by the Nuclear Assessments Office as source
 
material in evaluating probabilities of potential accidents, and the
 
consequences of these potential accidents. As the SCO staff understands,
 
the findings from the report will be the bases for the NAO's brief to
 
the Commission on whether the United States through its authorized
 
agencies has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or
 
means for the disposal of high-level nuclear (commercial) wastes.
 
For the above reasons we believe that your report presents pertinent
 
information that should be helpful in the Commission's deliberations.
 
Sincerely,
 
Kenneth GolliheA#4'<
 
Nuclear £ngineer
 
KG:rp
 
cc: Frank Hahn
 
Larry Welsh
 
Darrel Woo
 
Gary Simon
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA-THE RESOURCES AGENCY 	 EDMUND G BROWN JR, Governor 
ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION 
1III HOWE AVENUE T 19770 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95825 
(916) 	322-2038
 
October 7, 1977
 
Dr. Thomas English
 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
 
4800 Oak Grove Drive
 
Pasadena, CA 91103
 
Dear Tom:
 
Enclosed are the comments of the Nuclear Assessments Office on the draft
 
waste analysis report produced under our contract. Other comments may
 
come to you separately from the Siting Division, the Energy Assessments
 
Division, or the Commissioners. We have not included the comments of .the
 
other divisions at this time in order to reduce the time lag in undertaking
 
revisions.
 
The basic problem with the report is that except in minor respects there is
 
no insightful analysis -- there is little eialuation of 	data and experimen­
tation, no questioning of underlying assumptions or approaches, and incor­
poration of conclusions of other reports without an independent check on
 
the validity of those conclusions. In the section on spent fuel storage,
 
major parts of the discussion and analysis are lifted wholesale from the
 
G.E. Morris Consolidated Safety Analysis Report with little attempt to
 
evaluate this information critically or seek other views.
 
This type of an approach, therefore, misses the whole point of what a
 
"technical assessment" is intended to be. We believed a more penetrating
 
analysis was well within the capabilities of JPL, considering the level
 
of effort devoted to the project, and still maintain that belief. What
 
a technical assessment requires is not merely a recitation of statements
 
from two dozen references but thought as to what those statements mean,
 
whether they are adequate, where the holes might be, what is left unre­
solved, whether experiments have resolved what the authors say is resolved,
 
whether a report's conclusions are supported by its contents, mechanisms
 
which might have been overlooked, and so forth. Our general feeling about
 
your report is therefore one of disappointment.
 
We have had many discussions, including the one of May 27 where we expressed
 
the same concern that too little evaluation was being done. We are appre­
ciative of the additional details in this version of the report but had
 
expected more from the effort undertaken.
 
The problem of too little evaluation comes up most clearly when a statement
 
of the form "on the basis of an extensive review at (blank) these problems
 
are considered resolved." Considered by whom to be resolved? Who did the
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review? Was the review adequate? How was this established? What have
 
others concluded? Overall, generalizations or conclusions of this type
 
just do not appear to be justified or supported by the data in the draft
 
report. It would be much more accurate to say "on the basis of an exten­
sive review, the (blank) national lab reported their conclusions that the
 
problem was resolved; JPL has not independently evaluated this work," if
 
in fact that is the case.
 
The report also has some problems in overall approach. The evaluative
 
framework, as to what is and is not included in each of the three stages,
 
is not consistent throughout. The approach in Section 3 (pp. 3-2, 3-3)
 
runs into inconsistencies on p. 3-12 and especially p. 6-44. Some re­
thinking,is required. Second, a very narrow (and, according to Carl
 
Kuhlman, inadequate) definition of HLW is used which leads to some logic­
problems. Bullard's Appendix A recognizes the definitional problem and
 
avoids the problem of the rest of the text.
 
In details, the report needs more documentation and elaboration. The lack
 
of page references is annoying and, as Charles Miller and I have discussed,
 
should be corrected.
 
There seem to be two sections missing which were included in the August
 
draft and still listed on p. 6-42, "The RSSF Syndrome" and "ERDA Contra­
dictions." We would hope to see these restored.
 
There are also several sweeping statements in the report which do not seem
 
well backed-up, e.g.:
 
p. 5-38 In reference to Project Salt Vault, "...the events that
 
followed indicate that the-decision was scientifically
 
and politically premature."
 
p. 5-50 "...any models that have been constructed are extremely 
simplistic, and cannot be used to make credible predic­
tions." 
While these statements may be true, as they are in the report they leap out
 
at the reader starkly with little accompanying justification. The two state­
ments quoted above will likely be very controversial. Your position must be
 
fortified and, if it cannot, then modified.
 
The bulk of our comments are presented as marginalia to the text and they
 
cover everything from minute details to broad commentary. Certain other
 
general comments are attached as a separate piece.
 
If you believe a conference on these comments is in order, we would be 
pleased to oblige. We believe our comments will lead to a much-improved 
document and would hope you agree. 
Sincerely yours,
 
GARY 	SIMON
 
cc: 	 Rhoads Stephenson Nuclear Assessments Office
 
Jim Walker
 
Lloyd Forrest
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GENERAL COMMENTS ON "AN ANALYSIS OF THE TECHNICAL
 
STATUS OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT FUEL
 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS," JPL 5030-90
 
Page 1-4, Paragraph 2
 
There are two assumptions in this paragraph:
 
1. 	Scientific investigations will produce a feasible answer to waste dis­
posal.
 
2. 	The "hydrogeological" uncertainties are the major problems with this
 
segment of the fuel cycle.
 
The fact that the time limitations are very real may prove to be a signifi­
cant problem in seeking an answer through scientific investigations, and
 
there are other uncertainties which are as real as the "hydrogeological"
 
uncertainties. For example, site selection may turn out to be an increasingly
 
real problem in the face of state opposition. Another problem is long range
 
predictability in the geologic environment.
 
Section 5.3, Deep Geologic Isolation in Bedded Salt
 
The major concern in this section is with the hydrology of the site and its
 
possible connection with transport of wastes from the repository. Nowhere
 
does this section deal with problems of stability (tectonic) and seismic
 
hazard.
 
Page 5-40, Paragraph 3
 
This paragraph gives a simplistic view of the virtues of a bedded salt
 
deposit forthe disposal of nuclear waste. Indeed it speaks well for such
 
a soluble substance to be sitting around, i.e., the lack of circulating
 
groundwater, which is considered the chief transporting agent for radio­
nuclides. However, more should be learned about the nature of the cracks
 
that apparently "heal" so easily. For example, one area of future research
 
might include the development of a salt dome from a bedded salt deposit.
 
At what stage do the cracks become large enough to facilitate movement of
 
the 	salt upward?
 
Page 5-44, "Weakest Links"
 
There is no mention of the full scope of the study undertaken, and therefore
 
to discuss only the weakest links is not as enlightening as it may seem.
 
What are the actual strengths in the site selection and evaluation criteria
 
as determined by OWl? It does not speak well that the "weakest" aspects of
 
the 	process are all related to the hydrology. If we recognize salt as a
 
good repository medium due to its dryness, it is particularly bad that we
 
cannot characterize the site hydrology well enough to insure that state.
 
As an analogy, it would be like promoting a restaurant based on the quality
 
of its chef and not being able to insure the chef would be there next month
 
...would you still want to go next month?
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Point (3) "extrapolation..." seems unrealistic. I am not sure geologists
 
have the capability to predict anything over one million years.
 
Page 5-46, Project Salt Vault
 
The information regarding Project Salt Vault should be made much clearer.
 
It seems that a project which fails must have in it some basic misconception
 
in its assumptions. To then say that the results of that project are still
 
valuable sources of information could be a mistake. Someone must pour through
 
the proceedings and try to discover why it failed before the information
 
generated can be labelled reliable.
 
Page 5-48, Pararaph3
 
I.disagree that "analysis of potential effects.. .is very much site specific."
 
Certainly to the extent that each site is slightly different chemically this
 
is true; however, to put off experimentation seems short-sighted. Experimen­
tation with salt of varying compositions at this state could build a factual
 
base for aiding in site selection.
 
Page 5-49, Section 5.3.4.1.5
 
Given the importance of this type of prediction, I think the fact that the
 
"data base... is at present inadequate to model the present and future ground­
water regimes" is a very significant observation. It seems from this state­
ment that really the data base should be used as a major "weak link" in
 
discussing geologic storage.
 
Page 5-50, Section 5.3.4.2
 
On page 1-4 it was stated that the hydrogeological uncertainties could be
 
solved by scientific investigations now existing or in the planning stages.
 
It seems from this statement that this is the only large issue left. However,
 
in section 5.3.4.2 we learn that engineering achievability, a major part of
 
the evaluation attempted by this study, is still non-existent due to the lack
 
of a reliable data base. I would then conclude that the actual engineering
 
of the repository might be another "weakest link."
 
Section 6, Spent Fuel Storage and Disposal
 
1. 	Parts 6.1.1 - 6.1.2 are rewritten from the San Onofre FSAR (Ref. 6-1).
 
This very narrow 'discussion of refueling at one particular type of
 
reactor does not contribute significantly to an analysis of spent fuel
 
handling.
 
2. 	The following part (6.1.3) is far more relevant but needs expansion.
 
Sources should be given for the figures on length of pool storage (we
 
were given different ones in the hearings).
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The discussion of spent fuel storage capacity demand and projections is
 
very thin. There is no comparison of ERDA and AIF projections, and no
 
explanation of the potential significance of encroachment on full-core
 
reserve capacity or reload discharge capacity.
 
3. 	An overall shortcoming here and throughout most of the section is the
 
inadequate documentation. Even if just one document is used, page
 
numbers should be specified.
 
4. 	The description of independent spent fuel pool storage consists almost
 
entirely of a summary of selected portions of the G.E. Morris CSAR
 
(Ref. 6-15). This does not constitute an analysis of generic concerns
 
associated with independent pool storage.
 
5. 	One significant piece of data in the CSAR was entirely omitted. The
 
"cask tilt" accident with liner penetration should have been examined
 
for its possible significance for accident analysis. Was this accident
 
anticipated in any fault-tree or other type of analysis? At which
 
points did water losses exceed the capacity of pumps to maintain water
 
level or get rid of excess water? Ignoring this incident while using
 
much of the other information in the CSAR is extremely inconsistent.
 
6. 	The section on SURFF is the best part of the chapter in terms of inde­
pendent analysis. There was some over-reliance on the Technical Alter­
natives Document, and more information on the ongoing research programs
 
and the Canadian experience would have been useful. The "Issues" section
 
was very good, except that two of the four issues (Xhe RSSF Syndrome and
 
ERDA Contradictions) were apparently dropped, Will these be put back in?
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SWEDISH EMBASSY ADDRESS SWEDISH EMBASSA 
600 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE N W 
OFF[CE OF THE SCIENTIFIC COUNSELOR WASHINGTONU SA 0 C 20037 
TELEPHONE (202) 965.4100 
TELEGRAM SVENSK WASHINGTON 
TELEX RCA 248347 
WU 09.2724 
October 11, 1977
 
OCT L3 191,Dr. Thomas 1). English 
Project Manager
 
Nuclear Waste Management
 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
 
4800 Oak Grove Drive
 
Pasadena, Cal. 91103
 
Dear Tom,
 
I very much appreciate your sending me a copy of your HLW­
management report to the California Energy Commission. You are
 
really doing a very good job in collecting available information
 
in this area in a nutshell; though a very bigand goodtasting nut.
 
You will find enclosed summaries in English of the reports that have
 
been published so far by the Swedish Nuclear Utilities joint
 
nuclear fuel safety project; a project that has been formed in
 
order to-try to provide the necessary information to fulfil the
 
Swedish fuel cycle law enacted last spring (very similar to the
 
California fuel cycle laws of June 1976). I will be happy to send
 
you the full reports (in Swedish) if you find that any are of
 
special interest to you.
 
Please give me a call if you are going to Washington again, and we
 
might get together and talk for a while, without me having to
 
rush like last time.
 
Sincerely yours,
 
Lars-Inge Helander
 
LIg/EJo
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APPENDIX D
 
Assembly Bill No. 2822 
CHAPTER 196 
An act to add SLction 25524.2 to the Public Resources Code, relat­
ing to energy conservation. 
(Approved by Governor June 3,'1976 Filed with 
Secretary of State June 3, 1976 ] 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 2822, Nestande. Nuclear'thermal electric sites. 
Existing law, with prescribed exceptions, confers on the State En­
ergy Resources Conservation and Development Commission the au­
thority to certify thermal powerplants, electrical transmission lines, 
anid their sites. 
This bill would-prohibit any nuclear fission thermal powerplant, 
including those exempted'from certification, from being permitted 
land use in the state or, where applicable, from being certified by the 
commission until the commission finds that there has been devel­
oped and the United States through its authorized agency has ap­
proved and there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the 
disposal of high-level nuclear waste and 100 legislative days have 
passed since such findings of the commissign have been filed with the 
Legislature and neither house of the Legislature has adopted a reso­
lution disapproving such findings. In the event -of passage of such 
resolution, the bill would delineate a procedure for reexamination of 
its findings by the commission, resubmission to the Legislature, and 
certification of nuclear powerplants if the Legislature does not act by 
statute to declare such findings null and void and take appropriate 
action within 100-legislative days of resubmission. 
The bill would require the commission to continue to receive and 
process notices of intention and applications for certification, but 
would prohibit the commission from issuing a decision granting a 
certificate until the requirements of this bill have been met. "Tech­
nology or means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste" would 
be defined by the bill. 
It would specify that for purposes of the provisions of the bill the 
vested right to construct a nuclear thermal powerplant shall exist if, 
prior to the date on which the bill is chaptered, an electric utility has 
performed substantial' construction on such powerplant'and has in­
curred substantial expense for construction and'for necessary materi­
als for such powerplant and would include specific designated 
thermal powerplants and sites within such provision. 
The bill would also specify that it would not become operative if 
Proposition 15 of the June 1976 eledtion is adopted by the people. 
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Ch. 196 -2-
The people of the State ofCalifornia do enactas follows: 
SECTION 1. Section 25524.2 is added to the Public Resources 
Code, to read: 
25524.2. Nonuclear fission thermal powerplant, including any to 
which the provisions of this chapter do not otherwise apply, but 
excepting those exempted herein, shall be permitted land use in the 
state, or where applicable, be certified by the commission until both 
conditions (a) and (b) have been met: 
(a) The commission finds that there has been developed and that 
the United States through its authorized agency has approved and 
there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of 
high-level nuclear waste. 
(b) The commission has reported its findings and the reasons 
therefor pursuant to paragraph (a) to the Legislature. Such reports 
of findings shall be assigned to appropriate policy committees for 
review. The commission may proceed to certify nuclear fission 
thermal powerplants 100 legislative days after reporting its findings 
unless within those 100 legislative days either house of the 
Legislature adopts by a majority vote of its members a resolution 
disaffirming the findings of the commission made pursuant to 
paragraph (a).
 
A resolution of disaffirmance shall set forth the reasons for the 
action and shall provide to the extent possible, guidance to the 
commission as to an appropriate method of bringing the 
commission's findings into conformance with paragraph (a). 
If a disaffirming resolution is adopted, the commission shall 
reexamine its original findings-consistent with matters raised in the 
-resolution.On conclusion of its reexamination, the commission shall 
reduce its findings to writing with the reasons therefor and shall 
transmit-them to the Legislature. 
If the findings are that the conditions of paragraph (a) have been 
met, the commission may proceed to certify nuclear fission thermal 
powerplants 100 legislative days after reporting its findings to the 
Legislature unless within those 100 legislative days both houses of the 
Legislature act by statute to declare the findings null and void ,and 
take appropriate action 
To allow sufficient time for the Legislature to act, the reports of 
findings of the commission shall be submitted to the Legislature at 
least six calendar months prior to the adjournment of the Legislature 
sine die. 
(c) As used in this section, "technology or means for the disposal 
of high-level nuclear waste" means a method for the permanent and 
terminal disposition of high-level nuclear waste. It shall not 
necessarily require that facilities for the application of such 
technology and/or means be available at the time the commission 
makes its findings. Such disposition shall not necessarily preclude the 
possibility of an approved process for retrieval of such waste. 
(d) The commission shall continue to receive and process notices 
ofintention and applications for certification pursuant to this division 
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-3-- Ch. 196 
but shall not issue a decision pursuant to Section 25523 granting a 
certificate until the requirements of this section have been met. All 
other permits, licenses, approvals or authorizations for the entry or 
use of the land, including orders of court, which may be required 
may be processed and granted by the governmental entity 
concerned but construction work to install permanent equipment or 
structures shall not commence until the requirements of this section 
have been met. 
(e) Any nuclear fission powerplant is exempted from the 
provisions of this section if prior to the date on which this section is 
chaptered an electric utility has performed substantial construction 
on such powerplant and has incurred substantial expense for 
construction and for necessary materials for such powerplant, 
including, but not limited to, the following sites and facilities, with 
the associated estimated generating capacities: 
(1) As designated in the report of the Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company submitted to the Public Utilities Commission on 
December 23, 1966, pursuant to Section 1001 of the Public Utilities 
Code, one nuclear thermal powerplant, having a generating capacity 
of 1,060 megawatts, commonly known as Diablo Canyon Unit 1, to be 
located in San Luis Obispo County. 
(2) As designated in the report of the Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company submitted to the Public Utilities Commission on February 
16, 1968, pursuant to Section 1001 of the Public Utilities Code, one 
nuclear thermal powerplant, having a generating capacity of 1,060 
megawatts, commonly known as Diablo Canyon Unit 2, to be located 
in San Luis Obispo County. 
(3) As designated in the report of the Southern California Edison 
Company and the San Diego Gas and Electric Company to the Public 
Utilities Commission on July 16, 1970, pursuant to Section 1001 of the 
Public Utilities Code, two nucledr thermal powerplants, having a 
generating capacity of 1,100 megawatts per unit, commbnly known 
as San Onofre Unit 2 and San Onofre Unit 3, to be located in San 
Diego County.
SEC. 2. The provisions of this act shall not become operative if 
Proposition 15 of the June 1976 election is adopted by the people, 
whether or not this bill is chaptered before or after such adoption. 
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